In [1]: using Plots **Baseline Parameterization** In [2]: k = 6 # price_intervals $\alpha = 0.3 \# step_size$ $\delta = 0.95 \# discount_factor$ P = 0:1/k:1 # prices/action space (state space is competitor prices) # convergence if Q doesn't change for 100,000 consecutive periods (Calvano 2020, missing from Klein 2021) $conv_len = 100_000$ Out[2]: 100000 Learning **Define functions** In [3]: mutable struct Firm Q::AbstractMatrix # Q matrix ∈ M(actions, states) prices::Array # price history (save all for later calculations/plotting) end """Convert price p to index in Q matrix""" p2in(p) = Int(p * k + 1)Out[3]: p2in In [4]: """Calculate demand (linear)""" function D_i(p_i, p_j) **if** p_i < p_j 1 **-** p_i elseif p_i == p_j $0.5 * (1 - p_i)$ else end end """Calculate profit""" $\pi_{i}(p_{i}, p_{j}) = p_{i} * D_{i}(p_{i}, p_{j})$ Out [4]: π_i In [5]: """Calculate argmax but return random if multiple found""" rand_argmax(arr::Array) = rand(findall(x -> x == maximum(arr), arr)) Out[5]: rand_argmax In [6]: """Calculate argmax but return maximum if multiple found""" max argmax(arr::Array) = maximum(findall(x -> x == maximum(arr), arr)) Out[6]: max_argmax In [7]: """Return optimal strategy with ties chosen randomly""" function opt_strategy_rand(Q::Matrix, p::Number) $(rand_argmax(Q[:, p2in(p)]) - 1) / k$ end Out[7]: opt_strategy_rand In [8]: """Return optimal strategy with ties given to the max price""" function opt_strategy_max(Q::Matrix, p::Number) $(\max_{p \in \mathbb{N}} (Q[:, p2in(p)]) - 1) / k$ end Out[8]: opt_strategy_max In [9]: """Update Q matrix at time t""" function update_Q!(Q_i::Matrix, p_i::Array, p_j::Array, t::Int) ind_i , $ind_j = p2in(p_i[t])$, $p2in(p_j[t])$ prev_est = Q_i[ind_i, ind_j] $\text{new_est} = \pi_i(p_i[t], p_j[t]) + \delta * \pi_i(p_i[t], p_j[t+1]) + \delta^2 * \max(Q_i[:, p2in(p_j[t+1])])$ $Q_i[ind_i, ind_j] = (1 - \alpha) * prev_est + \alpha * new_est$ return Q_i end Out[9]: update_Q! In [10]: """Run simulation of duopoly for T periods""" function simulate_duopoly(T::Int) # initialize firms $w/t = \{1, 3\}$ Q1 = zeros(length(P), length(P)) Q2 = zeros(length(P), length(P)) prices1 = Array{Float64}(undef,T) prices2 = Array{Float64}(undef,T) prices1[1] = prices1[2] = rand(P) # t=1prices2[1] = prices2[2] = rand(P) # t=2prices1[3], prices2[3] = rand(P), prices2[2] # t=3firms = (Firm(Q1, prices1), Firm(Q2, prices2)) converged = false $prev_Q = [copy(Q1), copy(Q2)]$ unchanged = 0# update Q matricies i, j = 2, 1 # i = firm2 b/c t=4for t in 4:T # update Q at t-2 update_Q!(firms[i].Q, firms[i].prices, firms[j].prices, t-2) # update unchanged and check for convergence firms[i].Q == prev_Q[i] ? (unchanged += 1) : (unchanged = 0) unchanged == conv_len && (converged = true) prev Q[i] = copy(firms[i].Q) # set new prices $\epsilon = (0.000001)^{(t/T)}$ # $\epsilon = (1 - \theta)^{t}$ where decay parameter θ is set s.t. $\epsilon_T = .0001\%$ firms[i].prices[t] = rand() $< \epsilon$? rand(P) : opt_strategy_rand(firms[i].Q, firms[j].prices[t-1]) firms[j].prices[t] = firms[j].prices[t-1] # swap i and j b/c sequential i, j = j, iend return firms, converged end Out[10]: simulate_duopoly In [11]: """Calculate profit history given price histories""" function getprofits(prices1, prices2) profits1 = $[\pi_i(prices1[t], prices2[t])$ for t in 1:length(prices1)] profits2 = $[\pi_i(prices2[t], prices1[t])$ for t in 1:length(prices1)] profits1, profits2 end Out[11]: getprofits In [12]: """Plot price and profit