



Systems Security

COMSM1500

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Groups

- Please do check you have a group!
- <https://github.com/bris-sys-sec/labs/blob/master/1920-groups.pdf>

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Buffer overflow

This is important for Lab 1&2

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Assembly language

Small refresher

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`_start`

- `.text` *# code segment*
- `.global _start` *# export*
- `_start:`
- `movl $0x01, %eax` *# exit*
- `movl $0x00, %ebx` *# return code*
- `int $0x80` *# syscall*

hello world

- *# int write(int fd, char* buf, int len)*
- movl *\$0x04*, %eax *# write*
- movl *\$0x01*, %ebx *# stdout*
- movl *\$str*, %ecx *# buffer*
- movl *\$14*, %edx *# length*
- int *\$0x80*
- .data
- *str*:
- .ascii "Hello, World!\n"

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Stack


Small refresher

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
The stack

- `%ebp`
 - Base pointer
 - Top of the stack in current frame
- `%esp`
 - Current stack pointer
 - Next available byte on the stack



The stack

- Current stack frame (“top” to bottom)
 - arguments for function about to be called
 - saved register context (if reused)
 - local variable
 - old base pointer
- Caller’s stack frame
 - return address
 - (i.e. value program counter should be set on return)
 - pushed by call instruction
 - Arguments for this call



Example

```
▪ int zip1 = 15213;
▪ int zip2 = 98915;

▪ void call_swap() {
▪     swap(&zip1, &zip2);
▪ }

▪ void swap(int *xp, int *yp) {
▪     int t0 = *xp;
▪     int t1 = *yp;
▪     *xp = t1;
▪     *yp = t0;
▪ }
```

Example

```
▪ int zip1 = 15213;  
▪ int zip2 = 98915;  
  
▪ void call_swap() {  
▪     swap(&zip1, &zip2);  
▪ }
```

Example

- **int** zip1 = 15213;
- **int** zip2 = 98915;
- **void** call_swap() {
- swap(&zip1, &zip2);
- }

- *# void call_swap()*
- ...
- pushl \$zip1
- pushl \$zip2
- call swap
- ...

Example

```
▪ int zip1 = 15213;  
▪ int zip2 = 98915;  
  
▪ void call_swap() {  
▪     swap(&zip1, &zip2);  
▪ }
```

```
▪ # void call_swap()
```

```
▪ ...
```

```
▪ pushl $zip1
```

```
▪ pushl $zip2
```

```
▪ call swap
```

```
▪ ...
```

%ebp →

%esp →



Example

- `int zip1 = 15213;`
- `int zip2 = 98915;`
- `void call_swap() {`
- `swap(&zip1, &zip2);`
- `}`

- `# void call_swap()`


- ...

- `pushl $zip1`

- `pushl $zip2`

- `call swap`

- ...



Example

```
▪ int zip1 = 15213;  
▪ int zip2 = 98915;  
  
▪ void call_swap() {  
▪     swap(&zip1, &zip2);  
▪ }
```

```
▪ # void call_swap()
```


```
▪ ...
```

```
▪ pushl $zip1
```

```
▪ pushl $zip2
```

```
▪ call swap
```

```
▪ ...
```



Example

- `int zip1 = 15213;`
- `int zip2 = 98915;`
- `void call_swap() {`
- `swap(&zip1, &zip2);`
- `}`

- `# void call_swap()`

- ...

- `pushl $zip1`

- `pushl $zip2`

- `call swap`

- ...

`%ebp` →


`%esp` →




Example

```
▪ void swap(int *xp, int *yp) {  
  ▪   int t0 = *xp;  
  ▪   int t1 = *yp;  
  ▪   *xp = t1;  
  ▪   *yp = t0;  
  ▪ }  
  
▪ # void swap(int *xp, int *yp)  
  
  ▪ pushl %ebp  
  ▪ movl %esp, %ebp  
  ▪ pushl %ebx  
  } Set up  
  
  ▪ movl 12(%ebp), %ecx  
  ▪ movl 8(%ebp), %edx  
  ▪ movl (%ecx), %eax  
  ▪ movl (%edx), %ebx  
  ▪ movl %eax, (%edx)  
  ▪ movl %ebx, (%ecx)  
  } body  
  
  ▪ Popl %ebx  
  ▪ popl %ebp  
  ▪ ret  
  } finish
```


Example (setup)




Example (setup)




Example (setup)



Example (setup)




Example (body)




- `movl 12(%ebp), %ecx`
- `movl 8(%ebp), %edx`
- ... (you can figure this out on your own)


Example (finish)



Example (finish)




Example (finish)



Example



Example



- `popl %ebx`
- `popl %ebp`
- `ret`

Homework/exam question:
Briefly explain how the stack
works.


