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New proposal to restrict access of third countries to the EU public procurement market is published by the European Commission

On 21 March 2012, the European Commission (hereinafter, the Commission) released its proposal on the new rules of access to EU government procurement by foreign companies. The new draft *Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union's internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third* countries is intended to level the playing field for European business in government procurement abroad and to implement additional leverages for the liberalization of access of the EU companies government procurement in foreign markets. The core principle underpinning the new rules is one of '*substantial reciprocity*' under the proposed draft. In the case where EU suppliers, goods or services become targets of serious and persistent discrimination in foreign markets, the European Commission, following an investigation, will be able to restrict access to the EU public procurement for goods and services originating in such jurisdictions. The new proposal also addresses the issue of '*abnormally low*' tenders from foreign bidders with the mechanisms of additional transparency added. The proposal has been passed to the European Parliament and the Council for approval and must be adopted in the ordinary legislative procedure by the Parliament and by qualified majority voting in the Council. In light of the transitional periods necessary for regulatory and administrative adjustments, the proposal is expected to come into effect during the second half of 2013.

The EU market can be reasonably considered one of the most open markets of public procurement in the world, with nearly no restrictions on access to tenders by foreign businesses. Limitations on foreign participation in the EU bids are allowed for the utilities sector (i.e., contracting entities may reject foreign participants in, *e.g.*, tenders on water, post, telecommunication, energy, provided that there are no international obligations otherwise) and in the area of defence procurement. According to the proposal, contracting authorities will also be permitted to reject foreign bids of an estimated value of EUR 5 million and above, and consisting of more than 50% of goods and services not subject to the EU international procurement obligations. Such rejections would be subject to authorization by the Commission in case '*substantial reciprocity*' in procurement market access is not provided to EU companies in the country of origin of the bidder. Below the specified threshold of EUR 5 million, procurement remains free, and foreign participation could not be somehow limited.

Moreover, in the event of serious and repeated discrimination suffered by EU companies on foreign procurement markets, the Commission will be given powers to start consultations with the countries concerned and to adopt the necessary measures to restrict access to the EU procurement market. Such measures may take the form of price penalties on non-EU bids or even the exclusion of particular sectors. Choosing the applicable sanctions, the

Commission shall take into account the degree to which foreign laws ensure transparency in procurement, preclude discrimination against EU goods and services, and if the public authorities abroad maintain discriminatory practices against EU companies in the field of procurement. Finally, in case of foreign bids with '*abnormally low*' prices being proposed, the procuring authorities will have the obligation to inform the other tenderers on the reasons behind the acceptance of such bids. Increased transparency should diminish the cases of system abuse, when the winning company later fails to fulfil the terms of procurement contract due to the artificially low prices put forward at bidding stage.

The measures proposed by the EU shall not affect its obligations under the relevant international instruments. Terms on preferential access to the EU procurement market have been agreed in bilateral trade agreements with Mexico, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and South Korea. Similarly, the new rules shall not apply to procurement transactions covered by the WTO (plurilateral) Agreement on Government Procurement (hereinafter, the GPA or the Agreement). According to Article 6 of the draft EU Regulation, goods and services subject to international obligations could not be sanctioned, unless (i) they constitute less than 50% of the total value of the tender, (ii) the overall price of the tender is over EUR 5 million and (iii) there is no '*substantial reciprocity*' in market access for EU companies in the countries of origin of such services or goods. This regulatory architecture could potentially trigger certain WTO concerns depending on the manner in which it will be implemented. The GPA is not based on the '*substantial reciprocity*' test, and the commitments undertaken by the parties to it are not always symmetrical. If the '*substantial reciprocity*' test were to be broadly interpreted by the Commission, restrictions on access to EU procurement imposed on particular GPA partners would likely not be contrary to Article III of the Agreement, which prescribes national treatment to goods and services of GPA parties origin. Likewise, concerns could be raised in relation to the 50% threshold of goods in tenders subject to restrictions. In certain circumstances, goods from particular GPA partners may be systematically and repeatedly *de facto* discriminated even if they constitute less than 50% of the final product mix (consider, *e.g.*, a particular type of engines produced in a GPA party and excluded from tenders as part of a machinery originating from a non-party to the GPA failing to provide '*substantial reciprocity*' to the EU companies in procurement). Still, the WTO consistency of the measure will greatly depend on the way it will be applied and enforced by the Commission and the procurement authorities of the EU Member States. It appears from the explanatory note to the proposal that the EU is unlikely to apply sanctions to its bilateral partners and parties to the GPA, focusing mainly on fostering reciprocity in the foreign markets which have not concluded any procurement deals with the EU.

