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wolterstorff 1980:88
Kaplan 1990:98
Rohrbaugh 2003:193
Carruthers 1984:4-7

Introduction

Wynton Marsalis composed *In This House, On This Morning* in 1992. But what is the nature of the thing he composed? This, in essence, is the ontological question that I address in this book. As such, it should be distinguished from another question with which I am not concerned: namely, 'What is it for such an entity to count as music?'. This latter question is a plea for a piece of *conceptual analysis*: an analysis of the concept of music that will help us to determine, for example, whether something is a piece of music rather than mere noise. The ontological question is unconcerned with such matters: its correct answer, by contrast, will enlighten us as to the kind of entity musical works are. Such enlightenment, at any rate, is what this book seeks to provide.

Having disentangled this ontological question from the question of the correct application of the concept of music, we can, in fact, decompose it into two discrete inquiries. First of all, there is what we may call *the categorial question*: the issue of which ontological category works of music belong to. Someone addressing this question is engaged in a project of ontological classification, with a view to revealing musical works to be concrete particulars, properties, sets, types, or some such. But, of course, merely assigning musical works to an ontological category does not tell a fully satisfying story about their nature. Such a story must also include an answer to *the individuation question*: an account of the identity conditions of musical works. The ontologist of music should thus provide something informative of the form 'Work W and work W^* are numerically identical if and only if…', or else explain why no such account can be forthcoming.

In what follows, I shall motivate, elaborate, and defend one particular theory concerning the ontological nature of works of music: what I shall call *the simple view*. This account comprises two theses, constituting answers

to the categorial question and the individuation question respectively. Its answer to the categorial question is *the type/token theory*. This states that a musical work is a type whose tokens are datable, locatable patterns of sounds: sound-sequence-events, in other words. More specifically, such a work is a *norm*-type (i.e. a type that admits of properly and improperly formed tokens);[1] and its tokens can include performances and playings of it, but also sound-sequence-events brought about in ways other than by the actions of sentient beings.[2] The simple view's second constituent thesis—its account of musical works' identity conditions—is what may be termed *sonicism*. Characterized informally, sonicism states that musical works are types of sound-sequence-event 'pure and simple' (Levinson 1980*b*: 64): that is, that they are entities individuated purely in terms of how they sound.[3] According to the sonicist, all that is required for W and W^* to be one and the same work of music is that they be acoustically indistinguishable; hence it is possible for one and the same work to be composed by multiple composers at different times, and by means of the production of scores that specify different instrumentation (as long as this difference does not make for a difference in sound). More precisely, the sonicist claims that W and W^* are numerically identical works of music if and only if they have the same acoustic properties normative within them: that is, if and only if how W should sound is identical to how W^* should sound.[4]

What of the simple view's scope? I take it to apply to *all* works of pure, instrumental music—that is, to jazz works in addition to fully notated classical pieces—and to works composed for recording purposes as well

[1] This point has its origin in the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980: 58). My account owes much to his illuminating study, although it differs substantially from Wolterstorff's views in several key areas.

[2] Performances are sound-sequence-events produced by the actions of musicians using musical instruments. Playings are sound-sequence-events produced by actions of a different kind. Examples of playings include sound-sequence-events produced by the placement of a disc in a CD player and the pressing of the 'play' button, and sound-sequence-events produced by the setting going of a player piano. I shall defend the thesis that works can have tokens that are neither performances nor playings in §1.5.

[3] The version of sonicism I shall defend—what Stephen Davies calls 'timbral sonicism' (2001: 64)—will be more precisely formulated in Ch. 8. The timbral sonicist, in contrast to her 'pure' counterpart, insists that a work's tone colour—as well as its standard melodic, rhythmic, harmonic, dynamic, and articulational properties—features in an account of its individuation.

[4] This formulation of sonicism should not be taken to suggest that there is *just one* determinate way in which a musical work should be performed. Musical works, as we shall see in §1.5, invite interpretation by performers: a work's score does not precisely determine in every respect how a performance should sound.

as to works composed for performance.[5] Every work of pure instrumental music is a (norm-) type of sound-sequence-event.

So why should we accept the simple view? I argue that both of its constituent theses are *prima facie* correct, and that there are no objections to it sufficiently strong, nor alternative theories sufficiently convincing, to justify giving up what is the default position in the ontology of music. In Chapter 1 I claim that the first constituent thesis of the simple view—the type/token theory—is the most natural way of explaining the *repeatability* of works of music: the fact that they are items that can have multiple sound-sequence-events as occurrences. *In This House, On This Morning* is the thing that its various performances and playings are *of*, and the most plausible way of construing this 'occurrence of' relation is to treat it as another manifestation of the relation that obtains between a type's tokens and the type itself. Certainly, it is a mistake to suppose that the one–many relation holding between a work and its occurrences can be better explained by treating it as the same relation as that obtaining between a set and one of its members, or that holding between a property and one of its instances.

The idea that the repeatability of musical works can be captured by regarding them as types of sound-sequence-occurrence is, then, an intuitive one. Additionally, we shall see that the fact that work and performance stand to each other as type and token nicely explains how it is possible to listen to a work *by* listening to a performance of it. The fact remains, however, that neither the ontological nature of types, nor the nature of the relation that they bear to their tokens, is well understood. Chapters 2 and 3 seek to put this right by addressing these metaphysical questions head on, a project I take to have two clear benefits. First, it enables us to determine the type/token theory's philosophical commitments. The claim that works of music are types of sound-sequence-occurrence is difficult to assess until these commitments have been brought out into the open. Second, and relatedly, much of the work undertaken in the ontology of

[5] What of the music of pure improvisation, such as that played in Keith Jarrett's *Köln Concerts*? Here I agree with Stephen Davies (2001: 15) that such music making does not involve the performance of a musical work. True enough, someone might listen to a recording of one of Jarrett's improvisations and attempt to reproduce it, perhaps even adding some improvisational flourishes of her own; but this is insufficient to show that the original improvisation is itself a work. Unlike genuine works, free improvisations are not regarded as blueprints for performances, and our interest in them lies in their immediacy rather than in their potential repeatability. Pure improvisations, then, inasmuch as they are not musical works, fall outside the scope of the simple view.

music has, alas, tended to be cocooned from work done in mainstream analytical metaphysics, something that has contributed to the continued marginalization of aesthetics. By giving the type/token distinction an extended treatment, I hope to buck this trend, and thereby continue the process—begun by writers such as Jerrold Levinson (1980*b*, 1990*c*) and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980)—of returning the ontology of art to its rightful place at the core of the analytic metaphysical tradition.[6]

So what *are* the philosophical commitments that must be made by a type/token theorist? If the conclusions drawn in Chapters 2 and 3 are correct, works of music, if types, are abstract, unstructured, and both modally and temporally inflexible (i.e., incapable of having intrinsic properties other than those they have actually, and incapable of change in their intrinsic properties over time). Perhaps more significantly still, I argue, against Levinson (1980*b*, 1990*c*), that any treatment of works of music as types will inevitably end up committed to the thesis that such works exist eternally (i.e. at all times): a position I call *musical Platonism*. However, Chapters 4 and 5 argue that these consequences need not worry us and, in so doing, provide a catalyst for developing the type/token theory further. Two such developments are worthy of note at this stage. First of all, our talk of works as being structured—talk exemplified in claims that a work contains, ends on, or begins with, an A minor chord—must be reinterpreted according to Wolterstorff's theory of 'analogical predication' (1980: 61–2). The predicate 'ends with an A minor chord', when applied to a work, expresses the property *being such that a sound-event cannot be a properly formed token of it unless it ends on an A minor chord*. Such a predication sees us apply the predicate to the work all right; it is just that this predicate expresses a different, though related, property to that which it expresses when applied to one of its occurrences. Second, and perhaps most controversially, Chapter 5 develops an account of composition as (creative) *discovery* that is compatible with musical Platonism. Since works of music exist eternally, the process by which Marsalis composed *In This House, On This Morning* cannot have ended with the bringing of this work into existence. This compositional process was, I suggest, a creative one that is in some respects akin to a mathematician's uncovering of a proof or a scientist's uncovering of a theory. Nothing in

[6] Other key contributors to this process of reintegration include Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson (2004, 2006), Gregory Currie (1989), David Davies (2004), Robert Howell (2002), Stefano Predelli (1995, 2001), and Guy Rohrbaugh (2003).

the phenomenology of composition determines that we should view it as creation rather than discovery, and no feature of our appreciation of music, or indeed of its composers, is compromised by the Platonist account.

Having said this, and having granted the type/token theory's status as the default position on the categorial question, it would, nonetheless be defeated, if other ontological theories could equally well explain works' repeatability whilst assuaging more of our pre-theoretic intuitions. For this reason, Chapters 6 and 7 examine the two leading contemporary competitors to the type/token theory: the view of works of music as historical individuals (or, as I prefer to put it, *continuants*), and the conception of such works as compositional actions (whether these actions are construed, following Currie (1989), as action-types, or, following David Davies (2004), as action-tokens). What I refer to as *the continuant view* fails adequately to explain what the repeatability of a work of music consists in. In taking the relation between a work and one of its performances to be a specific form of that obtaining between an object and one of the items upon which it depends for its existence (the mysterious relation of *embodiment*), the continuant view ends up as, at best, obscure.

The two versions of the conception of works of music as compositional actions fare no better. Currie's 'action-type hypothesis' (1989: 8) can allow that works of music are repeatable, of course: they are types, after all. But the problem is that, in taking them to be types whose tokens are acts of composition rather than sound-sequence-occurrences, Currie cannot explain how the such things can be heard in their entirety: as we shall see in §7.2.3, according to Currie, the thing that is heard by an audience is not the work as a whole but a mere constituent of it. Davies too has to explain away the idea that musical works are audible, but this is not all. He must also motivate and defend his position against the strong intuition that musical works are things that stand in a one–many relation to their performances, rather than being identical with the datable, locatable processes by which they were composed. This is a tall order and one, ultimately, that Davies cannot deliver.

