

Building an Intrusion Detection System Using a Filter-Based Feature Selection Algorithm

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Abstract—Redundant and irrelevant features in data have caused a long-term problem in network traffic classification. These features not only slow down the process of classification but also prevent a classifier from making accurate decisions, especially when coping with big data. In this paper, we propose a mutual information based algorithm that analytically selects the optimal feature for classification. This mutual information based feature selection algorithm can handle linearly and nonlinearly dependent data features. Its effectiveness is evaluated in the cases of network intrusion detection. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS), named Least Square Support Vector Machine based IDS (LSSVM-IDS), is built using the features selected by our proposed feature selection algorithm. The performance of LSSVM-IDS is evaluated using three intrusion detection evaluation datasets, namely KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+ dataset. The evaluation results show that our feature selection algorithm contributes more critical features for LSSVM-IDS to achieve better accuracy and lower computational cost compared with the state-of-the-art methods.

Index Terms—Intrusion detection, feature selection, mutual information, linear correlation coefficient, least square support vector machine

1 INTRODUCTION

DESPITE increasing awareness of network security, the existing solutions remain incapable of fully protecting internet applications and computer networks against the threats from ever-advancing cyber attack techniques such as DoS attack and computer malware. Developing effective and adaptive security approaches, therefore, has become more critical than ever before. The traditional security techniques, as the first line of security defence, such as user authentication, firewall and data encryption, are insufficient to fully cover the entire landscape of network security while facing challenges from ever-evolving intrusion skills and techniques [1]. Hence, another line of security defence is highly recommended, such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Recently, an IDS alongside with anti-virus software has become an important complement to the security infrastructure of most organizations. The combination of these two lines provides a more comprehensive defence against those threats and enhances network security.

A significant amount of research has been conducted to develop intelligent intrusion detection techniques, which help achieve better network security. Bagged boosting-based on C5 decision trees [2] and Kernel Miner [3] are two of the earliest attempts to build intrusion detection schemes. Methods proposed in [4] and [5] have successfully applied

machine learning techniques, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), to classify network traffic patterns that do not match normal network traffic. Both systems were equipped with five distinct classifiers to detect normal traffic and four different types of attacks (i.e., DoS, probing, U2R and R2L). Experimental results show the effectiveness and robustness of using SVM in IDS. Mukkamala et al. [6] investigated the possibility of assembling various learning methods, including Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), SVMs and Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) to detect intrusions. They trained five different classifiers to distinguish the normal traffic from the four different types of attacks. They compared the performance of each of the learning methods with their model and found that the ensemble of ANNs, SVMs and MARS achieved the best performance in terms of classification accuracies for all the five classes. Toosi et al. [7] combined a set of neuro-fuzzy classifiers in their design of a detection system, in which a genetic algorithm was applied to optimize the structures of neuro-fuzzy systems used in the classifiers. Based on the pre-determined fuzzy inference system (i.e., classifiers), detection decision was made on the incoming traffic. Recently, we proposed an anomaly-based scheme for detecting DoS attacks [8]. The system has been evaluated on KDD Cup 99 and ISCX 2012 datasets and achieved promising detection accuracy of 99.95 and 90.12 percent respectively.

However, current network traffic data, which are often huge in size, present a major challenge to IDSs [9]. These “big data” slow down the entire detection process and may lead to unsatisfactory classification accuracy due to the computational difficulties in handling such data. Classifying a huge amount of data usually causes many mathematical difficulties which then lead to higher computational complexity. As a well-known intrusion evaluation dataset, KDD Cup 99 dataset is a typical example of large-scale datasets. This dataset consists of more than five million of

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training samples and two million of test samples respectively. Such a large scale dataset retards the building and testing processes of a classifier, or makes the classifier unable to perform due to system failures caused by insufficient memory. Furthermore, large-scale datasets usually contain noisy, redundant, or uninformative features which present critical challenges to knowledge discovery and data modeling.

To address the aforementioned problems on the methods for feature selection, we have proposed a Hybrid Feature Selection Algorithm (HFSA) in [10]. HFSA consists of two phases. The upper phase conducts a preliminary search to eliminate irrelevant and redundant features from the original data. This helps the wrapper method (the lower phase) to decrease the search range from the entire original feature space to the pre-selected features (the output of the upper phase). In this paper, we extend our work discussed in [10]. The key contributions of this paper are listed as follows.

- 1) This work proposes a new filter-based feature selection method, in which theoretical analysis of mutual information (MI) is introduced to evaluate the dependence between features and output classes. The most relevant features are retained and used to construct classifiers for respective classes. As an enhancement of Mutual Information Feature Selection (MIFS) [11] and Modified Mutual Information-based Feature Selection (MMIFS) [12], the proposed feature selection method does not have any free parameter, such as β in MIFS and MMIFS. Therefore, its performance is free from being influenced by any inappropriate assignment of value to a free parameter and can be guaranteed. Moreover, the proposed method is feasible to work in various domains, and more efficient in comparison with HFSA [10], where the computationally expensive wrapper-based feature selection mechanism is used.
- 2) We conduct complete experiments on two well-known IDS datasets in addition to the dataset used in [10]. This is very important in evaluating the performance of IDS since KDD dataset is outdated and does not contain most novel attack patterns in it. In addition, these datasets are frequently used in the literature to evaluate the performance of IDS. Moreover, these datasets have various sample sizes and different numbers of features, so they provide a lot more challenges for comprehensively testing feature selection algorithms.
- 3) Different from the detection framework proposed in [10] that designs only for binary classification, we design our proposed framework to consider multi-class classification problems. This is to show the effectiveness and the feasibility of the proposed method.

The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the related works to this study. Section 3 introduces the proposed feature selection algorithm FMIFS. Section 4 briefly describes the concept of Least Square Support Vector Machine (LS-SVM) and details the detection framework showing different detection stages involved in the proposed scheme. Section 5 presents the experimental details and

results. Finally, we draw a conclusion and discuss our future work in Section 6.

2 RELATED WORKS

2.1 Feature Selection

Feature selection is a technique for eliminating irrelevant and redundant features and selecting the most optimal subset of features that produce a better characterization of patterns belonging to different classes. Methods for feature selection are generally classified into *filter* and *wrapper* methods [12]. Filter algorithms utilize an independent measure (such as, information measures, distance measures, or consistency measures) as a criterion for estimating the relation of a set of features, while wrapper algorithms make use of particular learning algorithms to evaluate the value of features. In comparison with filter methods, wrapper methods are often much more computationally expensive when dealing with high-dimensional data or large-scale data. In this study hence, we focus on filter methods for IDS.