The proposed Regulation demonstrates a certain inclination towards additional protection of the domestic procurement markets by the Commission. Public procurement remains a very significant and attractive market for businesses in the EU and abroad. Currently, governmental spending in the EU amounts to 19% of the Union's GDP. 85% of the EU public procurement market is open to its GPA partners, for a total figure of about EUR 352 billion annually. According to the estimates of the Commission, discriminatory restrictions against EU goods and services abroad lead to yearly losses of around EUR 12 billion, with EU businesses often unable to place their products abroad due to unjust limitations. Therefore, the initiative by the Commission is aimed at encouraging foreign governments to conclude bilateral procurement deals with the EU or to accede to the GPA in order to meet the '*substantial reciprocity*' test and protect domestic businesses from potential limitations on market access in the EU government procurement. The adoption and enactment of the proposed EU Regulation should be monitored by all foreign businesses interested in tendering within the EU, as well as by the European companies, as they may receive additional tools of protection against fierce foreign competition in the EU procurement market.

WTO revives negotiations on a GIs register for wines and spirits

On 23 March 2012, in the first meeting of the negotiating group on a multilateral register for geographical indications (hereinafter, GIs) for wines and spirits after the Geneva Ministerial Conference of December 2011, the newly-elected Chairperson of the negotiations, Ambassador Yonov Frederick Agah of Nigeria, announced that he will start consultations on how to proceed. These negotiations focus on creating a multilateral register for wines and spirits and not on a *'GI extension'*, which would accord to all products the higher level of protection currently given to wines and spirits. This *'GI extension'* is being discussed in special meetings held under the good offices of the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy (although some countries consider the two matters to be related).

GIs are place names, or words associated with a geographical location, used to identify products that have a certain quality or reputation due to their origin from those places. Examples of GIs for wines and spirits include *'Champagne'*, *'Bordeaux'* and *'Tequila'*. Negotiations on the proposed multilateral register for the GI registration of wine and spirits began in 1997, pursuant to Article 23(4) of the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter, the TRIPs Agreement), which commits WTO Members to facilitate stronger protection for wine GIs by undertaking negotiations on a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs. These ongoing negotiations were incorporated into the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations when the Round was launched in 2001.

Intensive negotiations on a multilateral register for GIs of wines and spirits were carried out in the first months of 2011, culminating in the initial single draft text, based on the various proposals on the table, which was circulated on 21 April 2011. This draft circulation was considered a breakthrough as it marked the first time in 13 years of negotiations for a GI register that all WTO Members had discussed a single draft text. This so-called '*Draft Composite Text*' (in which text options are marked by square brackets) was intended as a good basis on which to continue negotiations towards a multilateral system of notification and registration for GIs of wines and spirits. However, there was no further progress in 2011. In December 2011, WTO ministers acknowledged that the Doha Development Agenda talks were at an impasse (in general) and called for a change of approach.

