#### Lecture 9: Lab in Human Cognition

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#### **Agenda for Today**

- Discuss writing for lab 2
- Discuss lab 1 grades and feedback
- Background on lab 3
- (rest of time: Finish analyses for lab 2)

# First Discuss writing for lab 2

## Second Feedback about Lab 1


(will be handed back at the end of class)

# Third Background on Lab 3


(please send data!)

# **Key Question Are mental images**"pictures" or language-like symbolic representations?


(aka "Analog" versus "Propositional" representations)



Images: pictures in the mind



Propositional representations are "language-like" abstract representations. Predicates, arguments (like first order logic)




**Figure 1.** Materials and results in a typical mental rotation experiment: (a) an example of a 'different' pair of objects used by Shepard and Metzler (1971); (b) a schematic illustration of a typical mental rotation function.

- Cooper (1976)
- First measured slope for rotation for each person
- Then, participants have to mentally rotate an object.
   An object appeared at the orientation that the observer's rotation was expected.
- People were as fast as when the objects were at the same orientation, giving strong evidence that the object was actually rotated.

- More familiar object are faster to rotate
- Unfamiliar objects which are MADE familiar become faster too!!


Can you rotate just anything?



Can you rotate just anything?




- Theoretical debates
  - Kosslyn (1973) Analog representations
  - Pylyshyn (1973) Propositional representations






**Pylyshyn** 



Propositions!



**Pylyshyn** 




If it was analog why would familiarity matter?



Kosslyn


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
Analog doesn't mean literally the same as the object you know!




**Pylyshyn** 



Then what do you mean by image?




**Pylyshyn** 



"Images are like surface displays generated on a cathode ray tube by a computer." - Kosslyn and Pomerantz (1977)




**Pylyshyn** 



Noone believes that.




**Pylyshyn** 




Noone believes
that. Think
of your "living
room", you get a
picture, unlike what youd
get if it was stored
as a bitmap picture.




**Pylyshyn** 



What about this?
(Dual code theory)




John Anderson




who are you?

who are you?




**Pylyshyn** 




John Anderson, a very famous cognitive psychologist

John Anderson




Anyway...




Kosslyn


**Pylyshyn** 



There must be some kind of intermediate representation. How could you describe a picture verbally? or draw a picture of an idea?




**Pylyshyn** 



The problem with propositional theories, .... is that they may be too powerful. They possess no inherent constraints, and the theorist must add restrictions onto his theory to make it conform with experimental observations.




**Pylyshyn** 



Some things are easier with images (like seeing if three cities are on a line a map would be good). In other cases, a set of distances between cities would be good.




**Pylyshyn** 



Yes, but both representation and process must always be specified. You can't argue about what pictures are good for without specifying a corresponding process first.


John Anderson



Think about it,
doesn't your mental inner
life SEEM like pictures?
(argument from
introspection)




**Pylyshyn** 



Let's be scientists here folks.


John Anderson




Ok... LHC's mental rotation lab data suggests that people manipulate the "image"!




**Pylyshyn** 



I can make a propositional model that mimics that!
Basically you represent the shape and then apply a series of little symbolic changes to it.



**Pylyshyn** 




If that were true, you could just as well jump directly from one orientation to the next!




**Pylyshyn** 



What about images demands this?



John Anderson **Pylyshyn** 



John Anderson

I'm getting tired of this.

- "1. the picture metaphor is the only current explicit interpretation of the image theory
- 2. The frequent criticisms made of the picture metaphor are not valid. One can have a viable dual-code model involving picture and verbal representations (see Fig. 2)
- 3. The arguments for the necessity of a propositional representation are far from compelling. The best have to do with the utility of such a representation for inference making.
- 4. The arguments for imaginal representation are based on introspection, computational considerations, empirical results and physiological considerations are not convincing
- 5. It is not possible to decide between imaginal and propositional representation strictly on the basis of behavioral data
- Anderson (1978)

#### Variables

- Current interest in mental rotation
  - What are the neural systems underlying mental rotation (e.g., do they involve spatial or motor areas?)
  - Embodied cognition (like mental image theories, assume mental/perceptual representation are grounded in our actions with the world)