Due to the continuous growth of data dimensionality, feature selection as a pre-processing step is becoming an essential part in building intrusion detection systems [13]. Mukkamala and Sung [14] proposed a novel feature selection algorithm to reduce the feature space of KDD Cup 99 dataset from 41 dimensions to 6 dimensions and evaluated the 6 selected features using an IDS based on SVM. The results show that the classification accuracy increases by 1 percent when using the selected features. Chebrolu et al. [15] investigated the performance in the use of a Markov blanket model and decision tree analysis for feature selection, which showed its capability of reducing the number of features in KDD Cup 99 from 41 to 12 features. Chen et al. [16] proposed an IDS based on Flexible Neural Tree (FNT). The model applied a pre-processing feature selection phase to improve the detection performance. Using the KDD Cup 99, FNT model achieved 99.19 percent detection accuracy with only 4 features.

Recently, Amiri et al. [12] proposed a forward feature selection algorithm using the mutual information method to measure the relation among features. The optimal feature set was then used to train the LS-SVM classifier and to build the IDS. Horng et al. [17] proposed an SVM-based IDS, which combines a hierarchical clustering and the SVM. The hierarchical clustering algorithm was used to provide the classifier with fewer and higher quality training data to reduce the average training and test time and to improve the classification performance of the classifier. Experimented on the corrected labels KDD Cup 99 dataset, which includes some new attacks, the SVM-based IDS scored an overall accuracy of 95.75 percent with a false positive rate of 0.7 percent.

2.2 Performance Evaluation

All of the aforementioned detection techniques were evaluated on the KDD Cup 99 dataset. However, due to some limitations in this dataset, which will be discussed in Section 5.1, some other detection methods [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23] were evaluated using other intrusion detection datasets, such as NSL-KDD [24] and Kyoto 2006+ [25]. A dimensionality reduction method proposed in [25] was to

find the most important features involved in building a naive Bayesian classifier for intrusion detection. Experiments conducted on the NSL-KDD dataset produced encouraging results.

Chitrakar and Huang [20] proposed a Candidate Support Vector based Incremental SVM algorithm (CSV-ISVM in short). The algorithm was applied to network intrusion detection. They evaluated their CSV-ISVM-based IDS on the Kyoto 2006+ [25] dataset. Experimental results show that their IDS produced promising results in terms of detection rate and false alarm rate. The IDS was claimed to perform real-time network intrusion detection. Therefore, in this work, to make a fair comparison with those detection systems, we evaluate our proposed model on the aforementioned datasets.

3 FILTER-BASED FEATURE SELECTION

If one considers correlations between network traffic records to be linear associations, then a linear measure of dependence such as Linear Correlation Coefficient (LCC) can be used to measure the dependence between two random variables. However, considering the real world communication, the correlation between variables can be nonlinear as well. Apparently, a linear measure cannot reveal the relation between two nonlinearly dependent variables. Thus, we need a measure capable of analysing the relation between two variables no matter whether they are linearly or nonlinearly dependent. For these reasons, this work intends to explore a means of selecting optimal features from a feature space regardless of the type of correlation between them.

3.1 Feature Selection Based on Mutual Information

Mutual Information is one of the promising measures in the realm of variable dependence estimation. Uniquely, it can cope with not only linearly dependent variables but also nonlinearly dependent ones. Thus, it is chosen as the base of our proposed feature selection algorithm.

3.1.1 Mutual Information

MI is a symmetric measure of the relationship between two random variables. It yields a non-negative value, and a zero value of MI indicates that the two observed variables are statistically independent [26].

Given two continuous random variables $U = \{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_d\}$ and $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_d\}$, where d is the total number of samples, the mutual information between U and V is defined in (1),

$$I(U; V) = H(U) + H(V) - H(U, V), \quad (1)$$

where $H(U)$ and $H(V)$ are the information entropies of U and V . The information entropies are the measures of uncertainties of the random variables U and V , where $H(U) = -\int_u p(u) \log p(u) du$ and $H(V) = -\int_v p(v) \log p(v) dv$, respectively. The joint entropy of U and V is defined as $H(U, V) = -\int_u \int_v p(u, v) \log p(u, v) dudv$.

Therefore, to quantify the amount of knowledge on variable U provided by variable V (and vice versa), which is known as mutual information, (2) is used.

$$I(U; V) = \int_u \int_v p(u, v) \log \frac{p(u, v)}{p(u)p(v)} dudv, \quad (2)$$

where $p(u, v)$ is a joint probability density function (pdf), and $p(u) = \int p(u, v) dv$ and $p(v) = \int p(u, v) du$ are the marginal density functions.

For discrete variables, mutual information between two discrete random variables with a joint probability mass function $p(u, v)$ and marginal probabilities $p(u)$ and $p(v)$ is defined by replacing the integration notation with the summation notation as shown in (3),

$$I(U; V) = \sum_{u \in U} \sum_{v \in V} p(u, v) \log \frac{p(u, v)}{p(u)p(v)}. \quad (3)$$

In the case of feature selection, a feature is relevant to the class if it contains important information about the class; otherwise it is irrelevant or redundant. Since mutual information is good at quantifying the amount of information shared between two random variables, it is often used as a criterion to evaluate the relevance between a feature and a class label [27]. Under this context, features with high predictive power are the ones that have larger mutual information $I(C; f)$. On the contrary, in the case of $I(C; f)$ equal to zero, the feature f and the Class C are proven to be independent of each other. This means that feature f contributes redundancy to the classification.

However, due to the reason that the value of the MI between variables is used as a criterion to select features from the original set, any computational errors could result in a significant degradation of the accuracy of any feature selection algorithms based on this measure. Therefore, the computation of MI, which requires the estimation of pdfs or entropies from the input data instances, is not an easy task. Thus, several estimation techniques could be applied to compute MI. Histogram and kernel density estimations are the most popular estimation methods for estimating the pdfs [28], [29]. Peng et al. [30] claimed that the histogram approach was computationally efficient, but could produce a large number of estimation errors. They also stated that kernel density estimation had a high estimation quality and at the same time high computational load. Another significant challenge with histogram techniques is the restriction to a low-dimensional data space [31]. It has also been pointed out by Rossi et al. [32] that both histogram and kernel density approaches suffer from the well-known problem of high-dimensionality. As this study is working with high-dimensional data, these two estimations are inapplicable.

