

# *PSCI 220: Crisis Diplomacy*

*Vanderbilt University*

*Fall 2014*

## *Course Information*

*Time* MWF 9:10 a.m.–10:00 a.m.

*Place* Crawford House 208

*Instructor* Professor Brenton Kenkel

*Email* [brenton.kenkel@vanderbilt.edu](mailto:brenton.kenkel@vanderbilt.edu)

*Office Hours* M 11:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m., Commons 324

*Course Website* <http://bkenkel.com/psci220>

## *Description*

The purpose of this class is to analyze theories of diplomacy—the management of international affairs through means other than the use of force. We will address questions like: Does a state become more or less secure when it issues threats to its adversaries? What types of states are most likely to form alliances, or honor their alliance commitments? When can third-party mediators effectively keep international disputes from escalating into war? Is “diplomatic” contact between states and terrorist groups even possible, let alone advisable for the states in question?

More broadly speaking, this class is designed to teach you how to approach international politics from a scientific standpoint. This entails developing a particular type of critical thinking: to formulate ideas about politics in terms of scientific theories, and to use empirical evidence to evaluate those theories. To this end, most of the course readings are drawn from the political science literature of the past two decades. Since the majority of such research uses quantitative analysis in one form or another, this means you will inevitably run into some math. But don’t panic! This course does not require any math background, and you will not be tested on mathematical concepts. Even when we read material with a quantitative component, our focus will be on theories, hypotheses, and research design—not mathematical details.



Photo from [Wikimedia Commons](#).

## *Grading*

Your grade in PSCI 220 consists of the following components:

- **Short Papers (20%).** You will write two short papers (5–7 pages each).<sup>1</sup> You will select the topic of each paper from a set of prompts

<sup>1</sup> Page lengths quoted assume a double-spaced document with 12-point text and 1-inch margins.

that will be handed out a week before the paper is due. The first of these papers will be due October 1, and the second will be due November 19.

- **Midterm Exam (20%).** An in-class midterm consisting of short essay questions will be held on October 6. *If you cannot be present in class on October 6, please let me know as soon as possible so that we can make alternative arrangements.*
- **Final Paper (50%).** The bulk of your grade is based on a research paper. The task of the final paper is to evaluate a hypothesis about an aspect of diplomacy in light of a historical or recent case. I will provide greater detail about the final paper assignment, including examples of good topics, in October. But you should be thinking about the paper in general terms from the start of the class. As we proceed through the schedule of readings, take time to consider which of the research questions we encounter are most interesting to you.

There are three parts to the final paper:

- *Proposal.* You will write a 1–2 page proposal summarizing (1) the research question you are going to address and (2) the historical or current-event evidence you will draw from. Proposals are due November 5. The sole purpose of the proposal is for me to ensure that your topic is relevant and manageable before you begin researching and writing your paper. The proposal itself, though required, will not be graded.
- *Presentation.* In the final week of class, each student will deliver a brief (5–10 minute) presentation in class about his or her research design and preliminary findings. One-fifth of the grade for your paper (and thus 10% of your course grade) is based on your presentation.
- *Paper.* The paper itself should be about 15 pages long, and cannot exceed 20 pages (not including references). It is due to me at 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 11, which falls within the time that would ordinarily be reserved for the final exam.
- **Class Participation (10%).** This class is a seminar, and your participation is crucial for its success. I expect you not only to attend class, but also to have completed the readings and prepared to discuss them. Your attendance, preparation, and engagement in class discussion will all be reflected in your participation grade.

## *Academic Integrity*

As in all courses at Vanderbilt, your work in PSCI 220 is governed by the Honor Code. I encourage you to discuss course material and assignments with your peers, but the written work you turn in must be solely your own. You are required to write and sign the Honor Pledge on all written assignments and examinations: “I pledge on my honor that I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.”

I have no tolerance for plagiarism. If you turn in plagiarized work, you will receive a failing grade for the course and be reported to the Honor Council. Plagiarism is not just verbatim copying and pasting—representing someone else’s ideas as your own without citing the source is also a form of plagiarism. Ignorance of what constitutes plagiarism is not an excuse or a defense. For more information about what is and is not plagiarism, refer to [the Student Handbook section on the Honor System](#). Always remember: *when in doubt, cite*.

## *Additional Concerns*

### *Special Accommodations*

If you need course accommodations due to a disability, if you have emergency medical information to share with me, or if you need special arrangements in case the building must be evacuated, please make an appointment with me or with the [Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and Disability Services Department](#) (2-4705) as soon as possible.

### *Classroom Recording*

The use of technologies for audio and video recording of lectures and other classroom activities is allowed only with the express permission of the instructor. In cases where recordings are allowed, such content is restricted to personal use only unless permission is expressly granted in writing by the instructor and by other classroom participants, including other students. Personal use is defined as use by an individual student for the purpose of studying or completing course assignments. When students have permission for personal use of recordings, they must still obtain written permission from the instructor to share recordings with others.

