TODO title

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Through their interactions, their activities, and even their mere presence, organisms change the environment for themselves and others. This “niche construction” process becomes particularly interesting when it creates evolutionary feedback, whereby selective pressures are altered in response to environmental change. Here we consider how niche construction influences the evolution of cooperation, which has been a long-standing challenge to evolutionary theory. We simulate populations of individuals that cooperatively produce a public good that permits increased growth in a stressful environment and investigate how local- and global-scale niche construction affects the ability of these populations to resist invasion by non-producing cheats. We find that niche construction profoundly impacts the evolution of cooperation by creating new opportunities for adaptation. Cooperators are able to escape subversion by cheats as long as niche construction clears these paths of adaptation. This work provides a crucial step towards understanding how evolution occurs in complex environments like those found in nature.

# Introduction

Cooperative behaviors are common across all branches of the tree of life. Insects divide labor within their colonies, plants and soil bacteria exchange essential nutrients, birds care for others’ young, and the trillions of cells in the human body restrain their growth and coordinate to provide vital functions. Each instance of cooperation presents an evolutionary challenge: How can individuals that sacrifice their own well-being to help others avoid subversion by those that do not? Over time, we would expect these *defectors* to rise in abundance at the expense of others, eventually driving cooperators—and perhaps the entire population—to extinction.

Several factors can defer this potential *tragedy of the commons* (Hamilton, 1964; Hardin, 1968; Nowak, 2006; West *et al.*, 2007b). For example, cooperators must benefit more from the cooperative act than others. This can occur when cooperators are clustered together in spatially-structured populations (Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009; Nadell *et al.*, 2010; Kuzdzal-Fick *et al.*, 2011) or when cooperators use communication (Brown and Johnstone, 2001; Darch *et al.*, 2012) or other cues (Sinervo *et al.*, 2006; Gardner and West, 2010; Veelders *et al.*, 2010) to cooperate conditionally with kin. Interestingly, cooperation can also be bolstered by genetic linkage with self-benefitting traits (Foster *et al.*, 2004; Dandekar *et al.*, 2012; Asfahl *et al.*, 2015), setting the stage for an “adaptive race” in which cooperators and defectors vie for the first highly-beneficial adaptation (Waite and Shou, 2012; Morgan *et al.*, 2012).

Hankshaw and Kerr (2015) recently showed that in spatially-structured populations, cooperators can gain a substantial leg up on defectors in an adaptive race when the cooperative behavior increases local population density, thus increasing the likelihood of acquiring beneficial non-social mutations. By hitchhiking along with these adaptations, the cooperative trait can rapidly rise in abundance. Nevertheless, this advantage is fleeting. As soon as the opportunities for adaptation are exhausted, cooperators are once again at a disadvantage against defectors. However, Hankshaw and Kerr (2015) demonstrated that cooperation can be maintained indefinitely when frequent environmental changes produce a steady stream of non-social adaptive opportunities. Although organisms typically find themselves in dynamic environments, change might not occur at a rate that provides sufficient adaptive opportunities to ensure long-term cooperator survival.

In this work, we examine whether the changes in selection that arise as organisms modify their environment can create opportunities that allow cooperators to be maintained by hitchhiking. We expand upon the model presented in Hankshaw and Kerr (2015), by allowing populations to alter their local environment based on the the presence of different non-social adaptations. This niche construction creates feedback that increasingly favors the adaptations present in each population. We first examine how the intensity of these feedbacks affects the hitchhiking process. Because the production of public goods increases population density, populations containing cooperators will exert a greater influence on their environment. As a result, these environments will be more quickly brought to states where fitness is higher.

As populations construct unique niches, they potentially decrease the threat of invasion from neighboring patches. This occurs when the traits that were advantageous in an immigrant’s home niche are maladaptive elsewhere. Because environmental change is influenced solely by non-social phenotypes in this model, this change of invasibility affects cooperators and defectors equally. Here again, however, populations containing a greater number of cooperators may have an advantage. The greater number of individuals that emigrate from these larger populations allow them to “export” their niche—and thus reduce the fitness of neighboring competitors—at a higher rate. We explore whether the range expansion that this process enables provides additional opportunities for cooperation to hitchhike.

