

# 賽局論 HW3

許博翔

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**Problem 1** (7.11.24).

- (a)  $\min(7, 2, 1, 2, 7) = 1, \min(2, 6, 2, 6, 2) = 2, \min(5, 4, 3, 4, 5) = 3, \min(2, 6, 2, 6, 2) = 2, \min(7, 2, 1, 2, 7) = 1$ , so  $\underline{m} = \max(1, 2, 3, 2, 1) = 3$ .  
 $\max(7, 2, 5, 2, 7) = 7, \max(2, 6, 4, 6, 2) = 6, \max(1, 2, 3, 2, 1) = 3, \max(2, 6, 4, 6, 2) = 6, \max(7, 2, 5, 2, 7) = 7$ , so  $\overline{m} = \min(7, 6, 3, 6, 7) = 3$ .

Since from 4b, we get that  $\underline{v} = \overline{v} = \underline{m} = 3$ .

$\therefore$  the value of this game is 3, and the row player's strategy is  $p = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0)$ ;  
the column player's strategy is  $q = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0)$ .

$$(b) \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 3 & 2 & 5 \\ 0 & -1 & 6 & 7 \\ 3 & 4 & 2 & 3 \\ -7 & 2 & 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{c_4 \geq c_1 \text{ and } r_4 \leq r_1} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 3 & 2 \\ 0 & -1 & 6 \\ 3 & 4 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{r_1 \leq r_3} \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 & 6 \\ 3 & 4 & 2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Suppose the strategy of the row player is  $(0, p_2, p_3, 0)$ , and the strategy of the column player is  $(q_1, q_2, q_3, 0)$ .

$$\underline{v} = \max_{p_2, p_3} \min(3p_3, -p_2 + 4p_3, 6p_2 + 2p_3) = \max_{p_2} \min(3 - 3p_2, 4 - 5p_2, 2 + 4p_2).$$

The maximum occurs when  $3 - 3p_2 = 4 - 5p_2$  or  $3 - 3p_2 = 2 + 4p_2$  or  $4 - 5p_2 = 2 + 4p_2$ . We take these solutions  $p_2 = \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{7}, \frac{2}{9}$ , calculate the correspond maximin

and we get that when  $p_2 = \frac{1}{7}$ , the maximin is maximized.

$$\therefore \underline{v} = \min\left(\frac{18}{7}, \frac{23}{7}, \frac{18}{7}\right) = \frac{18}{7}.$$

On the other hand,  $\overline{v} = \min_{q_1, q_2, q_3} \max(-q_2 + 6q_3, 3q_1 + 4q_2 + 2q_3) = \max(-q_2 + 6q_3, 3 + q_2 - q_3)$ .

The minimum occurs when  $-q_2 + 6q_3 = 3 + q_2 - q_3$ .

$$\Rightarrow q_2 = \frac{7q_3 - 3}{2}.$$

Since  $q_2 \in [0, 1], q_3 \in [0, 1], q_2 + q_3 \in [0, 1]$ , we get the bound of  $q_3 = [\frac{3}{7}, \frac{5}{7}] \cap [0, 1] \cap [\frac{1}{3}, \frac{5}{9}] = [\frac{3}{7}, \frac{5}{9}]$ .

$$\Rightarrow -q_2 + 6q_3 = \frac{3}{2} + \frac{5}{2}q_3, \text{ which has minimum when } q_3 = \frac{3}{7}.$$

$$\therefore \bar{v} = \frac{3}{2} + \frac{5}{2} \times \frac{3}{7} = \frac{18}{7}.$$

$\therefore$  the value of this game is  $\frac{18}{7}$ , and the row player's strategy is  $p = (0, \frac{1}{7}, \frac{6}{7}, 0)$ ;

the column player's strategy is  $q = (\frac{4}{7}, 0, \frac{3}{7}, 0)$ .

**Problem 2.** The following is the payoff Colonel Blotto gets for each strategy:

Colonel Blotto \ Count Baloney	(2, 1)	(1, 2)
(3, 1)	2 + 0	1 - 1
(2, 2)	0 + 1	1 + 0
(1, 3)	-1 + 1	0 + 2

Since Count Baloney gets exactly the opposite of the payoff that Colonel Blotto gets, the above value is what Colonel Blotto wants to maximize and Count Baloney wants to minimize.

$\min(2, 0) = 0, \min(1, 1) = 1, \min(0, 2) = 0$ , so for Colonel Blotto, the security value is  $\max(0, 1, 0) = 1$ , and the strategy is (2, 2).

$\max(2, 1, 0) = 2, \max(0, 1, 2) = 2$ , so for Count Baloney, the security is  $\min(2, 2) = 2$ , and the strategy is (2, 1) or (1, 2).