To avoid the aforementioned problems, in this work, the estimator proposed by Kraskov et al. [33] is applied. Unlike histogram and kernel density estimations, this technique relies on estimating the entropies of given data using the average distance from each datum to its k -nearest neighbors. The novelty of this estimator is its ability to estimate MI between two random variables of any data space. The main idea is to estimate the entropy, without knowing the densities $p(u, v)$, $p(u)$ and $p(v)$, based on the algorithm of k -nearest neighbors. More details about estimating MI can be found in [33].

3.1.2 State-of-the-Art Feature Selection Algorithms Based on Mutual Information

Several feature selection algorithms, including those in [11], [30], [34], [35], and [36], have been proposed in literature based on the principle of mutual information. Battiti's MIFS [11] is one of the earliest methods that evaluate features based on their relevance to classification. It harnesses the MI between the input and the output for each round of selection of features by calculating $I(C; f_i)$ and $I(f_s, f_i)$, where f_s and f_i are candidate features and C is a class label. MIFS selects the feature that maximises $I(C; f_i)$, which is the amount of information that feature f_i carries about the class C , and is corrected by subtracting a quantity proportional to the MI with the features selected previously. Numerous studies, including [34] and [12], have been conducted to improve Battiti's MIFS. The enhancements in all of these methods have been made on the improvement of the second criterion term as shown in Step 4 of Battiti's MIFS. However, these methods present some limitations. For example, there is not a specific guideline to select an appropriate value for the parameter β in MIFS [11], MIFS-U [34] and MMIFS [12]. In addition, the imbalance between the first and the second terms of the selection criterion in those methods has not been completely solved. More detailed and clearer explanation about these methods and their limitations can be found in Appendix A, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2016.2519914>.

3.1.3 Flexible Mutual Information Based Feature Selection

To remove the burden of setting an appropriate value for β as it is required in Battiti's MIFS, Kwak's MIFS-U and Amiri's MMIFS, a new variation of MIFS is proposed in this section. This new feature selection approach suggests an enhancement to the feature selection criterion involved in the computation of Step 4 of Battiti's MIFS algorithm (discussed in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material). Equation (4) shows a new formulation of the feature selection criterion involved, which is intended to select a feature from an initial input feature set that maximizes $I(C; f_i)$ and minimizes the average of redundancy MRs simultaneously.

$$G_{MI} = \arg \max_{f_i \in F} (I(C; f_i) - \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{f_s \in S} MR), \quad (4)$$

where $I(C; f_i)$ is the amount of information that feature f_i carries about the class C . MR, in (4), is the relative minimum redundancy of feature f_i against feature f_s and is defined by (5).

$$MR = \frac{I(f_i; f_s)}{I(C; f_i)}, \quad (5)$$

where $f_i \in F$ and $f_s \in S$. In the case of $I(C; f_i) = 0$, feature f_i can be discarded without computing (4). If f_i and f_s are relatively highly dependent with regard to $I(C; f_i)$, feature f_i will contribute to redundancy. Thus, to reduce the number of features that need to be examined, a numerical threshold $Th(= 0)$ value is applied to G_{MI} in (4) so that G_{MI} has the following properties:

- 1) If $(G_{MI} = 0)$, then the current feature f_i is irrelevant or unimportant to the output C because it cannot

provide any additional information to the classification after selecting the subset S of features. Thus, the current candidate f_i is removed from S .

- 2) If $(G_{MI} > 0)$, then the current feature f_i is relevant or important to the output C because it can provide some additional information to the classification after selecting the subset S of the feature. Thus, the current candidate f_i is added into S .
- 3) If $(G_{MI} < 0)$, then the current feature f_i is redundant to the output C because it can cause reduction in the amount of MI between the selected subset S and the output C . It is worth noting that the second term in Equation (4), which measure the redundancy among features, is larger than the first term, which measure the relevance between feature f_i and the output class. Thus, feature f_i is removed from S .

The selection process of FMIFS is demonstrated in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1. Flexible Mutual Information Based Feature Selection

Input: Feature set $F = \{f_i, i = 1, \dots, n\}$

Output: S - the selected feature subset

begin

Step 1. Initialization: set $S = \emptyset$

Step 2. Calculate $I(C; f_i)$ for each feature, $i = 1, \dots, n$

Step 3. $n_f = n$; Select the feature f_i such that:

$$\arg \max_{f_i} (I(C; f_i)), i = 1, \dots, n_f,$$

Then, set $F \leftarrow F \setminus \{f_i\}$; $S \leftarrow S \cup \{f_i\}$; $n_f = n_f - 1$.

Step 4. **while** $F \neq \emptyset$ **do**

Calculate G_{MI} in (4) to find f_i where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n_f\}$;

$n_f = n_f - 1$;

$F \leftarrow F \setminus \{f_i\}$;

if $(G_{MI} > 0)$ **then**

$S \leftarrow S \cup \{f_i\}$.

end

end

Step 5. Sort S according to the value of G_{MI} of each selected feature.

return S

3.2 Feature Selection Based on Linear Correlation Coefficient

In order to demonstrate the flexibility and effectiveness of FMIFS against feature selection based on linear dependence measure, we substitute MI by Linear Correlation Coefficient (LCC) in Algorithm 1.

LCC [37] is one of the most popular dependence measures evaluating the relationship between two random variables. Whilst LCC is fast and accurate in measuring the correlation between random linearly dependent variables, it is insensitive to nonlinear correlations. Given the two same random variables U and V of the same type, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is defined in (6).

$$\text{corr}(U; V) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (u_i - \bar{u})(v_i - \bar{v})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (u_i - \bar{u})^2 \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i - \bar{v})^2}}. \quad (6)$$




Fig. 1. The framework of the LS-SVM-based intrusion detection system.

