Closes #104 github pull request.
Recent ncurses can be configured --with-termlib, which splits out the terminfo-level functions from libncurses into a separate libtinfo. This allows us to avoid an unnecessary dependency on libncurses. (We already avoided this on distributions that link with -Wl,--as-needed.) Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <firstname.lastname@example.org> Closes #128 github pull request.
performed and FreeBSD (at least) implements thin behaviour. Add an explicit test to detect this situation in Dispatcher::parse_params(). (This behaviour difference is not relevant to other uses of strtol()). This corrects the mishandling of (eg) "CSI m" on FreeBSD. Closes #129 github pull request. [keithw -- also fixes same issue with mosh-server on OS X]
AC_MSG_ERROR inside the variable assignment doesn't work properly. We get output like checking for protoc... ./configure: line 4524: is: command not found no and then the build continues (and fails) with PROTOC="". Closes #132 github pull request.
Identified by Anders Kaseorg. Test case: ( reset; seq 100; printf 'Hello, world!'; sleep 1; printf '\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \r\e[K'; sleep 1; printf '\n' ) > /dev/pts/16 2>&1 (replace /dev/pts/16 with mosh or termemu terminal)
This tests cryptographic primitives implemented by others. It uses the same interfaces and indeed the same compiled object code as the Mosh client and server. It does not particularly test any code written for the Mosh project.
Instead of guessing the right function to use, we malloc() 15 bytes more than we need, and compute the aligned offset within. The AlignedBuffer class takes care of passing the original pointer to free().
This reverts commit 78c7c72.
"Both the privacy and the authenticity properties of OCB degrade as per s^2 / 2^128, where s is the total number of blocks that the adversary acquires.... In order to ensure that s^2 / 2^128 remains small, a given key should be used to encrypt at most 2^48 blocks (2^55 bits or 4 petabytes)" -- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krovetz-ocb-03 We deem it unlikely that a legitimate user will send 4 PB through a Mosh session. If it happens, we simply kill the session. The server and client use the same key, so we actually need to die after 2^47 blocks. Closes #77.
…humb-2. (closes #86 github issue) (approved by Ted Krovetz, author of OCB reference implementation)