Ultimately, then, the type/token theory is the best available answer to the categorial question. It enables us to explain the nature of musical works' repeatability, and does so whilst being minimally disruptive of our pre-philosophical instincts. This conclusion having been reached, the individuation question takes centre stage. Granted that works of music are types whose tokens are sound-sequence-occurrences, how are they

individuated? The answer to this question that I recommend—a version of sonicism—stands to the individuation question as the type/token theory stands to the categorial question. For the obvious thing to say is that works are numerically identical just in case they are acoustically indistinguishable; and this intuition, I argue, is supported by an equally intuitive account of the nature of our aesthetic appreciation: (moderate) musical empiricism. The basic thought behind the latter theory is that a work's aesthetic properties may all be appreciated by merely listening to it; and the view is fine-tuned into a supervenience thesis: the claim that a work's aesthetic properties supervene on its acoustic properties (together with the category of artwork to which it belongs). With this view in place, together with the idea that the ontological nature of works reflects our aesthetic practice, sonicism follows swiftly. If a work's aesthetic properties are all present in its acoustic appearance, then we need look no further than this appearance when providing identity conditions for pieces of music. There is no more to the individuation of such works than how they sound.

One thing that follows from the sonicist's way of individuating musical works is that such works are coarser-grained than many contemporary aestheticians would have it (Levinson 1990*c*: 221). Given the truth of sonicism, two composers who produce scores that instruct performers to produce sequences of sounds that are qualitatively indistinguishable thereby compose the same work. And this holds even if the composers' respective scores specify that different instruments be used in the production of such sounds (e.g. if one score specifies a piano and the other a Perfect Timbral Synthesizer), and even if the composers are situated at vastly different points in the history of music.

The weight of opinion amongst aestheticians has it that both of these consequences are false, thereby revealing acoustic indistinguishability to be only necessary, and not sufficient, for work-identity. Two composers, it is claimed, can compose acoustically indistinguishable works that are yet manifestly distinct. With a view to demonstrating this contention, counter-examples to the sonicist proposal fall into two categories. Philosophers whom we may term *instrumentalists* appeal to cases designed to show that compositions composed for different instruments, even if sonically indistinguishable, count as numerically distinct; while *contextualists* construct examples intended to prove that, although composers working in distinct musico-historical contexts may compose sonic *sound-alikes*, they cannot be

said to compose one and the same work. So whilst the sonicist will say that the cases appealed to by her opponents are really examples in which two composers compose the same work in different epochs, or by specifying different means of sound production, such explanations are argued to be illegitimate by the contextualist and the instrumentalist respectively.

So why is the sonicist's way of describing such cases under threat? Significantly, there is a common form to the most credible arguments offered by the instrumentalist and the contextualist. The idea, in essence, is that a composer's specification of a work's instrumentation, or a composer's occupancy of a set of co-ordinates in musico-historical space, is determinative of many of the work's artistic, aesthetic, and expressive properties (Levinson 1990*c*: 22; 1980*b*: 76); and, hence, that if two composers are working in distinct musico-historical contexts, or if they compose their works for different instruments, their compositions—even if acoustic doppelgängers—will inevitably differ with regard to such properties, and so, by Leibniz's Law, fail to be identical.

It is this form of argument that is the main focus of Chapters 8 and 9. In my view, the examples taken to demonstrate that works of music may differ aesthetically without differing acoustically prove no such thing. They are either ill-formed or else can be explained away in a manner consistent with sonicism. There is, I contend, no genuine case in which acoustic indistinguishability fails to make for work-identity. Sonicism—the *prima facie* position on the individuation question—emerges unscathed. What this means, of course, is that both elements of the simple view stand undefeated. In the ontology of music, simplicity rules.

1

The Type/Token Theory Introduced

1.1 Introduction

As I explained in the Introduction, the simple view that it is the business of this book to defend comprises two theses: the type/token theory and sonicism. The former—an answer to the categorial question—has it that a musical work is a type whose tokens are sound-sequence-events (i.e. datable, locatable patterns of sounds). The latter—an answer to the individuation question—claims that work-identity consists in acoustic indistinguishability. According to sonicism, when it comes to the individuation of works of music, all that matters is how they sound.

The purpose of the present chapter is twofold: to provide an initial motivation for the simple view's first constituent thesis, and then to begin the process of developing and defending it. To this end, I shall present the view of musical works as types of sound-sequence-event as the *face-value* theory: the account that is *prima facie* correct and must be accepted as long as it is not defeated. Two kinds of defeat are conceivable: the type/token theory could face objections to which it has no adequate reply; and it could face rival theories that do a better job of explaining the relevant phenomena whilst doing justice to our pre-theoretic intuitions about works of music and our relation to them. In my view, however, the type/token theory is both defensible and the best value theory available. This chapter makes a start on demonstrating this conclusion.

After a brief introduction to the type/token theory, I shall consider some of the familiar rival accounts in the ontology of music, before going on to

elaborate it in such a way as to fend off what might at first seem to be quick and easy objections. By the present chapter's end, a kind of philosophical base camp will have been reached. Many of the usual suspects (i.e. the familiar rivals to the type/token theory) will have been rounded up and dispatched, and we will be confident in the type/token theory's position as the face-value theory on the categorial question. Having gained such a foothold, Chapters 2 and 3 will offer a detailed account of the ontological nature of types: a project that will reveal works of music, *qua* types, to be unstructured, unchanging, and, most significantly of all, eternally existent entities. Chapters 4 and 5 will defend these consequences before, in Chapters 6 and 7, I offer critiques of what I regard as the type/token theory's most serious rivals: the view of musical works as continuants; and the family of views that takes such works to be compositional actions.[1] With this, the defence of the type/token theory will have reached completion.

1.2 Motivating the Type/Token Theory: Repeatability

Works of music exist. True sentences such as

(1) *In This House, On This Morning* is a suite,
(2) Bartok's Fifth Quartet sets people's nerves on edge,[2]
(3) *Straight, No Chaser* is dynamic,

and

(4) Marsalis composed *In This House, On This Morning*

have as constituents singular terms that refer to such items. And true sentences such as

(5) There are more than thirty symphonies composed by Mozart,

and

(6) Exactly one of Bruckner's symphonies was unfinished,

see us quantifying over them. So what kind of thing are they?

[1] The former view is explicitly taken by Rohrbaugh (2003), and suggested by Predelli (forthcoming) and Michael Morris (forthcoming); the latter approach is taken by Currie (1989) and David Davies (2004).

[2] I owe this example to Wolterstorff (1970: 251).

The answer that I recommend is that a work of music is a species of abstract (i.e. non-spatially located) entity: that is, a type whose tokens are concrete patterns of sounds. Significantly, in taking musical works to be types rather than, say, sets, we commit ourselves to a distinctive view of how such works are individuated. For, in Ian Rumfitt's words, the identity of a type is determined, not by which tokens actually exist, but by 'the *condition* which a token meets or would have to meet in order to instantiate it' (1993: 448).[3] As we shall see presently, this feature of the type/token theory nicely enables it to capture the fact that works have their performances, playings, and other occurrences inessentially.

Before we get on to this, however, it is important that we appreciate how swiftly the type/token theory emerges as a neat solution to a puzzle concerning the ontological nature of works of music. For the perplexing thing about musical works—as opposed to, say, paintings—is that they are *repeatable*. According to the standard view, at least, the ontological story about paintings is fairly open and shut: paintings are physical objects.[4] A painting can, of course, be copied—a forger, for example, might produce a work that succeeds in reproducing the original's visual array—but such copies are works distinct from the original. Musical works, by contrast, have the possibility of multiple occurrence built in to them. A symphony can be performed or played over and over again, and, crucially, such performances and playings are not mere copies of it, but *occurrences* of it: items that make the work manifest. Whereas a copy of a painting is another work that resembles the original, a symphony's performances are the very means by which we encounter the symphony itself. Symphonies, and works of music generally, are in this sense intrinsically repeatable; and the appeal of the type/token theory lies in the fact that it elegantly explains what this phenomenon of repeatability consists in.

Taking note of this one–many relationship that obtains between a work of music and its occurrences, a reconstruction of the thinking that leads to the type/token theory begins by making the plausible assumption that this repeatability is explicable in terms of the ontological category to which

[3] Though sufficient for my present purposes, this account of the way in which types are individuated will be amended—in order to deal with the phenomenon of norm-types—in §1.5 below.

[4] This standard view of the ontological nature of paintings has been challenged by P. F. Strawson (1974), who argues that all artworks are types. At this stage, I have no wish to take sides on this issue: I introduce it only as a heuristic device to convey the problem raised by musical works' repeatability.

such works belong. Specifically, it is suggested that the best explanation of a musical work's repeatability takes such a work to be a *generic entity*: that is, something whose ontological category supports instantiation.[5] We are then invited to treat musical works as types because, in doing so, we thereby provide a familiar and plausible explanation of the nature of the relation holding between a work and its occurrences. The relation obtaining between a work of music and its occurrences is just that obtaining between a type of sound-sequence-occurrence and its tokens. Rather than being a queer relation of *embodiment*, it turns out to be just one more example of the familiar relation that holds, for instance, between the word 'table' and its token inscriptions and utterances.

But this is not all. Musical works, besides being repeatable, are also audible. When listening to a performance of a work of music, one thereby listens to the work performed. As Wolterstorff puts it, '[i]n listening to a symphony one hears two things at once, the symphony and a performance thereof' (1980: 41); indeed, one hears the symphony *by* hearing the performance (1980: 40–1). A further benefit of the type/token theory is that it smoothly explains how such *indirect listening* is possible: hearing a work by hearing a performance of it is a matter of hearing a type of sound-event by virtue of hearing one of its token patterns of concrete sounds. The token stands proxy for the type, and thereby enables one's perceptual experience to 'pass through' the token, and so relate the listener to the type lying behind it.

At this point, an analogy with what Quine terms 'deferred ostension' (1969: 39–41) may help the point to stick. To use Quine's own example, one may explain the abstract singular term 'alpha' by pointing at an instance of the letter on a blackboard and saying 'That is alpha'; and the explanation works because, in pointing at the concrete token, one thereby indirectly demonstrates the type that lies behind it. It is the token's presence before one in space that enables the pointing gesture to pick out the type for which the token stands proxy, and it does not matter that 'the abstract object ... which is the letter alpha does not contain the ostended point, nor

[5] This use of 'generic' is borrowed from Richard Wollheim (1968: 91). The thought that musical works' repeatability should be explained by treating them as generic entities is denied by those who take such works to be continuants. But when it comes to this issue, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: as we shall see in Ch. 6, Rohrbaugh's denial (2003) that musical works are generic entities prevents him from adequately explaining what the repeatability of such works amounts to.

any point' (Quine 1969: 40). The presence of one of the type's concrete tokens ensures that demonstrative reference to the type is secured.

Well, as for demonstrative reference, so for perceptibility. The type/token theorist in the ontology of music can use the conceptual apparatus of the type/token distinction in an analogous way to explain how it is possible to listen to a work of music by listening to one of its performances. Just as the demonstration of a letter-type is secured by one of its tokens being present in space before one, so one may listen to a type of sound-event by virtue of listening to one of its token performances or playings. As in the case of demonstrative reference via deferred ostension, the presence of a token secures the obtaining of a relation between a person and a type. Hearing a performance of a work just *is* to hear the work *in* performance: and the reason why this is so is that the work stands behind a performance of it in exactly the same way that a letter-type stands behind its concrete tokens.

This, then, is the way in which the apparatus of the type/token theory enables us to explain how we may listen to a work by listening to one of its performances. But it is unlikely that leaving things here will be enough to convince the more naturalistically inclined philosopher. For types are abstract entities, which, as I use the term, means that they have no location in space; and an objector might question whether such entities are the kinds of things that can be heard, even indirectly. Specifically, it may be alleged that types, since they are not located in space, cannot impinge upon our sensory surfaces: being abstract in the sense introduced above, they are causally inert and hence can play no part in the concrete causal process that ends with an auditory experience. Given that the objects of perception *must* be things that enter into this process, and that types' abstract status precludes them from doing so, musical works, if types, cannot be things that are themselves heard.

One response to this objection would be to grant it and, as a result, to retreat to the thesis that only *performances* of works of music can be heard. But such a move would be both counter-intuitive and unnecessary. It would be counter-intuitive because, as we have seen Wolterstorff suggest already, it is surely a datum that works of music are things that we can listen to. We hear *works* performed: we do not merely hear performances of them. Someone who had clearly listened attentively to a performance of *In This House, On This Morning*, but who nonetheless insisted that she had never heard the work, would be looked upon with bewilderment by her

fellow concert-goers. An ontological proposal that had as a consequence that such a person had spoken truly should only be adopted *in extremis*.

Thankfully, such a desperate move is not forced upon the type/token theorist. Before getting too carried away with the objection currently under consideration,[6] we should first of all unpack it. Its key claim, of course, is that types of sound-event cannot themselves be perceived because, lacking location in space, they cannot enter into causal relations, and hence cannot figure in the causal process that ends with an auditory experience. But at this point, we would do well to remember that the question of what it is for an entity to enter into causal relations requires very careful handling. Indeed, it only *seems* obvious that abstract (i.e. non-spatial) entities cannot be causally efficacious, once a couple of controversial philosophical assumptions have been made. When these assumptions are (rightly) questioned, the idea that certain *abstracta* may yet be causally active, and hence be numbered amongst the objects of perception, turns out to be harmless.

With a view to laying bare the assumptions in question, we may start by remarking that it is *events*, rather than objects (material or otherwise), that are primarily related as cause and effect.[7] Objects *can* be said to be causes, but only by virtue of somehow participating in an event: that is, by figuring in the thing that *does* the causing and, so to speak, 'acts as the elbow in the ribs' (Bennett 1988: 23).[8] Shem, for example, can be said to have brought about the bruising on Shaun's knee, but only by virtue of participating in an event (i.e. a kicking of Shaun) that had the bruising of Shaun's knee (another event) as its effect. Now, the assumptions made by someone who denies that abstract entities such as types can be causally efficacious would seem to be these: first, that there are clear criteria for whether an entity participates causally in an event; and, second, that it is clear that entities without a spatial location fail to meet these criteria. But in fact, neither assumption is warranted, as we shall now see.

As John Burgess and Gideon Rosen explain (1997: 24), there are a number of ways in which material objects may be involved in events in

[6] As R. A. Sharpe does, for example. (1995: 39).

[7] See, e.g., Davidson 1963, 1967*a*. The remarks of the following two paragraphs rely heavily on the insightful discussion in Burgess and Rosen 1997: 23–5. I was pointed in its direction by Caplan and Matheson (2004: 120).

[8] Although the colourful phrase is Bennett's, he would not agree with the use that it is put to here: he actually denies that events are entities that emit force and hence do the pushing, shoving, and forcing that is found in nature (1988: 22–3).

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a way deemed causally efficacious. Some such involvement has the object undergo some intrinsic change (such as in Shem's and Shaun's participation in Shem's kicking of Shaun); other such involvement has the participating object undergo only extrinsic change (as when a stone participates in the event of a smashing of a window); whilst objects are sometimes taken to participate in events in a causally efficacious way, if they fail to change when they could have done so (as when someone tries to kick a boulder into a stream but fails to budge it). What we have here is a pretty shapeless collection of cases of causally relevant participation with no overall criterion that binds them together.

Of course, one could just insist that an entity can participate in an event in a causally efficacious way only if it is the kind of thing that can emit the forces recognized by physics: a position nicely characterized by Burgess and Rosen thus:

> Physics tells us how ordinary material bodies act causally. They act by exerting forces of one of four kinds: gravitational, electromagnetic, or weak or strong nuclear. Biographies and novels, species and genera, exert no such forces over and above that of the aggregate of the concrete tokens and organisms pertaining to them. So they do not act causally in the relevant sense—and there's an end on't! (Burgess and Rosen 1997: 25)

But as Burgess and Rosen explain (1997: 25), this way of thinking—though engagingly expressed—is a *non sequitur*. Physics informs us as to the nature of the forces involved in the causal processes that obtain between physical events. What it does *not* do is provide an answer to the *conceptual* question of what it is for an object to participate causally in an event. To answer this question, we must do some philosophy, not physics; and our problem is that no fully developed theory is forthcoming.

A further complication is introduced by the fact that there is no unanimity about how the notion of an event should be explicated. If events are construed along the lines suggested by Jaegwon Kim (1976)—that is to say, as ordered triples of objects, properties, and times—then a natural thing to say is that an object counts as causally efficacious if it is a constituent of a triple that is a causally productive event. But, at a stroke, such a move undercuts the reason for thinking that types, *qua abstracta*, are causally inert and, hence, imperceptible. For there is no conceptual barrier to supposing that *abstracta* may be members of ordered triples; indeed, if, as seems

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plausible, properties are abstract objects, then Kim himself must accept that *every* event contains an abstract object, namely, a property.

Of course, Kim's particular account of events is not the only item on the menu. A popular alternative is that suggested by Davidson (1969). Concerned that Kim's ontological proposal individuates events too finely—according to Kim, no stabbing can be a killing, no killing can be a murder, no arm raising a signalling, and no birthday party a celebration (1967*b*: 133–4)[9]—Davidson presents a theory of events as things whose only parts are temporal parts. Given this account, talk of an event's having objects, properties, or times as constituents is senseless: events *concern* objects and properties, but a single event may be described in a variety of ways that introduce different objects and different properties.

With such a conception in place, the question of what it is for an object to figure causally in an event becomes cloudier still. The idea that objects count as causes by virtue of *entering into*, or *participating in*, events in a causally relevant way has to be treated metaphorically. Indeed, it seems that all we can say is that an object so participates causally in an event by being *appropriately related* to the said event (Caplan and Matheson 2004: 121); and, naturally, just what it is for a candidate relation between an object and an event to count as 'appropriate' is up for grabs. But at this point, I think that we should reconsider the machinery of the type/token distinction. For one plausible species of appropriate relation would seem to obtain precisely when the participating object is a type and the event one of its tokens. Suppose, for example, that the showing of a film sparked a riot. In this sense, the showing of the film—the event—*concerns* the film every bit as much as does Shem's kicking of Shaun concern Shem and Shaun. The film—the type—participates in the event that causes the riot. But does it do so in a causally relevant way? Ordinary language has it that it does: we are quite happy to speak of films causing riots; the film causes the riot by virtue of being shown. But more than this, philosophy reveals there to be no defensible motive for denying it. As we have noted already, we do not possess a worked out theory of what it is for an object to participate in Davidson-style events in a causally active way. And without there being such a theory that rules out the film's causing the riot, we remain free to say that it does so by virtue of the riot-sparking

[9] This objection is actually aimed at the account offered by R. M. Martin, but Martin's views (as presented by Davidson) differ little, if at all, from those of Kim.

event being one of its tokens. (A film, after all, is just a type whose tokens are datable, locatable showings.) It does not matter that the film is an abstract object: it participates causally in a causal process by virtue of one of its tokens being a member of the chain of causally related events. To resist this way of speaking is, I believe, to rely unthinkingly upon the scientism that Burgess and Rosen have unmasked as irrelevant to the point at issue.

The moral for the audibility of works of music, *qua* types of sound-event, should be obvious. A work of music, thus construed, can enter into causal relations derivatively by virtue of being a type of sound-event: a type whose token events can feature as relata of causal relations. Hence, given that the objects of perception are just those things that causally effect how things perceptually seem to us, this means that the type/token theory is not precluded from saying that works of music, in addition to their tokens, may be heard. Far from it. In fact, a work of music, though abstract, can be heard precisely *because* it is a type of whose tokens are performances, playings, and other sound-events that can cause us to have certain auditory experiences. The work itself counts as a *bona fide* object of hearing because the event that initiates the causal chain leading to an auditory experience—a sound-event—is one of its tokens.

The type/token theory thus provides a defensible account of what it is to listen to a work by listening to a performance or playing of it; and the elegance of this account, together with the type/token theory's aforementioned explanation of the nature of musical works' repeatability, serves to make it an attractive answer to the categorial question in the ontology of music. Once we assume that works of music are generic entities—that is, entities with instances—a conception of such works as types seems to follow swiftly.

But perhaps too swiftly, it could be alleged. An entity is generic just in case it is the sort of item that has exemplification built into it as standard. Given this gloss, it is clear that types are not the only generic entities: there are also sets and properties. So why should an acknowledgement that works of music are generic commit us to viewing them as types of sound-event rather than as sets of, or indeed properties of, such events? This is the question that I address in the remainder of this section. It will become evident that there are compelling reasons for preferring the type/token theory to these two alternatives, reasons that help to establish the type/token theory's position as the face-value answer to the categorial question.

Properties, it is true, are generic. A property is an entity that is capable of instantiation by particulars. So could *In This House, On This Morning* be a property of certain sound-sequence-occurrences? No, for two reasons. First, properties are categorially unsuited to be musical works. *In This House, On This Morning* is not a mere feature of a performance of it: a respect in which performances or playings can be alike or differ. It is, by contrast, the *blueprint* for such performances and playings: a thing in its own right. This is reflected in the fact that 'In This House, On This Morning'—like other type-names such as 'The Union Jack' and 'The Ford Thunderbird'—is itself neither a predicate nor a singular term systematically related to such a predicate (as 'happiness' is to 'is happy'). On the contrary, 'In This House, On This Morning' only appears in predicates that are themselves explicitly relational, such as 'is a performance of *In This House, On This Morning*' (Rohrbaugh 2003: 197).

Second, and relatedly, works and their occurrences exhibit a pattern of shared predication characteristic of the type/token model rather than the property/instance model. The following thesis, whose origin lies in the work of Wollheim (1968: 92–3), holds good at the level of *predicates*:[10] if a predicate 'is *F*' is true of a token in virtue of the token's being a token of a type *K*, then 'is *F*' is also true of *K*. Hence, 'is coloured' and 'is rectangular' are both true of The Union Jack in addition to being true of its tokens.[11] Significantly, the analogous principle concerning the transmission of predicates does *not* hold for particulars and their properties: as Wollheim points out (1968: 93), we do not describe redness as being itself red.

So does the pattern of shared predication between musical works and their performances match the pattern exhibited between types and tokens or that between properties and their instances? The former. Take any predicate true of a performance by virtue of its being a performance of *W*—predicates such as 'has a $C^{\#}$ in its seventh measure' or 'ends with an A minor chord'—and the predicate will also be truly applicable to the work itself. This being so, works of music look like being types rather than properties.

What, then, of a set-theoretical approach to the ontology of music? Could *In This House, On This Morning* be the set of its occurrences? Again,

[10] Though not, as we shall see in §2.3, at the level of the properties they express.
[11] I capitalize names of types (except when referring to word-types by means of inverted commas).

no, and again for two reasons. First, it is a fact, and a fact explained by the type/token theory, that one can listen to a work by listening to one of its performances; but if musical works were sets, it is quite unclear how this could be so. A set is just an extensional construction from its members, so to listen to the set, one would have to listen to its complete membership; and there is no sense in which, by listening to a single performance of *In This House, On This Morning*, one has thereby listened to every such performance.

Second, there is a modal difference between musical works and sets of sound-sequence-events. Since sets are extensional constructions out of their members, what makes a set *that* set is purely that it has *those* members. Consequently, sets have their members (or lack of them) essentially:[12] no set could have different members from those it has actually. *In This House, On This Morning*, by contrast, does not have its occurrences essentially: it might have had more, fewer, or different performances than it has had actually. There are possible worlds in which *In This House, On This Morning* has more, fewer, or different occurrences than it has actually; but there is no possible world in which the set ω of the work's actual occurrences has more or fewer members; hence the work cannot be ω.

Two possible replies to this objection are available to the supporter of the set-theoretical approach to the ontology of music, but both are seriously undermotivated. First, as Caplan and Matheson point out (2004: 133), one might resist this modal argument's conclusion by taking a Lewisian counterpart-theoretic approach to *de re* modality.[13] But such an approach fixes a high price for identifying works of music with sets of occurrences: along with other commentators, I find it counter-intuitive to suppose that a claim about how things could have stood with α really concerns how things stand with *another* object: a world-bound α-counterpart (Kripke 1980: 45–6). An account of the ontological nature of works of music that avoided such a commitment would be welcome.

[12] This point about the identity conditions of sets is well made by, among others, Peter Simons (1982: 198), David Wiggins (1980: 113), and Wolterstorff (1970: 178–80).

[13] See, e.g., Lewis 1968 and 1986. According to such a construal, a property F is essential to α just in case both it and all its counterparts are F, whilst F is accidental to α just in case α is F but some of its counterparts are not F. With this account in place, demonstrating that it is possible for a work—*qua* set ω of occurrences—to have more, fewer, or different occurrences merely requires us to introduce a counterpart relation that selects as a counterpart of ω at least one set that differs in its membership to ω.

It could, nonetheless, be argued, I suppose, that there need be no such commitment to counterpart theory, if works were identified with sets of actual *and merely possible* occurrences. This, indeed, appears to be the kind of position taken by Nelson Goodman. According to Goodman, 'the work exists as the possibility of a range of (differing) performances, each of which satisfies it' (1968: 41). However, I agree with John McDowell (1980: 210) that the thesis that there are possible but non-occurrent events is no more palatable than the thesis that there are possible but non-existent people. Such a desperate attempt to prolong the life of the set-theoretical approach is not worth the trouble it inevitably brings.

Indeed, this is especially so given the way the type/token theory neatly avoids the difficulties that beset the set-theoretical approach. The crucial difference between types and sets is this: whilst the identity of a set is determined by its membership, the identity of a type, we have noted already, is determined by the condition that something must meet to be one of its tokens. And it is this difference that enables the type/token theory to sidestep neatly the modal problem facing the set-theoretical approach. For, since the identity of a type is determined by the condition that something must meet to be one of its tokens, and not by which tokens actually exist, it follows that types do not have their instances essentially. What makes the type *K that* type is that it lays down a certain condition for something to be one of its tokens; it would still lay down this condition, and so would remain that type, even if fewer, more, or different tokens satisfied it. As a result, the type/token theorist can straightforwardly account for our modal intuitions concerning works and their occurrences without having to take on the kinds of controversial commitments that blight the set-theoretical approach.

Having said this, the history of philosophy is littered with face-value theories that have turned out to be second-best at explaining the relevant data. Not in this case, however. And, with a view to eventually demonstrating the truth of this claim, the next two sections will demonstrate that neither nominalist approaches nor anti-realist accounts of the ontology of music are to be preferred to the type/token theory. A consideration of these competitors will enable us both to further elaborate the thesis that musical works are types of sound-sequence-event and to appreciate the theory's comparative strength.

about performances and playings. And such a nominalist seeks to make her case by showing that true sentences that appear to have us ontologically committed to works of music may be paraphrased in such a way as to reveal such a commitment to be illusory. However, such a project is fraught with difficulties of both a technical and theoretical nature.

It is fair to say that, when it comes to sentences such as

(1) *In This House, On This Morning* is a suite,

the sort of paraphrase recommended by both Richard Rudner (1950) and Jay Bachrach (1971) seems natural enough. That is, the nominalist will be tempted to argue that (1) should be paraphrased as something like

(7) All performances of *In This House, On This Morning* are composed of a succession of short movements,

a sentence whose logical form may, in turn, be represented as

(8) $(\forall x)$(x is a performance of *In This House, On This Morning* $\rightarrow$ x is composed of a succession of short movements).

But we should be careful not to underestimate the difficulties that this apparently simple style of nominalistic paraphrase presents. For, as we have noted already, the predicate 'is a performance of *In This House, On This Morning*' seems to be explicitly relational, one of its constituents being a singular term referring to a work. Clearly, the nominalist must provide an analysis of this predicate that reveals the appearance of a genuine singular term within the predicate to be illusory.

This, though, is none too easy a thing to do. One option would be to treat 'is a performance of *In This House, On This Morning*', like Quine's 'is-Pegasus' (1948: 8), as an irreducible predicate. But such a move evidently cannot convince us that apparent names of works can be analysed out of all contexts: our understanding of such a Quinean predicate requires us to know the reference of the name from which it is so obviously derived. Bachrach, meanwhile, suggests that we analyse the predicate in terms of the production of scores (1971: 418–20), his favoured strategy representing the logical form of (1) as

(9) $(\forall x)$(x is a performance for which Marsalis wrote the notation during a certain time in 1992 $\rightarrow$ x is composed of a succession of short movements).

But this proposal fares no better, for it is highly implausible to suppose that apparent talk of works involves talk of the production of scores. In particular, it is possible for someone to understand (1) and yet have no idea who produced the original score and when. Bachrach's suggested paraphrase seems to demand too much knowledge from speakers.

Things get messier still when we consider sentences such as

(2) Bartok's Fifth Quartet sets people's nerves on edge

and

(3) *Straight, No Chaser* is dynamic.

For one thing that is plain is that the nominalist must come up with different styles of paraphrase for (1), (2), and (3). Clearly, someone sincerely uttering (2) need not commit herself to *every* performance of the piece setting people's teeth on edge (Wolterstorff 1970: 251). The claim, rather, is more likely to be that

(10) Most performances of Bartok's Fifth Quartet set people's teeth on edge.

And when it comes to (3), it is clear that the sentence has both descriptive and normative readings, and hence must have two nominalistic paraphrases (Snoeyembos 1979: 383–4). If (3) is read as being merely a statistical claim, then it may be paraphrased as

(11) Most performances of *Straight, No Chaser* are dynamic.

On the other hand, there is a use of (3) that is intended to convey a fact about how performances *ought* to be. Someone uttering (3) in this sense gives voice to a standard that she thinks performances should live up to. Obviously, (11) fails to do justice to the normative reading of (3), a reading that will have to be paraphrased by the nominalist as something like

(12) Any *properly formed* performance of *Straight, No Chaser* is dynamic.

One thing that the discussion thus far suggests is this: even if successful nominalistic paraphrases *are* forthcoming, they have a disappointingly 'piecemeal quality' (Loux 1998: 68). Whilst it is plausible to think that (1)–(3) have a common logical form, the nominalist, searching for ways to analyse out our apparent reference to musical works, is forced to treat them as semantically disparate. And this suspicion that the nominalist's response is *ad hoc* is confirmed by a consideration of sentences such as

(4) Marsalis composed *In This House, On This Morning*.

re: footnote
to what extent
does this view admit

The problem here is that (4) resists all of the paraphrases proposed so far: Marsalis did not compose most, all, or each properly formed performance.