As negotiations renew, the key issues and positions should be recalled (see, Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 2 of 28 January 2011). The multilateral GIs register for wines and spirits negotiations covers six issue areas: 1) Notification: how a name would be notified and which WTO Members would be entitled to submit notifications; 2) Registration: how the GIs system would be operated and what role the WTO Secretariat would play; 3) The legal consequences of registration: what legal commitments or other obligations would arise as a result of a term's registration; 4) Fees and costs: determining which WTO Members would bear the cost of GIs registration; 5) Special and differential treatment for developing countries; and 6) Participation: whether partaking in the GIs system will be entirely voluntary, or whether the registration of a term will have mandatory implications for all WTO Members. Throughout the negotiations for a GIs wine and spirits register, key differences have emerged among WTO Members regarding, in particular, the third issue area *(i.e.*, the extent of the legal obligations that WTO Members would be required to assume as a result of a term's listing in the GIs register) and the sixth issue area (*i.e.*, whether the GIs system will be strictly voluntary or have mandatory effects for all WTO Members). Stronger protection for GIs is a key Doha Round goal for the EU. However, other WTO Members, most notably Australia and the US, where European GIs are often used generically, have stated that existing legal protections for copyright and trademarks make any plan for a GIs register redundant.

The draft GIs register proposal of 21 April 2011 thus emerged as a result of consultations among representatives of three separate groups that have submitted GIs register proposals. A '*joint proposal*' group, which includes a mixed group of developing and developed countries, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chinese Taipei, South Africa and the US, seeks to implement a GIs register as a mere database. WTO Members would then choose whether or not to participate in the register. The intellectual property authorities of participating WTO Members would consult the database when considering the extent of protection for individual trademarks or GIs within their countries. A second proposal, put forward by over 100 WTO Members, including the EU and Switzerland, envisages a GIs system that would apply to all WTO Members. WTO Members could, however, choose whether or not to register their own GIs. The legal authorities in all WTO Members would need to take a GIs term's registration *'into account'* and treat it as *prima facie* evidence that the term meets the proper definition of a GI. The legal authorities within each WTO Member would nevertheless be permitted to consider whether the GI is subject to exceptions because, *inter alia,* the term is generic. Previously, the EU had even proposed that, if a term is registered, the assumption (in legal terms, the '*irrebuttable presumption*') would be that it should be protected in all WTO Member countries, except those that have successfully challenged the term. A third proposal, suggested by negotiators from Hong Kong and China, attempts to bridge the gap between the first and second proposals. This proposal suggests that if a GI term is registered, it would be *prima facie* evidence of the ownership of the rights to a term, but only within WTO Members that choose to participate in the GIs registration system.

Historically, the international agreements on GIs (such as the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration, Stockholm Revision, 1967), which existed before the TRIPs Agreement, have generally been viewed as ineffective tools of GIs protection. By contrast, the TRIPs Agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995, incorporates a significant degree of GIs protection. Article 22(2) of the TRIPs Agreement mandates that WTO Members must allow interested parties a means to prevent the use of a product name or designation which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of a good, and must prevent any use of GIs which constitutes an '*act of unfair competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters*'. In addition, Article 23(1) of the TRIPs Agreement grants a particularly high standard of protection to the geographical names of wines and spirits. Here, any use of misleading indications is prohibited, even if the true origin of the goods is stated or if the GI is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as '*kind*', '*style*' or '*type*'. It should also be noted that Article 24(4) of the TRIPs Agreement constitutes a grandfathering clause, which protects GIs used by any WTO Member's nationals or domiciled residents in a continuous manner for at least 10 years before 15 April 1994, or in good faith prior to that date.

In an immediate reaction to the announcement of new negotiations, Chile (for the '*joint proposal group*') and the EU (for the other '*camp*') stated that they, or the groups which they represent, are prepared to work with the Chairperson to find a way forward in order to set up a register that would '*facilitate*' the protection of GIs (according to each group's interpretation). However, the '*joint proposal group*' also stated that it is not prepared to discuss work outside the negotiating mandate. It repeated its long held view that, for example, the system must apply only to wines and spirits, be voluntary, create no new legal obligations, respect '*territoriality*' (*i.e.*, not resulting in one country's legal system being imposed on another's) and be simple and transparent to use.

