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**Scheme** Pedersen Commitment (PC)

The commitment scheme from [Ped91, Section3] parametrized by a group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $q$  with a generator  $G$  (e.g., an elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{G}, q, G)$ ), and a second generator  $H$  chosen independently<sup>1</sup> from  $G$ .

**Inputs:**  $m$ , an input message to commit and later open.

**Outputs:**  $valid$  if the commitment is verified correctly.

**Commit**( $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ ) $\dashrightarrow (C, w)$

- 1: Sample  $w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ , a random witness
  - 2:  $C \leftarrow w \cdot G + m \cdot H$  as the commitment of  $m$ .
- return**  $(C, w)$

**Open**( $m, C, w$ ) $\dashrightarrow valid$

- 1:  $c' \leftarrow m \cdot G + w \cdot H$
  - return**  $valid$  if  $c \stackrel{?}{=} c'$ , **ABORT** otherwise.
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## References

- [Ped91] Torben Pryds Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In *Annual international cryptology conference*, pages 129–140. Springer, 1991.

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<sup>1</sup>Such that nobody knows  $x$  s.t.  $H = x \cdot G$ . This can effectively achieved via aggregation of commitments of independent random values following the instructions of [Ped91], or via  $H \leftarrow \text{Hash2Curve}(m)$  of a fixed message  $m$  (e.g.,  $m = \text{"NOTHING}_0\text{P}_M\text{Y}_S\text{LEEVE"}$ ) as we do.