For students registered with EAD and who have been approved for audio or video recording of lectures and other classroom activities as a reasonable accommodation, applicable federal law requires in-

structors to permit those recordings. Such recordings are also limited to personal use, except with permission of the instructor and other students in the class.

### *Books*

The following books are required:

- M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (Longman, 1993).
- G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

### *Schedule*

The schedule of readings is tentative and is subject to change. I will inform you at least a week in advance of any changes to the required readings.

Links to all journal articles are available in the syllabus on the course website, <http://bkenkel.com/psci220/syllabus.html>. Scans of book chapters will be made available on the course's Blackboard page, which you can access via [OAK](#).

#### AUGUST 20–22: DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

- Hedley Bull, "Diplomacy and International Order," chap. 7 in *The Anarchical Society* (Columbia University Press, 1977).

#### AUGUST 25–29: DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

*No class Friday, August 29.*

- Hans Morgenthau, "Diplomacy" and "The Future of Diplomacy," chap. 31–32 in *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed. (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).
- Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Realism and Complex Interdependence," chap. 2 in *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2000).
- Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall, "The Study of Diplomacy," chap. 1 in *Essence of Diplomacy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
- *Recommended:*

- Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002): 1–30.

#### SEPTEMBER 1–5: DIPLOMACY THROUGH HISTORY

- M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, entire book.
- *Recommended:*
  - Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Cosimo Classics, 2009).

#### SEPTEMBER 8–12: THE PRACTICE OF NEGOTIATIONS

- G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, chapters 2–6.

#### SEPTEMBER 15–19: DETERRENCE

- Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chapters 1–3.
- *Recommended:*
  - Daniel Ellsberg, “The Crude Analysis of Strategy Choices,” *American Economic Review* 51, no. 2 (1961): 472–478.
  - Bruce M. Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7, no. 2 (1963): 97–109.

#### SEPTEMBER 22–26: SPIRAL MODELS VERSUS DETERRENCE

*First short paper to be assigned Wednesday, September 24.*

- Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” chap. 3 in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976).
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
- Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997): 171–201.
- *Recommended:*
  - Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 371–400.

## SEPTEMBER 29–OCTOBER 3: TESTING RATIONAL DETERRENCE THEORY

*First short paper due Wednesday, October 1.*

- Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): 143–169.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): 208–224.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (1990): 336–369.
- Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (1990): 466–501.
- *Recommended:*
  - James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (2002): 5–29.

## OCTOBER 6: MIDTERM EXAM

## OCTOBER 8–10: CONSTRUCTING ALLIANCES

*No class Friday, October 10.*

- Stephen M. Walt, “Explaining Alliance Formation,” chap. 2 in *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).
- James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 63–83.
- *Recommended:*
  - Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48, no. 3 (1966): 266–279.
  - Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, “Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816–1992,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 2 (2000): 203–227.

## OCTOBER 13–15: KEEPING ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS

*No class Friday, October 17 due to fall break.*

- Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 5 (2000): 686–699.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (1996): 109–139.
- Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004): 775–795.

#### OCTOBER 20–24: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

- Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460.
- James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–592.
- Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): 437–456.
- *Recommended:*
  - Brett Ashley Leeds, "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (1999): 979–1002.
  - Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 829–844.

#### OCTOBER 27–31: THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION

- Andrew Kydd, "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (2003): 597–611.
- Burcu Savun, "Information, Bias, and Mediation Success," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2008): 25–47.
- *Recommended:*
  - Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, "Cheap Talk," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10, no. 3 (1996): 103–118.

- Katja Favretto, “Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (2009): 248–263.
- Kyle C. Beardsley, “Pain, Pressure, and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation Incidence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 395–406.
- Shawn Ling Ramirez, “Diplomatic Flexibility in the Shadow of an Audience: The Double-Edged Sword of Private Mediation” (working paper, Emory University, 2013).

#### NOVEMBER 3–7: PEACEKEEPING

*Final paper topic proposals due Wednesday, November 5.*

- Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” *International Organization* 57, no. 2 (2003): 337–372.
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” *International Organization* 59, no. 2 (2005): 261–292.
- J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, “The Peacekeeping–Peacemaking Dilemma,” *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2005): 621–645.

#### NOVEMBER 10–14: DIPLOMACY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

*Second short paper to be assigned Wednesday, November 12.*

- Lisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 46, no. 4 (1992): 765–792.
- Jennifer Mitzen, “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres,” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 401–417.
- Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett, “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace,” *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (2006): 969–1000.
- *Recommended:*
  - Alexander Thompson, “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission,” *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 1–34.
  - Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organization” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32.



## NOVEMBER 17–21: NEGOTIATING WITH NON-STATE ACTORS

*Second short paper due Wednesday, November 19.*

- Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 3 (1995): 295–312.
- Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–364.
- Navin A. Bapat, “State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2006): 213–230.

## DECEMBER 1–3: STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

*Final papers due at 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 11.*