Milton Snoeyembos's response to examples such as (4) is to offer a different style of paraphrase altogether, one which appeals to score-tokens rather than sound-sequence-events (1979: 384). So (4) is paraphrased as

(13) Marsalis created a score (token) of *In This House, On This Morning*,

an approach that has an obvious application to both

(5) There are more than thirty symphonies composed by Mozart

and

(6) Exactly one of Bruckner's symphonies was unfinished.

(5), presumably, will be paraphrased as

(14) There are more than thirty symphonic scores (i.e. score-tokens) created by Mozart,

whilst (6) will come out as

(15) Bruckner failed to finish exactly one of the symphonic scores (i.e. score-tokens) he created.

But besides the worry that this approach is merely an arbitrary move designed to prop up nominalism, (13)–(15) are extremely counter-intuitive paraphrases of (4)–(6) respectively. For the things that are composed by composers are surely *works of music*, not their scores. True enough, Marsalis composed the work *by* producing a score, but the score is not the thing composed: it is a *representation* of the thing composed. Furthermore, as we have noted already, some works do not have scores at all.

Perhaps alternative nominalist paraphrases of (4)–(6) are available, and perhaps the nominalist can come up with other ways of explaining away the apparently relational nature of predicates of the form 'is a performance of ϕ'; but the piecemeal nature of the nominalist's response neither does justice to our sense that the target sentences exhibit a commonality of form, nor inspires confidence that such further paraphrase will not simply invite further counter-examples.

But this is not the end of the matter. For even if *all* our talk of musical works admitted of nominalist paraphrase, this fact would not demonstrate that such talk failed to commit us ontologically to works of music. Two things need to be stressed. First, the fact (if it is fact) that (1) may be paraphrased as (7) does not of itself indicate that it is (7), rather than (1),

that reveals our ontological commitments. Given that (1) and (7) have the same meaning—that what is said in an utterance of one is the same as what is said by an utterance of the other—who is to say that (1) does not, in fact, reveal the hidden ontological commitments in (7)? Indeed, philosophers have, on occasion, argued in just this kind of way. David Lewis, for example, claims that the modal realist's case is made by the fact that we are happy to paraphrase modal sentences in such a way as to render explicit what he takes to be a hidden ontological commitment to possible worlds.[16] The moral Lewis draws is this: we should take such sentences, with their ontological commitments, at face value unless doing so leads to trouble and doing otherwise is known not to (Lewis 1973: 84).

All of which brings me on to my second point. Given that it is *prima facie* the case that (1)–(6) see us referring to, or quantifying over, musical works, we should only abandon this reading if it is shown to be unsustainable. And this certainly has not been done. Indeed, I intend to show the opposite. By the end of Chapter 5, we shall see that nothing need deter us from the natural path of treating the (apparent) names of works at face value: as names of types of sound-sequence-event. Certainly, this position has no consequence more implausible than the thesis that the things composers compose are scores, not works.

1.4 Musical Anti-Realism

An acknowledgement that works of music are repeatable, together with a recognition of the drawbacks of nominalist, set-theoretical, and property-based approaches to the categorial question, makes the type/token theory seem all the more attractive. However, the failure to find concrete, physical entities with which to identify works of music might be taken by some to indicate that we have been misguided in assuming them to be inhabitants

[16] 'It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit "ways things could have been". I believe that things could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called "ways things could have been". I prefer to call them "possible worlds"' (Lewis 1973: 84).

of the mind-independent world at all. The moral drawn by the follower of the *anti-realist* approach to the ontology of music is that such works are not fully objective denizens of the universe, but mind-dependent entities. But to my mind, this approach, too, is untenable. The remainder of this section is devoted to explaining why this is so.

Let us define *anti-realism* in the ontology of music as the doctrine that works of music are mental entities or, at least, mental constructions. Such a disjunctive definition means that the musical idealism suggested by R. G. Collingwood (1938) and, more recently, by Renée Cox (1986), as well as the constructivist view taken by David Pearce (1988), all count as anti-realist. In my view, however, no version of the view stands up to close scrutiny.

If we focus, to begin with, on the idealist thesis that musical works are to be identified with mental entities of some kind, we will note at once that it has attracted three main objections. First, in what is already emerging as something of a theme, it seems that musical works, if mental entities, would not be the kinds of things that could be heard (Levinson 1980*b*: 63). Second, and relatedly, mental entities are not, it appears, shareable (Levinson 1990*c*: 256; Pearce 1988: 105): an imagined tune before Marsalis's mind, if it is an entity at all, is a distinct entity from a remembered tune before the mind of a listener. If musical works were such mental entities, there would not be one work accessible to us all, but as many works as there were occasions on which a work was imagined, remembered, or otherwise thought about. Finally, there has tended to be a lack of clarity concerning the precise nature of the mental entities with which works of music are identified. Such entities have been claimed to be: imaginary tunes, where such things have been viewed as tunes in the composer's head (Collingwood 1988: 142); 'conceptions' (Cox: 1986: 136); as well as thoughts (Cox 1986: 136). Clearly, if an identification of musical works with mental entities is to stand a chance of convincing us, we need to know in no uncertain terms what the said mental entities are.

It is the latter problem that is the deepest source of idealism's difficulties, for, as we shall see, there is no candidate mental entity available that is suited for being identified with a work of music. For a start, it would be wildly counter-intuitive to identify *In This House, On This Morning* with a mental *event* or *state-token*. Such items, unlike works of music, are demonstrably

unrepeatable. To identify the work with, for example, a datable event of Marsalis's imagining of it would be to admit that one and the same work could not be imagined, performed, or played at any other time.

It might be alleged, however, that such a criticism merely undermines a straw man. Collingwood, for one, does not identify works with mental events; he takes works to be *objects of mental acts*. A composer's work of music, he says, is 'something imagined ... [that] exists merely as a tune in his head' (1938: 142). So, according to Collingwood, it seems that imagining a tune—having a tune run through one's mind, in other words—consists in one's standing in some quasi-perceptual relation or other to a certain mental object: a real but mental tune. But immediately, it is hard to see how this position is an improvement upon the doomed attempt to identify musical works with mental state-tokens. For, once again, there is no available explanation of how a mental item before Marsalis's mind can be one and the same entity as a mental item before the mind of someone else. To simply stipulate, as Cox does, for example, that such inner objects 'exist outside the mind of any particular perceiver ... in that they exist in the minds of other perceivers' (1986: 139) is to take for granted the phenomenon that stands in need of explanation. It can only be baffling to be told that a mental tune is an entity that can pop up in more than one mind. If we are to accept the invitation to treat tunes heard by the mind's ear as entities at all, then the entity before my mind's ear would seem to have to be a thing distinct from the entity before yours. As is the case with mental pictures, if such things exist at all, I cannot have yours, and you cannot have mine. Given that this is so, and that identity is a one–one relation, it follows that *In This House, On This Morning* cannot be identified with such an item without provoking a counter-intuitive proliferation of such works.

As if this objection were not serious enough, it in fact serves to introduce a further, deeper worry. For the philosophy of mind upon which Collingwood's ontology of music is predicated—namely, that a tune's running through one's head is a process in which one stands in a quasi-perceptual relation to a real but mental tune—has been decisively refuted by both Wittgenstein (1953: §§363–97) and Gilbert Ryle (1949: ch. 8). Collingwood assumes that the fact that one is imagining, or seemingly hearing, a tune entails that one is 'hearing' a seeming-tune (where placing 'hear' in inverted commas indicates the quasi-perceptual relation believed

to obtain between the subject and the mental item).[17] But this transition is no more valid here than in the perceptual case. 'The argument from hallucinations' fails because the fact that Macbeth seems to see a dagger does not entail that he 'sees' a seeming-dagger (Smith and Jones 1986: 98–9), so we should not assume that hearing a tune in one's head is being aware of a seeming-tune.

Furthermore, an ontology of mental tunes can only be mythical, given that neither the nature of such items, nor the kind of relation that subjects are supposed to bear to them, admit of explanation. The notion of an imagined tune gets its appearance of cogency via an intended analogy with heard tunes; but such an analogy cannot be made good: an imagined tune cannot resemble a heard tune because imagined tunes precisely *cannot* be heard—the 'mind's ear' is nothing like its literal counterpart. And when it comes to the question of the relation that the imagining subject is supposed to bear to one of these entities, the intended analogy between running a tune through in one's head and actually hearing it is of little use either. For any likeness between a tune's running though one's mind and hearing it is not a matter of both processes being (quasi-) perceptual. Having a tune run through one's head is in *no sense* perceptual, as is evident in the differences between the two processes. One can only hear what is there to be heard, and one can only hear a tune in situations in which others could do so; neither of these features is true of the phenomenon we call 'running a tune through in one's head'. Imagining a tune, too, unlike hearing it, is subject to the will: it is something one can be told to do (Wittgenstein 1980: §83), and one can, on occasion, *choose* to imagine a certain tune; neither thesis is true of hearing a tune. All in all, the supporter of Collingwood's position is forced to admit that imagined tunes are entities we know not what, to which we are related by a mental act about which we can say next to nothing.

What, then, *is* going on when I run through the first part of *In This House, On This Morning* in my head? In what does the likeness between imagining it and hearing it consist? Just this: that in hearing the tune with my 'mind's ear' I imagine that the tune is being played in my hearing (Ryle 1949: 242). And what this amounts to is this: not standing in some kind of

[17] The same assumption is made by Cox when she slides from the truism that someone may remember a work of music to the claim that 'the music of a particular work can exist *in* a perceiver's memory' (1986: 134; my italics). This latter way of putting it is not innocent, since it perpetuates the myth that the mind is a strange place in which mental objects, such as tunes, reside.

relation to ghosts of sounds, but coming up with a series of *abstentions* from producing noises that would be produced, were it to be hummed, sung, or played aloud (Ryle 1949: 255). Following a heard tune and imagining the tune are alike, not because they both involve standing in a relation to an entity (one heard, the other merely mental), but because they are both utilizations of *knowledge* of how the tune goes. Knowing the tune just consists in having such capacities (Ryle 1949: 255).

The upshot for Collingwood's account of the ontology of works of music is thus clear. True enough, his account has difficulty in explaining how musical works could be public and shareable. But the deeper objection is simpler and utterly conclusive: there exist no items of the kind with which he seeks to identify works of music.