histories""" function makeplots(prices1, prices2, profits1, profits2, step::Int; titled = "") x = 1:step:length(prices1) p1 = plot(x, [prices1[x] prices2[x]], ylim =(0, 1), title = "Price (every \$(step)th)") p2 = plot(x, [profits1[x] profits2[x]], title = "Profit (every \$(step)th)") plot(p1, p2, label=["Firm 1" "Firm 2"], layout=(2,1), plot_title=titled, titlelocation=:left) end Out[12]: makeplots Run experiment In [25]: T = 500_000 firms, converged = simulate_duopoly(T) firm1, firm2 = firms # calculate profit history profits1, profits2 = getprofits(firm1.prices, firm2.prices) @show converged firm1.prices[end], profits1[end], firm2.prices[end], profits2[end] converged = true Out[25]: (0.5, 0.125, 0.5, 0.125) In [26]: makeplots(firm1.prices, firm2.prices, profits1, profits2, 2_000, titled = "Learning Trajectory") Learning Trajectory Price (every 2000th) Out[26]: 1.0 Firm 1 8.0 Firm 2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.0×10^{5} 2.0×10^{5} 3.0×10^{5} 4.0×10^{5} 5.0×10^{5} Profit (every 2000th) 0.25 Firm 1 0.20 Firm 2 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0×10^{5} 1.0×10^{5} 3.0×10^{5} 4.0×10^{5} 5.0×10^{5} Performance metrics **Define metrics** In [33]: """Calculate optimal Q-function given current competitor strategy""" function optimal_Q(firm_i::Firm, firm_j::Firm; max_periods=10_000_000) main = Firm(copy(firm_i.Q), firm_i.prices[end-1:end]) comp = Firm(firm_j.Q, firm_j.prices[end-1:end]) firms = (main, comp) # loop over all action-state pairs in Q until convergence prev_Q = copy(firms[1].Q) unchanged = 0 # periods Q has remained unchanged i, j = 1, 2periods = 0while true # stop if hasnt converged periods == max_periods && break # update Q if firm is main (to get optimal) **if** i == 1 update_Q!(firms[1].Q, firms[1].prices, firms[2].prices, 1) # update unchanged and check for convergence firms $[1] \cdot Q == prev_Q ? (unchanged += 1) : (unchanged = 0)$ unchanged == conv_len && break prev_Q = copy(firms[1].Q) # set epsilon to .1 b/c cant use decay since dont know when will converge # perhaps theres a better value / way to decay? $\epsilon = .1$ firms[1].prices[2] = rand() $< \epsilon$? rand(P) : opt_strategy_rand(firms[1].Q, firms[2].prices[2]) firms[2].prices[2] = opt_strategy_max(firms[2].Q, firms[1].prices[2]) firms[j].prices[1] = firms[j].prices[2] # future price becomes current price i, j = j, iperiods += 1 end firms[1].Q end Out[33]: optimal_Q In [29]: """Calculate profitability metric := avg profit of final 1000 periods""" $\Pi_i(\text{profits}::Array{Float64}) = sum(\text{profits}[\text{end}-999:\text{end}]) / 1000$ $\Pi_{i}(profits1), \Pi_{i}(profits2)$ Out[29]: (0.125, 0.125) In [34]: """Calculate optimality metric := estimated / best-response discounted future profits""" function Γ_i(firm_i::Firm, firm_j::Firm) ind_i, ind_j = p2in(firm_i.prices[end]), p2in(firm_j.prices[end]) firm_i.Q[ind_i, ind_j] / maximum(optimal_Q(firm_i, firm_j)[:, ind_j]) end Γ_i(firm1, firm2) Out[34]: 1.0 In [35]: """Check if outcome is a Nash equilibrium""" isNash(firm_i, firm_j; tol = 0.000001) = isapprox(Γ_i (firm_i, firm_j), 1, atol = tol) && $isapprox(\Gamma_i(firm_j, firm_i), 1, atol = tol)$ isNash(firm1, firm2) Out[35]: true In [36]: best_response = optimal_Q(firm1, firm2) Out[36]: 7×7 Matrix{Float64}: 2.14344 2.14344 1.30435 2.14344 1.50902 1.53851 1.54842 2.14344 2.21288 2.08718 2.28233 1.65497 1.59299 1.54922 2.14344 2.14344 1.32877 2.36566 1.54983 1.56951 1.56043 2.375 