

A polynomial algorithm for the deterministic mean payoff game

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Abstract

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We consider an infinite-horizon game on a directed graph (X, E) between two players, MAX and MIN. For any vertex x , we write $E(x) = \{y; (x, y) \in E\}$ for the set of vertices that can be reached from x by following one edge and we assume $E(x) \neq \emptyset$. The set of vertices $X = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ of the graph is partitioned into the sets X_+ and X_- of nodes respectively controlled by MAX and MIN. The game starts in some vertex x_0 . At each time step, the player who controls the current vertex chooses a next vertex by following an edge. So on and so forth, the choices generate an infinitely long trajectory (x_0, x_1, \dots) . In the mean payoff game, the goal of MAX is to maximize

$$\liminf_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^T r(x_t),$$

while that of MIN is to minimize

$$\limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^T r(x_t).$$

As a proxy to solve the mean payoff game, our technical developments will mainly consider the γ -discounted payoff for some $0 \leq \gamma < 1$, where the goal of MAX is to maximize

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t r(x_t)$$

while that of MIN is to minimize this quantity.

SUMMARY

1 Notations and Preliminaries

M N

For any pair of policies $\mu : X_+ \rightarrow X$ for MAX and $\nu : X_-$ for MIN (mappings such that for all x , $\mu(x) \in E(x)$ and $\nu(x) \in E(x)$), let us write $P_{\mu, \nu}$ for the transition matrix: for all $(x, y) \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}^2$, $P_{\mu, \nu}(x, y)$ equals 1 if and only if μ and ν induce a transition $x \rightarrow y$ and 0 else. Seeing the reward $r : X \rightarrow 0, 1, \dots, R$ and any function $v : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ as vectors of \mathbb{R}^n , consider the following Bellman operators

$$T_{\mu, \nu} v = r + \gamma P_{\mu, \nu} v,$$

$$T_{\mu} v = \min_{\nu} T_{\mu, \nu} v$$

$$\tilde{T}_{\nu} v = \max_{\mu} T_{\mu, \nu} v$$

$$Tv = \max_{\mu} T_{\mu} v = \min_{\nu} \tilde{T}_{\nu} v$$

that are γ -contractions with respect to the max-norm. For all pairs of policies (μ, ν) , the value is

$$v_{\mu, \nu} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\gamma P_{\mu, \nu})^t g = (I - \gamma P_{\mu, \nu})^{-1} r$$

and is the only fixed point of $T_{\mu, \nu}$. Given any policy μ for MAX, the minimal value that MIN can obtain

$$v_{\mu} = \min_{\nu} v_{\mu, \nu}$$

is the fixed point of T_{μ} , and it is well known that any policy ν_+ for MIN such that $T_{\mu, \nu_+} v_{\mu} = T_{\mu} v_{\mu} = v_{\mu}$ is optimal. Symmetrically, given any policy ν for MIN, the maximal value that MAX can obtain

$$\tilde{v}_{\mu} = \max_{\nu} v_{\mu, \nu}$$

is the fixed point of \tilde{T}_{ν} , and it is well known that any policy μ_+ for MAX such that $T_{\mu_+, \nu} v_{\mu} = \tilde{T}_{\nu} \tilde{v}_{\nu} = \tilde{v}_{\nu}$ is optimal. The optimal discounted payoff

$$v_* = \max_{\mu} \min_{\nu} v_{\mu, \nu}$$

is the fixed point of T . Let (μ_*, ν_*) be any pair of positional strategies such that $T_{\mu_*, \nu_*} v_* = T v_*$. It is well-known that (μ_*, ν_*) is optimal.

n -periodic policies

Finally, min-attractor

2 A quasi-optimality equation that is local

The equation $v_* = T v_*$, that characterizes the optimal value of the game, is *global* in the sense that it is a system of equations that involves the values of *all* vertices. We shall begin by describing and prove a quasi-optimality equation that has the virtue of being *local* in the sense that it involves only the value of *one* vertex:

Lemma 1. *Let v be any value function that satisfies $v \leq T v$. If for some x , we have*

$$[T^n v](x) - v(x) \leq \epsilon,$$

Then

$$v(x) \geq v_*(x) - \frac{\epsilon}{1 - \gamma}.$$

Proof. First, observe that by the monotonicity of T , and since $v \leq T v$, we have

$$v \leq T v \leq T^2 v \leq \dots \leq T^n v.$$

Let $\vec{\nu} = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_n)$ be a policy such that

$$T^n v = \tilde{T}_{\vec{\nu}} v.$$

Assume MIN uses $\vec{\nu}$ to play n steps against the optimal policy μ_* of MAX from x . Consider the n vertices visited:

$$x_0 = x, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$$

Since there are n vertices, there necessarily exists $0 \leq i < j \leq n$ such that $x_i = x_j$. Let $\vec{\nu}_p = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_{i-1})$, $\vec{\nu}_c = (\nu_i, \dots, \nu_{j-1})$ and $\vec{\nu}_{p'} = (\nu_j, \dots, \nu_n)$ so that $\vec{\nu} = \vec{\nu}_p \vec{\nu}_c \vec{\nu}_{p'}$.

