
Scheme **Feldman**

A VSS scheme based on the Feldman commitment scheme [Fel87] and the SSS scheme [Sha79]. The scheme is parametrized by a group \mathbb{G} of prime order q and generator G , the number of shares produced n , and the number of shares required to reconstruct t (threshold).

Split $_G(s \in \mathbb{F}_q) \dashrightarrow (\mathbf{y} = \{y_{(1)}, \dots, y_{(n)}\}, \mathbf{C} = \{C_{(1)}, \dots, C_{(t)}\})$

- 1: Set $\mathbf{p}_0 \leftarrow s$ as the constant term of a polynomial $\mathbf{p}(x)$ of degree $t - 1$.
- 2: Set $C_1 \leftarrow s \cdot G$ as the commitment of the secret.
- 3: **for** $j \in [t - 1]$ **do**
- 4: Sample $\mathbf{p}_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_q^*$ as the random coefficients of the polynomial \mathbf{p} .
- 5: $C_{(j+1)} \leftarrow \mathbf{p}_j \cdot G$ as a commitment of each coefficient.
- 6: **for** $i \in [n]$ **do**
- 7: $y_{(i)} \leftarrow \sum_{k=0}^{t-1} (\mathbf{p}_k \cdot i^k)$ as the evaluation of $\mathbf{p}(x)$ in $x=i$.

return $(\mathbf{y} = \{y_{(i)}\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathbf{C} = \{C_{(j)}\}_{j \in [t]})$ as n shares and t commitments

Verify $_G(i \in [n], y_{(i)} \in \mathbb{F}_q, \mathbf{C} = \{C_{(1)}, \dots, C_{(t)}\}) \dashrightarrow \text{valid}$

- 1: $R \leftarrow C_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} (j \cdot i) \cdot C_{(j+1)}$ as the expected commitment.
- 2: $L \leftarrow y_{(i)} \cdot G$ as the actual commitment of the share $y_{(i)}$.
- 3: Check if $L \stackrel{?}{=} R$, **ABORT** if not.

return *valid*

Combine $_G(X' \in [n]^t, \mathbf{y}' = \{y_{(i)} \in \mathbb{F}\}_{i \in X'}, \mathbf{C} = \{C_{(1)}, \dots, C_{(t)}\}) \dashrightarrow s$

- 1: Run $\text{Feldman.Verify}(i, y_{(i)}, \mathbf{C}) \forall i \in X'$ to verify all the t shares in \mathbf{y}' .
- 2: Run $\text{SSS.Combine}(X', \mathbf{y}')$ to reconstruct the secret s .

return s

References

- [Fel87] Paul Feldman. A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing. In *28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1987)*, pages 427–438, 1987.
- [Sha79] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. *Communications of the ACM*, 22(11):612–613, 1979.