The value of $\text{corr}(U;V)$ falls in a definite closed interval $[-1,1]$. A value close to either -1 or 1 indicates a strong relationship between the two variables. A value close to 0 infers a weak relationship between them. Algorithm 2 shows our proposed algorithm based on LCC, and this algorithm is named Flexible Linear Correlation Coefficient based Feature Selection (FLCFS). Algorithm 2 is designed to select a feature that maximises G_{corr} in (7) and to eliminate irrelevant and redundant features.

$$G_{\text{corr}} = \arg \max_{f_i \in F} (\text{corr}(C; f_i) - \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{f_s \in S} \frac{\text{corr}(f_i; f_s)}{\text{corr}(C; f_i)}). \quad (7)$$

Algorithm 2. Flexible Linear Correlation Coefficient Based Feature Selection

Input: Feature set $F = \{f_i, i = 1, \dots, n\}$

Output: S - the selected feature subset

begin

Step 1. Initialization: $S = \emptyset$

Step 2. Calculate $\text{corr}(C; f_i)$ for each feature, $i = 1, \dots, n$

Step 3. $n_f = n$; Select the feature f_i such that:

$$\arg \max_{f_i} (\text{corr}(C; f_i)), i = 1, \dots, n_f,$$

Then, set $F \leftarrow F \setminus \{f_i\}$; $S \leftarrow S \cup \{f_i\}$; $n_f = n_f - 1$.

Step 4. **while** $F \neq \emptyset$ **do**

Calculate G_{corr} in (7) to find f_i where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n_f\}$;

$n_f = n_f - 1$;

$F \leftarrow F \setminus \{f_i\}$;

if ($G_{\text{corr}} > 0$) **then**

$S \leftarrow S \cup \{f_i\}$.

end

end

Step 5. Sort S according to the value of G_{corr} of each selected feature.

return S

4 INTRUSION DETECTION FRAMEWORK BASED ON LEAST SQUARE SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE

The framework of the proposed intrusion detection system is depicted in Fig. 1. The detection framework is comprised of four main phases: (1) data collection, where sequences of network packets are collected, (2) data preprocessing, where

training and test data are preprocessed and important features that can distinguish one class from the others are selected, (3) classifier training, where the model for classification is trained using LS-SVM, and (4) attack recognition, where the trained classifier is used to detect intrusions on the test data.

Support Vector Machine is a supervised learning method [38]. It studies a given labeled dataset and constructs an optimal hyperplane in the corresponding data space to separate the data into different classes. Instead of solving the classification problem by quadratic programming, Suykens and Vandewalle [39] suggested re-framing the task of classification into a linear programming problem. They named this new formulation the Least Squares SVM (LS-SVM). LS-SVM is a generalized scheme for classification and also incurs low computation complexity in comparison with the ordinary SVM scheme [40]. One can find more details about calculating LS-SVM in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material. The following sections explain each phase in detail.

4.1 Data Collection

Data collection is the first and a critical step to intrusion detection. The type of data source and the location where data is collected from are two determinate factors in the design and the effectiveness of an IDS. To provide the best suited protection for the targeted host or networks, this study proposes a network-based IDS to test our proposed approaches. The proposed IDS runs on the nearest router to the victim(s) and monitors the inbound network traffic. During the training stage, the collected data samples are categorised with respect to the transport/Internet layer protocols and are labeled against the domain knowledge. However, the data collected in the test stage are categorised according to the protocol types only.

4.2 Data Preprocessing

The data obtained during the phase of data collection are first processed to generate the basic features such as the ones in KDD Cup 99 dataset [41]. This phase contains three main stages shown as follows.

4.2.1 Data Transferring

The trained classifier requires each record in the input data to be represented as a vector of real number. Thus, every symbolic feature in a dataset is first converted into a numerical value. For example, the KDD CUP 99 dataset contains

TABLE 1
Comparison of Feature Ranking

(a) Feature ranking results on the KDD Cup 99 dataset		
Algorithm	# Feature	Feature ranking
FMIFS	19	$f_5, f_{23}, f_6, f_3, f_{36}, f_{12}, f_{24}, f_{37}, f_2, f_{32}, f_9, f_{31}, f_{29}, f_{26}, f_{17}, f_{33}, f_{35}, f_{39}, f_{34}$
MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$)	25	$f_5, f_{23}, f_6, f_9, f_{32}, f_{18}, f_{19}, f_{15}, f_{17}, f_{16}, f_{14}, f_7, f_{20}, f_{11}, f_{21}, f_{13}, f_8, f_{22}, f_{29}, f_{31}, f_{41}, f_1, f_{26}, f_{10}, f_{37}$
MIFS ($\beta = 1$)	25	$f_5, f_7, f_{17}, f_{32}, f_{18}, f_{20}, f_9, f_{15}, f_{14}, f_{21}, f_{16}, f_8, f_{22}, f_{19}, f_{13}, f_{11}, f_{29}, f_1, f_{41}, f_{31}, f_{10}, f_{27}, f_{26}, f_{12}, f_{28}$
FLCFS	17	$f_{23}, f_{29}, f_{12}, f_{24}, f_3, f_{36}, f_{32}, f_2, f_8, f_{31}, f_{25}, f_1, f_{11}, f_{39}, f_{10}, f_4, f_{19}$

(b) Feature ranking results on the NSL-KDD dataset		
Algorithm	# Features	Feature ranking
FMIFS	18	$f_5, f_{30}, f_6, f_3, f_4, f_{29}, f_{12}, f_{33}, f_{26}, f_{37}, f_{39}, f_{34}, f_{25}, f_{38}, f_{23}, f_{35}, f_{36}, f_{28}$
MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$)	23	$f_5, f_3, f_{26}, f_9, f_{18}, f_{22}, f_{20}, f_{21}, f_{14}, f_8, f_{11}, f_{12}, f_7, f_{17}, f_{16}, f_{19}, f_1, f_{15}, f_{41}, f_{32}, f_{13}, f_{28}, f_{36}$
MIFS ($\beta = 1$)	28	$f_5, f_{22}, f_9, f_{26}, f_{18}, f_{20}, f_{14}, f_{21}, f_{16}, f_8, f_{11}, f_1, f_{17}, f_7, f_{12}, f_{19}, f_{15}, f_{40}, f_{32}, f_{13}, f_{10}, f_{28}, f_{31}, f_{27}, f_2, f_{36}, f_{23}, f_3$
FLCFS	22	$f_{29}, f_{12}, f_{33}, f_{39}, f_4, f_{23}, f_{34}, f_{25}, f_{26}, f_{38}, f_8, f_{35}, f_{19}, f_{32}, f_{18}, f_3, f_6, f_{40}, f_{30}, f_5, f_{27}, f_{22}$

(c) Feature ranking results on the Kyoto 2006+ dataset		
Algorithm	# Feature	Feature ranking
FMIFS	4	f_{19}, f_{10}, f_2, f_4
MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$)	6	$f_{19}, f_2, f_{10}, f_{16}, f_7, f_{12}$
MIFS ($\beta = 1$)	15	$f_{19}, f_7, f_{16}, f_6, f_{12}, f_{11}, f_{17}, f_{13}, f_8, f_{15}, f_{18}, f_5, f_9, f_1, f_2$
FLCFS	7	$f_{10}, f_{17}, f_2, f_{12}, f_8, f_6, f_5$

numerical as well as symbolic features. These symbolic features include the type of protocol (i.e., TCP, UDP and ICMP), service type (e.g., HTTP, FTP, Telnet and so on) and TCP status flag (e.g., SF, REJ and so on). The method simply replaces the values of the categorical attributes with numeric values.

