


IN GOD WE TRUST



BENGHAZI



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HPSCI also reviewed why the IC did not provide an immediate and specific tactical warning of the attacks in Benghazi. Relevant documents confirm that the IC did not possess intelligence indicating planning or intentions for attacks on the Benghazi facility on or about September 11, 2012.⁶⁶ And thus, the IC did not fail to provide such warning. Furthermore, the Committee did not find evidence to suggest the IC could have collected intelligence to warn of the attacks.

After the attacks, CIA reported on September 15, 2012, that [REDACTED], a former Transitional National Council security official in Benghazi, said he received, very shortly before the attacks, information of a possible imminent attack against the TMF and tried to notify the Libyan Intelligence Service the day of the attacks. However, he was unable to make contact and relay the information. CIA's Chief of Tripoli Station sent this information to senior CIA officers on September 16, 2012, including then-Deputy Director Michael Morell. Mr. Morell directed that analysts review the information to determine if there was anything there that would change their assessments of what happened.⁶⁸

This specific report by [REDACTED] to the Libyans—if it even occurred—remains uncorroborated. **Finding #2:** CIA provided sufficient security personnel, resources, and equipment to defend against the known terrorist threat and to enable CIA operations in Benghazi. There is evidence that the CIA turned down requests for additional security resources at the Annex.

An adequate number of highly trained security personnel defended the Annex, which contained physical security features to enable secure CIA operations despite the increased threat in the region. Indeed, CIA security officers demonstrated that capability during the attacks. Security personnel used their vehicles and weapons to simultaneously mount a rescue operation at the Annex also defending the CIA Annex.⁶⁹ Concurrent with both of those operations, CIA deployed a team from Tripoli with additional security officers to rescue Ambassador Stevens and further bolster CIA's defensive capabilities in Benghazi.⁷⁰ Even after the deadly mortar strikes at the Annex, remaining CIA officers at the Annex believed they could continue to defend the Annex without additional support.⁷¹

According to the first of two site vulnerability assessments conducted by the CIA prior to the attacks, the Annex's physical security features included numerous advantages over those of the TMF's lone advantage was that it was larger and was less vulnerable from the street. The distance from the street allowed for added protection from a bomb blast at or near the walls or facilities, and would provide additional time for security officers to respond before attackers could reach the Annex.⁷²

⁶⁶ HPSCI Review of Benghazi Intelligence Review (October 2012 OONI-provided package of 429 intelligence cables, reports, and assessments ranging from February to October 2012).
⁶⁷ CIA Email: "Few Per your request - more explanation on Tripoli Station assessment on attacks".
⁶⁸ CIA Email to SSCI Staff: "Answers to SSCI Benghazi Questions from August 2013," September 6, 2013.
⁶⁹ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 11.
⁷⁰ HPSCI Transcript: "Full Committee Hearing with CIA's former Chief of Benghazi Base," May 22, 2013, pg. 13.
⁷¹ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officer 8," December 13, 2013 pg. 26.
⁷² Benghazi Base, Libya Comparative Analysis: Site Vulnerability, [REDACTED], December 13, 2013 pg. 3-4.

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⁶⁹ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 11.
⁷⁰ HPSCI Transcript: "Full Committee Hearing with CIA's former Chief of Benghazi Base," May 22, 2013, pg. 13.
⁷¹ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officer 8," December 13, 2013 pg. 26.
⁷² Benghazi Base, Libya Comparative Analysis: Site Vulnerability, [REDACTED], December 13, 2013 pg. 3-4.

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the operational buildings.⁷³ According to CIA officers' testimony and documentation, CIA continued to add physical security features to the Annex and upgraded their operational posture after both reviews and prior to the attacks.⁷⁴ The Committee found no evidence that the CIA turned down requests for additional resources at the Annex. Further, CIA's low profile in Benghazi generally provided it an additional layer of security.⁷⁵ Finally, in response to the continued growing threat against Western personnel and interests in Benghazi, CIA implemented additional security measures, including:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Shortly after the Chief of Station in Tripoli arrived in country, he consulted with the Chief of Benghazi Base, personally assessed the security situation, and took actions that were intended to improve logistics, security, and communication that ultimately proved critical in enabling the Tripoli Team to quickly travel to Benghazi that night.⁷⁷

Finding #3: State Department security personnel, resources, and equipment were unable to counter the terrorist threat that day, and they required CIA assistance.

Although HPSCI generally does not review State Department security capabilities, and this review did not set out to review those capabilities, evidence the Committee received related to the level of the State Department's security capabilities in Benghazi.

CIA security personnel testified that State Department DS agents repeatedly stated they felt ill-equipped and ill-trained to contend with the threat environment in Benghazi. According to eyewitnesses testifying before HPSCI, the DS agents knew well before the attacks that they could not defend the TMF against an armed assault. The DS agents also told CIA about their requests for additional resources that

⁷³ Benghazi Base, Libya Comparative Analysis: Site Vulnerability, [REDACTED], December 13, 2013 pg. 13; HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with the former Chief of Tripoli Station," April 1, 2014 pg. 13; HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 41.
⁷⁴ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 4.
⁷⁵ CIA Cable Benghazi 14996 "Security Recommendations for Benghazi Base Following the Recent Attacks Against Western Targets," [REDACTED], CIA-provided Summary of Post-Review Actions in Response to Security Recommendations.
⁷⁶ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Interview with the former Chief of Tripoli Station," April 1, 2014 pg. 3-4.

