



# Smart Contract Security Audit Report



# Table Of Contents

## 1 Executive Summary

---

## 2 Audit Methodology

---

## 3 Project Overview

---

### 3.1 Project Introduction

---

### 3.2 Vulnerability Information

---

## 4 Code Overview

---

### 4.1 Contracts Description

---

### 4.2 Visibility Description

---

### 4.3 Vulnerability Summary

---

## 5 Audit Result

---

## 6 Statement

---

# 1 Executive Summary

On 2025.01.15, the SlowMist security team received the Brevis Network team's security audit application for Vip Hook Algebra, developed the audit plan according to the agreement of both parties and the characteristics of the project, and finally issued the security audit report.

The SlowMist security team adopts the strategy of "white box lead, black, grey box assists" to conduct a complete security test on the project in the way closest to the real attack.

The test method information:

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open source code, non-open source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant impact on the security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project team should evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to reproduce in engineering.
Suggestion	There are better practices for coding or architecture.

## 2 Audit Methodology

The security audit process of SlowMist security team for smart contract includes two steps:

- Smart contract codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using automated analysis tools.
- Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The contracts are manually analyzed to look for any potential problems.

Following is the list of commonly known vulnerabilities that was considered during the audit of the smart contract:

Serial Number	Audit Class	Audit Subclass
1	Overflow Audit	-
2	Reentrancy Attack Audit	-
3	Replay Attack Audit	-
4	Flashloan Attack Audit	-
5	Race Conditions Audit	Reordering Attack Audit
6	Permission Vulnerability Audit	Access Control Audit
		Excessive Authority Audit
7	Security Design Audit	External Module Safe Use Audit
		Compiler Version Security Audit
		Hard-coded Address Security Audit
		Fallback Function Safe Use Audit
		Show Coding Security Audit
		Function Return Value Security Audit
		External Call Function Security Audit

Serial Number	Audit Class	Audit Subclass
7	Security Design Audit	Block data Dependence Security Audit
		tx.origin Authentication Security Audit
8	Denial of Service Audit	-
9	Gas Optimization Audit	-
10	Design Logic Audit	-
11	Variable Coverage Vulnerability Audit	-
12	"False Top-up" Vulnerability Audit	-
13	Scoping and Declarations Audit	-
14	Malicious Event Log Audit	-
15	Arithmetic Accuracy Deviation Audit	-
16	Uninitialized Storage Pointer Audit	-

## 3 Project Overview

### 3.1 Project Introduction

It is a contract based on VIP level providing cost discounts.

### 3.2 Vulnerability Information

The following is the status of the vulnerabilities found in this audit:

NO	Title	Category	Level	Status
N1	Preemptive Initialization	Race Conditions Vulnerability	Suggestion	Acknowledged
N2	Risk of excessive authority	Authority Control Vulnerability Audit	Medium	Acknowledged

## 4 Code Overview

### 4.1 Contracts Description

<https://github.com/brevis-network/algebra-vip-plugin-contract>

Commit: 30ae9e6fbb0d19ff4403b786b2a81a1c87cc6f5b

The main network address of the contract is as follows:

**The code was not deployed to the mainnet.**

### 4.2 Visibility Description

The SlowMist Security team analyzed the visibility of major contracts during the audit, the result as follows:

VipDiscountPlugin			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<Constructor>	Public	Can Modify State	BrevisApp
init	External	Can Modify State	-
getCurrentFee	External	-	-
defaultPluginConfig	External	-	-
beforeSwap	External	Can Modify State	-
beforeInitialize	External	Can Modify State	-
afterInitialize	External	Can Modify State	-
beforeModifyPosition	External	Can Modify State	-
afterModifyPosition	External	Can Modify State	-
afterSwap	External	Can Modify State	-
beforeFlash	External	Can Modify State	-
afterFlash	External	Can Modify State	-

VipDiscountPlugin			
handleProofResult	Internal	Can Modify State	-
setConfigInPool	External	Can Modify State	onlyOwner
setPool	External	Can Modify State	onlyOwner
setFee	External	Can Modify State	onlyOwner
setVkHash	External	Can Modify State	onlyOwner
setBrevisRequest	External	Can Modify State	onlyOwner

## 4.3 Vulnerability Summary

### [N1] [Suggestion] Preemptive Initialization

#### Category: Race Conditions Vulnerability

#### Content

By calling the init function to initialize the contract, there is a potential issue that malicious attackers preemptively call the init function to initialize.

- contract/contracts/VipDiscountPlugin.sol

```
function init(uint16 _origFee, address _brevisRequest, address _pool, bytes32
_vkHash) external {
    initOwner();
    _setBrevisRequest(_brevisRequest);
    origFee = _origFee;
    vkHash = _vkHash;
    pool = _pool;
}
```

#### Solution

It is suggested that the initialization operation can be called in the same transaction immediately after the contract is created to avoid being maliciously called by the attacker.

#### Status

Acknowledged

**[N2] [Medium] Risk of excessive authority****Category: Authority Control Vulnerability Audit****Content**

The Owner has the ability to modify critical contract parameters through various setter functions. If the Owner's private key is compromised, an attacker could maliciously alter these parameters, potentially disrupting the contract's normal functionality.

- contract/contracts/VipDiscountPlugin.sol

```
Owner can setConfigInPool
Owner can setPool
Owner can setFee
Owner can setVkHash
Owner can setBrevisRequest
```

**Solution**

In the short term, during the early stages of the project, the protocol may need to frequently set various parameters to ensure the stable operation of the protocol. Therefore, transferring the ownership of core roles to a multisig management can effectively solve the single-point risk. A safer approach is to add timelock on top of multi-signature.

**Status**

Acknowledged

## 5 Audit Result

Audit Number	Audit Team	Audit Date	Audit Result
0X002501150001	SlowMist Security Team	2025.01.15 - 2025.01.15	Medium Risk

Summary conclusion: The SlowMist security team use a manual and SlowMist team's analysis tool to audit the project, during the audit work we found 1 medium risk, 1 suggestion vulnerabilities.



## 6 Statement

SlowMist issues this report with reference to the facts that have occurred or existed before the issuance of this report, and only assumes corresponding responsibility based on these.

For the facts that occurred or existed after the issuance, SlowMist is not able to judge the security status of this project, and is not responsible for them. The security audit analysis and other contents of this report are based on the documents and materials provided to SlowMist by the information provider till the date of the insurance report (referred to as "provided information"). SlowMist assumes: The information provided is not missing, tampered with, deleted or concealed. If the information provided is missing, tampered with, deleted, concealed, or inconsistent with the actual situation, the SlowMist shall not be liable for any loss or adverse effect resulting therefrom. SlowMist only conducts the agreed security audit on the security situation of the project and issues this report. SlowMist is not responsible for the background and other conditions of the project.



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