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The cornerstone of many of today's most prominent religions, such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam, is the idea that there is only a single God. However, much argument has gone into whether the idea that a single God, or multiple Gods is more likely, and is still a topic of debate today.

In this paper, I will be discussing Thomas Aquinas's three claims about the existence of only a single God in his book *Summa Theologiae*. More specifically, I will be explaining Aquinas's arguments, and mounting a possible objection to his claims, and then giving possible ways that he would refute those objections.

Aquinas's first argument is the argument from divine simplicity. He begins by defining the difference between particulars and universals. A particular is a trait that can only be defined to one person, such as being Socrates. In other words, having all of the attributes of Socrates makes someone Socrates, and no one else can be Socrates. However, there are universal traits that make up Socrates that can be ascribed to others, such as being a man. To be a man is not to be Socrates, but Socrates is a man. Further, I can not say anybody is Socrates, because that is particular to him. Leading off of this, Aquinas argues for there being only one God. He claims that "[being God] belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above(Question 3, Article 3)"(*Summa Theologiae* Part 1, Question 11, Article 3). In other words, divinity is particular to being God, and since it is particular, no other being can have that trait. So, no other being can be God, and therefore there is only one God.

With the premise that God is divinity, this argument becomes very plausible. An objection would have to come under the premise that what he talks about in Question 3 Article 3 has a fault in logic, not anything in the above argument.

Aquinas's second argument is the argument from God's infinity. The Principle of Indiscernibility of identicals tells us that for two things to be wholly the same, they must have the exact same properties. So, according to Aquinas, "If then many Gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other" (*Summa Theologiae* Part 1, Question 11, Article 3). These differing qualities must either be privations or perfections. Having a quality that is a privation though, would make the one God not all perfect, and thus not a God because God is all perfect. And vice versa, having a perfection that the other God lacks means that one God would be all perfect, while the other God would not be, and thus not a God. So, because the two Gods have to have different qualities in order to be different entities, and qualities can be either good or bad, it is impossible to have multiple Gods.

Aquinas's third argument is the argument from the Unity of the World. Here he argues that since there is order in the world with all of the different moving parts, something must be behind it. According to Aquinas, this must be because "many are reduced into one order by one better than by many" (*Summa Theologiae* Part 1, Question 11, Article 3). While this could be a team of beings doing this ordering, Aquinas believes that it makes most sense for a single God to, because a team of beings would not be able to create the order. So, the best explanation for what must be behind our order is God, because God is first, perfect and non-accidental.

The best possible objection to Aquinas's arguments for a single God is against his second argument. The objection relies on the premise that there can be neutral traits that are neither good nor bad. For example, different Gods could be perfect in all of the traits that matter toward being a God, but differ in the traits that are not essential to being a God. Due to this, there could be two or more Gods, all omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, but would be different beings.

In counter to this, first, I would challenge the objector to come up with a trait that is neutral. Material traits, such as a color of hair or preference of food would not work for saying that two Gods are different because God is immaterial. For immaterial traits though, I have not been able to find a possible trait that could be different that would result in both having the qualities of God. For example, one of the possibilities that I thought of was that one God could care more about the universe and things that are not alive, and another less about that and more about living creatures. However, in doing so would make the God that cares more about dead things less good, because he would be denying the natural order and goodness of things. The natural order and goodness of things goes from dead things, to alive things, to humans, then to angels, and to deny that is placing importance outside of the proper order of things.

Another example of traits that could possibly be neutral are personality traits. However, under closer examination there can not be differences in between multiple God's personalities and all be God. For example, even a seemingly neutral personality trait in today's society such as shyness, would not be applicable because one God being more shy than another could cause him to do a less good act. This line of reasoning applies for all other personality traits as well, so, as God must be all perfect, he must have perfect personality traits as well. If two God's both have the same personality traits, then we can not look there for a possible difference in between them either.

Finally, while there may be other possible traits that could differ, I would argue that even if there were a neutral trait that multiple Gods could have different, it would be nonessential to them being God. What is essential to being God is being all knowing, all good, and all powerful. Now I contend that there could be multiple all knowing beings, and multiple all good beings, but

under the assumption that God is all powerful, it would be impossible to have multiple gods.

This is because you can not have two all powerful beings. To be all powerful is to be more powerful than everything else, so to argue that both could have the quality of being all powerful is impossible. So, even if multiple Gods had different neutral traits that did not affect their godly status, I believe it would be impossible for two Gods to exist anyway.

Due to my failed attempts to find a trait that two God's could have different qualities that would not affect their godly status, and to the idea that two Gods could not both have the quality of omnipotence, I have come to the conclusion that the objection that two Gods could have neutral traits is incorrect.

Because, in my opinion, the best objection to Aquinas's arguments does not hold merit, Aquinas's arguments for a single God must be a plausible conclusion.