Illegal Drug Markets

13 November 2019

Supply Chain

• Global size of markets, 2009 ("World Drug Report" 2011)

Opium: \$68 billionCocaine: \$85 billion

• iPhone Sales: \$165 billion (2018)






Figure: Source: Reuter (2013)

Cocaine



Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.

Heroin



Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.

Cost-Price Margins (Reuter 2013)

| Table 18.1 F | Table 18.1 Price and Purity of Cocaine and Heroin from Production to Retail, ca. 2005 | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|-------------------------|--|--|
| | Cocaine—1 kilogram | | | | Heroin—1 kilogram | | | | | |
| Stage | Raw Price | Purity | 100% Pure | Location | Raw Price | Purity | 100% Pure | Location | | |
| Farm- gate | \$800 | 100% | \$800 | Colombia | \$900 | 100% | \$900 | Afghanist an | | |
| Export | \$2,200 | 91% | \$2,400 | Colombia | \$3,400 | 73% | \$4,700 | Afgn. neigh- bors | | |
| Import/ Whole- sale (Kg.) | \$14,500 | 76% | \$19,000 | Los An- geles | \$10,000 | 58% | \$17,000 | Turkey | | |
| Mid-lev- el / Whole- sale (Oz) | \$19,500 | 73% | \$27,000 | Los Angeles | \$33,000 | 50% | \$66,000 | England & Wales | | |
| Typical retail price- Country | \$78,000 | 64% | \$122,000 | United States | \$105,000 | 44% | \$239,000 | United Kingdom | | |

Retailers - Street Gangs

"Mexican DTOs and criminal groups are the principal transporters of illicit drugs into and through the Chicago HIDTA region" - DEA

"Street gangs control most retail drug distribution in the [Chicago] and are increasingly exploiting relationships with other gangs or DTOs and use of technology to advance their criminal activities" - DEA

- Some involvement in production (e.g. converting powder to crack cocaine, repackaging)
- Non-economic operating expenses dominate. . .

Operating Expenses

TABLE IV
THE IMPACT OF GANG WARS ON GANG FINANCES
Monthly Averages in 1995 Dollars

| | Preex | pansion | Postexpansion | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Category | Gang war | No gang war | Gang war | No gang war |
| Total revenues | 17,100 | 25,600 | 54,500 | 76,900 |
| Drug sales | 10,900 | 19,000 | 44,500 | 58,900 |
| Dues | 5,300 | 5,300 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Extortionary taxes | 900 | 1,300 | 0 | 8,000 |
| Total nonwage costs | 10,200 | 10,600 | 30,400 | 24,500 |
| Cost of drugs sold | 2,800 | 3,900 | 11,300 | 12,800 |
| Tribute to gang hierarchy | 1,400 | 5,000 | 5,800 | 5,900 |
| Mercenary fighters | 3,600 | 0 | 5,000 | 0 |
| Funerals/payments to families of the | | | | |
| deceased | 1,000 | 300 | 2,300 | 800 |
| Weapons | 600 | 300 | 3,000 | 1,600 |
| Miscellaneous expenses | 800 | 1,100 | 3,000 | 3,400 |
| Total gang wages | 7,900 | 6,600 | 25,600 | 37,600 |
| Officers | 1,500 | 2,900 | 2,300 | 3,800 |
| Foot soldiers | 6,400 | 3,700 | 23,300 | 33,800 |
| Net profit accruing to leader | -1,000 | 8,400 | -1,500 | 14,800 |
| Monthly wage per foot soldier | 220 | 130 | 370 | 540 |
| Price and quantity of drugs sold: | | | | |
| Quantity ("bags") | 1,442 | 2,019 | 7,556 | 8,563 |
| Price (per bag in 1995 dollars) | 7.12 | 9.54 | 5.90 | 6.86 |

Data in the table reflect monthly averages for the time periods in which a gang war is or is not ongoing, both before and after the expansion in territory. The five months corresponding to the transation period associated with the growth in territory are excluded from the table due to ambiguity about the presence or absence of a gang war. Values are based on monthly data for the four-year period. Data are unavailable for 6 for absence of a gang war. Values are based on monthly data for the four-year period. Data are unavailable for 6 for the period of the second of the

Territoriality

"If you want to expand your sales, you have to expand your street corners. You know, you have to physically take street corners, which is a violent act." - John Lippert, Bloomberg Markets

"Because crack distribution generates significant profits for street gangs, low-level rival gang members routinely engage in violence to acquire turf or steal drugs or drug proceeds" - DEA

Territoriality



Price and Violent Competition

Gang Wars

- Levitt and Venkatesh (2000)
 - Gang wars occur about 25 percent of the time
 - Gang wars result in 20-30 percent drop in prices and quantities sold
 - Death rate (annual) for members: 7 percent
- Papachristos (2009)
 - 35 percent of homicides in 1994, 1998, 2002 documented as gang-related by homicide detectives
 - 88 percent inter-gang

"In 2006 nearly 50 percent of the homicides and a large percentage of other violent crimes and property crimes committed in Chicago were attributed to street gangs that are involved in drug trafficking" - DEA

Law Enforcement and Imprisonment

"3,500 of the 13,000 inmates currently housed in the Cook County Jail have some gang affiliation" - DEA

• At any given time, 1/3 of gang leadership is imprisoned (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000)

Homicides and Non-Fatal Shootings




Figure: Source: Chicago PD

Homicides and Non-Fatal Shootings




Figure: Source: Chicago PD

Narcotics Arrests




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Narcotics Arrests




Figure: Source: Chicago PD

Questions

Labor Market for Retailers

- If retail prices are so high, why are earnings for dealers so low?
- Why is compensation so low, given risk?

Territoriality and Competition

- Why is violence so uniquely associated with black markets?
- Violence versus prices as competitive means...complements or substitutes?
- Consumers presumably can travel quickly to different territories...what benefits does 'turf' bring if not market power?

Policy

- How would increased police enforcement (seizures or arrests) affect competition (price and violent) between groups?
- Radical counterfactual: drug legalization
 - Tradeoff(?): violence versus consumption

References

Levitt, Steven D, and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. 2000. "An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang's finances." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 755–89.

Papachristos, Andrew V. 2009. "Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang Homicide." *American Journal of Sociology* 115 (1): 74–128.

Reuter, Peter. 2013. "Drug Markets and Organized Crime," no. August: 1–15.

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