

-=[**HEAP SPLOIT'N**]=-

by epochfail

i totally stole
the title slide

08-SEP-15

also the rest of ‘em

id

- Respond to “epoch”, “ev”, “russian”
- UNSW graduate
- Non-security eng @ Google
- Plumber at https://9447.plumbing/

id

- Respond to “epoch”, “ev”, “russian”
- UNSW graduate
- Non-security eng @ Google
- Plumber at https://9447.plumbing/
- Sometimes cosplay as a pwny

- Nothing I say is representative of my employer, etc, etc

summary

- wat is heap
- types of bugs
- live haq demo
- glibc y u so hard


All I wanted to do is ~~make video~~
play wargames.
WTF is a malloc?
quickmeme.com

address space


```
$ cat /proc/`pidof saas-stripped`/maps
08048000-080ef000 r-xp ..... saas-stripped
080ef000-080f1000 rwxp ..... saas-stripped
080f1000-080f3000 rwxp
089a2000-089c4000 rwxp        [heap]
f778a000-f778b000 rwxp
f778b000-f778c000 r-xp        [vdso]
ffe09000-ffe2a000 rwxp        [stack]

^^ addresses ^^   ^^ perms    ^^ what's inside
```

basics

- OS provides memory in 4kb multiples (0x1000)
- Need a way to partition these regions
- Usually a linked list on top of those regions

basics

- `void* malloc(size_t sz)` -- allocates sz bytes in heap
- `void free(void* ptr)` -- returns malloced memory
- `calloc(), realloc()` -- similar

- `alloca()` -- allocates on stack (not heap)

basics

Fictional heap (may not make sense)



ezhp

- Plaid CTF 2014, 200 pts
- Note-keeping system
  - Add note
  - Read note
  - Modify note
  - Delete note
- Reversing is left as an exercise to the reader (or a later lecture)
-
```
struct Node {
    int size;              // <-- metadata
    Node *next, *prev;
    char data[];           // <-- user data goes here
}
```

decompiled (not really)

```
void deallocate(void *v) {
  if (!v) return;
  mm_header *curr = (mm_header *)((char *)v - sizeof(mm_header));
  mm_header *prev = curr->prev;
  mm_header *next = curr->next;

  // we don't bother coalescing.
  if (prev) prev->next = next;
  if (next) next->prev = prev;
  curr->next = base->next;

  if (base->next) base->next->prev = curr;
  base->next = curr;
  curr->sz &= ~1;
}
```

For allocate(), etc:
https://github.com/pwning/plaidctf2014/blob/master/pwnables/ezhp/ezhp.c

unlink() sploit'n

- Old-school technique (ceyx/dzhkh were alive back then).
  Patched in 2004 or so
- Write-what-where primitive
  - Can write a value to an address of choice
  - Here, write pointer to data under our control

unlink() sploit'n

```
                prev  ↓↓↓   next ↓↓↓
0xffd4f100:     0xdontcare  0xffd4f120  0x41414141  0x41414141
0xffd4f110:     0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141

0xffd4f120:     0xffd4f100  0xffd4f130  0x42424242  0x42424242

0xffd4f130:     0xffd4f120  0xdontcare  0x43434343  0x43434343
```

What happens when we free(0xffd4f120)?

unlink() sploit'n



What happens when we free(0xffd4f120)?

0xffd4f100's next now points to 0xffd4f130

0xffd4f130's prev now points to 0xffd4f100

unlink() sploit'n

```
                prev  ↓↓↓   next ↓↓↓
0xffd4f100:     0xdontcare  0xffd4f130  0x41414141  0x41414141
0xffd4f110:     0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141

0xffd4f120:     0xdontcare  0xdontcare  0xdontcare  0xdontcare

0xffd4f130:     0xffd4f100  0xdontcare  0x43434343  0x43434343
```

What happens when we free(0xffd4f120)?

0xffd4f100's next now points to 0xffd4f130

0xffd4f130's prev now points to 0xffd4f100

unlink() sploit'n

```
                prev  ↓↓↓   next ↓↓↓
0xffd4f100:     0xdontcare  0xffd4f120  0x41414141  0x41414141
0xffd4f110:     0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141

0xffd4f120:     0x0804xxxx  0x0804yyyy  0x42424242  0x42424242

0xffd4f130:     0xffd4f120  0xdontcare  0x43434343  0x43434343
```

What happens when we free(0xffd4f120)?

unlink() sploit'n



	prev ↓↓↓	next ↓↓↓		
0xffd4f100:	0xdontcare	0xffd4f120	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffd4f110:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffd4f120:	0x0804xxxx	0x0804yyyy	0x42424242	0x42424242
0xffd4f130:	0xffd4f120	0xdontcare	0x43434343	0x43434343

What happens when we free(0xffd4f120)?