Finally, we demonstrate how *negative* niche construction, where populations change their environment in ways that reduce fitness, can further support cooperation. Even though the niche construction process creates selective feedbacks, we would expect the magnitude of these feedbacks to decrease as populations evolve. Once individuals can no longer gain adaptations that compensate for the costs of cooperation, they are then outcompeted by non-cooperators. However if populations construct their environment in a way which decreases fitness, cooperation can still hitchhike when this change also creates the opportunity to gain compensatory adaptations.

# Materials and Methods

We build upon the model described in Hankshaw and Kerr (2015), in which cooperators and defectors compete and evolve in a spatially-structured metapopulation of populations. Each of these populations grows to carrying capacity, mutates, and migrates to neighboring patches. During this process, populations adapt to their local environments. In our extended model, we allow populations to modify their local environment, and these modifications feed back to affect selection.

## Model Description

Our simulated environment consists of patches arranged as an lattice (see [Table 1](#tables) for model parameters and their values), where each patch supports a population of zero or more individuals. Each individual in the population has a genotype, which is an ordered list of integers (loci). The first loci are *adaptive loci*, and are each occupied by a or an integer from the set , where is the number of potential alleles. At each of these loci, the presence of a non-zero allele represents an adaptation to the environment that confers fitness benefit . A binary allele at locus determines whether or not that individual is a cooperator. Individuals with allelic state at this locus are cooperators, carrying a cost , while individuals with allelic state are defectors. When , a minimally-adapted cooperator recoups the cost of cooperation. Equation 1 defines function , which gives the number of individuals in the population with allelic state at locus . indicates whether the allelic state matches allelic state () or not (), and is the genotype of individual .

Organisms also influence their environment, which, in turn, influences selection. We model this as a form of frequency dependent selection. Specifically, the selective value of adaptive allele at locus increases with the number of individuals in the population that have allele at locus (note that we treat both adaptive loci and allelic states as circular, so the allelic state at locus 1 is affected by locus , and allele 1 is best preceded by allele ). The slope of this increase is , which specifies the intensity of niche construction. As a consequence of this form of frequency dependence, genotypes with sequentially-increasing allelic states will tend to evolve. Because mutations are random, as described later, each population will evolve sequences that start with different allelic states. These different sequences represent the unique niches constructed by populations. Under this model, the fitness of an individual with genotype in population is:

where is a baseline fitness, and represents the allelic state of genotype at locus . The function indicates whether a given allelic state is in (i.e., it is non-zero), while the function gives the value below some value in the circular set (Equation 3).

$$ \beta(x, x\_{max}) = \{(x - 2 + x\_{max}) \bmod x\_{max}\} + 1 \qquad (3)$$

Cooperators produce a public good that is equally accessible to all members of the population. This public good increases the carrying capacity at that patch, allowing the population to reach greater density. This benefit increases linearly with the proportion of cooperators. Thus, if is the proportion of cooperators in a population at the beginning of a growth cycle, then that population reaches the following size during the growth phase:

The function reflects the benefit of public good production. A population composed entirely of defectors reaches size , while one composed entirely of cooperators reaches size (with ). During growth, individuals compete for inclusion in the resulting population. The composition of population with cooperator proportion after growth is multinomial with parameters and and , where:

Here, is the fitness of an individual with genotype (see Equation 2). therefore reflects that an individual’s ability to persist is proportional to its fitness relative to others’.

For simplicity, we apply mutations after population growth. Mutations occur independently at each locus and cause the allelic state to change. Mutations occur at each adaptive locus at rate , and cause a new allelic state to be chosen at random from the set . At the binary cooperation locus, mutations occur at rate . These mutations flip the allelic state, causing cooperators to become defectors and vice versa. Therefore, the probability that genotype mutates into genotype is given by:

where and are the Hamming distances between genotypes and at the cooperation locus and adaptive loci, respectively. The Hamming distance is the number of loci at which allelic states differ (Hamming, 1950). Because we define no inherent relationship among alleles, each of the allelic states is equally likely to arise via mutation at a given locus.

