


Crisis Diplomacy

Democracy and Alliances

April 2, 2015



Recap

- **Alliance commitment**
- **Regime type and international cooperation**

Central Question

Are democracies more or less likely than autocracies to maintain alliance commitments?

Common Argument

Both Gaubatz and Leeds claim:

Alliance commitments are stronger among democracies than among autocracies.

Risk Factors for Breaking Commitments

- **Shifting policy preferences**
- **Low costs**

Preference Stability

- **Public involvement**
- **Leadership turnover**
- **Institutional continuity**
- **Preference cycling**

Preference Cycling

Voter 1	Voter 2	Voter 3
Clinton	Bush	Paul
Bush	Paul	Clinton
Paul	Clinton	Bush

Costs of Breaking Commitments

- **Interdependence**
- **Legal norms**
- **Veto players**
- **Transparency**

Theoretical Conclusion

Democracies are better at commitment because

- 1. preferences are more stable**
- 2. costs of breaking commitments are greater**

Taking It to Data

Which commitments are the most prominent in international politics?

How can we measure the strength of a commitment?


Hypothesis

Alliance commitments between democracies will last longer than those between autocracies.

Gaubatz: Data Collection

- **Unit of analysis**
 - **Pair of states?**
 - **Treaty?**
- **DV: Alliance duration**
- **IV: Regime type**
- **Controls:**
 - **Number of members**
 - **Major power involvement**
 - **Type of pact**

Gaubatz: Results



Gaubatz: Results

TABLE 5. *Predicted alliance durations (expected duration in years of a defense pact starting in 1925 between two major powers)*

	<i>Democratic alliances</i>	<i>Mixed alliances</i>	<i>Nondemocratic alliances</i>
<i>All alliances</i>			
Dyads	17.1	9.8	10.7
Model 1	8.8	3.4	4.2
Model 2	12.6	6.7	6.6
<i>Defense pacts</i>			
Dyads	39.0	16.3	10.6
Model 1	30.6	18.5	18.4
Model 2	30.8	18.7	18.5

Sources. See Table 2.

Leeds: Data Collection

- Unit of analysis: State in alliance invoked by war**
- DV: Decision to join war**
- IV: Regime type**
- Controls:**
 - Major power status**
 - Change in power**
 - Change in domestic institutions**
 - Initiator's side or target's side?**

Leeds: Results

TABLE 1. <i>Logit analysis of alliance commitment violation in war, 1816–1944</i>		
<i>Variables</i>	<i>Estimated coefficient with associated standard error</i>	<i>Change in predicted probability of violation</i>
DEMOCRATIC STATE	−2.799** (1.143)	−0.165
MAJOR POWER	1.029* (0.640)	0.113
CHANGE IN POWER OF STATE SINCE ALLIANCE FORMATION	2.463*** (0.551)	0.353
CHANGE IN DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS OF STATE SINCE ALLIANCE FORMATION	1.554** (0.572)	0.235
ALLY IS ORIGINAL TARGET IN WAR	1.157* (0.605)	0.154
Constant	−3.133	
<i>N</i>	143	
Chi ²	30.90	
Percent correctly predicted	86%	
<i>Notes:</i> Standard errors are calculated assuming potential nonindependence among cases associated with the same alliance. Change in predicted probability of violation is the absolute change in probability of violation associated with a change from 0 to 1 in this independent variable when all other variables are held constant at their mean values. *** <i>p</i> < 0.001. ** <i>p</i> < 0.01. * <i>p</i> < 0.1.		

Questions

What are the advantages and disadvantages of each research design?

(Does it matter?)

Next Time

- Read Farrell and Rabin, "Cheap Talk" (JSTOR)
- Read Kydd, "Which Side Are You On?" (JSTOR)

Image Sources

- NATO signing: **Wikimedia Commons**
- Statistical plots and tables: **Gaubatz (1996), Leeds (2003)**