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detained and transported to the United States for trial.⁷⁸ Sufyan bin Qumu, the spiritual leader of AAS-Damnah, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, and a trainee at an al-Qa'ida terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in 1993, probably played some role in the attacks.⁷⁹ even though reliable intelligence indicates that Qumu was not in Benghazi on the night of the attacks.⁸⁰ Qumu and Khattalah were both AAS leaders at the time, knew each other, and ran in the same circles, but the nature of their relationship is still not fully clear.

Ample intelligence reporting from multiple sources indicates Khattalah's role in the attacks. For example, CIA's then-Chief of Base in Benghazi told Committee staff that available sources suggest that Abu Khattalah and his group were responsible for the attacks.⁸¹

[REDACTED] In an August 2013 CNN interview, Khattalah acknowledged that he was at the TMF after the attacks but denied he was involved in the violence.⁸² On June 17, 2014, the White House announced, and it was widely reported, that the U.S. successfully conducted a unilateral operation in Benghazi, Libya to capture Khattalah.⁸³ He is now in U.S. federal custody.

According to a February 7, 2014, FBI briefing to Committee staff, [REDACTED] indicates that [REDACTED] and ordered them to attack the TMF on September 11—in response to both the anti-Islamic video and Ayman al-Zawahiri's fatwa to avenge the death of al-Qa'ida deputy Abu Yaha al-Libi. According to these reports, [REDACTED] report [REDACTED] that indicated [REDACTED] ordered the attacks in revenge for the death of al-Libi and other intelligence extremists were involved.⁸⁴

Another suspect, Faraj al Chalabi, was an al-Qa'ida terrorist linked to the 1994 terrorist murder of two German tourists.⁸⁵ In February 2014, CIA assessed that he was the amir of a group that claimed responsibility for recent attacks against U.S. facilities and citizens in Libya and pledged to conduct more

⁷⁸ New York Times "U.S. Charges Libyan Milita Leader in Benghazi Attack," August 6, 2013; Indictment, United States v. Khattalah, No. 1:14-cr-00141 (D.D.C. June 26, 2014).
⁷⁹ Department of Defense Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Cuba "Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (CRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: USLY-000537DP (S)."
⁸⁰ HPSCI Staff MFR: "Meeting with the former Chief of Benghazi Base," December 14, 2012.
⁸¹ CIA Wire: "Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks," March 24, 2014.
⁸² NCTC "Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks," September 9, 2013 (Authorised by CIA, NCTC, and FBI); CNN "First Criminal Charges Filed in Benghazi Attack Probe," August 7, 2013
⁸³ www.cnn.com/2013/08/06/politics/benghazi-charges/
⁸⁴ Statement by the President on the Apprehension of Ahmed Abu Khattalah, June, 17, 2014 www.whitehouse.gov
⁸⁵ CIA Wire "Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks," March 24, 2014.
⁸⁶ NCTC "Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks," September 9, 2013 (Authorised by CIA, NCTC, and FBI).

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Afghanistan when the Taliban launched an attack on the compound as soon as the RPG round hit the wire.⁸³

The attacks on the Annex mortally wounded Ambassador Stevens and CIA security officer and one State Department member of the security team rescued and who continued to fire on the Annex for a short time. The CIA was not collecting and shipping the bodies of the four dead Americans, AM and the other at about 10:00 AM. B

The Libyan Shield militia members compound as soon as the RPG round hit the wire. The Libyan Shield militia members evacuated. The Libyan Shield official sheltered with the U.S. personnel and he for vehicles to transport all remaining personnel vehicles returned at 6:14 AM. All remaining CIA personnel at the airport. The CIA

During this time, the Libyan government arranged for the body of Ambassador Stevens and the bodies of the four dead Americans, AM and the other at about 10:00 AM. B

II. In the months prior to the attacks, the Annex's physical security features included numerous advantages over those of the TMF's lone advantage was that it was larger and was less vulnerable from the street. The distance from the street allowed for added protection from a bomb blast at or near the walls or facilities, and would provide additional time for security officers to respond before attackers could reach the Annex.

Finding #1: There is no evidence of a provided sufficient strategic warning to the Annex, including those at the State Department, of the attacks in Benghazi and they began.

⁸³ Video footage: HPSCI Transcript: "Full Committee Hearing with CIA's former Chief of Benghazi Base," May 22, 2013, pg. 13.
⁸⁴ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 11.
⁸⁵ Video footage: HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 11.
⁸⁶ Video footage: HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officers 3, 4, and 5," November 14, 2013 pg. 11.
⁸⁷ HPSCI Transcript: "Full Committee Hearing with CIA's former Chief of Benghazi Base," May 22, 2013, pg. 13.
⁸⁸ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officer 8," December 13, 2013 pg. 26.
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⁹⁴ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officer 8," December 13, 2013 pg. 26.
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¹⁰⁰ HPSCI Transcript: "Subcommittee Staff Interview with Officer 8," December 13, 2013 pg. 26.