1.33462 2.5 2.68145 1.60014 1.5716 2.375 2.25625 2.25625 1.32423 2.25625 1.63189 2.50226 2.50469 2.25625 2.25625 1.32501 2.25625 1.61265 1.55132 1.56628 2.25625 2.25625 1.29459 2.25625 1.77304 1.5543 1.53323 Competition In [55]: """Simulate competition using derived Q functions""" function compete(firm_i::Firm, firm_j::Firm, periods::Int; deviate=0) firms = (firm_i, firm_j) tprices = (Array{Float64}(undef,periods), Array{Float64}(undef,periods)) tprices[1][1] = 1i, j = 2, 1for t in 2:periods tprices[i][t] = opt_strategy_max(firms[i].Q, tprices[j][t-1]) (t == deviate) && (tprices[i][t] -= 1/k) # undercut by 1 interval tprices[j][t] = tprices[j][t-1] i, j = j, iend tprices end Out[55]: compete Comparison with firm 1's best-response Q function In [38]: tprices = compete(firm1, firm2, 20) tprofits1, tprofits2 = getprofits(tprices[1], tprices[2]) tprices_best = compete(Firm(best_response, []), firm2, 20) tprofits_best1, tprofits_best2 = getprofits(tprices_best[1], tprices_best[2]) println("Total Firm 1 current profits = ", sum(tprofits1)) println("Total Firm 1 best-response profits = ", sum(tprofits_best1)) p1 = makeplots(tprices[1], tprices[2], tprofits1, tprofits2, 1, titled="Current") p2 = makeplots(tprices_best[1], tprices_best[2], tprofits_best1, tprofits_best2, 1, titled="Best-Response") plot(p1, p2) Total Firm 1 current profits = 2.25 Total Firm 1 best-response profits = 2.25 Best-Response Current Out[38]: Price (every 1th) Price (every 1th) 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 Firm 1 0.8 8.0 Firm 2 Firm 2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 10 10 5 15 20 15 20 Profit (every 1th) Profit (every 1th) 0.25 0.25 Firm 1 Firm 1 0.20 0.20 Firm 2 Firm 2 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 10 15 20 10 15 20 5 5 Competition after a forced deviation Firm 1 deviates at t = 5. Deviation profits of 1.79 are lower than non-deviation profits of 2.25 (from best-response comparison). Firm 2 punishes Firm 1 by its reducing price further before returning to the monopoly level. In [64]: tprices = compete(firm1, firm2, 20, deviate = 5) tprofits1, tprofits2 = getprofits(tprices[1], tprices[2]) println("Total Firm 1 deviation profits = ", sum(tprofits1)) makeplots(tprices[1], tprices[2], tprofits1, tprofits2, 1, titled="Forced Deviation") Total Firm 1 deviation profits = 1.791666666666665 Forced Deviation Out[64]: Price (every 1th) 1.0 Firm 1 8.0 Firm 2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 15 10 20 Profit (every 1th) 0.25 Firm 1 0.20 Firm 2 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 10 15 20 Frequency of convergence prices on multiple runs Figure 2 in Klein 2021 had 667/1000 runs lead to a Nash equilibrium In [42]: $T = 500_000$ runs = 50 # 1000 convg_prices = Array{Tuple{Float64, Float64}}(undef,runs) nashcount = 0for i in 1:runs firms, converged = simulate_duopoly(T) convg_prices[i] = (firms[1].prices[end], firms[2].prices[end]) nashcount += isNash(firms[1], firms[2]) end In [43]: nashcount Out[43]: 33 In [44]: freq = **Dict**() for tup in convg_prices freq[tup] = get(freq, tup, 0) + 1end sorted = sort(freq, byvalue=true, rev=true) Out[44]: OrderedCollections.OrderedDict{Any, Any} with 9 entries: $(0.3333333, 0.3333333) \Rightarrow 24$ (0.5, 0.5)=> 11 (0.5, 0.333333) $(0.166667, 0.666667) \Rightarrow 3$ (0.833333, 0.5) $(0.833333, 0.666667) \Rightarrow 1$ $(0.333333, 0.166667) \Rightarrow 1$ $(0.666667, 0.666667) \Rightarrow 1$ (1.0, 0.5) => 1 In []: