

Hot-spot model of risk structured disease spread

Abstract

Superspreading is an important factor in transmission of many diseases.

Previous research either focuses on individual heterogeneity, or incorporates very specific and realistic movement and network data.

Here we introduce a minimal stochastic model that nonetheless captures the essential aspects of location specific and risk structured superspreading. We explore how this mechanism shifts the potential for large outbreaks, reshapes the epidemic curves and ultimately changes the peak and final size of outbreaks.

We find confirmation that outbreaks of diseases with superspreading are “infrequent but explosive” compared to those of similar but homogeneous infectiousness. Our predictions depart from both homogeneous models and previous models of superspreading in that we additionally find a general acceleration of the rise and fall of transmissibility of the disease caused by the self-accelerating concentration of early infections among higher risk individuals. This causes larger outbreaks in some cases, but counterintuitively smaller and less severe outbreaks in moderately to highly infectious diseases.

Significance Statement

Our research explores a model of disease outbreaks that incorporates location-specific effects (disease spreads more readily in some hot spot locations) and risk structure of the population (some people visit these locations more often). We find that such a model agrees with established understanding of “superspreading” in its assessment of the likelihood of large outbreaks taking place, but predicts some notable departures related to the size and overall development of an epidemic.

Introduction

After the SARS pandemic in 2005, researchers noted that disease transmission was not homogeneous: some small number of infected individuals – “super spreaders” – were responsible for a disproportionately large number of total infections [1]. Subsequent research noted a similar pattern in other diseases: 15% to 20% of infected individuals caused 75% to 85% of subsequent infections in diseases as diverse as measles, smallpox, monkeypox, HIV and others [3]. The COVID-19 pandemic follows a similar pattern: transmission is dominated by superspreading events (SSEs) in which a superspreading individual infects many people over a short time [6].

Many models of disease with superspreading assume individuals are more biologically infectious or have a greater number of random contacts. They find that, compared to disease with no heterogeneity in spread, outbreaks with superspreading are less likely to occur but more explosive in their early stages. The models assume some people are potential superspreaders because of their individual characteristics - their larger lung capacity allows them to exhale more of an airborne virus, they have more sexual partners, etc. - and if one of these people is among the first to be infected they will infect many more people and the disease will spread rapidly. But conversely, if the first handful of cases in a community fails to infect a potential superspreader the disease will peter out.

These models capture important characteristics of disease with skewed spread, and allow for precise understanding of how heterogeneity affects outbreaks. These models, however, assume a certain homogeneity and lack of structure in that potential super spreaders are themselves no more likely to become infected. Consider the spread of a sexually transmitted disease. Behavior around sexual partners and use of prophylaxis will make some individuals more likely to spread the disease and symmetrically more likely to become infected.¹ COVID and other airborne diseases are known to spread most readily in certain locations, making them heavily influenced by mobility and behavioral affects related to these locations.[needs citations] Some people undoubtedly spend more or less time in these locations, we wonder how the connection between probability to be infected and probability to spread to many people could influence our understanding of diseases with superspreading.

More recent efforts have of course considered movement and other more realistic nuances to try to understand superspreading. Grossmann et al run simulation experiments on realistic network models to find that network structure can have significant impacts on key aspects of epidemics [7]. Chang et

¹This has been studied previously in [Mark Kot & Dobromir Dimitrov paper]

al use finely grained mobility data to model outbreaks and predict that a small minority of locations (points of interest) are responsible for a majority of infections [8].

We feel there is an opportunity to bridge the gap between earlier simple models and these modern more realistic models with one that captures heterogeneous structural effects while remaining general enough to be analytically tractable.

To this end, we introduce an agent-based model with a simple mechanism of risk structure and location-based affects. Each agent in the model has an unchanging riskiness level that determines the frequency with which they visit a “hot spot” location, a location that could stand in for a church, bar or restaurant where disease spreads more readily. We use this model to investigate how diseases with high location-based superspreading vary from more homogeneous diseases in terms of the likelihood of an outbreak, and the peak and final size of outbreak when present. We show how some particular distributions of risk taking behavior across the population heighten these effects. Finally, we introduce analytic results that provide theoretical bases for all of these findings and allow for robust interpretation and prediction.

Agent Based hsSIR Model

The hot spot SIR (hsSIR) model begins with N individuals in a fixed population that can be one of susceptible (S), infected (I) or recovered (R) (Fig 1). Each day, each infected agent i may transmit an infection to any susceptible agent with fixed probability β_C (homogeneous community spread – Fig 1Aiii). At the same time, each agent independently visits the “hot spot” with probability ρ_i ; then disease spreads from each infected individual in the hot spot to each susceptible individual there with probability β_R (hot spot spread – Fig 1Aiii). ρ_i is fixed for each individual but varies between individuals, we consider different distributions of risk across the population and different levels of β_R and β_C (Fig 1B).

Individuals recover from infection after a fixed number of days D . We start each simulation by choosing one individual at random to be infected, and continue until all agents are either susceptible or recovered.

Computed quantities executive summary

Some quantities prove useful, in particular the basic and effective transmission numbers R_0 and R_e . These are the expected number of secondary infections per infection at the beginning of an outbreak

80 and at any time during an outbreak, respectively. We find these values to depend on the mean riskiness
81 values of the entire, susceptible and infected populations; as well the variance of the same.

quantity	description
model parameters	
β_r	hot spot spread
β_c	homogeneous community spread
D	recovery time (days)
N	total number of individuals
ρ_i	riskiness values for each individual - ρ_i is the probability that individual i visits the “hot spot” in a given day
dynamic variables	
S, I, R	set of individuals in each state of susceptible, infected and recovered
computed quantities	
$\bar{\rho}, \bar{\rho}_S, \bar{\rho}_I$	mean riskiness of the entire, susceptible (S) or infected (I) population
$\text{var}(\rho), \text{var}(\rho_I), \text{var}(\rho_S)$	variance of the riskiness values of the entire, susceptible (S) or infected (I) population
R_0	basic reproduction number
R_e	effective transmission number

82 Results

83 Large Outbreaks Less Likely with Hot Spot Spread

84 If one person in a small population or community becomes infected, they have a chance of recovering
85 before spreading the disease to anyone else; or of spreading to only a small number who themselves
86 recover before the initial infection becomes an outbreak. On the other hand, as soon as more than a very
87 small number of secondary infections happen, a larger outbreak is all but guaranteed. This probability

of a large outbreak as a result of one initial infection is a well known function of the population size and infectiousness of a disease and can be quantified accurately as the probability of disease extinction of a branching process model (See [any epidemiology textbook], or [supplementary explanation/reader of this]). Existing understanding of superspreading events suggests that increased heterogeneity in disease spread decreases the probability of a large outbreak[[2]][3].

Our hot spot model results show the same decrease in outbreak probability compared to the homogeneous case (Figure 2). As we increase the relative contribution of hot spot to homogeneous spread in our model, we find lower probability of a large outbreak. Comparing scenarios with the same R_0 and proportion of hot spot spread, we find that populations with a lower mean riskiness saw smaller probabilities of disease outbreak (Figure 2 - lines of different color diverge) – in these scenarios risk is more heavily concentrated in a smaller portion of the population so the scenario is more heterogeneous. Surprisingly, we found that the *variance* of the distribution of riskiness across the population plays no role (Figure 2 - lines of different texture are indistinguishable).

Branching Process Approximation Matches ABM Findings

To better understand predicted outbreak probabilities, we follow [any epidemiology textbook], [2] and [3] and compare the results of the hot spot model to a branching process approximation in which we compute the probability of disease extinction. In the SI, we show that the extinction probability τ can be expressed as:

$$\tau = \bar{\rho}[(1 - \bar{\rho}\beta_r)(1 - \beta_c) + (1 - (1 - \bar{\rho}\beta_r)(1 - \beta_c)\tau)]^N + (1 - \bar{\rho})[(1 - \beta_c) + \beta_c\tau]^N$$

We can solve this expression implicitly for τ to yield predictions which almost perfectly match the results from the hsSIR agent-based model (Fig 2).

What can we learn from the agreement between the branching process model and the agent-based model? The branching process model ignores two factors present in the ABM: i) the early accelerative effect in an outbreak as infected agents with higher riskiness are infected first, and ii) the differences in risk distribution shapes beyond their mean. This agreement suggests that these two factors only become significant later on into an outbreak, at which point disease extinction has already become vanishingly unlikely.

114 Outbreak Sizes Increased for Small R_0 ; Decreased for Large R_0

115 Next we look at when an outbreak does occur and ask how hot spot dynamics affect the size and
 116 severity of the outbreak. We consider peak size – the largest number of infected individuals at one time
 117 – and final size – the total number of individuals infected over the entire course of the outbreak. For
 118 very low R_0 (below 1.5), we see much larger outbreaks compared to the base homogeneous model (Fig.
 119 3). Of course in the base model, an outbreak can't happen at all with an R_0 below 1.0 (on average each
 120 individual infects 1 person) – but here an outbreak within only the highest risk individuals can still
 121 happen. For moderate R_0 (between 1.5 and between 2.0-3.0), outbreaks with hot spot dynamics have
 122 a higher number of infections at their peak (larger peak size), but infect fewer individuals over their
 123 course (smaller final size) (Fig 3). And for high R_0 (above 2.0 to 3.0), outbreaks have both smaller
 124 peak and final size. These findings are consistently more pronounced for the risk distributions with (a)
 125 higher variance, and (b) lower mean riskiness (i.e. in which more α_r is higher so that more of the
 126 risk taking is concentrated in a smaller part of the population).

127 Outbreak Dynamics Driven by Rise and Fall of Effective Transmission Rate

128 During an outbreak, the effective reproduction rate R_e gives the expected number of new cases generated
 129 by an infected individual before they recover. In the homogeneous case,

$$R_e = D\beta S$$

130 On average an infected individual infects β proportion of the susceptible population S every day, and
 131 they are infected for D days. So R_e declines monotonically as the number of susceptible individuals
 132 decreases, the outbreak peaks when R_e falls below 1 and cases begin to decline.

133 In the hotspot SIR model we find an analogous expression for R_e :

$$R_e = D\beta_C S + D\bar{\rho}_S \bar{\rho}_I \beta_R S = D(\beta_c + \bar{\rho}_S \bar{\rho}_I \beta_r) S$$

134 This is almost the same as the homogeneous, except the simple parameter β is replaced by the more
 135 complex $\beta_c + \bar{\rho}_S \bar{\rho}_I \beta_r$, which depends on the mean riskiness of the susceptible and infected populations
 136 $\bar{\rho}_S$ and $\bar{\rho}_I$. This dependency drives the dynamical differences between hsSIR and (homogenous) standard

137 SIR.

138 Individuals who visit the hot spot are more likely to become infected early, pushing up the mean
 139 riskiness of the infected population $\bar{\rho}_I$ and making higher risk individuals even more likely to become
 140 infected. As these higher risk individuals leave the susceptible population by becoming infected $\bar{\rho}_I$
 141 declines. At first the susceptible population is large and the infected population is small, so this
 142 increases $\bar{\rho}_I$ more than it decreases $\bar{\rho}_S$ and creates a positive feedback loop in which R_e increases rapidly.
 143 Eventually the susceptible population decreases in size, some number of high risk individuals recover
 144 out of the infected population, and $\bar{\rho}_I$ itself starts to decline; at this point R_e begins to decrease rapidly.
 145 As we saw in the previous section, this accelerates the rise and decline of the outbreak, exacerbating
 146 diseases with low R_0 while causing diseases with high R_0 to peak earlier and lower (Fig 3).

147 **Integro-differential Equation Model Reveals Effect of Risk Distribution's** 148 **Variance**

149 As we increase N (while decreasing β_r and β_i to hold R_0 constant), the ABM tends towards a more
 150 deterministic system. In the limiting case, the behavior of the system is described perfectly by a system
 151 of integrodifferential equations.

152 Given that $\beta_{hs} = \beta_c + \bar{\rho}_S \bar{\rho}_I \beta_r$, we would like to understand how $\bar{\rho}_I$ and $\bar{\rho}_S$ change over time. In the
 153 supplement, we introduce and develop the integrodifferential equations to find:

1.
$$\frac{d}{dt} \bar{\rho}_S = -\beta_r I \bar{\rho}_I \text{Var}(\rho_s)$$

2.
$$= \bar{S} \left[\beta_c (\bar{\rho}_S - \bar{\rho}_I) + \beta_r \bar{\rho}_S \bar{\rho}_I \left((\bar{\rho}_S + \frac{\text{Var}(\rho_S)}{\bar{\rho}_S}) - \bar{\rho}_I \right) \right]$$

154 In other words:

- 155 1. The mean riskiness of the susceptible population ($\bar{\rho}_S$) decreases at a rate proportional to force of
 156 infectious spread in the hot spot (β_R), the total infected population size (I) and the variance of
 157 the distribution of riskiness in the susceptible population ($\text{var}(\rho_S)$).
- 158 2. The mean riskiness of the infected population ($\bar{\rho}_I$) evolves towards a value between $\bar{\rho}_S$ and
 159 $\bar{\rho}_S(1 + \text{Var}(\rho_S)/(\bar{\rho}_S)^2)$

160 To reiterate, we're interested in how R_e changes. The key to understanding that is finding how $\bar{\rho}_I$ and
 161 $\bar{\rho}_S$ change, and here we've found a remarkably simple expressions for $\bar{\rho}_I$'s and $\bar{\rho}_S$'s featuring $\text{var}(\rho_s)$.
 162 What this all means is that in higher variance risk distributions – i.e. in scenarios where a small number
 163 of people visit a hot spot frequently – $\bar{\rho}_S$ decreases and $\bar{\rho}_I$ initially increases faster, heightening the
 164 accelerative outbreak dynamics that eventually lead to different outcomes than the homogeneous case.

165 Discussion

166 1. Summary of findings

167 The model we develop, in agreement with general findings of diseases driven by heterogeneity and/or
 168 superspreading, finds that outbreaks are relatively less frequent or likely to occur. Most infections lead
 169 to no or few further infections, but the infection of a potential superspreader leads to an explosion in
 170 early cases. This is where our findings start to differ from the traditional superspreader story. Under
 171 less structured assumptions, as case numbers grow the heterogeneity between individuals' infectiousness
 172 matters less; as only the average infectiousness is relevant. The differences in effect are averaged out,
 173 and the standard homogeneous SIR model is a fine predictor of peak and final epidemic size.

174 In our model, early case numbers rise at the same time as the outbreak becomes increasingly concentrated
 175 among high risk individuals leading to pronounced acceleration. Then the acceleration reverses; and
 176 case numbers decline faster than would be otherwise predicted because high risk individuals have
 177 already preferentially been removed from the uninfected population. We show in the Results section
 178 how this acceleration-then-deceleration can lead to higher *or* lower peak and final numbers of infections.

179 2. Applied lessons - cite intervention timing & gravity/movement models

180 What implications does this have? Assuming hot spot effects are in play:

181 2.1 Intervetion timing and approaches.

182 People considering interventions should take away a few lessons.

183 The timing of interventions should consider which risk segment of the population is being targetted.
 184 Interventions targetted at high risk individuals, such as closing or limiting capacity in bars, restaurants
 185 or churches, may be significantyl less useful by the time cases are high – their intended targets are more

likely to have already been previously infected.

Conversely, such interventions targetted at high risk individuals make the most sense preventatively – i.e. in an area considered at risk of an outbreak but without high numbers of documented cases.

2.2 Forecasting disease curves

Attempts to quantify parameters such as R_0 or to predict case numbers over time and model the general development an epidemic should consider the effect that risk structure can play. One should expect that outbreaks of diseases with high degree of superspreading, especially superspreading concentrated in high risk individuals and/or moderated through location-based SSEs will grow very fast in their early stages as if heading towards higher peaks and overall extents. But then later on, things will tend to level off.

3. How this dovetails with empirical work

3.1 General movement models

Availability of cell phone data has made it possible to quantify in a very general way the frequency with which people visit specific locations, and we can use these results to think about which risk distributions (fig 1B) are most realistic. One influential recent result indicates that over broad ranges of time the number of people N_f visiting a location with frequency f is proportional to $\frac{1}{f^2}$; i.e. that frequency of visitation is power law distributed with an exponent of 2.[9] This suggests that among distributions considered in fig 1B, those with the highest variance (dotted lines) are the most realistic.

3.2 Significance of location-based effects

[References needed] suggest that airborne diseases like COVID-19 and SARS have extremely strong location effects; with infection likelihood per unit time increasing several orders of magnitude between indoor and outdoor exposure.

These two results are to say that we would expect hot spot dynamics to be very relevant in such diseases.

210 4. Limitations & future work

211 Assumptions

212 Our model makes a number of assumptions. We limit our focus to a fixed population in an isolated
213 community. We allow only a single hot-spot location. Community spread is homogeneous, and besides
214 differing riskiness values individuals are identical in their individual infectiousness and susceptibility.
215 We assume individuals’ risk taking choices don’t vary with rising case numbers.

216 Obviously none of these assumptions are realistic, but we view it as worthwhile to understand an
217 idealized case that sheds light on this specific mechanism.

218 Future and related work

219 Avenues for future work could include looking for evidence of these dynamics in emperical data, or
220 allowing risk-taking behavior to vary to understand how behavioral responses to rising case numbers
221 quantitatively affect a disease outbreak.

222 Final conclusion paragraph

223 We believe that our model provides a framework for thinking about and analyzing outbreaks of
224 disease with high location-specific affects in populations with quantifiable risk structures. We’ve
225 provided through a unique mechinism yet more reason to expect that diseases with superspreading are
226 characterized by infrequent, large outbreaks while going further to suggest that such outbreaks rise and
227 fall faster than conventionally predicted. We hope our research can provide a useful starting point for
228 future work that focuses on the role that human movement plays in the spread of disease.

229 Methods

230 Setup

231 We initialize a fixed-size population of N agents. Each agent i ($i \in [0, N)$) is characterized by a fixed
232 “riskiness” parameter $\rho_i \in [0, 1]$ that never changes, and a disease state of Susceptible (S), Infected (I)
233 or Recovered (R). We set the following parameters:

- 234 • $\beta_c \in [0, 1]$, $\ll 1$ community spread rate – the probability of disease spreading from an I to an S
235 individual through a single community contact,

- $\beta_p \in [0, 1], \ll 1$ hot-spot spread rate - the probability of disease spreading from an I to an S individual through contact in the problem-place; this is typically larger than β_c .
- D the recovery rate - the rate at which I individuals move to R (the disease lasts on average $1/\gamma$ time units).

All agents i are initially in S, and each agent's ρ_i is drawn iid. from a specific fixed distribution P over $[0, 1]$. One agent is chosen at random and moved to I to start the simulation.

Dynamics

Risk Taking Every timestep, each agent i visits the problem place with probability ρ_i .

Disease Spread All agents in the problem place make a contact with all other agents in the problem place; I individuals in this subset spread the disease to S individuals with probability β_p (problem place spread). Simultaneously, all agents (in and out of the problem place) make contact with all other agents and (I) individuals spread to (S) individuals with probability β_c (homogeneous community spread).

Recovery

(I) agents recover if they've been infected for D days. If there are no (I) agents, the simulation ends.

2.2 Investigation Procedure

To investigate how disease dynamics and outcomes differ, we compare simulations with different levels of “hot-spot” dynamics and different shapes of risk distribution P while controlling for initial basic reproduction number R_0 .

Basic Reproduction Number

The first infected agent has expected infectiousness $E[P] := \bar{\rho}$ and will recover in D timesteps. Each time step, this agent goes to the problem place with probability $\bar{\rho}$, encounters $\bar{\rho}N$ susceptible agents, and infects each of them with probability β_p . At the same time, the agent infects all other agents with probability β_c each. This leads to:

$$R_0 = D(\bar{\rho}^2\beta_p N) + D(\beta_c N) = \frac{(\bar{\rho}^2\beta_p + \beta_c)N}{\gamma}$$

259 **Effective Reproduction Number**

260 **Hot-Spot weight, Risk Distributions**

261 Using this definition we can compare scenarios where hot-spot spread contributes 1/4, 1/2 or 3/4 of
262 the expected disease spread by varying β_c and β_p , for the same R_0 .

263 Further, we can consider different shapes of the risk distribution P.

264 In particular, we use nine different Beta distributions to consider Ps with low, medium and high
265 variability; and low (1/8), medium (1/4), and high (1/4) means. These are shown in detail in [Beta
266 Distributions Figure].

