Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies

First Edition

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Peace and Conflict Studies

Past, Present, and Future

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The field of Peace and Conflict Studies is a relative newcomer among the various disciplines that compose the traditional perspectives of the university curriculum. While disciplines such as psychology, biology, political science, sociology, or law require no explanation as to what they are as fields of study and need no justification for the role they play in university education, the field of Peace and Conflict studies seems to have emerged on the scene somewhat late in the game—not without a certain degree of surprise considering that peace and conflict have been around pretty much as long as there have been people—and as a result, there is sometimes confusion and consternation about why and how this relatively new field came into existence. Still to this day, there are many skeptics who feel that the field of Peace and Conflict Studies is a redundant field, rehashing material and repeating perspectives that are already adequately covered and addressed in other, more traditional fields such as political science or sociology. But what separates all of the various and more traditional fields of study from one another is not the topics that they address, but rather the questions they pose about those topics. War, for instance, can be studied in sociology or political science, psychology or biology, but each different field of study will bring to the table a specific set of questions that is uniquely generated by that field of study. In this regard, Peace and Conflict Studies is no different from any of the more traditional disciplines with which it consistently and constructively interacts. Peace and Conflict Studies brings its own questions to the table, questions that no one else was asking, or questions that no one else was asking in quite the same way.

This brief introductory essay on the field of Peace and Conflict Studies is designed to introduce the essential elements and ongoing challenges of the field itself. One of the most important things to keep in mind in all of this is the fact that part of the distinctiveness of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies is that it is by its own admission an interdisciplinary field. Critics of Peace and Conflict Studies often point to this as a fundamental if not fatal flaw of the whole field: a field that draws from many different fields is really no field at all. By their perspective, Peace and Conflict Studies is simply recycling already existing material and does not really warrant the creation of a new and specialized field of study. Isn't "peace journalism" really just a part of the field of Journalism,

albeit with an emphasis on peace? Isn't "peace psychology" really just a part of the field of Psychology, similarly with an emphasis on peace? The answer to these and other related questions is a polite but emphatic "no." Peace and Conflict Studies borrows freely, and yes at times imperfectly, from many other academic disciplines, but what makes it a cohesive and independent field of study is the way it takes those borrowed elements and refashions them into something distinctive and something new. Indeed, the ability of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies to refashion and thus reinvigorate already existing perspectives is one of its greatest assets. It also creates one of the greatest challenges to the field: namely, to show that the refashioning and melding of these different perspectives and approaches into something new will help us create an unprecedented and innovative approach to the big and timeless questions generated by peace and war and all things related. The results so far have been mixed and inconsistent, and yet in moments the field of Peace and Conflict Studies has been quite productive and refreshingly profound. Many challenges remain, of course, but Peace and Conflict Studies as a field has at least shown itself to be quite capable and adept at weathering any and all challenges, and so at least in the present, it is a field that is quite clearly here to stay. And that, I would suggest, is truly a good thing.

The Problem of Peace

At first glance, it is something of a puzzle as to why a field such as Peace and Conflict Studies would be eyed with any sort of skepticism or suspicion. After all, peace is generally seen as a good thing: in any survey of any population, with the exception perhaps of arms dealers and other war profiteers, if one were to pose the question of whether people generally prefer to live in times of peace or in times of war, the answer would be a foregone conclusion. People have always preferred peace to war. So who would have a problem with Peace and Conflict Studies, a field devoted to making more peace and less conflict in the world? Who could possibly question the need for a new approach that gives us a much more reasonable chance to create a peaceful environment in which to live our lives?

The answer, as strange as it seems, is that a lot of people from a lot of different disciplines have a problem with peace, or more specifically, with Peace and Conflict Studies and the way it promotes peace. It is not the case that these critics and skeptics prefer war to peace; they just harbor skepticism and articulate criticism of the way that Peace and Conflict Studies approaches its own subject matter. Aside from the matter discussed above, about whether Peace and Conflict Studies needs to exist as an additional field, beyond the traditional academic fields that already exist, there are additional questions that are often voiced that sometimes push the field on the defensive in justifying its own existence and the proving the validity and value of its claims.