Buffer overflow

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
Example

```
▪ int read_get(void) {  
▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return i;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```




Example

```
▪ int read_get(void) {  
▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return i;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```



Example

```
▪ int read_get(void) {  
▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return I;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```



Example

```
▪ int read_get(void) {  
▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return i;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```

Changed return address!
and old ebp.

%ebp



X
X
X
X
X
X
X

%esp




Example

```
▪ int read_get(void) {  
▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return i;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```

Changed return address!
and old ebp.

%ebp



&evil
something
X
E
V
I
L
X

Example


```
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▪   char buf[128];  
▪   int i;  
▪   gets(buf);  
▪   i = atoi(buf);  
▪   return i;  
▪ }  
  
▪ int main() {  
▪   x = read_get();  
▪   printf("%s", x);  
▪ }
```

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Homework/exam question:
Explain how buffer overflow
can be exploited to execute
arbitrary code.

Changed returned address!
and old ebp.

%ebp




&evil
something
X
E
V
I
L
X

buffer overflows

- Vulnerability in C / assembly programs where the compiler does not enforce array bounds.
 - `a[1]`
 - `*(a+1)`
- Take over a setuid program, get root.

stack overflow



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execve

- **NAME**

- `execve` - execute program

- **SYNOPSIS**

- `#include <unistd.h>`

- `int execve(const char *filename,`
- `char *const argv[],`
- `char *const envp[]);`

- **DESCRIPTION**

- `execve()` executes the program pointed to by filename.

execve in assembly

```
▪ .section .data
▪     cmd: .asciz "/bin/sh"
▪     ptr: .int cmd
▪         .int 0

▪ .section .text
▪     .globl _start
▪ _start:
▪     mov $0x0b, %eax    # execve
▪     mov $cmd, %ebx     # command
▪     mov $ptr, %ecx     # args
▪     mov $0, %edx       # env
▪     int $0x80
```

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What's the problem?

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The problem

- `mov $0x0b, %eax = B8 0B 00 00 00`
 - B8: `mov IMM32, %eax`
 - those null bytes will terminate a `strcpy/scanf/gets` etc.
- challenge is to create shellcode with only “legal” bytes
- also, how to address your payload?
- For **you** to figure out in the coursework ;-)

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How to protect from this?

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countermeasures



prevent

detect

recover

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!

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Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
 - Maybe can check usage of problematic C functions?

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
 - Maybe can check usage of problematic C functions?
 - What about raw pointer manipulations?

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
 - Maybe can check usage of problematic C functions?
 - What about raw pointer manipulations?
 - Look at a real large C projects... does not look easy

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
 - To help find bugs

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
 - To help find bugs
 - Static analysis

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
 - Solution B: build tools
 - To help find bugs
 - Static analysis
- ```
▪ void foo(int *p) {
 ▪ int off;
 ▪ *z = p + off;
 ▪ if (off > 8)
 ▪ bar(8);
 ▪ }
```

# Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
  - To help find bugs
  - Static analysis
- ```
void foo(int *p) {  
  int off; NOT INITIALIZED  
  *z = p + off;  
  if (off > 8)  
    bar(8);  
}
```

Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
 - To help find bugs
 - Static analysis
- ```
void foo(int *p) {
 int off; NOT INITIALIZED
 *z = p + off;
 if (off > 8) PROPAGATE ASSUMPTION ABOUT
 bar(off); off VALUE
}
```

# Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
  - To help find bugs
  - Static analysis
  - Fuzzing
    - Pushing massive amount of random value to a program
    - See if it crashes

# Prevent!

- Solution A: Avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
  - To help find bugs
  - Static analysis
  - Fuzzing
    - Pushing massive amount of random value to a program
    - See if it crashes
    - Can be a bit smarter and make sure we reach every branch in the program

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...



# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...
  - Legacy code! (that's how the real world exists)

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...
  - Legacy code! (that's how the real world exists)
  - Need low level hardware access?

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...
  - Legacy code! (that's how the real world exists)
  - Need low level hardware access?
  - Performance?

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...
  - Legacy code! (that's how the real world exists)
  - Need low level hardware access?
  - Performance?
    - It used to be a problem, not necessarily anymore

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language
  - JAVA, C#, Rust etc...
  - Legacy code! (that's how the real world exists)
  - Need low level hardware access?
  - Performance?
    - It used to be a problem, not necessarily anymore
    - Is your program CPU bound anyway?

# Prevent!

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language

# Prevent!

Homework/exam question:  
This is the reflective part of  
your coursework.

- Solution A: avoid bugs in your C code!
- Solution B: build tools
- Solution C: use a memory safe language

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# Next lecture

... to be continued

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# Thank you

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