4.2.2 Data Normalisation

An essential step of data preprocessing after transferring all symbolic attributes into numerical values is normalisation. Data normalisation is a process of scaling the value of each attribute into a well-proportioned range, so that the bias in favor of features with greater values is eliminated from the dataset. Data used in Section 5 are standardised. Every feature within each record is normalised by the respective maximum value and falls into the same range of [0-1]. The transferring and normalisation process will also be applied to test data.

4.2.3 Feature Selection

Even though every connection in a dataset is represented by various features, not all of these features are needed to build an IDS. Therefore, it is important to identify the most informative features of traffic data to achieve higher performance. In the previous section using Algorithm 1, a flexible method for the problem of feature selection, FMIFS, is developed. However, the proposed feature selection algorithms can only rank features in terms of their relevance but they cannot reveal the best number of features that are needed to train a classifier. Therefore, this study applies the same technique proposed in [12] to determine the optimal number of required features. To do so, the technique first utilises the proposed feature selection algorithm to rank all features based on their importance to the classification processes. Then, incrementally the technique adds features to the classifier one by one. The final decision of the optimal number of features in each method is taken once the highest classification accuracy in the training dataset is achieved.

The selected features for all datasets are depicted in Tables 1 [a, b, c], where each row lists the number and the indexes of the selected features with respect to the corresponding feature selection algorithm. In addition, for KDD Cup 99 and to make a comparison with those systems that have been evaluated on different types of attacks (discussed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6), we construct five classes. One of these classes contains purely the normal records and the other four hold different types of attacks (i.e., DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L), respectively. The proposed feature selection algorithm is applied to the aforementioned classes. The selected features are shown in Table 3.

4.3 Classifier Training

Once the optimal subset of features is selected, this subset is then taken into the classifier training phase where LS-SVM is employed. Since SVMs can only handle binary classification problems and because for KDD Cup 99 five optimal feature subsets are selected for all classes, five LS-SVM classifiers need to be employed. Each classifier distinguishes one class of records from the others. For example the classifier of Normal class distinguishes Normal data from non-Normal (all types of attacks). The DoS class distinguishes DoS traffic from non-DoS data (including Normal, Probe, R2L and U2R instances) and so on. The five LS-SVM classifiers are then combined to build the intrusion detection model to distinguish all different classes.

4.4 Attack Recognition

In general, it is simpler to build a classifier to distinguish between two classes than considering multiclass in a problem. This is because the decision boundaries in the first case can be simpler. The first part of the experiments in this paper uses two classes, where records matching to the normal class are reported as normal data, otherwise are considered as attacks.

Algorithm 3. Intrusion Detection Based on LS-SVM {Distinguishing Intrusive Network Traffic from Normal Network Traffic in the Case of Multiclass}

Input: LS-SVM Normal Classifier, selected features (normal class), an observed data item x
Output: L_x - the classification label of x
begin
 $L_x \leftarrow$ classification of x with LS-SVM of Normal class
if $L_x ==$ "Normal" **then**
 Return L_x
else
 do: Run Algorithm 4 to determine the class of attack
end
end

However, to deal with a problem having more than two classes, there are two popular techniques: "One-Vs-One" (OVO) and "One-Vs-All" (OVA). Given a classification problem with M classes ($M > 2$), the OVO approach on the one hand divides an M -class problem into $\frac{M*(M-1)}{2}$ binary problems. Each problem is handled by a separate binary classifier, which is responsible for separating the data of a pair of classes.

Algorithm 4. Attack Classification Based on LS-SVM

Input: LS-SVM Normal Classifier, selected features (normal class), an observed data item x
Output: L_x - the classification label of x
begin
 $L_x \leftarrow$ classification of x with LS-SVM of DoS class
if $L_x ==$ "DoS" **then**
 Return L_x
else
 $L_x \leftarrow$ classification of x with LS-SVM of Probe class
 if $L_x ==$ "Probe" **then**
 Return L_x
 else
 $L_x \leftarrow$ classification of x with LS-SVM of R2L class
 if $L_x ==$ "R2L" **then**
 Return L_x
 else
 $L_x ==$ "U2R";
 Return L_x
 end
 end
end
end

The OVA approach, on the other hand, divides an M -class problem into M binary problems. Each problem is handled by a binary classifier, which is responsible for separating the data of a single class from all other classes. Obviously, the OVO approach requires more binary classifiers than OVA. Therefore, it is more computationally intensive. Rifkin and Klautau [42] demonstrated that the OVA technique was preferred over OVO. As such, the OVA technique is applied to the proposed IDS to distinguish between normal and abnormal data using the LS-SVM method.

After completing all the aforementioned steps and the classifier is trained using the optimal subset of features which includes the most correlated and important features, the

normal and intrusion traffics can be identified by using the saved trained classifier. The test data is then directed to the saved trained model to detect intrusions. Records matching to the normal class are considered as normal data, and the other records are reported as attacks. If the classifier model confirms that the record is abnormal, the subclass of the abnormal record (type of attacks) can be used to determine the record's type. Algorithms 3 and Algorithm 4 describe the detection processes.

5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Description of the Benchmark Datasets

Currently, there are only a few public datasets available for intrusion detection evaluation. Among these datasets, the KDD Cup 99 dataset, NSL-KDD dataset and Kyoto 2006+ dataset have been commonly used in the literature to assess the performance of IDSes. According to the review by Tsai et al. [43], the majority of the IDS experiments were performed on the KDD Cup 99 datasets. In addition, these datasets have different data sizes and various numbers of features which provide comprehensive tests in validating feature selection methods. Therefore, in order to facilitate a fair and rational comparison with other state-of-the-art detection approaches, we have selected these three datasets to evaluate the performance of our detection system.