Take, for instance, the preference that Peace and Conflict Studies has for the existence of peace itself. Peace and Conflict Studies certainly looks at various wars and conflicts around the world, and scholars from the field give particular scrutiny to the issue of why and how war and other forms of organized violence (such as riots and rebellions) occur, and why and how other, more peaceful routes of action were not considered or pursued. But at the end of the day, the preference in Peace and Conflict Studies is always for peace, and when war and conflict and violence are studied, they are studied with the assumption that somewhere along the way, something went wrong. Either an environment was created whereby violent action was seen as the only viable solution, or theories were in play that made violent action seem necessary or attractive, or some other aberrant set of actions occurred that precluded the possibility of the peaceful resolution of the dispute or conflict in question. From the perspective of Peace and Conflict Studies, if we can identify the mistakes that were made, or if we can understand the theories that made violent action possible, then we can plan a better

route in the present and the future that avoids those mistakes and alters those theories so that we are more likely to end up with peace rather than war.

The criticism with all of this lies, however, in the assumption that peace is always preferable to war. To practitioners from other, more traditional academic perspectives, to start an entire field of study with an inherent bias is to commit one of the cardinal sins of intellectual inquiry: namely, to confuse a bias with a method, and to confuse a subjective preference with an objective principle. This is not to say that scholars from these other academic disciplines are free from personal bias: there are conservative scholars just as there are liberal ones, and there are moderate scholars just as there are radical ones, in nearly every academic discipline. But what makes Peace and Conflict Studies different, and unacceptably so, according to its critics, is that the field itself retains and cultivates the bias, so that scholars of Peace and Conflict Studies are required to adhere to that bias before entering the field. And that, say the critics, means that Peace and Conflict Studies is more a group of activists and advocates who are using the cloak of dispassionate scholarship to lend credibility to their efforts, rather than, as institutions of higher learning require, a group of credible and valid academics who are engaged in dispassionate research that may in fact lead to conclusions that differ from the preferences that the field itself holds to be true.

Part of the suspicion that Peace and Conflict Studies is really just activism masquerading as academia is associated with the chronology of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. The origins of Peace and Conflict Studies as a discipline are rooted in the 1960s, specifically at a time when a complex cluster of different and disparate political initiatives began to come together to form what is collectively referred to as the Peace Movement. In more colloquial terms, those who joined the Peace Movement were often referred to as "hippies" or sometimes "radicals," and while both of those terms may have been something of a badge of honor in the 1960s and into the 1970s, in the present moment it gives something of an image problem to Peace and Conflict Studies. For some, Peace and Conflict Studies is a field of study whose historical moment has come and gone, a field of study composed either of aging hippies who cannot let go of the past, or of naïve neophytes whose views are impractically idealistic and irrelevant to the security concerns of the present.

Another aspect of the image problem that Peace and Conflict Studies must contend with is the association that is often made between peace and weakness, or between peace and passivity. The preference for peace that is such an important component for Peace and Conflict Studies becomes a liability in the eyes of those who see peace not as a conscious and intentional preference but as an act of weakness and indecision, a weak-kneed avoidance for conflict when conflict is required. Peace, in other words, is the preference of those who are afraid to make the tough choices required of true leaders. Especially in the era after September 11, 2001, when much of the world was caught up in the "war on terror," many people balked at the suggestion that we should pursue peaceful dialogue with groups that did not hesitate to slaughter the innocent in pursuit of their own violent agendas. Peace looked like a preference for backing down, or worse, for doing nothing.

Not all of the criticisms of and debate over the field of Peace and Conflict Studies come from outside the field itself—some are generated within. In this regard, Peace and Conflict Studies is no different than any other academic discipline, where competing schools of thought and endless debates about the scope and direction of the discipline are replete and commonplace. Within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, perhaps the most contentious debate is the one over the question of whether or not the preference for peace is a *strong* preference or an *absolute* preference. For those who feel that the preference for peace is an absolute one, the concept of nonviolence becomes the central focus of the entire field. Peace and Conflict Studies thus becomes divided over the question of whether nonviolence is an absolute normative value (the

field becomes grounded in the concept of nonviolence) or whether nonviolence is only one strategy among many. There are those who work in Peace and Conflict Studies who feel that all options, even violent ones, should be kept on the table, though the preference for peaceful paths of action always takes precedence. These types of internal debates, along with the external criticisms, should not be taken as things that cast doubt on the effectiveness or the credibility of Peace and Conflict Studies as a discipline. Lively and intense debate, from within or without, is precisely the sort of thing that makes practitioners and scholars in the field hone their craft, and precisely the sort of multifaceted engagement that challenges that various actors in Peace and Conflict Studies to strengthen the integrity of the field itself.

