# Coordinated Betting by Multi-Fund Managers (Gelly Fu)

Brittany Lewis Kelley School of Business - IU

Discussion for MFA 2020 69<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting

March 19, 2021

#### **Motivation**

- Mutual funds larger share of the financial markets than ever before (Falato, Goldstein, Hortacsu 2020)
- Mutual funds have incentive to outperform to attract funds (Massa, Patgiri 2008)
- Mutual fund managers' compensation contracts reward outperformance but do not penalize underperformance (Ma, Tang, Gomez 2019)

• Do fund managers seek outperformance in a way that harms investors?

#### **Summary of Main Results**

Paper proposes new agency problem where managers manage 2 or more funds and maximize the probability that one fund outperforms

- To do this:
  - Presents model where multi-fund manager maximizes her own consumption by selecting negatively correlated stocks across her funds
  - 2. Combines 3 data sources to study whether theory is borne out in the data

**Main result:** returns less correlated between two funds managed by same manager relative to other matched funds

Other results: These managers take more risk, trade more often, are more heavily weighted in volatile sectors such as finance and manufacturing rather than less volatile sectors such as telecom and energy

#### **Robustness Tests and Consistent Outcomes**

#### **Robustness Tests**

- SameStyle
- TeamSample
- Placebo Managers similar but not identical
  - At least one manager the same and at least one unique to the 2 funds

#### **Consistent Outcomes - funds that engage in negative correlation**

- Strategically coordinate investments in different industries opposite portfolio weights in more volatile industries (manufacturing and finance rather than telecom and energy)
- Take more positions skewed toward small cap in one fund and toward large cap in another fund
- Risk Taking
  - Have 0.31% higher volatility
  - Invest in more lottery like stocks

#### **Main Comment: Result Depends on Matching**

#### Matching methodology

- Identify funds managed by same manager funds i and j
- Identify common stocks in both as C<sub>i,j</sub>
- Identify unique stocks in j relative to i as  $U_{i,j}$
- Match j to the universe of funds in same investment style and size quintile
  - Call each matched fund M
- Generate synthetic portfolio M\* using fund j and M holdings
  - $M^*$  splices together  $C_{i,j}$  and  $U_{i,M}$
- Measure corr(i, j) relative to corr(i, M\*)

## Main Comment: Result Depends on Matching Cont'd

- $M^*$  is synthetic portfolio composed of  $C_{i,j}$  and  $U_{i,M}$
- Result:  $corr(i,j) < corr(i,M^*)$ 
  - lacktriangledown  $\Rightarrow$  more discussion on the matching process and synthetic fund

#### Result depends on matching process

- How similar are  $C_{M,i}$  and  $C_{i,i}$ ?
- Do they contain the same number of stocks, do they have the same average return?
  - 1. Yes: could validate swapping  $C_{M,i}$  with  $C_{i,i}$
  - 2. No: it may be that the interplay between  $C_{M,i}$  and  $U_{M,i}$  is important to track j
    - $\Rightarrow$  swapping  $C_{M,i}$  with  $C_{j,i}$  could overstate  $M^*$ 's correlation with i and drive result that  $corr(j,i) < corr(M^*,i)$

- Fund i has 3 stocks: Target, Walmart, Nike
- Fund j has 3 stocks: Target, Walmart, United
- Fund M has 3 stocks: Walmart, United, Delta
  - Fund *M* selected to be similar to *j*, overlap with *j* is Walmart, United
  - *M*'s overlap with *i* however is only Walmart
  - Methodology creates M\* by swapping M's Walmart for j's Target and Walmart
- Now depending on how the  $U_{M^*,i}$  weighting works, it could matter how United and Delta are weighted in the synthetic portfolio
- Extreme example where  $U_{i,i}$ 's overlap with  $U_{M,i}$  is weighted at 0
  - Only consider the new bet: Delta

# **Imagine the Following Stocks**

Fund i Holdings	Fund j Holdings	Fund <i>M</i> Holdings
Target	Target	Delta
Walmart	Walmart	Walmart
Nike	United	United

Fund i Return	Fund j Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

correlation = 0.24

Fund i Return	Fund j Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

correlation = 0.24

Fund i Return	Fund M Return
(Target) 2	(Delta) -2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

correlation = -0.72

Fund i Return	Fund j Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

Fund i Return	Fund M Return
(Target) 2	(Delta) -2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

correlation = 0.24

$$correlation = -0.72 \\$$

Fund i Return	Fund M* Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(Delta) -2
	(United) -4

correlation = 0.33

Fund i Return	Fund j Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

Fund i Return	Fund M Return
(Target) 2	(Delta) -2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

$$correlation = 0.24$$

$$correlation = -0.72 \\$$

Fund i Return	Fund M* Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(Delta) -2
	(United) -4

correlation = 0.33

$$corr(j, i) = 0.24 < corr(M^*, i) = 0.33$$

Fund i Return	Fund j Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

Fund i Return	Fund M Return
(Target) 2	(Delta) -2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(United) -4

$$correlation = 0.24$$

$$correlation = -0.72 \\$$

Fund i Return	Fund M* Return
(Target) 2	(Target) 2
(Walmart) 4	(Walmart) 4
(Nike) 3	(Delta) -2
	(United) -4

correlation = 0.33

$$corr(j, i) = 0.24 < corr(M^*, i) = 0.33$$

Lewis (Kelley - IU) But  $corr(j,i) = 0.24 > corr(M,i) = -0.72 \rightarrow$  Reverses the result

#### **Other Comments - Performance Analysis**

Managers engaging in this strategy are 39% more likely to produce star funds

- Managing two or more is already signal that you are a better manager
  - Coordination is at the manager level. Worried about bias at the manager level - MBA, PhD, past performance at the manager (rather than fund) level

#### Conclusion

- Important question
- Interesting approach
- Additional analysis explaining matching process and creation of synthetic portfolio M\* would be valuable

Additional controls for manager characteristics would be valuable