
Protocol Lindell22.Sign

An instantiation of the three-round threshold protocol of Lindell22 [Lin22], parametrized by a group \mathbb{G} of prime order q with generator G , a hash function H , a Commitment scheme, a zero-sharing protocol Przs and a dlog PoK Fischlin .

Players: Key share holders: $\{\mathcal{P}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ holding $\{x_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and public key Q
Quorum of signers: $\{\mathcal{P}_i\}_{i \in S}$ for $S \in [n]^t$ and $S^* = S \setminus \{i\}$

Inputs: sid : unique session id
 m : message to sign
 $taproot$: flag to indicate compatibility with BIP341

$\mathcal{P}_i.\text{Round1}() \dashrightarrow (c_i, \{z^a_{(i,j)}\}_{j \in S^*})$
1: Sample $k_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{q^*}$ and compute $R_i \leftarrow k_i \cdot G$
2: $(c_i, w_i) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(R_i \parallel i \parallel sid \parallel S)$
3: $\mathcal{F}^{\text{Broadcast}}(c_i)$

$\mathcal{P}_i.\text{Round2}(\{c_j, z^a_{(j,i)}\}_{j \in S^*}) \dashrightarrow (\pi_i^{dl}, R_i, w_i, \{z^b_{(i,j)}\}_{j \in S^*})$
1: $\pi_i^{dl} \leftarrow \text{Fischlin.Prove}(k_i)$
2: $\mathcal{F}^{\text{Broadcast}}(\pi_i^{dl}, R_i, w_i)$

$\mathcal{P}_i.\text{Round3}(\{\pi_j^{dl}, R_j, w_j, z^b_{(j,i)}\}_{j \in S^*}) \dashrightarrow \sigma_i$
1: **for** $j \in S^*$ **do**
2: Run $\text{Open}(R_j \parallel j \parallel sid \parallel S, c_j, w_j)$, **ABORT** if it fails
3: Run $\text{Fischlin.Verify}(R_j, \pi_j^{dl})$, **ABORT** if it fails
4: $R \leftarrow \sum_{j \in S^*} R_j$
5: $d'_i \leftarrow \text{ShamirToAdditive}(i, S, x_i)$
6: Run $(R_i, s_i) \leftarrow \text{Schnorr.Variant}(R_i, d'_i)$
return $\sigma_i = \{R_i, s_i\}$

Aggregate ($\sigma_i \forall i \in S$) $\dashrightarrow \sigma$
1: $r \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n R_i$
2: $s \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n s_i$
return $\sigma \leftarrow (r, s)$

References

- [Lin22] Yehuda Lindell. Simple three-round multiparty schnorr signing with full simulatability. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/374, 2022.
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/374>.