The KDD Cup 99 dataset is one of the most popular and comprehensive intrusion detection datasets and is widely applied to evaluate the performance of intrusion detection systems [43]. It consists of five different classes, which are normal and four types of attack (i.e., DoS, Probe, U2R and R2L). It contains training data with approximately five million connection records and test data with about two million connection records. Each record in these datasets is labeled as either normal or an attack, and it has 41 different quantitative and qualitative features.

The NSL-KDD is a new revised version of the KDD Cup 99 that has been proposed by Tavallaei et al. in [24]. This dataset addresses some problems included in the KDD Cup 99 dataset such as a huge number of redundant records in KDD Cup 99 data. As in the case of the KDD Cup 99 dataset, each record in the NSL-KDD dataset is composed of 41 different quantitative and qualitative features.

Each of the KDD Cup 99 and NSL-KDD benchmarks includes three different sets: training (the "10 percent KDD Cup 99" data and "KDDTrain+" respectively), test ("kddcup testdata" and "KDDTest+" respectively) and a set containing samples of new attacks previously unseen in the training data (the corrected labels KDD Cup 99 dataset and KDDTest⁻²¹ dataset respectively).

The Kyoto 2006+ dataset was presented by Song et al. [25]. The dataset covers over three years of real traffic data, over the period between November 2006 and August 2009, collected from both honeypots and regular servers that were deployed at Kyoto University. Each connection in this dataset has 24 different features.

5.2 Experimental Setup

In all experiments, the value of MI is estimated using the estimator proposed by Kraskov et al. [33] (discussed in Section 3.1). To select the best value of k used in the estimator for the approach of k -nearest neighbour, several experiments with

different values for k are conducted. Through the experiments, we have found that the best estimated value of MI was achieved when $k = 6$, which is the same as the value suggested in [33]. In addition, the control parameter β for MIFS algorithm is varied in the range of $[0,1]$, which is the range suggested in [11] and [34], with a step size of 0.1. The optimal value of β that gives the best accuracy rate is selected for a comparison with the proposed approach.

Empirical evidence shows that 0.3 is the best value for β in the three datasets, so we included the results with this optimal β value for comparison. We have also included the results with the value of β equal to 1, which is the same as the value applied in [34]. The reason of choosing different values of β is to test all possibilities of the feature rankings since the best value is undefined for the given problem. The experimental results of different values of β indicate that when the value is closer to 1 the MIFS algorithm assigns larger weights to the redundant features. In other words, the algorithm places more emphasis on the relation between input features rather than between input features and the class and vice versa.

Based on the above findings, to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed feature selection algorithm, five LSSVM-IDSs are built based on all features and the features that are chosen using four different feature selection algorithms (i.e., the proposed FMIFS, MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$), MIFS ($\beta = 1$), FLCFS), respectively, with $k = 6$. Three different datasets, namely KDD Cup 99 [41], NSL-KDD [24] and Kyoto 2006+ dataset [25], are used to evaluate the performance of these IDSs. The experimental results of the LSSVM-IDS based on FMIFS are compared with the results using the other four LSSVM-IDSs and several other state-of-the-art IDSs.

For the experiments on Kyoto 2006+ dataset, the data of 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 August 2009 are selected, which contain the latest updated data. For the experimental aims on each dataset, 152,460 samples are randomly selected. A 10-fold cross-validation is used to evaluate the detection performance of the proposed LSSVM-IDS. In addition, in order to make a comparison with the detection system proposed in [20], the same sets of data captured from 1st to 3rd November 2007 are chosen for evaluation too. The comparison results are shown in Table 6.

5.3 Performance Evaluation

Several experiments have been conducted to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the proposed LSSVM-IDS. For this purpose, the accuracy rate, detection rate, false positive rate and F -measure metrics are applied. The accuracy metric, detection rate and false positive rate are defined by

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FN + FP}, \quad (8)$$

$$\text{Detection Rate} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}, \quad (9)$$

$$\text{False Positive Rate} = \frac{FP}{FP + TN}, \quad (10)$$

where True Positive (TP) is the number of actual attacks classified as attacks, True Negative (TN) is the number of actual normal records classified as normal ones, False

Positive (FP) is the number of actual normal records classified as attacks, and False Negative (FN) is the number of actual attacks classified as normal records.

The F -measure is a harmonic mean between precision p and recall r [44]. In other words, it is a statistical technique for examining the accuracy of a system by considering both precision and recall of the system. F -measure used in this paper assigns the same weights to both Precision Rate (PR) and Recall Rate (RR), and is given by (11).

$$F\text{-measure} = \frac{2(\text{Precision} * \text{Recall})}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}}. \quad (11)$$

The precision (PR) is the proportion of predicted positives values which are actually positive. The precision value directly affects the performance of the system. A higher value of precision means a lower false positive rate and vice versa. The precision is given by (12).

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}. \quad (12)$$

The recall (RR) is another important value for measuring the performance of the detection system and to indicate the proportion of the actual number of positives which are correctly identified. The recall is defined as:

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}. \quad (13)$$

5.4 Results and Discussion

The classification performance of the intrusion detection model combined with FMIFS, MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$), MIFS ($\beta = 1$) and FLCFS and the model using all features based on the three datasets are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 2. The results clearly demonstrate that the classification performance of an IDS is enhanced by the feature selection step. In addition, the proposed feature selection algorithm FMIFS shows promising results in terms of low computational cost and high classification results.

Table 2 summarises the classification results of the different selection methods in regard to detection rates, false positive rates and accuracy rates. It shows clearly that the detection model combined with the FMIFS has achieved an accuracy rate of 99.79, 99.91 and 99.77 percent for KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+, respectively, and significantly outperforms all other methods. In addition, the proposed detection model combined with FMIFS enjoys the highest detection rate and the lowest false positive rate in comparison with other combined detection models.

The proposed feature selection algorithm is computationally efficient when it is applied to the LSSVM-IDS. Fig. 2 shows the building (training) and test times consumed by the detection model using FMIFS compared with the detection model using all features. The figure shows that the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS performs better than LSSVM-IDS with all 41 features on all datasets. There are significant differences when performing experiments on KDD Cup 99 and NSL-KDD and a slight difference on Kyoto 2006+ dataset by comparison with the two aforementioned models.