In the context of the generic names and GIs protection, it should also be noted that on 26 March 2012, a number of food producers and organisations from countries such as Argentina and the US launched the '*Consortium for Common Food Names*', an initiative that

'*seeks to stop initiatives to restrict the use of generic food names, opposing any attempt to monopolise generic names that, according to the consortium, have become part of the public domain*', such as *parmesan, feta, provolone, bologna* and *salami*, as well as terms used by winemakers such as '*classic*', '*vintage*', '*fine*' and '*superior*'. According to the consortium, an appropriate model should be adopted that protects '*legitimate*' GIs like '*Parmigiano Reggiano*', while preserving the right of all producers to use common names like '*parmesan*'. This development shows that the negotiations in the WTO negotiating group on a multilateral register for GIs for wines and spirits will not be straightforward given that some countries and their producers have apparently irreconcilable positions. Business parties with an interest in intellectual property rights concerning wine and spirits should accordingly monitor the forthcoming negotiations and developments closely.

The US suspends Argentina from its Generalised System of Preferences for failure to pay arbitration awards

On 26 March 2012, the US announced that it was suspending Argentina from its Generalised System of Preferences (hereinafter, GSP) as a result of Argentina's failure to pay arbitration awards granted in two disputes involving US companies. This decision follows a 2010 request by two US companies, Azurix and Blue Ridge Investments, that Argentina's GSP benefits be suspended based upon its failure to pay the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter, ICSID) arbitration awards of USD 165.2 million and USD 133.2 million, respectively. ICSID arbitration for these two disputes was available pursuant to the 1994 US-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, which provides this option as a dispute settlement remedy. In response to the requests of the US companies, President Obama applied 19 USC §2462(b)(2)(e), which provides, in relevant part, that a country failing to act in good faith in recognising as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favour of a US corporation, partnership or association, which is 50% or more beneficially owned by US citizens, may have its GSP withdrawn, suspended, or limited in the application of the duty-free treatment accorded under 19 USC §2462(d). In 2011, US imports from Argentina benefitting from GSP treatment totalled USD 477 million, representing 11% of all goods exports from Argentina to the US.

The suspension of Argentina's GSP benefits under 19 USC §2462(b)(2)(e) raises the question of whether the US action is WTO compliant. Developed countries can provide preferential tariff treatment to developing countries (hereinafter, DCs) under paragraph 1 of the WTO's Enabling Clause. The seminal case relating to allocation and suspension of GSP is *European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries* (hereinafter, *EC – Tariff Preferences*), which specifically examined additional tariff preferences provided by the EC to 12 DCs combating drug production and trafficking (hereinafter, Drug Arrangements). India challenged these Drug Arrangements claiming that the EC tariff preferences were limited to only 12 named countries. After the initial WTO Panel ruling affirmed that identical tariff treatment must be available to all GSP beneficiaries, the WTO Appellate Body clarified that the Enabling Clause permits developed countries to treat GSP beneficiaries differently, provided, however, that '*similarly-situated*' beneficiaries are offered the same treatment. Consequently, the Appellate Body held that GSP Drug Arrangements were '*non-discriminatory*' under the Enabling Clause as long as identical tariff treatment was available to all '*similarly-situated*' qualifying DCs beneficiaries. The Appellate Body then held that the EC's Drug Arrangements failed to meet this requirement in two significant instances. First, only 12 countries could benefit from the drug-related GSP preferences and, as such, it could not be ensured that the preferences were available to all GSP beneficiaries suffering from illicit drug production and trafficking. Second, it could not be determined whether or not a DC qualified for this special GSP treatment as no specific criteria or standards were created to differentiate beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements

from other GSP beneficiaries. Based upon these reasons, the EC's Drug Arrangements failed to meet the non-discrimination requirements of Footnote 3 to the Enabling Clause and, consequently, were unjustified under Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

The situation in *EC – Tariff Preferences* differs from Argentina's GSP suspension by the US in that the EC Drug Arrangements tariff preferences were provided exclusively to 12 countries, while other GSP eligible countries had neither the access to these preferences, nor any ability to gain such access through specified criteria as a country qualifying by combating drug consumption and trafficking. In contrast, 19 USC §2462(b)(2)(e), which the US applied to suspend Argentina's GSP treatment for failing to pay arbitral awards, appears to be applicable to *any* country receiving preferential tariff treatment under the US GSP. In addition, there appears to be no criteria that allows for differentiation to be made among GSP beneficiaries in the application of 19 USC §2462(b)(2)(e). As a result, all countries receiving GSP benefits from the US should be treated similarly and in a non-discriminatory manner under this provision, as is required under the Enabling Clause and in the authoritative WTO interpretation of *EC – Tariff Preferences*.