Since  $2 > 1$ , the saddle point does not exist by the theorem in the powerpoint of minimax and maximin.

Suppose that Count Baloney's mixed strategy is  $q = (q_1, q_2)$ , if Colonel Blotto plays:

$$(3, 1), \pi = 2q_1$$

$$(2, 2), \pi = q_1 + q_2$$

$$(1, 3), \pi = 2q_2.$$

$$\max(2q_1, q_1 + q_2, 2q_2) \stackrel{q_1 + q_2 = \frac{2q_1 + 2q_2}{2}}{=} \max(2q_1, 2q_2) = \max(2q_1, 2 - 2q_1) \geq \frac{2q_1 + 2 - 2q_1}{2} =$$

$$1, \text{ the equation holds } \iff q_1 = \frac{1}{2}.$$

$\therefore q = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$  is Count Baloney's strategy.

Suppose that Colonel Blotto's mixed strategy is  $p = (p_1, p_2, p_3)$ , if Count Baloney's

plays:

$$(2, 1), \pi = 2p_1 + p_2$$

$$(1, 2), \pi = p_2 + 2p_3.$$

The maximum of  $\min(2p_1 + p_2, p_2 + 2p_3)$  occurs when  $2p_1 + p_2 = p_2 + 2p_3$ , that is,

$$p_1 = p_3.$$

$$\Rightarrow p_2 = 1 - p_1 - p_3 = 1 - 2p_1.$$

$$\Rightarrow \max \min(2p_1 + p_2, p_2 + 2p_3) = \max \min(1, 1) = 1.$$

$\therefore p = (p_1, 1 - 2p_1, p_1)$  for all  $0 \leq p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2}$  is Colonel Blotto strategy.

$\therefore p = (p_1, 1 - 2p_1, p_1)$  for  $0 \leq p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $q = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$  is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

**Problem 3** (7.11.32).

0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

1 represents that the starship is survived, and 0 represents that the starship is destroyed.

$\Rightarrow$  Captain Kirk's aim is to maximize the value, while Mr. Spock's aim is to minimize the value.

One can see that the intersection of the first row and the 8-th column is a saddle point since  $0 \leq 0, 0 \leq 1, 0 \geq 0$ , and therefore the starship will be destroyed if both players play optimally.

**Problem 4.** Suppose that  $M$  is an  $n \times k$  matrix, and let  $M_{ij}$  denote the value of the intersection of the  $i$ -row and the  $j$ -column of  $M$ .

(a)  $\underline{m} = \max_{i=1,2,\dots,n} \min_{j=1,2,\dots,k} M_{ij}.$

Let  $S = \{(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \in [0, 1]^n : a_1 + a_2 + \dots + a_n = 1\}.$

Let  $p = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n)$  be the mixed strategy of the row player.

$\underline{v} = \max_{(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n) \in S} \min_{j=1,2,\dots,k} (M_{1j}p_1 + M_{2j}p_2 + \dots + M_{nj}p_n).$

Let  $e_i := (e_{i1}, e_{i2}, \dots, e_{in})$ , where  $e_{ij} = \mathbb{I}\{i = j\}.$

Clearly,  $e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n \in S$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow \underline{v} &= \max_{(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n) \in S} \min_{j=1, 2, \dots, k} (M_{1j}p_1 + M_{2j}p_2 + \dots + M_{nj}p_n) \geq \max_{(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n) \in \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n\}} \min_{j=1, 2, \dots, k} (M_{1j}p_1 + \\ &M_{2j}p_2 + \dots + M_{nj}p_n) = \max_{i=1, 2, \dots, n} \min_{j=1, 2, \dots, k} (M_{1j}e_{i1} + M_{2j}e_{i2} + \dots + M_{nj}e_{in}) = \\ &\max_{i=1, 2, \dots, n} \min_{j=1, 2, \dots, k} (M_{ij}) = \underline{m}. \end{aligned}$$

(b) Since the row player and the column player are symmetric.

$\therefore$  from the above, similarly,  $\bar{v} \leq \bar{m}$ .

$$\Rightarrow \underline{m} = \bar{m} \geq \bar{v} \geq \underline{v} \geq \underline{m}.$$

$$\Rightarrow \bar{v} = \underline{m} = \underline{v}.$$

### Problem 5.

Decision variables:  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m$ .

The objective function: maximize  $\underline{v}$ .

Constrained:

$$\forall j, \underline{v} \leq p_1\pi_{1,j} + p_2\pi_{2,j} + \dots + p_m\pi_{m,j}, \left( \because \underline{v} = \min_j (p_1\pi_{1,j} + p_2\pi_{2,j} + \dots + p_m\pi_{m,j}) \right)$$

$$p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m \in [0, 1],$$

$$p_1 + p_2 + \dots + p_m = 1.$$