The Basic Elements of Peace and Conflict Studies

The greatest contribution that Peace and Conflict Studies has made—a contribution that is both intellectual and practical—is to have offered up a whole new understanding of peace itself. The architects of Peace and Conflict Studies, through years of research and years of on-the-ground field-work, have pushed us far beyond the old understanding of peace as a fortuitous lull that occurred between wars and offered a new understanding of peace as something that is every bit as complex as war itself. Peace does not occur simply because war was not around, as some sort of default option or by-product created by the absence of war, but rather peace occurs for very specific and very complex reasons. Whereas scholars and analysts from other academic perspectives, whether history or political science or sociology or other more traditional fields, have spent so much time focusing on the wars of human history and human society, giving the impression that war is what caused things to change and made things "interesting," scholars and analysts from Peace and Conflict Studies began to ask different sorts of questions. Instead of focusing on the question of why a particular war started, Peace and Conflict Studies as a field would ask why the peace ended. Peace and Conflict Studies took peace as seriously as it did war, and in so doing pushed our understanding of peace far deeper than other disciplines had cared to do. Peace was no longer the boring interlude between wars—peace was now the centerpiece of academic inquiry.

Peace of Conflict Studies also looks at war and conflict, of course, but it does so with the idea of looking at key moments of transition, the moments when peace began to fall apart and weaken, allowing the proponents of war and other forms of violent conflict to have their way. These moments of transition are central to the approach of Peace and Conflict Studies because understanding how peace falls apart and how war comes into existence are both crucial components to finding a way to make peace more durable, or in a perfect world, permanent.

While Peace and Conflict Studies as a discipline has examined nearly every major and minor conflict in the present and the past, and while Peace and Conflict Studies has built an impressively complex and interdisciplinary tool kit to analyze these conflicts and to help resolve them in the hope of restoring and sustaining a durable peace, it is possible to distill all of the efforts of Peace and Conflict Studies down to a few essential elements. The most important of these essential elements are *peace, conflict, violence, and power*. No matter what the matter at hand may be, and no matter how complex that matter may be, every analytical endeavor and every theoretical perspective in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies can be traced back to one of these elements, or some easily discernible combination thereof. As it turns out, this gives a powerful sense of clarity to the insights offered and solutions proposed by those who ply their craft in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Peace is of course a central element to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, but what separates Peace and Conflict Studies from other perspectives and other fields is the way that peace is moved to center stage and the way that peace is given just as much analytical scrutiny as war or any other complex phenomena with the potential to create violence and trauma. One of the many contributions of Peace and Conflict Studies, for instance, has been to identify different types of peace—just as there are many different types of war—to help broaden our understanding of what peace means and how and why it occurs in some places but not in others. Peace and Conflict Studies differentiates at the simplest level between what is called a negative peace, which is simply a peace characterized by the absence or cessation of conflict, and a positive peace, which is a peace characterized by active efforts to resolve any ongoing issues or tensions that might lead to a rekindling of violence or conflict. Far too often, world leaders and military commanders are invited to the table to sign pieces of paper to say that the war is over and peace has begun, but if no measures are taken to resolve lingering issues and tensions that remain after the signing of a peace treaty, issues and tensions that can threaten at any moment to cause a new outbreak of violence and hostility, then we have only a negative peace rather than a positive one. A negative peace is far more fragile than a positive one, and hence, Peace and Conflict Studies spends a great deal of time trying to further our understanding of how a positive peace differs substantively from a negative one.

In spite of the strong preference for peace that is central to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, *conflict* is also an important topic of study for the field. While many a critic of Peace and Conflict Studies has excoriated the field for being impossibly idealistic in its view that peace is both preferential and possible in all scenarios, it may come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with the field that scholars and practitioners in Peace and Conflict Studies accept conflict as a constant and continuous part of the social and political landscape, even in times of peace. There are many people working in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies who think that peace is perennially sustainable, but none of them is soft-minded enough to think that conflict will somehow just wither away. Where Peace and Conflict Studies differs from other fields of study is not therefore in rejecting the likelihood of conflict itself in times of peace, but in articulating an approach that shows how conflict, when it occurs, does not inevitably lead to violence and hostility. Conflict will always occur, but there are constructive ways of dealing with it and resolving it so that it does not lead inevitably and ineluctably to war. By this account, war is seen as the manifestation of a catastrophic failure to engage constructively with the generative elements of a conflict. In other words, war happens when peace fails.