This being so, it might be appealing for a would-be idealist to follow Cox in identifying works of music with 'conceptions (of tones, silences and relationships)' (1986: 136) or, as she sometimes puts it, 'musical thoughts' (1986: 138). But this move is no more convincing than that considered previously. If such conceptions and thoughts are *acts of thinking*, then they are datable mental events; and we have already rejected the idea that musical works can be identified with these. So what else could 'thoughts' be? Well, they could be construed as the objects of acts of thinking: propositions. But the problem here is that propositions have tended to be regarded as necessarily existent, mind-independent, and language-independent entities (Loux 1998: 137). On such a view, clearly, thoughts are not mental entities at all, and so can be of no use to the musical idealist. Other philosophers, by contrast, have denied that thoughts are anything other than mental events, rejecting the idea that propositional attitudes relate thinkers to propositions (Prior 1963). Either way, the ontology of mind resolutely refuses to offer up entities suitable for the musical idealist's project.

So what of the more sophisticated anti-realist suggestion that musical works are not mental items, but mental *constructions*? According to Pearce (1988), we should exploit a potential analogy between the ontology of music and constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics. Mathematical objects, so the constructivist's story goes, are brought into being by our mathematical practices. Nonetheless, once created, they have objective, mind-independent properties. If musical works were like this, we would have a neat way of accepting that Marsalis created *In This House, On This Morning* whilst denying that the work inhabits a private mental realm.

Works would be human creations, yet mind-independent entities. As Pearce himself puts it,

> *A musical work is a (certain kind of) mental construction, created by the activity of the composer.* Once created, however, the work has an 'objective' character in that it can be referred to, studied, performed and heard *as* a certain work with such-and-such characteristics. (Pearce 1988: 107; emphasis original)

But such a view remains a mere promissory note unless the ontological nature of such mental constructions is fully explained and defended; and it is telling that precisely this task has not even been attempted by Pearce. We have been told what Pearce thinks musical works might be *like* (viz. numbers-as-construed-by-the-intuitionist), but a simile is not a theory. Until we are told a little more, of a positive nature, about the properties had by such items, the claim that they are created and shareable can only be wish-fulfilment. Types form a long-established ontological category; musical-works-according-to-Pearce do not.

Besides facing this problem, there are two other respects in which Pearce's conception falls short when compared with the type/token theory. First, when it comes to the question of musical works' audibility, Pearce is no better off than Collingwood. The analogy between musical works and numbers breaks down because numbers, unlike works of music, cannot be heard. Pearce nowhere explains how an item characterized purely in terms of an analogy with mathematical objects can be listened to. Given what has been said already, it is plain that the type/token theorist is substantially better off when it comes to satisfying our intuitions concerning the perceptibility of musical works.

Second, Pearce offers no explanation of musical works' repeatability: that is, the one–many relation that holds between works of music and their occurrences. According to the type/token theory, of course, a sound-sequence-event's being an occurrence of *In This House, On This Morning* is a matter of the former being one of the latter's tokens: work and performance instantiate the same relation that obtains between words and their instances and between The Polar Bear (i.e. the type) and polar bears. This relation is familiar and explicable: a token *t* is a token of a type *K* just in case it meets the condition or conditions that something must meet to be a *k*. All Pearce can say, by contrast, is that '*a musical work is explicitly presented by a performance of it*' (1988: 108; emphasis original). This, however, is to label, rather than

explain, the phenomenon of a work's repeatability. The type/token theorist suggests that a work's repeatability consists in its being a type whose tokens are sound-sequence-occurrences. Pearce offers no equivalent explanation.

1.5 The Type/Token Theory Elaborated

Our brief survey of some of the type/token theory's rivals has served to reinforce its position as the face-value theory in the ontology of music. None of the other theories discussed so far manages simultaneously to explain satisfactorily the nature of a musical work's repeatability whilst doing justice to the everyday fact that we can listen to (the whole of) such works. This is not to deny that there are other available positions in metaphysical space: the conception of works of music as continuants and the view of such works as compositional actions will be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Nonetheless, a provisional moral can be drawn at this stage: we have yet to come across an objection or an alternative theory that would justify our dispensing with our *prima facie* theory. This being so, we can now go on to develop the type/token theory in more detail, refining and elaborating the claim that works of music are types of sound-event. In particular, it is time to consider in greater depth the nature of the types that are musical works.

In order to see one way in which a properly formulated version of the type/token theory must be developed, it is only necessary to consider the following problem: how is it possible for a performance of a work of music to be anything other than properly formed? How, in other words, can we explain the fact that an amateurish performance can nonetheless count as a performance (albeit flawed) of a work? To be sure, this is a problem that Richard Wollheim—one of the originators of the type/token theory—does not have the resources to solve. For Wollheim holds that some of a work's properties are *definitive* of it:[18] that is, that there are some properties that must be had by any of its token performances and playings (1968: 93). What would such definitive properties be? Presumably, at the very least, they would pertain to the pitches and durations of notes as specified by the work's score. This, however, merely yields the conclusion that any

[18] This way of putting it is due to Predelli (1995: 340). Much of my discussion is owed to his penetrating and pellucid article.



performance lacking one of these properties cannot count as a performance of the work in question: in other words, that a work cannot have clumsy or amateurish performances. My committing a single mistake in a performance of 'Never No Lament'—say, playing a G instead of a D, or holding the D for a beat too long—would mean that my performance failed to count as a performance of the piece at all. The obvious moral to draw from all this is: so much the worse for Wollheim's theory. Faulty, amateurish, and—dare one say it—incompetent performances of works are a (regrettable) fact of life; we do not regard them as necessarily failing even to count as performances of the works intended by their technically limited performers.

Of course, the supporter of Wollheim's position could, at this point, just decide to bite the bullet. But I take it that the consequence just elucidated is too outlandish to be plausible. It is akin to a position according to which, strictly speaking, words cannot be misspelt since an incorrectly spelt inscription is not a genuine token of the word in question at all. Surely, we want to say, there can be both incorrect spellings of words and incorrect performances of works of music; the issue can only be whether the type/token theorist can account for this phenomenon.

As it happens, she can. For, following Wolterstorff (1980: 54–8), we may say that works of music are *norm-types*: types that admit of both properly *and* improperly formed tokens.[19] Let us further say that a property F is *normative within* a type K just in case (i) K is a norm-type; and (ii) it is impossible for there to be something that is a properly formed token of K and which lacks F (Wolterstorff 1980: 58). Two things follow from our recognition of the existence of norm-types. First, the schematic account of the individuation of types suggested in §1.2 requires a harmless piece of emendation: the identity of a type is determined by the condition something must meet in order to be one of its tokens, *or—if the type is a norm-type—to be a correctly formed token*. Second, and crucially, if musical works are norm-types, we can explain how works of music, *qua* types, can have incorrect performances in the following way: just as long as the performance does not lack *too many* of the properties normative to the work, it nonetheless counts as a genuine, albeit incorrect, performance. Of course, the question of *how many* normative properties is *too many* does not have a precise answer, and

[19] Wolterstorff uses 'kind' where I use 'type', but he accepts that either term is acceptable (1980: 194).

is only capable of elucidation in the light of the discussion of examples. I assume, for instance, that my tenuous grasp of the score of 'Never No Lament' does not automatically disqualify my performances from counting as performances of the piece. An *unrecognizable* performance, on the other hand, is another matter entirely.

At this point, however, a sceptic may have a couple of worries: namely, that talk of a performance's being 'properly formed' implies that there is *just one* correct way of performing a work (a conclusion that is manifestly false); and that the introduction of norm-types is nothing but a purpose-built, *ad hoc* device for propping up the type/token theory. Happily, both fears are groundless. To ease the first worry, we need only appreciate that the condition that a sound-event must meet to be a properly formed token of a work may, in fact, be quite permissive and, as a result, allow a good deal of room for the performer to stamp her performance with her own interpretation. So, for example, a work's score may be unspecific in some of its demands (as was J. S. Bach's *The Art of Fugue* on the piece's instrumentation); or else the demands may be vague (e.g. if scores make use of tempo-words, words concerning articulation, and words such as 'cantabile'). Musical works, *qua* types of sound-event, leave gaps for the performer's interpretation, and hence do not prescribe exactly one correct way of performing them.

When it comes to the concern that norm-types may be *ad hoc* entities, it need only be pointed out that norm-types are common-or-garden entities. True enough, many types do not have a normative element: the type Red Thing, for example, does not have improperly formed tokens. But equally, natural kinds *are* norm-types. There can certainly be improperly formed tokens of The Domestic Dog (*Canis familiaris*): albino dogs and dogs missing an ear or a leg are nevertheless tokens of the type. And it is a truism that, just as long as an inscription is sufficiently close to being correctly formed, it counts as an inscription of a certain word, albeit one of which its author should not feel particularly proud. The moral is this: in claiming works of music to be norm-types, we are not guilty of plucking a notion out of thin air. Norm-types are part of the fabric of the universe.

Musical works are thus norm-types whose tokens are sound-sequence-events. For such a sound-sequence-event to be a properly formed token of a certain work, it must sound a certain way: it must have all of the properties

normative within the type.[20] And for it to count as a token of the work at all, it should have a sufficient number of those normative properties. But is *any* sound-sequence-event that possesses a sufficient number of the properties normative for a work *W* a genuine token of it? Or, alternatively, in order to count as a token of *W*, must the token also have been *produced* in a certain kind of way? Specifically, should we hold that only *performances* can be tokens of works, that a work's tokens must be performances *or playings*, or that a work can have tokens that are *neither* performances nor playings? Up to now, I have been assuming that the least restrictive of these accounts is correct: I have tended to describe a work's tokens as 'sound-sequence-events' rather than as 'performances' or 'performances or playings'. I shall end this section by briefly explaining this decision.

The most restrictive account of the nature of a musical work's tokens—the view of such works as *performance*-types—is, to my mind, needlessly narrow. It would be perverse to deny that a sound-sequence-event produced by playing a compact disc could be a genuine token of *In This House, On This Morning*. As Wolterstorff explains (1980: 85), in such a situation we would describe ourselves as hearing the work in the playing, and this would seem to indicate that the playing is a genuine token of the work. At this point, however, Wolterstorff resists any temptation to become any more permissive on the question, taking the preferred position to be that only performances and playings can be tokens of works, largely as a result of considering a thought-experiment such as the following.