Now, assume that against μ_* , MIN uses the non-stationary policy $\vec{v}' = \vec{v}_p(\vec{v}_c)^\infty$. The trajectory is made of a path followed by a cycle of length $j - i$ that is repeated infinitely often:

$$\underbrace{x_0 = x, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{i-1}}_{\text{path}}, \underbrace{x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_{j-1}}_{\text{cycle}}, \underbrace{x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_{j-1}}_{\text{cycle}}, \dots$$

The value of this game satisfies for any w ,

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\mu_*, \vec{v}}(x) &= \mathbb{1}_x T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p}(T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c})^\infty w \\ &= \mathbb{1}_x T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p} 0 + \gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} [(T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c})^{k+1} w - T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c}^k w] + \gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i} w \\ &= \mathbb{1}_x T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p} w + \gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^{(j-i)k} (P_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c})^k (T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c} w - w) \\ &= \mathbb{1}_x T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p} w + \gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i} (I - \gamma^{j-i} P_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c})^{-1} (T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c} w - w) \\ &= \mathbb{1}_x T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p} w + \frac{\gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i}}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} (T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c} w - w) \end{aligned}$$

Take $w = T^{n-j} v$ and substract $v(x)$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\mu_*, \vec{v}}(x) - v(x) &= \mathbb{1}_x (T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_p} T^{n-j} v - v) + \frac{\gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i}}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} (T_{\mu_*, \vec{v}_c} T^{n-i} v - T^{n-i} v) \\ &\leq \mathbb{1}_x (\tilde{T}_{\vec{v}_p} T^{n-j} v - v) + \frac{\gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i}}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} (\tilde{T}_{\vec{v}_c} T^{n-j} v - T^{n-j} v) \\ &\leq \mathbb{1}_x (\tilde{T}_{\vec{v}_p} T^{n-i} v - v) + \frac{\gamma^i \mathbb{1}_{x_i}}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} (\tilde{T}_{\vec{v}_c} T^{n-j} v - T^{n-j} v) \\ &= \mathbb{1}_x (T^n v - v) + \frac{\gamma^i}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} \mathbb{1}_{x_i} (T^{n-i} v - T^{n-j} v) \\ &\leq \mathbb{1}_x (T^n v - v) + \frac{\gamma^i}{1 - \gamma^{j-i}} \mathbb{1}_x (T^n v - v) \\ &\leq \frac{\epsilon}{1 - \gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by the fact that $v_{\mu_*, \nu_*}(x) \leq v_{\mu_*, \vec{v}}(x)$. □

3 A non-stationary Policy Iteration algorithm

We consider the following algorithm that takes as main parameter a threshold ϵ .

$\vec{\mu}$

Lemma 2. *After at most $\frac{n(1-\gamma)(v_{\mu_*} - v_{\mu_0})}{\epsilon}$ iterations, the algorithm stops and return a policy μ such that*

$$v_{\mu_*} - v_\mu \leq nR + \frac{\epsilon}{1 - \gamma}$$

If one chooses γ sufficiently high and ϵ sufficiently small of order $\frac{1}{n^2}$

By Zwick we know that

$$\|g_{\mu_*} - (1 - \gamma)v_{\mu_*}^\gamma\| \leq 2n(1 - \gamma)R.$$

Therefore

$$\|g_{\mu_*} - (1 - \gamma)v_{\mu}^{(\gamma)}\| \leq 3n(1 - \gamma)R + \epsilon.$$

If we choose $\gamma = 1 - \frac{1}{12n^3R}$ and $\epsilon = \frac{1}{Rn^2}$, we get

$$\|g_{\mu_*} - (1 - \gamma)v_{\mu}^{(\gamma)}\| \leq \frac{1}{2n^2}.$$

and we can thus deduce the value g_{μ_*} .

4 A scaling variant

Theorem 1. *The total number of iterations of the Policy Iteration algorithm is bounded by $n^3 \log R$.*