267 **Procedure**

268 We consider these three proportions of hot-spot spread; and within each, nine distributions of risk
269 taking; then we run simulations for values of R_0 ranging from 0 to 8 and compare the outcomes of the
270 outbreaks to those of a similar setup with no risk taking (the homogeneous case).

271 **2.3 Other Models**

272 To aid in investigating the dynamics of the model in certain cases, we consider and analytically analyze
273 the following additional models.

274 **Branching process model**

275 When the number of infected agents is small; we use a branching process model.

276 [this is developed more in the text]

277 **2.1.3 Integrodifferential model**

278 Conversely, when the number of infected agents is large (either N is very large or the number of infected
279 agents is just large relative to N), we consider the following integrodifferential equations:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial S(\rho, t)}{\partial t} &= -\beta_c S(\rho, t) \int_0^1 I(u, t) du - \beta_r S(\rho, t) \rho \int_0^1 I(u, t) u du \\ \frac{\partial I(\rho, t)}{\partial t} &= \beta_c S(\rho, t) \int_0^1 I(u, t) du + \beta_r S(\rho, t) \rho \int_0^1 I(u, t) u du - \gamma I(\rho, t)\end{aligned}$$

280 We analyze these equations and find several useful analytic results which help to understand the general
281 or expected dynamics of the system; especially when N is large.




Figure 1: Hot spot SIR model

Figure 1. Hot spot model. (A) (i) The model starts from a standard SIR model and assigns each individual a fixed “riskiness” value between 0 and 1. (ii) Each day, individuals visit the hot spot with probability equal to their riskiness. (iii) Infected agents in the hot spot spread the disease with high transmission rate to susceptible agents in the hot spot. At the same time, all infected agents spread the disease to all susceptible agents with low transmission rate. Infected agents eventually recover and cannot be infected again, and the simulation ends when no agents are infected. (B) We consider different risk distributions for the population using beta distributions with low, medium and high mean; and low, medium and high variance. See methods for more details. (C) A single simulation starts with one infected individual in a fixed population of N individuals and tracks infected and recovered agents over time until no agents are infected. (D) We run each simulation 1,000 times with the same parameters; final outcomes (here, the total number infected over the course of the outbreak - “extent”)

293 are bimodal - they cluster tightly around values that depend heavily on the parameters, or around zero
294 (indicating that no large outbreak occurred).




Figure 2. Outbreak Probability. We say that an outbreak has occurred if at least 5% of individuals were infected over the course of a simulation. In a homogeneous model, the probability of this occurring increases sharply as a function of R_0 (black lines). (A) Colored lines show outbreak probability across 1,000 trials in the agent-based model as a function of R_0 for 9 different risk distributions; different panels show varying contributions of hot spot spread to R_0 . (B) Comparison of the theoretical outbreak probability (1 minus probability of extinction in the branching process approximation) is drawn in solid lines, to the agent-based model results from (A); showing excellent agreement.




Figure 2: Effects of risk distribution on epidemic peak and final size

304 **Figure 3. Effects of risk distribution on epidemic peak and final size.** (A) Colored lines show
 305 average epidemic size minus the peak predicted by a homogeneous model with the same R_0 . (B) Colored
 306 lines show average final size minus the final size predicted by a homogeneous model with the same R_0 .
 307 “Peak” is the maximum number of infected agents at any given time during a simulation, “final size” is
 308 the total number of agents experiencing infection during a simulation. We limit to simulations in which
 309 an outbreak occurred (at least 5% of the population was infected).




Figure 4. Effects of the risk distribution on epidemic curves. Top panels show how R_t in the hot spot model (purple line) rises and falls sharply, contrasted with the homogeneous model (black) in which R_t declines monotonically. Middle and bottom panels show how this affects the peak and total number of infections respectively. From left to right, with hot spot dynamics: low R_0 diseases peak higher and affect more people; medium R_0 diseases peak higher but affect fewer people; and high R_0 diseases peak lower and affect fewer people. Figures made with scenario of risk mean of 0.25, “high” risk distribution variance and 0.5 fraction of hot spot spread (middle right panel in figure 1 B, dotted purple in the center column in figure 2 and 3).

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