

# Causes of War

## **Domestic Constraints and Bargaining**

March 24, 2015

# Today's Agenda

- 1. Domestic audiences and international bargaining.**
- 2. Presentation on "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders."**
- 3. Presentation on "Political Bias and War."**

# Recap: Causes of Bargaining Breakdown

- **Uncertainty**
- **Commitment problems**
- **Mobilization**

# Domestic Politics and Bargaining Breakdown

- **How can domestic politics cause war?**
- **Do democracies or dictatorships have more bargaining power?**

# International Negotiations as Two-Level Game


- 1. Governments bargain with each other**
- 2. Domestic audiences "ratify" the deal**
  - Everyone ratifies → Agreement implemented**
  - Anyone doesn't → Disagreement outcome**

# Two-Level Games and War

**The two-level game is a *general* theory of international negotiations.**


**Let's apply it to bargaining in the shadow of war.**

# The Usual Bargaining Model





# Introducing Domestic Constraints






# Bargaining Outcomes

**Effects of strengthening the domestic constraint:**

- 1. More favorable settlement *if* a deal is reached**
- 2. Less chance of reaching a deal**


# Domestic Constraints: Share of Spoils

# Tighter domestic constraint → Greater share




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
# Domestic Constraints: Risk of War

**Tighter domestic constraint → War more likely**



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
# Two-Level Games and War

Problems: The Cost of War

**Isn't war more costly for the public?**

# Two-Level Games and War

## Problems: The Cost of War





# Two-Level Games and War

Problems: Democratic Peace

**War is relatively unlikely between democracies.**

**Wouldn't this theory imply the opposite?**

# Conclusions

- **Cross-cutting effects of domestic constraints**
  - **Settlements less likely**
  - **Better outcomes if settlement is reached**
- **Application to bargaining in the shadow of war: shaky at best**

## For Next Time

- Read Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes" (JSTOR)
- Start reading *The Sleepwalkers*?
- Presentation on "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises"
- Presentation on "Autocratic Audience Costs"

# Image Sources

— **WTO protests:** **Flickr** user `strausser`