Suppose, by some gigantic fluke, a sound-sequence were produced naturally (perhaps by the wind rattling through an empty house) that was recognizable as a note-for-note facsimile of the sounds indicated by Marsalis's score for *In This House, On This Morning*.[21] Would not this also count as an instance of the work? To my mind, there is no harm in treating such a pattern of sounds as a genuine token of *In This House, On This Morning*. First, and as Wolterstorff himself argued when considering the question of whether a work's tokens may include playings as well as performances, it would seem to be true that the work could be heard in the concrete sound-pattern, even though this pattern is produced without the intervention of human actions; once more, there seems little *prima facie*

[20] Here I assume the truth of timbral sonicism: that the only properties normative within works of music are acoustic ones. This claim will be defended in Chs. 8 and 9.

[21] This example is a variation on that discussed by Wolterstorff (1980: 84–8).

reason for denying its status as a genuine token of a piece. Second, we shall see in Chapter 8 that *performance-means properties*—that is, properties concerning how sounds are produced—are not normative within works. All that matters for whether a sound-sequence-event is a properly formed token of a work is how that token sounds. Given that this is so, there is no reason to expect that only sound-sequences produced on musical instruments, or produced by playing recordings of such sound-sequences, can be genuine work-tokens. If what makes a sound-sequence-event a properly formed token of a work has nothing to do with how its constituent sounds are produced, then the idea that a sound-sequence must be a playing or a performance takes on a distinctly gratuitous air.

Nonetheless, Wolterstorff is correct to point out that the position I am recommending has a consequence that might seem counter-intuitive. For if we allow that a work can have tokens that are neither performances nor playings, then it follows that it is possible for a work of music to be tokened before it has been composed (Wolterstorff 1980: 87). By contrast, if we restrict a work's possible tokens to performances and playings, no such consequence ensues. For someone to perform *W*, she must intend to do so, and a playing of *W* is a reproduction of sounds that were produced with that intention; so it follows that no performance or playing of *W* can take place before the work was composed and thereby made available to performers.

Ultimately, though, I doubt whether such considerations should sway a type/token theorist. For, as will swiftly become apparent in Chapter 3, types, of their very nature, are eternally existent entities. Consequently, even someone who takes musical works to be types of performance or of playing has to admit that such works *exist* before they are composed. Now, as we shall see in Chapter 5, this doctrine of musical Platonism turns out to be by no means as implausible as one might fear. But, for now, we need only accept this: that once it is agreed that works are mind-independent to the extent that they pre-exist their composition, it adds nothing *additionally* counter-intuitive to acknowledge that they may be tokened before they are composed (i.e. discovered). Indeed, if *In This House, On This Morning* is sufficiently mind-independent to have existed before Marsalis composed it, it is only natural to think that it could have had instances (of the kind envisaged in our thought-experiment) prior to its composition.

Having decided that a work's possible tokens are not simply limited to performances and playings, we are led towards the following account

once—seems to rule out the possibility of treating types as concrete, once it is acknowledged that they lack spatial parts.

In Zemach's view, however, the fact that types have no spatial parts indicates, not that they have no spatial location, but that they constitute a (neglected) ontological category: namely, that of repeatable entities that are continuous in space (1970: 239)—that is, that lack spatial parts (1970: 232)—yet which are concrete. According to Zemach, The Polar Bear, *qua* concrete entity, is present wherever there exists a token polar bear. But since The Polar Bear has no spatial parts, it cannot be merely present *in part* wherever there exists a token polar bear; the type can only be *wholly* present wherever it is tokened. As he himself puts it,

> The [P]olar [B]ear has four legs, is white, and weighs about 500 pounds. Had '[T]he [P]olar [B]ear' denoted a property, an abstract entity, or a set, all these statements were wildly false; no property has four legs, no abstract entity is white, and no set weighs 500 pounds. 'The [P]olar [B]ear' does not denote the mereological sum of all polar bears either, for that huge mass of flesh weighs considerably more than 500 pounds and has thousands of legs. The [P]olar [B]ear is therefore a concrete object, as is evidenced by the above properties it has, yet it is also repeatable; you can see *it* in its natural habitat or in a zoo. (Zemach 1989: 69)

By calling The Polar Bear 'repeatable' here, Zemach means that 'it, the whole thing *recurs*' in space (1989: 69). So, in other words, Zemach takes The Polar Bear to be a concrete entity which has no spatial parts and to which, as a result, the axiom of localization does not apply. But to my mind, such an account of the nature of types is poorly motivated and, ultimately, untenable.

Let us first of all consider the question of Zemach's motivation. In the extract above his main argument is that types must be concrete because they have properties that only concrete entities could have. The Polar Bear, for example, would be weightless were it an abstract entity, whilst The Common Elm, were it not a material object, would not be green (Zemach 1970: 240). But such arguments are powerless against a moderately sophisticated version of the orthodox view. Zemach claims that

(18) The Polar Bear has four legs

can only be true, if The Polar Bear is concrete. But if the predicate 'has four legs' means what it standardly means, then (18) cannot be true, even if the type is construed along the lines suggested by Zemach. For if The

Polar Bear is a continuant in space—if, that is, it has no spatial parts—then how can it have legs? Legs are spatial parts and have spatial parts themselves. If the problem is that of explaining how types can share properties with ordinary material things, it is all too clear that Zemach's account of types provides no solution to it.

As a result of considering examples such as these, it soon becomes apparent that much of our everyday talk about types stands in need of philosophical explication. As I mentioned in §2.2, the type-theorist is perfectly entitled to treat claims such as (16)–(22) at face value, as containing a referring expression that denotes a type or as involving quantification over types. But, once the abstract nature of types is accepted and internalized, some of the claims made about types take on a paradoxical appearance. Consider, for example,

(16) The Polar Bear is a mammal,
(17) The Ford Thunderbird is a fine car,

or, for that matter, (18). Can an abstract entity *really* feed its own young, be a car, or have four legs? Examples such as these demonstrate that it can only be mistaken to suppose that types routinely share the properties instantiated by their tokens. Richard Wollheim, for one, fails to see this, claiming that a raft of properties are transmitted from a type's tokens to the type itself: namely, 'all and only those properties that a token of a certain type has necessarily, i.e., that it has in virtue of being a token of that type' (1968: 93). 'The Union Jack', he says, 'is coloured and rectangular, properties which all its tokens have necessarily' (1968: 93). But this remark sees Wollheim failing to appreciate the consequences of his own conception of types as abstract entities (1968: 98). For if The Union Jack is an abstract entity, and if 'coloured' and 'rectangular' express the same properties they do when ascribed to tokens, it cannot be true that The Union Jack is coloured and rectangular. Types cannot have physical properties such as these.

We thus have a paradox. Claims such as (16), (17), and (18) would seem to be true, but, given the fact that types are abstract, it is difficult to see how they could be anything other than false. One way in which a type-theorist could respond to this puzzle would be to take the bull by the horns and argue that such sentences are, indeed, false. The idea would be that the sentences in question, though themselves false, are commonly used by us to convey the truths expressed by

(16*) All polar bears are mammals,
(17*) Most Ford Thunderbirds are fine cars,

and

(18*) All properly formed polar bears have four legs

respectively. The suggestion would be that we commonly utter, for example, (16)—failing to pick up on its falsehood—but that what we are really interested in getting across is the truth of (16*).

This, though, strikes me as being rather implausible. When we say that The Polar Bear is a mammal and has four legs, we surely utter a truth of some kind or other (Wolterstorff 1970: 240). What we have said is of a different order entirely from a claim that The Polar Bear is an invertebrate, or that it has a hundred legs; and the most obvious way of explaining this difference is to say that the former two claims are true, the latter two false. Consequently, given our justified unwillingness to give up the thought that the logical forms of (16), (17), (18), and the rest are as they appear, the only way of solving the puzzle is to accept what Wolterstorff terms the doctrine of 'analogical predication'(1980: 58–62). Since (16), (17), and (18) are each composed of a referring expression (referring to a type) and a predicate, and since (16), (17), and (18) are literally true, it follows that we must accept that the predicates in these sentences express different properties from the properties they express when they are applied to a concrete token. It is not that types and their tokens can share the same *properties*, but that they can share the same *predicates*: predicates that, when applied to types, express properties that are *systematically related* to the properties expressed by these predicates when applied to their tokens.

To elaborate, (16), (17), and (18) are true in the same circumstances as (16*), (17*), and (18*) respectively; and the reason why this is so is that the senses of the predicates in the former sentences are supplied by the respective paraphrases. In (16), 'is a mammal' expresses the property of *being such that something cannot be a token of it unless it is a mammal*; in (17), 'is a fine car' expresses the property of *being such that most of its tokens are/will be fine cars*;[8] and in (18), 'has four legs' expresses the property of *being such*

[8] The addition of 'will be' here allows for it to be true—as it surely can be—that the Ford Thunderbird was a fine car in the period of time after it was designed but before any of its tokens were manufactured.

that something cannot be a properly formed token of it unless it has four legs.[9] The beauty of this proposal is that it preserves our intuition that (16)–(22) are true, but in such a way that we need not follow the nominalist in denying that genuine reference to a type, or quantification over types, has taken place.[10] Equally, it captures the fact that we talk about a type *by virtue of* talking about what it would be for something to be one of its tokens, without having us deny that we are really referring to a type at all.

Where does this leave Zemach's alternative conception of types as concrete entities lacking spatial parts? Crucially, the presumed motivation for Zemach's account has been undercut. As we saw earlier, Zemach himself cannot explain the truth of a claim such as

(18) The Polar Bear has four legs,

since, if—as he assumes—the predicate has its usual meaning, only things with spatial parts can satisfy it. Only things bound, not continuous, in space—that is, things with spatial parts—can have legs. Furthermore, we have just noted that the orthodox view of types—once allied to the doctrine of analogical predication—*can* explain how (18) and the like come to be literally true. This semantic fact is both insusceptible to the explanation that Zemach offers and capable of being explained by the orthodox conception of types that he rejects.