TABLE 2
Performance Classification for All Attacks Based on the Three Datasets

	KDD Cup 99			NSL-KDD			Kyoto 2006+		
	DR	FPR	Accuracy	DR	FPR	Accuracy	DR	FPR	Accuracy
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	99.46	0.13	99.79	98.76	0.28	99.91	99.64	0.13	99.77
LSSVM-IDS + MIFS ($\beta = 0.3$)	99.38	0.23	99.70	95.96	0.53	97.96	98.59	0.16	99.32
LSSVM-IDS + MIFS ($\beta = 1$)	89.26	0.34	97.63	93.26	0.47	96.75	98.10	0.58	99.12
LSSVM-IDS + FLCFS	98.47	0.61	98.41	92.29	0.41	96.45	98.07	0.82	98.99
LSSVM-IDS + All features	99.16	0.97	99.19	91.12	0.38	95.96	94.29	0.33	97.42

5.5 Comparative Study

In order to demonstrate the performance of the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS, experiments have been conducted to make comparisons with some state-of-the-art approaches. As mentioned in Section 4, the KDD Cup 99 is divided into five different classes and many experiments have been conducted on DoS, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks. Table 3 shows the selected features for the different attack classes. Tables 4, 5 and 6 depict the comparison results based on KDD Cup test, NSL-KDDTrain+ and Kyoto 2006+ datasets respectively. The results illustrated in these tables strongly indicate that the proposed detection model shows promising results compared with other models.

Table 4 shows the accuracy percentages achieved by different detection models for the five classes on KDD Cup 99 dataset. Regarding the results obtained by other authors, it can be seen that the proposed approach enjoys the best accuracy among all models in all of the classes.

Table 5 demonstrates the result achieved by LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS compared with other approaches tested on NSL-KDDTrain+ datasets in terms of the detection, false positive and accuracy rate. It is clear that LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS

enjoys the best results at 99.94 percent accuracy, 98.93 percent detection rate and 0.28 percent false positive rate.

Table 6 shows a comparison with the results achieved by CSV-ISVM proposed in [20] that has been tested on Kyoto 2006+ dataset. Through the results, both systems show continuous improvement in detection rates and reduction in false positive rates. However, the obtained results of the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS are better, compared to CSV-ISVM in any round of the iterations. The final results achieved by LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS in the 10th iteration show 97.80 and 0.43 percent of the final detection and false positive rates respectively, while CSV-ISVM produces 90.15 and 2.31 percent of the final detection and false positive rates respectively. The training and test times taken by both systems are also demonstrated in Table 6. Unlike CSV-ISVM, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS takes much less time. This is because LSSVM-

TABLE 4

Comparison Results in Terms of Accuracy Rate
with other Approaches Based on the KDD Cup 99 Dataset
(n/a Means No Available Results)

System	Normal	DoS	Probe	U2R	R2L
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	99.79	99.86	99.91	99.97	99.92
SVM with PBR [14]	99.59	99.22	99.38	99.87	99.78
SVM [6]	99.55	99.25	99.70	99.87	99.78
Bayesian Network [15]	98.78	98.95	99.57	48.00	98.93
Flexible Neural Tree [16]	99.19	98.75	98.39	99.70	99.09
SVM + PSO and FS [45]	99.45	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
SVM + SA and FS [46]	99.42	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
TUIDS [19]	94.76	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Radial SVM [5]	n/a	98.94	97.11	97.80	97.78




Fig. 2. Building and testing times of LSSVM-IDS using all features and LSSVM-IDS combined with FMIFS, respectively, on three datasets.

TABLE 3

Feature Ranking Results for the Four Types of Attacks
on the KDD Cup 99 Dataset

Class	# Feature	Feature ranking
DoS	12	$f_{23}, f_5, f_3, f_6, f_{32}, f_{24}, f_{12}, f_2, f_{37}, f_{36}, f_8, f_{31}$
Probe	19	$f_5, f_{27}, f_3, f_{35}, f_{40}, f_{37}, f_{33}, f_{17}, f_{41}, f_{30}, f_{34}, f_{28}, f_{22}, f_4, f_{24}, f_{25}, f_{19}, f_{32}, f_{29}$
U2R	23	$f_{37}, f_{17}, f_8, f_{18}, f_{16}, f_1, f_4, f_{15}, f_7, f_{22}, f_{20}, f_{21}, f_{31}, f_{19}, f_{12}, f_{13}, f_{14}, f_6, f_{32}, f_{29}, f_3, f_{40}, f_2$
R2L	15	$f_3, f_{15}, f_5, f_{10}, f_9, f_{32}, f_{33}, f_{22}, f_1, f_{17}, f_{24}, f_{11}, f_{23}, f_8, f_6$

TABLE 5

Comparison Results Based on NSL-KDD Dataset
(n/a Means No Available Results)

System	# Feature	DR	FPR	Accuracy
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	18	98.93	0.28	99.94
DMNB [47]	all	n/a	3.0	96.50
DBN-SVM [48]	all	n/a	n/a	92.84
Bi-layer behavioral-based [21]	20	n/a	n/a	99.20
TUIDS [19]	all	98.88	1.12	96.55
FVBRM [49]	24	n/a	n/a	97.78
C4.5 with linear correlation-based [50]	17	n/a	n/a	99.10
PSOM [22]	10	n/a	n/a	88.30
HTTP based IDS [23]	13	99.03	1.0	99.38
Hybrid IDS [18]	all	99.10	1.2	n/a

TABLE 6
Comparison Performance of Classification on the Kyoto 2006+ Dataset (the Days 2007, November 1, 2 and 3)

Iteration count	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS				CSV-ISVM [20]			
	DR	FPR	Train(s)	Test(s)	DR	FPR	Train(s)	Test(s)
1	96.01	0.84	0.152	0.246	79.65	4.54	1.823	7.76
2	97.01	0.64	0.296	0.396	84.72	4.03	3.463	10.363
3	97.13	0.64	0.505	0.656	85.58	3.92	5.26	15.443
4	97.18	0.64	1.140	1.343	86.08	3.80	9.662	19.532
5	97.26	0.60	1.475	1.773	86.81	3.54	11.302	22.735
6	97.32	0.57	2.228	2.643	87.24	3.33	13.593	25.887
7	97.61	0.55	3.214	3.773	88.08	3.03	14.348	28.23
8	97.61	0.53	4.343	5.172	88.10	3.01	17.475	31.615
9	97.70	0.45	5.585	6.508	89.64	2.52	23.02	35.547
10	97.80	0.43	7.275	8.408	90.15	2.31	27.257	40.097

IDS + FMIFS uses a feature selection stage that can reduce the number of needed features for the classifier to five features. These features are: {source_IP_address, service, dst_host_srv_count, destination_bytes, src_bytes}.