After mutation, individuals emigrate to an adjacent patch at rate . The destination patch is randomly chosen with uniform probability from the source patch’s Moore neighborhood, which is composed of the nearest 8 patches on the lattice. Because the metapopulation lattice has boundaries, patches located on an edge have smaller neighborhoods.

Metapopulations are initiated in a state that follows an environmental change. First, populations are seeded at all patches with cooperator proportion and grown to density . An environmental challenge is then introduced, which subjects the population to a bottleneck. For each individual, the probability of survival is , which represents the likelihood that a mutation occurs that confers tolerance. Survivors are chosen by binomial sampling. Because individuals have not yet adapted to this new environment, the allelic state of each individual’s genotype is set to at each adaptive locus (). Following initialization, simulations are run for cycles, where each discrete cycle consists of growth, mutation, and migration. At the end of each cycle, populations are thinned to allow for growth in the next cycle. The individuals that remain are chosen by binomial sampling, where each individual persists with probability , regardless of allelic state.

## Source Code and Software Environment

The simulation software and configurations for the experiments reported are available online (Us, 2015). Simulations used Python 3.4.0, NumPy 1.9.1, Pandas 0.15.2 (McKinney, 2010), and NetworkX 1.9.1 (Hagberg *et al.*, 2008). Data analyses were performed with R 3.1.3 (R Core Team, 2015).

# Results

## Niche construction prolongs cooperator survival

“cooperator presence” greater in NC runs than with no-NC (GNH)

## Negative Niche construction helps

Runs with wraparound persist indefinitely, while those without do not.

## NC Prevents/Limits Defector invasion

## NC Enables Cooperator Spread by “exporting” environment

# Discussion

* summary of results
* similarities/differences from previous work
  + Schwilk and Kerr (2002)
  + 10.1073/pnas.0812644106
* public goods as niche construction
* future QS or other environmental sensing
* Facultative cooperation
  + Rodrigues (2012)
  + Dumas and Kümmerli (2010)
  + Kümmerli and Brown (2010)
  + Darch/Diggle
  + QS?
  + Environmental Sensing? - (Koestler and Waters, 2014, Bernier et al. (2011))
* Negative Niche construction as a stragegy? - would those that create this constant pressure (L=5, A=6) do better than those that do not (L=5, A=5)?

Niche construction and selective feedbacks Niche construction and other social interactions

## Public Goods

TODO: merge this in with the “Cooperative Niche Construction” section [TEST](Coopeative%20Niche%20Construction)

By their very nature, public goods benefit populations by making their environment more hospitable. For example, bacteria produce extracellular products that find soluble iron (Griffin *et al.*, 2004), digest large proteins (Diggle *et al.*, 2007; Darch *et al.*, 2012), and reduce the risk of predation (Cosson *et al.*, 2002), among many others (West *et al.*, 2007a). While many studies have explored how the environment affects the evolution of cooperative bahviors, relatively few have examined how those behaviors affect the environment and the resulting change in evolutionary trajectories. Lehmann (2007) demonstrated analytically that when niche construction act benefits future generations, cooperation is favored due to reduced competition among kin. When rate-benefitting and yield-benefitting altruistic acts co-evolve, Van Dyken and Wade (2012) showed that “reciprocal niche construction”, where the selective feedbacks produced by one act benefitted the other, can lead to increased selection for both traits. While these studies have focused on the niche constructing effects of cooperation, we instead focus our attention here on how niche construction enables cooperators to escape defection by hitchhiking along with non-social traits.

## Primacy/Recency

In our model, alterations to the environment were immediately echoed by changes in selection. However, decoupling the timescales on which these processes occur can have substantial effects (Laland *et al.*, 1996). By integrating past allelic states into Equation 2, we can begin to explore how the cumulative effects of niche construction affect the creation of non-social adaptive opportunities and the benefits that they offer cooperation. Here, how these past allelic states are integrated will play an important role. For example, when the effects of earlier generations are weighted more heavily, the influence of migration may be diminished. While this will reduce the threat of emigration by defectors, cooperator populations will also be less effective at exporting their niche.