But besides being poorly motivated, Zemach's conception of types as *concreta* lacking spatial parts is deeply problematic in itself. First of all, and as we have noted already, there is something deeply counter-intuitive about the idea that types can be concrete entities, literally possessing properties such as *being located in London Zoo*, *having four legs*, and *weighing 500 pounds*, yet lack spatial parts. For such properties can be possessed only by things that *occupy* space, and this means that such things must be divisible in space. True enough, at this point Zemach could appeal to the self-same doctrine of analogical predication that we introduced a moment ago in order to explain how it can be true that The Polar Bear can lack spatial parts and yet have four legs and weigh 500 pounds. But such a move would thereby undercut the reason for holding his view in the first place. Zemach's conception of types gains what appeal it has by purporting to explain how a type can

[9] In other words, The Polar Bear, like a work of music, is a *norm-type*.

[10] See Wolterstorff 1980: 61, for such an account of analogical predication for works of music and their tokens. Such an account will be argued for in §4.2.

is a change in Socrates, not in Xanthippe. Likewise, the fact that a type may have had more or fewer tokens, or may differ in the number of its tokens through time, does not indicate that types may genuinely have been different or can change, *in themselves*, through time: the number of tokens a type has, or can have, is determined by matters outside of itself and does not concern its intrinsic nature.[16]

So let us return to the question of whether types are dually inflexible in the sense introduced at the beginning of this section. And let us, in addition, return to the way in which they are individuated. Types, it emerged in the previous section, are ontologically thin entities: they are unstructured items individuated by the condition that something must meet to be one of their (properly formed) tokens. They are just, as it were, token-binders. Given that this is so, the only way in which a type could differ in its intrinsic properties, or could change with respect to such properties through time, would be by laying down a different condition upon potential instances, or by the condition it lays down changing over time. But it follows from the way in which types are individuated that neither of these situations is possible. For if the identity of a type is understood in terms of the condition for being one of its (properly formed) tokens, any type which lays down a different such condition is automatically a different type. Any attempt to describe a type as having changed, or a possible situation in which a type differs from the way it is actually, ends up, at best, as a description of a different type altogether.

An objector, however, will point out immediately that we *do* sometimes talk as if types are capable of both temporal and modal flexibility. For example, one might think that, as modifications were made to its design, The Ford Thunderbird—that is, the type—changed; and it is tempting to suppose that, had its designers thought a little differently, it might have been different. Such claims, however, need to be interpreted carefully. For in my view, apparent cases in which types are modally or temporally flexible can be explained away as cases in which there is more than one (inflexible) type. I shall return to this approach to explaining away the apparent flexibility of

[16] Of course, precisely how the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties should be analysed is a substantial, and thorny, philosophical question; but something like the following would seem to be correct: an *intrinsic* property of an object is one the object possesses by virtue of itself, i.e. depending on no other thing (Dunn 1990: 178). And even if this definition requires some fine-tuning, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is intuitive enough to grasp by means of the kinds of paradigmatic examples of intrinsic and extrinsic properties that I have just provided.

types in Chapter 4, when I consider the claim that musical works are dually flexible. For now, though, some examples might help the strategy to stick.

Imagine, then, that the designers of the Ford Thunderbird decided to undertake what they called 'a radical overhaul' of the car's design. Perhaps the engine is upgraded, the suspension system changed, and the chassis given a new 'look'. Here, it seems to me, we are under no obligation to regard the single type as having changed, and it is revealing that ordinary language would have us refer to the later design as a 'new version' of the car, or else as a 'Mark 2', or some such. All in all, the most intuitive description of what has gone on here is that a new car has been designed that is *based upon* the original. There are two types here, not one that has changed.

Other cases, however, are a little more complicated. Now imagine that the Ford Motor Company decides merely to increase the length of the Ford Thunderbird's wing mirrors by a quarter of an inch. Here, perhaps, it is less obvious that we should regard the new design as representing a different type of car. Nonetheless, even in cases such as this, we shall see that we have the resources to explain away the thought that the type itself has changed.

So what should we say about such a case? Well, the first thing that should be pointed out is that the example has not yet been adequately described, since we have not yet been told of the nature of the original design's instructions concerning the length of the car's wing mirrors. Specifically, we have no idea whether the original design explicitly allowed for the kind of change in the length of the wing mirrors that has taken place. So let us explore the various options by, first of all, imagining that the decision to increase the length of the car's wing mirrors *was* explicitly allowed for in the original design. (Perhaps the original design said that the length of the wing mirrors should fall within a certain range.) Here we have a case analogous to a composer's use of vague tempo-words in a score: that is to say, we have an instruction that allows the producer of the type's tokens some leeway with regard to the feature in question. In such a situation, it seems to me that the right thing to say is that the decision to increase the car's wing mirrors within the range allowed for by the original design does *not* result in the production of tokens of a different type. The Ford Thunderbird has built into it the idea that its tokens can vary (within a certain range) with respect to the length of their wing mirrors. But neither has the type *changed*, of course. It always has, and always will be, such as



to allow for such variation in its tokens. The type is unchanging but *fuzzy* with regard to this feature.

What, then, if the minimal redesign were *not* explicitly allowed for in the original design, either because a determinate length of wing mirror was specified, or because the wing mirrors' length was specified as unregulated, or even not mentioned at all? In such cases, we should revert to our original strategy: namely, that of insisting that the redesign introduces a new car-type (rather than a change in the type). For if the redesign conflicts with the original design (either by contradicting a specific instruction or by introducing a specific instruction where no such thing existed before), then it can only represent a different (albeit closely related) type.

Naturally, at this point, someone attracted to the idea that types may be modally and temporally flexible will insist that it is precisely cases of this kind that add grist to her mill. We *do*, after all, say things like 'Ford have introduced a small change to the Thunderbird'. Ultimately, though, I doubt whether any user of ordinary language would complain if this remark were unpacked as the claim that the company had developed a new type of car based upon the original Thunderbird and sharing its name. Nothing of any importance seems to hang on the idea that types are modally and temporally flexible; and, in any case, the appearance of dual flexibility can be explained away.

2.6 Conclusion

Types, I have argued, are abstract, unstructured, fixed, and unchanging. So we already have a clear idea of some of the commitments involved in the thesis that musical works are types. Crucially, however, this set of commitments is not yet complete. For, as we shall see in the next chapter, types are, by their very nature, eternally existent. As a result, and to return to this book's main concern, if *In This House, On This Morning* is a type of sound-sequence-event, it follows that Marsalis's compositional act could not have literally created the work. The work existed already.

Some, no doubt, will blanche at a conception of musical works as unstructured, fixed, unchanging, and eternally existent *abstracta*. Such

philosophers will claim that the type/token theory's cost—in the form of the commitments it imposes upon its propounder—prices it out of the market. Chapters 4 and 5 rebut this suggestion. Once the type/token theory's commitments are properly understood, we can appreciate that its explanation of musical works' repeatability actually comes cheap.

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Types II: Platonism

3.1 Introduction: Eternal Existence and Timelessness

We saw in the previous chapter that types are fixed and unchanging. But besides possessing these features, types have also tended to be regarded as items that cannot come into or go out of existence (Wolterstorff 1980: 88; Kaplan 1990: 98). But does this mean that types are eternal existents (i.e. that they exist at all times), or does it mean that they exist timelessly (i.e. that they exist but at no time)? Philosophers have been divided on this issue: Kaplan (1990: 98), for example, takes the former view, whilst Rohrbaugh (2003: 193) seems to take the latter. In this chapter I shall argue for, and defend, the thesis that types exist eternally. I shall call this view *Platonism* about types.

To begin with, though, we need to be clear about what the distinction between timeless and eternal existence consists in. A key difference is this. If an entity α exists eternally, *both* the tenseless claim

(25) α exists

and

(26) α exists at all times

are true. By contrast, the thesis that α enjoys timeless existence has it that the truth of (25) renders (26) is *senseless*. If α really is a timeless existent, then (26) makes as little sense as does the claim that the number 2 is everywhere. Indeed, if α exists timelessly, then to say that α exists now makes no more sense than saying that the number 2 is in Manchester.

So why am I so sure that a commitment to the thesis that types neither come into nor go out of existence should lead to us to view types as eternal, rather than timeless, existents? For two reasons.[1] First, treating types as timeless entities problematizes the very idea of coming into certain kinds of epistemic contact with such things. If, for example, words (i.e. word-types) cannot be said meaningfully to exist-at-a-time, then they cannot be understandable-at-a-time. For a word to be understood at t, it must exist *to be* understood at t. Likewise, assuming musical works to be types, if such types existed timelessly, then how could they be composed, performed, or listened to at various times? If an audience is to listen to a work, *qua* type, at t, then the work must be present at t: it must be available to be heard at that time.

But this is not all. For the plain fact is that a sentence ascribing eternal existence to a type, a sentence such as

(27) The Ford Thunderbird exists now, has always existed, and will always exist

does not have the patent senselessness of the claim that the number 2 is everywhere. The point about (27) is not that it makes no sense, but that it is controversial. We can make sense of it all right. If we are to be convinced that, contrary to its appearance, (27) is senseless, then we need an argument to do the job.

The problem, however, is that no such argument would seem to be forthcoming. One might, I suppose, take the senselessness of (27) to follow from the fact that the types are *changeless* (or, at least, temporally inflexible in the sense explicated in §2.5). But such reasoning would be mistaken. For although it may be plausibly argued that there cannot be time without change—that is, that a universe in which nothing underwent change would be a timeless universe—it does not follow from this that any changeless thing must be a timeless thing. As Carruthers explains (1984: 6), we can perfectly well imagine a changeless object being surrounded by changing things and, hence, existing through the times of these changes. Once it is granted that types coexist with things that change, there is no obstacle to supposing that they exist changelessly yet eternally. So, given the aforementioned objections to conceiving of types as timeless entities, my conclusion is this: to deny that types can come into existence or cease to be is to commit oneself to their existing at all times. Types exist eternally. Or so I shall argue in this chapter.

3.2 Types and Properties

No type can come into or go out of existence, and hence types—all types—exist eternally. Why do I think this? To see why, let us, first of

[1] Here I follow the enlightening discussion of eternality and timelessness in Carruthers 1984: 4–7.