

Crisis Diplomacy

Alternative Models of International Crises

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Theories and History

Two ways to integrate them:

- 1. Historical evidence as empirical test of a theory.**
- 2. Theory as framework to interpret case evidence.**

History as Theory Testing

- **Procedure**
 - 1. Derive hypotheses from premises**
 - 2. Compare to historical record**
- **Best with**
 - **multiple theories**
 - **multiple cases**
- **Example: Next week's readings**

Theory as Historical Interpretation

- **Procedure**

- 1. Collect historical evidence**

- 2. Organize in line with theoretical framework**

- **Best with**

- **one or more theories**

- **one or more cases**

- **(but not multiple of both)**

- **Example: *Essence of Decision***

Allison's "Models"

- **Not theories per se**
- **Guidelines for theory-building**
 - **Families of explanations**
 - **What to hold fixed**
 - **What to focus on**

Comparing Models

There's no "right" model of the Cuban Missile Crisis, let alone all crises.

Which model is best depends on which aspects you want to explain.

Rational Actor Model

- Holds fixed
 - State interests and preferences
 - Actions available to a state
- Used to analyze
 - Strategic choices
 - Outcomes of international *interactions*

Limitations of the Rational Actor Model

Where do state interests and preferences come from?

Where do constraints on state action come from?

Why do states act in ways that rationalist theories can't account for?

Organizational Behavior Model

- **Holds fixed**
 - **State interests and preferences**
 - **Other states' behavior**
- **Used to analyze**
 - **Actions available to a state**
 - **How state actions are executed**

Organizational Behavior Model

Constraints on State Action

- **Logistical difficulties**
- **Imperfect lines of communication**
- **Necessity of delegation**

How did these affect the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Organizational Behavior Model

What States Can't Do

Why didn't Kennedy choose air strikes?

- Standard operating procedures**
- Physical capacity of the military**

Organizational Behavior Model

Things the Rational Model Can't Explain

Why would nuclear-armed F-102s be flying near Soviet airspace in the midst of a major crisis?

- Standard operating procedures**
- Imperfect communication**

Integrating Rationalist and Organizational Models

Brinkmanship can't work unless there's a chance of an accident.

The organizational behavior model shows how an accident can happen.

Governmental Politics Model

- **Holds fixed**
 - **Actions available to a state**
 - **Other states' behavior**
- **Used to analyze**
 - **State interests and preferences**
 - **Why seemingly suboptimal actions are chosen**

Governmental Politics Model

Choosing the Blockade

Why did Kennedy choose a blockade paired with an ultimatum?

Governmental Politics Model

Choosing the Blockade: Options and Initial Opinions

Negotiations: Rusk (State)

Blockade (+ Ultimatum): McNamara (DOD), Dillon (Treasury)

Air Strike: Acheson (former State), McCone (CIA), Bundy (WH), R. Kennedy (DOJ)

Air Strike + Invasion: Taylor (JCS)

Governmental Politics Model

It's not enough to show there was disagreement.

Need evidence of

- "Where you stand depends on where you sit"**
- Bargaining (\neq disagreement)**
- Relative agency power influencing final decision**

Integrating Governmental and Rationalist Models

"Two Level Games" ... which we'll see later.

For Next Time

- Turn in first short paper
- Read Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?" (JSTOR)

Image Sources

— EXCOMM meeting: **Wikimedia Commons**