## Cooperative Niche Construction

While our focus for this work has been on the eco-evolutionary feedbacks created by non-social traits, it would also be interesting to explore how this system is affected by the timescale at which carrying capacity at a given patch is increased by public goods. In natural settings, a multitude of factors including protein durability (Brown, 2007; Kümmerli and Brown, 2010), diffusion (Allison, 2005; Driscoll and Pepper, 2010), and resource availability (Zhang and Rainey, 2013; Ghoul *et al.*, 2014) influence both the rate and the degree to which public goods alter the environment (and thereby selection). Lehmann (2007) demonstrated that a cooperative, niche constructing behavior can be favored when it only affected selection for future generations, thus reducing the potential for competition among contemporary kin. The evolutionary inertia that this creates, however, may ultimately work against cooperators. When public good accumulates in the environment, cooperators must reduce their investment in production to remain competitive (Kümmerli and Brown, 2010).

TODO: wrap up. Facultative cooperation requires sensing.

## Host-Symbiont

In many instances of cooperation, the environment is itself a biological entity, which can produce additional evolutionary feedbacks. As the host population changes, so too will selection on their symbiont populations. Here, evolutionary outcomes depend greatly on the degree of shared interest between the host and symbiont. For example, the cooperative production of virulence factors by the human pathogen *P. aeruginosa* in lung infections is harmful to those with cystic fibrosis (Harrison, 2007). Conversely, cooperative light production by *A. fischeri* is vital for the survival of its host, the Hawaiian bobtail squid (Ruby, 1996). It was recently argued that incorporating the effects of niche construction is critical for improving our understanding of viral evolution (Hamblin *et al.*, 2014) and evolution in co-infecting parasites (Hafer and Milinski, 2015). Incorporating host dynamics, co-evolution, and the feedbacks that they produce into models is likely to be equally important for gaining an understanding of how cooperative behaviors evolve in these host-symbiont settings.

# Acknowledgments

* TODO: Organizers?
* TODO: lab comments

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# Figures


## Figure 1

### Figure 1A




Proportion of cooperators over time when there are no opportunities for non-social adaptation

### Figure 1B




Proportion of cooperators over time with non-social adaptation (GNH)

### Figure 1C



Proportion of cooperators over time with non-social adaptation and selective feedbacks

## Figure 2




Cooperator Presence TODO

## Figure 3

Mean fitness over time for the treatments shown in Figure 2

### Figure 3A - Fitness for base case: niche construction



Grand mean Fitness of cooperators and defectors TODO

### Figure 3B - Fitness with double delta, no epsilon




Grand mean Fitness of cooperators and defectors, double delta, no epsilon TODO

### Figure 3C - Fitness with no negative niche construction (L=5, A=5)



Grand mean Fitness of cooperators and defectors, no negative niche construction TODO

### Figure 3D - Fitness with extreme negative niche construction (L=1, A=6)



Grand mean Fitness of cooperators and defectors, extreme negative niche construction TODO

## Figure 4

Cooperators invade from single population

## Figure 5

Defectors are kept at bay

## Figure 6

### Figure 6A - Effect of Migration Rate (m)

### Figure 6B - Effect of Public Good Benefit (Smax-Smin)

# Tables

Model parameters and their value

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Parameter | Description | Base Value |
|  | Number of metapopulation sites | 625 |
|  | Number of adaptive loci | 5 |
|  | Number of alleles | 6 |
|  | Fitness benefit, nonzero alleles | 0.3 |
|  | Production cost | 0.1 |
|  | Fitness benefit, sequential alleles | 0.00015 |
|  | Baseline fitness | 1 |
|  | Minimum population size | 800 |
|  | Maximum population size | 2000 |
|  | Mutation rate (adaptation) |  |
|  | Mutation rate (cooperation) |  |
|  | Migration rate | 0.05 |
|  | Initial cooperator proportion | 0.5 |
|  | Mutation rate (tolerance to new stress) |  |
|  | Number of simulation cycles | 1000 |
|  | Population dilution factor | 0.1 |

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