Crisis Diplomacy Two-Level Games March 17, 2015

Why Domestic Politics Matter for Diplomacy

Democracies and dictatorships differ in:

- preferences
- constraints
- options

Flashback: Models of Decision

- Rational actor
 - Focus on interstate strategic interactions
 - Hold fixed preferences
- Governmental politics
 - Preferences as function of internal bargaining
 - Hold fixed other states' behavior

Integrating the Models

- Putnam's central question: How do domestic divisions affect international bargaining?
- Central answer: Strong domestic audiences...
- 1. decrease chances of reaching settlement
- 2. improve terms of settlement (if reached)

The Two-Level Game

Basic Components

- Actors
 - Governments (Level I)
 - Respective domestic audiences (Level II)
- -Stakes: international policy
- Disagreement outcome: status quo
- Settlement outcome: new policy implemented

The Two-Level Game

Sequence of Events

- 1. Governments bargain with each other
 - No deal → status quo
 - Deal → move onto next level
- 2. Domestic audiences "ratify" the deal
 - Both ratify → deal implemented
 - Either doesn't → status quo

Issue Space and Win Sets

- Continuum of possible settlements
 - distribution of a benefit
 - division of a cost
 - policy space (e.g., left-right, dove-hawk)
- Win set: range of outcomes an actor deems acceptable

Issue Space and Win Sets

Example: Tariff on Japanese Cars

Issue Space and Win Sets

Example: Global Women's Rights

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less

|-- Saudi I --|
|---- Saudi II ----|

|----- USA I ------|
|------ USA II ------|
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Attainable Outcomes

An outcome can be reached only if it lies in *every* actor's win set.







Win Set Size

Two effects of shrinking a country's Level II win set:

- 1. More say in the final deal
- 2. Less chance of agreement altogether

Win Set Size: Distributive Consequences

Smaller Level II win set → Better deal

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none **** nuke

|------|
|------ USA I -----|
|----- USA II -----|
|----- Iran I ------|
|------ Iran II -------|
```

Win Set Size: Chances of Agreement

Level II win set too small → No deal

```
none **** nuke

|------|
|------ USA I -----|
|----- USA II -----|
|----- Iran I ------|
|------ Iran II -------|
```

Win Set Size: Chances of Agreement

Level II win set too small → No deal

Connections to Schelling

Taking a decision out of your hands has benefits...

... but it also has risks.

Origins of Win Sets

In a democracy, why would the leader's win set differ from the public's?

Origins of Win Sets

- How the issue relates to domestic coalitions
- Domestic political institutions
- Promises by Level I leaders

Expanding the Issue Space

Countries can bargain over more than one issue at once.

How does this affect Level I and Level II win sets?

And the outcomes of bargaining?

Dictatorships and Democracies

Which kind of government has an advantage in two-level games?

Limitations of Putnam's Analysis

What are the competing explanations?

What is this article missing?

For Next Time

 Read Leeds, "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation" (JSTOR).

Image Sources

- Chess boards: Flickr user streetwalker