5.6 Additional Comparison

The performance of the LSSVM-IDS model is further compared with the PLSSVM model [12], which uses a feature selection algorithm based on the mutual information method, named MMIFS. The comparison results shown in Table 7 are based on the *Corrected Labels* sub-dataset of the KDD 99 dataset. The effectiveness of the two models is compared in three aspects: the accuracy rate, average building time and testing time in minutes.

From Table 7, it can be observed that the proposed system reduces the building time and test time very considerably for all categories. In addition, with respect to the accuracy, both models have shown promising results for all classes. It is clear from the table that LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has better accuracy in DoS, Probe and U2R classes, while the PLSSVM + MMIFS produces a better accuracy rate when applied to Normal and R2L class. Moreover, the table shows that LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS outperforms the PLSSVM + MMIFS model in the overall performance.

Furthermore, the detection rate of LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has been compared with some other approaches that have

TABLE 7
Accuracy, Building Time (min) and Test Time (min)
for All Different Classes on the *Corrected Labels* of the KDD
Cup 99 Dataset Using LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS are Compared
with Those Using PLSSVM + MMIFS Proposed by Amiri in [12]

Class Name	Model	Accuracy (%)	Building time (min)	Testing time (min)
Normal	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	98.39	7.92	5.51
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	99.1	25	11
DoS	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	98.93	10.06	4.50
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	84.11	19	8
Probe	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	99.57	13.04	8.49
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	86.12	35	13
U2R	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	99.66	0.47	0.32
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	99.47	23	10
R2L	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	90.08	1.06	0.44
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	98.70	5	4
Overall	LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	97.33	6.51	3.85
	PLSSVM + MMIFS	93.50	21.4	9.20

also been tested on the *Corrected Labels* dataset and the results are shown in Table 8. Through Table 8, compared to the KDD Cup 99 winner's detection system and other systems, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS achieves the best detection rates for U2R and R2L attacks with rates of 22.11 and 88.38 percent respectively. The detection model proposed in [17] provides the best detection rate for the Probe attack of 97.5 percent. For the normal class, all of KDD Cup 99 winner [2], Association rule [52] and PNrule [51] achieve the best result with 99.50 percent detection rate. However, overall, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has achieved the best detection rate among all systems.

Fig. 3 illustrates a comparison between LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS and the other two detection models proposed by Tsang et al. [53] in terms of *F*-measure rates. These two methods have applied the genetic-fuzzy rule mining

TABLE 8
Detection Rate (%) for Different Algorithm Performances
on the Test Dataset with *Corrected Labels* of KDD Cup 99
Dataset (n/a Means no Available Results)

System	Normal	DoS	Probe	U2R	R2L	Overall
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS	98.98	98.76	86.08	22.11	88.38	78.86
KDD'99 winner [2]	99.50	97.10	83.30	13.20	8.40	60.3
Kernel Miner [3]	99.42	97.47	84.52	11.84	7.32	60.11
PNrule [51]	99.50	96.90	73.20	6.60	10.70	57.38
SVM IDS [4]	99.3	91.6	36.65	12	22	52.31
Association rule [52]	99.50	96.80	74.90	3.8	7.9	56.58
ESC-IDS [7]	98.20	99.50	84.10	14.10	31.50	65.48
Clustering [17]	99.3	99.5	97.5	19.7	28.8	68.96
TUIDS [19]	90.01	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a




Fig. 3. Comparison results of *F*-measure rate on the *Corrected Labels* of KDD Cup 99 dataset.




Fig. 4. Comparison results of classification accuracy on KDDTest+21.

technique to evaluate the importance of IDS features. This figure, makes it obvious that the proposed model outperforms the Tsang models in most of the classes including Normal, DoS, Probe and R2L with 89.31, 99.27, 84.16 and 48.13 percent, respectively. MOGFIDS provides the highest result in U2R class of 25.09 percent. Overall, the results of the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS shown in this figure demonstrate satisfying performance improvements compared with the other two methods.

Fig. 4 shows a comparison of the proposed system with those systems proposed in [24], [54] and [55] that have been tested on the KDDTest+21 in terms of the classification accuracy. Among those systems, the proposed detection model achieved the best classification accuracy of 94.68 percent.

After all, the large number of unseen attacks in the above datasets that do not appear in the corresponding training datasets make it even harder for an IDS to detect an attack. For example, in the *Corrected Labels* dataset, Bouzida and Cuppens [56] has shown that snmpgetattck and normal records have almost the same features, and this makes it impossible for any IDS to detect this type of attacks.

6 CONCLUSION

Recent studies have shown that two main components are essential to build an IDS. They are a robust classification method and an efficient feature selection algorithm. In this paper, a supervised filter-based feature selection algorithm has been proposed, namely Flexible Mutual Information Feature Selection (FMIFS). FMIFS is an improvement over MIFS and MMIFS. FMIFS suggests a modification to Battiti's algorithm to reduce the redundancy among features. FMIFS eliminates the redundancy parameter β required in MIFS and MMIFS. This is desirable in practice since there is no specific procedure or guideline to select the best value for this parameter.

FMIFS is then combined with the LSSVM method to build an IDS. LSSVM is a least square version of SVM that works with equality constraints instead of inequality constraints in the formulation designed to solve a set of linear equations for classification problems rather than a quadratic programming problem. The proposed LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has been evaluated using three well known intrusion detection datasets: KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+ datasets. The performance of LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS on KDD Cup test data, KDDTest+ and the data, collected on 1, 2 and

3 November 2007, from Kyoto dataset has exhibited better classification performance in terms of classification accuracy, detection rate, false positive rate and F -measure than some of the existing detection approaches. In addition, the proposed LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has shown comparable results with other state-of-the-art approaches when using the *Corrected Labels* sub-dataset of the KDD Cup 99 dataset and tested on Normal, DoS, and Probe classes; it outperforms other detection models when tested on U2R and R2L classes. Furthermore, for the experiments on the KDDTest+21 dataset, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS produces the best classification accuracy compared with other detection systems tested on the same dataset. Finally, based on the experimental results achieved on all datasets, it can be concluded that the proposed detection system has achieved promising performance in detecting intrusions over computer networks. Overall, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has performed the best when compared with the other state-of-the-art models.

Although the proposed feature selection algorithm FMIFS has shown encouraging performance, it could be further enhanced by optimising the search strategy. In addition, the impact of the unbalanced sample distribution on an IDS needs to be given a careful consideration in our future studies.

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Xiangjian He is the corresponding author.

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