In order to assess the possible WTO consistency of the US measure, one would have to further establish whether this provision has been (or will be) enacted *vis-à-vis* '*similarly-situated*' countries in similar circumstances (*i.e.*, countries not paying arbitral awards). Specifically, if a US company requests that the GSP of another country be suspended pursuant to an alleged violation of 19 USC §2462(b)(2)(e), would the US act similarly in suspending this country's GSP benefits as it did with Argentina? The discretion that 19 USC §2462(d) accords to the President to either suspend a country's GSP preferences or continue providing them does not appear to be guided and disciplined by any specific criteria, and could potentially result in discriminatory application, possibly violating Footnote 3 and Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.

Argentina has 60 days from the announcement of the suspension to pay the two awards before the suspension takes place pursuant to 19 USC §2462(f)(2). If Argentina were to pay the ICSID arbitral awards during this time or to reach a mutually agreeable settlement with the two US companies, the US Government could reinstate Argentina's GSP benefits. The primary beneficiaries of GSP treatment were exporters of Argentine cheeses, sugar confections, leather, strawberries, grape wine and lithium. If no settlement is agreed upon, these exports will be subject to the US most-favoured nation tariff rate, which will inevitably raise the price of these exports and likely make them uncompetitive on the US market. In a related development, Thailand's GSP privileges are also at risk of being suspended by the US due to Thailand's alleged unfair import restrictions on US pork, as the US National Pork Producers Council is considering filing a petition to have the US remove Thailand's GSP privileges. If Thailand's GSP privileges were to be suspended, it could impact approximately USD 500 million of Thai products imported into the US. Therefore, the evolution of this GSP suspensions should be carefully monitored by the Government of Argentina, all Argentine businesses that export products to the US, Thailand's Government, Thai businesses exporting to the US, US importers and by other countries receiving GSP benefits, as this case could determine when and how tariff preferences can be removed by developed countries.

Financial crisis pushing Argentina towards protectionism?

Argentina's recent moves in the field of imports policy generated alarm at the latest meeting of the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, held in Geneva on 30 March 2012. In particular, a number of countries expressed their concern by means of a joint statement read by the US on behalf of twelve other WTO Members (*i.e.*, Australia, the EU, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Turkey). The

declaration expressed '*continuing and deep concerns regarding the nature and application of trade-restrictive measures taken by Argentina*', which are allegedly '*adversely affecting imports into Argentina from a growing number of WTO Members*'.

According to the statement, since 2008, Argentina has been following a protectionist tendency that seems to increasingly hinder the access of foreign goods to the country. A system of non-automatic licensing operates in respect of a gradually expanding number of goods, including laptops, home appliances, air conditioners, tractors, machinery and tools, autos and auto parts, plastics, chemicals, tyres, toys, footwear, textiles and apparel, luggage, bicycles and paper products. When it comes to these products, lengthy requirements involving registration, review and approval are being imposed at customs. In practice, this system leads to delays and financial losses for exporters and traders of imported goods. Earlier in 2012, Argentina has reportedly introduced a regulation requiring that importers file sworn statements with the Argentine tax agency with respect to the customs duties payment and have their import requests approved before being able to import (see, Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 2 of 27 April 2012).

The sponsors of the statement proposed the '*request that Argentina take immediate steps to address the concerns*' or, in the alternative, demanded a detailed written explanation of the recently adopted measures. In any case, all these WTO Members indicated that they '*reserve their rights to pursue this matter further*'. In WTO terms, this means possible WTO dispute settlement.

