

Party Collusion and Legislative Activity

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Introduction

A spectre is haunting party politics—

Cartel party thesis

- describes changes in state / society relationship
- predicts high(er) levels of inter-party collusion
- often measured via membership | state funding

Problem

Party finance and membership do not say much of

- inter-party collaboration over legislative activity
- mediating effects of ideological distance


Possible solutions

- elite surveys of party leaders and members
- objective proxies for legislative collaboration

Proposal

Use **bill co-sponsorships** as proxies for

- **collaboration** between specific party elites (MPs)
- **collusion** between \pm formal groups of MPs
 - political parties
 - parliamentary groups
 - government coalitions



Hypotheses


- H1. **Ideology.** Ideological distance will actually *encourage* cross-party bill co-sponsorship
- H2. **Coalitions.** MPs in the governing majority will reach out to coalition partners as well as to MPs from opposition parties
- H3. **Party characteristics.** More established parties should feature more senior MPs more actively engaging in those patterns of behaviour

Data

Region	Country	Chamber	Period	Years	Legislatures
East	Bulgaria	Unicameral	2005–2015	11	4
	Czech Republic	Lower	1996–2015	20	6
		Upper	1996–2015	20	6
	Estonia	Unicameral	2007–2015	9	3
	Hungary	Unicameral	1998–2015	18	5
	Lithuania	Unicameral	1992–2015	24	6
	Romania	Lower	1996–2015	20	5
		Upper	1996–2015	20	5
		Unicameral	1998–2015	18	5
	Slovakia	Unicameral	1998–2015	18	5
West	Austria	Lower chamber only	1994–2015	22	7
	Belgium	Lower	1991–2015	25	7
		Upper	1995–2014	20	5
	France	Lower	1986–2015	25*	6
		Upper	1986–2015	30	7
	Ireland	Lower	1997–2015	19	4
		Upper	1997–2015	19	4
	Italy	Lower	1983–2015	33	9
		Upper	1996–2015	20	5
	Portugal	Unicameral	1991–2015	25	7
	Switzerland	Lower	1995–2015	21	5
		Upper	1995–2015	21	5
		Unicameral	1995–2015	21	5
North	Denmark	Unicameral	2001–2015	15	5
	Finland	Unicameral	1999–2014	16	4
	Iceland	Unicameral	1995–2015	21	6
	Norway	Unicameral	1985–2015	31	8
	Sweden	Unicameral	1988–2015	28	8
Asia	Israel	Unicameral	2009–2015	7	3

*Missing legislature 10 (1993–1997) of the French lower chamber.

Data



Region	Country	Chamber	Period	Years	Legislatures
East	Bulgaria	Unicameral			
	Czech Republic	Lower			
		Upper	1996–2015	20	6
	Estonia	Unicameral	2007–2015	9	3
		Unicameral	1996–2015	20	5
		Unicameral	1996–2015	20	5
		Lower	1996–2015	20	5
		Upper	1996–2015	20	5
		Unicameral	1996–2015	20	5
		Lower chamber only	1996–2015	20	5
		Lower	1996–2015	20	5
		Upper	1996–2015	20	5
		Lower	1986–2015	25*	6
		Upper	1986–2015	25	7
		Lower	1997–		
		Upper	1997–		
	Italy	Lower	1983–		
		Upper	1996–2015	20	5
North	Denmark	Unicameral	2001–2015	15	5
	Finland	Unicameral	1999–2014	16	4
	Iceland	Unicameral	1995–2015		
	Norway	Unicameral	1985–2015		
	Sweden	Unicameral	1988–2015	26	6
	Israel	Unicameral	2009–2015	7	3

26 parliamentary chambers

19 European countries

143 observation points


242 parties / groups

F. Briatte, “Network Patterns of Legislative Collaboration in Twenty Parliaments”

Network Science, 2016

*Missing legislature 10 (1993–1997) of the French lower chamber.

Data



Riksdag (SE), 2014–

Model

For each **party / group** at time t , measure

- % of co-sponsorship ties made across party lines
- % of ties made across gov. / opp. 'coalition' lines

Predict both quantities using

- Fractional logits, since outcome $\in (0, 1)$
- Chamber / legislature panel effects


Covariates

- Ideological dispersion of co-sponsors
- Coalition (government or opposition) status
- % of senior (i.e. non-freshman) and female MPs
 - Start year and duration of legislature
 - Chamber size

level of measurement

- Party / Group
 - Chamber / Legislature

Results



Results

Cosponsorship cartels?

- Ideological dispersion actually *encourages* cross-party (and cross-coalition) bill cosponsorship
- Governing coalitions are even more likely to attract cosponsors from other parties / groups
- Party composition has an unclear effect when measured via % of (senior | female) sponsor MPs

Thank you for your attention

Paper, slides and replication material at

github.com/briatte/epsa2018

Code for fractional regression models at

github.com/cran/frm (Joaquim J.S. Ramalho)