0xffd4f100 and 0xffd4f130 untouched.

0x0804xxxx now point to the heap.

good targets

Attacker can choose what to overwrite

- If no NX/DEP, can point GOT/DTORS to heap for $hellcode
- Else, point to some useful code..?
- Heap pointers, etc, for structs on the heap
  - Quite useful
  - Recently OS X got rooted with this
- Else, point to pivot for ROP & hope.....? :(

good targets

void MLG_360_noscope() in libc (64 bit):

One-gadget RCE on Linux

```
.text:000000000004641C    mov     rax, cs:environ_ptr_0
.text:0000000000046423    lea     rdi, aBinSh     ; "/bin/sh"
.text:000000000004642A    lea     rsi, [rsp+180h+var_150]
.text:000000000004642F    mov     cs:dword_3C16C0, 0
.text:0000000000046439    mov     cs:dword_3C16D0, 0
.text:0000000000046443    mov     rdx, [rax]
.text:0000000000046446    call    execve
.text:000000000004644B    mov     edi, 7Fh        ; status
.text:0000000000046450    call    _exit

.text:00000000000E6315    mov     rax, cs:environ_ptr_0
.text:00000000000E631C    lea     rsi, [rsp+1B8h+var_168]
.text:00000000000E6321    lea     rdi, aBinSh     ; "/bin/sh"
.text:00000000000E6328    mov     rdx, [rax]
.text:00000000000E632B    call    execve
.text:00000000000E6330    call    abort

.text:00000000000E7216    mov     rax, cs:environ_ptr_0
.text:00000000000E721D    lea     rsi, [rsp+1C8h+var_168]
.text:00000000000E7222    lea     rdi, aBinSh     ; "/bin/sh"
.text:00000000000E7229    mov     rdx, [rax]
.text:00000000000E722C    call    execve
.text:00000000000E7231    call    abort
```

some kinds of vulns

- **Heap overflow**

```
strcpy(malloc(16), user_input);
```

- **Use-after-free**

```
free(struct);    // Let's say struct has pointers
alloc_some_memory();
keep_using(struct);
```

- **Type confusion**

  Either real bug like shitty casting (uninteresting).
  Or induced by the attacker through OF or UAF or...

- **Others**

approaches

- **Info leak**

  Find location of heap (under ASLR).
  Try to disclose adjacent or old memory contents:

```
char *p = malloc(16);
strncpy(p, user_input, 16);
printf("%s", p);
```

  > "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD\xA0\xBF\x04\x06"

  From here, do some maths to deduce heap address.

- **Heap spraying**

  Allocating many fixed-size objects.
  Idea is to make heap uniform (predictable).

  Usually followed by corrupting an object and hoping.

We'll
Do It
Live!

glibc impl

```
struct malloc_chunk {
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T      prev_size;  /* Size of previous chunk (if free).  */
  INTERNAL_SIZE_T      size;       /* Size in bytes, including overhead. */

  struct malloc_chunk* fd;         /* double links -- used only if free. */
  struct malloc_chunk* bk;

  /* Only used for large blocks: pointer to next larger size.  */
  struct malloc_chunk* fd_nextsize; /* double links -- used only if free. */
  struct malloc_chunk* bk_nextsize;
};
```

glibc impl

- Some heap overflows can be exploited relatively easily
  (see sploitfun links at the end)
  fastbins demo?

- If you are constrained in your allocs/deallocs,
  or cannot control data near where you wanna write
  you're gonna have a bad time

- Glibc 2.19 (Ubuntu 14.04?) -> 2.21 (current)
  idk if they are changing much (allegedly hardened it)

- It's fukt. See sploitfun for 2 working types of corruption.

links

- https://sploitfun.wordpress.com/2015/02/10/understanding-glibc-malloc/
  Overview of how glibc malloc works.
  Recent.
  Disclaimer: TLDR.

- https://sploitfun.wordpress.com/2015/03/04/heap-overflow-using-malloc-maleficarum/
  Overview of glibc-malloc sploit'n possibilities.
  Includes POCs.

  Recent despite being based on 2005's Malloc Maleficarum.
  Good read.
  Explains glibc malloc patches.

- http://code.woboq.org/userspace/glibc/malloc/malloc.c.html
  Malloc source (glibc 2.21 ?)

- http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com.au/


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