Thus far, WTO Members have not brought their disagreement to the WTO dispute settlement system. In line with its diplomatic character, the WTO allows its Members to bring their causes of distress to light in a more amicable environment. Raising a concern of such nature at the meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods indicates the willingness of particular Members to put Argentina's practices under the '*spotlight*', while simultaneously trying to obtain other Members' support. Article XI of the GATT prevents WTO Members from adopting and maintaining import restrictions taking the form of, *inter alia*, licensing measures. In this respect, an early GATT panel concluded, in 1978, that non-automatic import licensing procedures, which amounted to significant and burdensome restrictions on imports, were deemed to be inconsistent with Article XI. For further clarification, the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures clearly differentiates between *automatic* and *non-automatic import licensing* measures. The former are defined as import licensing procedures where approval of the application is granted in all cases, that do not have trade-restrictive effects, and that comply with a number of procedural requirements. The latter, on the other hand, captures all procedures not complying with the aforementioned conditions (see in this regard, Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 2 of 27 April 2012).

Argentina's trading partners are already raising their voices at the WTO and building pressure on Argentina by claiming the WTO inconsistency of the measures being applied, *de jure* or *de facto*, by Argentine customs. Although the *fora* where these concerns have so far been expressed are still largely diplomatic in nature and geared toward building peer pressure on Argentina, everything seems to indicate that WTO disputes are around the corner, should Argentina persist in its protectionist approach. Argentina could consider resorting to available WTO-consistent instruments in order to deal with its trade problems. An example may be the application of safeguard measures, allowed under GATT Article XIX and Article 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, to counter the importation of products in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products and to safeguard the balance of payments. Whatever the case, all traders dealing with Argentina must remain vigilant and work with their countries' authorities in order to ensure that their businesses commercial interests are the least affected by the growing trade tensions and/or adequately addressed during the procedures and instruments that are activated at the WTO.

Recently Adopted EU Legislation

Market Access

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 288/2012 of 30 March 2012 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 291/2012 of 2 April 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 992/95 as regards tariff quotas of the Union for certain agricultural and fishery products originating in Norway*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 295/2012 of 3 April 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No. 474/2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community*

Trade Remedies

- *Commission Decision of 4 April 2012 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of sodium cyclamate originating in the People's Republic of China, limited to two Chinese exporting producers Fang Da Food Additive (Shen Zhen) Limited and Fang Da Food Additive (Yang Quan) Limited*

Food and Agricultural Law

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 269/2012 of 26 March 2012 concerning the authorisation of dicopper chloride trihydroxide as feed additive for all animal species.*

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 270/2012 of 26 March 2012 amending Annexes II and III to Regulation (EC) No. 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for amidosulfuron, azoxystrobin, bentazone, bixafen, cyproconazole, fluopyram, imazapic, malathion, propiconazole and spinosad in or on certain products.*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 274/2012 of 27 March 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 1152/2009 imposing special conditions governing the import of certain foodstuffs from certain third countries due to contamination risk by aflatoxins.*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 284/2012 of 29 March 2012 imposing special conditions governing the import of feed and food originating in or consigned from Japan following the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 961/201.*

- *Council Decision of 14 February 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuffs.*

- *Regulation (EU) No. 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector.*

- *List of competent authorities of the Member States within the meaning of Article 4(6) of Directive 2002/46 on food supplements*

- *Decision No. 1/2012 of the EU-Switzerland Joint Committee of 15 March 2012 amending Tables III and IV(b) of Protocol No. 2 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 concerning certain processed agricultural products.*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 302/2012 of 4 April 2012 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 294/2012 of 3 April 2012 amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No. 669/2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin*

- *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 1760/2000 as regards electronic identification of bovine animals and deleting the provisions on voluntary beef labelling*

Other

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 277/2012 of 28 March 2012 amending Annexes I and II to Directive 2002/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum levels and action thresholds for dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls.*

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 278/2012 of 28 March 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No. 152/2009 as regards the determination of the levels of dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls.*

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 290/2012 of 30 March 2012 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1178/2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 293/2012 of 3 April 2012 on monitoring and reporting of data on the registration of new light commercial vehicles pursuant to Regulation (EU) No. 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council*

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