Violence is also a fundamental element of Peace and Conflict Studies, largely because its moment of appearance is seen as a threshold, a decisive moment of transformation where events move unmistakably away from peace. Conflict may be a permanent part of the landscape, but not all conflict is violent. Peace and Conflict Studies spends considerable energy analyzing conflicts to understand the transitional moment when violence is introduced, and in the field, practitioners of the methods of Peace and Conflict Studies spend considerable energy trying to prevent the onset of violence in any particular conflict or situation. Nonviolent conflict is still a social or political perturbation that requires attention and remedy, but it not an immanent crisis in the way that violent conflict tends to be. Conflict resolution, which is an integral part of Peace and Conflict Studies, engages with the various layers of conflict precisely to prevent conflict from crossing the line into the deployment of violence. It does so because once that occurs the nature of the conflict changes dramatically and getting to peace becomes a much more complicated and difficult affair.

Power is another essential element of Peace and Conflict Studies. Anyone can call for the introduction of violence in a conflict situation, for instance, but it takes a person or a group of persons who have acquired power and also the capacity to use that power—formally or informally—to convince or force others to

follow the request to engage in violent or lethal behavior. Peace and Conflict Studies looks at different forms of power to evaluate both how conflicts start and how they end, or how conflicts become violent in some situations but not in others. One of the tragic and recurring patterns that occurs in conflicts around the world is a situation where local or national leaders make decisions to go to war or to engage in violent conflict and yet the general population does not share or support that view. Frequently, those in the general population lack sufficient power to oppose or reverse the decision, and so they are left to suffer the consequences of violence without having any meaningful say in the matter. Peace and Conflict Studies does not find power to be inherently evil or corrupting—indeed, much of the field is devoted to the idea of empowering people to give them a larger stake in cultivating a peaceful life-environment—but it does focus on situations where power is unequally distributed or unfairly (or repressively) exercised to understand the constructive and destructive influences that power can have in relation to peace, conflict, and violence.

On a final note, one of the things that distinguishes Peace and Conflict Studies from other fields and other perspectives is the equal attention it gives to the interplay of these four essential elements (peace, conflict, violence, and power) at both the macro and the micro level. Peace and Conflict Studies is just as interested in the moment where a disagreement between two people becomes a violent fight as it is in the moment when the disagreement between two countries becomes a violent international conflict. Similarly, Peace and Conflict Studies is equally interested in why specific individuals choose to follow or not to follow calls for violent action—why one person chooses peace while another chooses war, why one protestor voices an opinion with words while another does so with bricks, sticks, and stones. There are always macro and micro questions in all complex conflicts; these questions are different in nature, but also complementary and interrelated. It is one thing to ask the question of why international terrorist groups exist, or how they are formed and how they justify their lethal tactics, and quite another to ask how a specific individual decides to join one of those groups, of how a specific individual decides to "become a terrorist." Looking at the interplay of factors from the individual level to the international is one of the most notable contributions of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

The Role of Theory in Understanding Peace and Conflict

All fields of study have theories, and Peace and Conflict Studies is no exception. The use of theory, or the desire to concoct new theories, is sometimes met with a certain amount of frustration or exasperation, since theory is often criticized for only working in a perfect conceptual world rather than in the far messier conditions of the so-called real world. At times, this criticism is not without merit, but theory can also play a very positive role, and theory, when done well, can have a very positive influence on the way events play out in the real world. Theory, for instance, can help us discern patterns and make reasonable predictions based on those patterns. If we see that the decision to introduce violence into a conflict tends to happen at the same time and for the same reasons in specific types of situations, then we have a better chance of intervening constructively—of preventing the outbreak of violence—when we see similar situations in the future, based on the predictive theory generated by the careful analysis of multiple conflicts.

Peace itself as a concept is both oversimplified and undertheorized. Part of the reason for this has been the tendency to treat peace in simplistic terms, as the uneventful interlude between wars, for instance. With the contributions of Peace and Conflict Studies elaborating on the idea that there are different types of peace, and that peace is a complex and complicated phenomenon, the need for developing a cogent and

comprehensive theory of peace is becoming more and more compelling. An overarching and unified theory of peace, if that is even possible or desirable, eludes the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, but there has been no shortage of conceptual and theoretical debate within the field to try to make sense of the complex machinery that is in motion in the interplay of peace, conflict, violence, and power.

Some of that theoretical debate occurs in the form of articulating critiques, revisions, and refinements of already existing theories that have emerged out of other fields of inquiry. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism, for instance, are three theoretical approaches that were developed and are still applied in other academic disciplines such as Political Science and Sociology, but Peace and Conflict Studies takes those theories and either offers up a new set of criticisms to show how these theories are inadequate to explain the prevalence and persistence of peace, or else revises those theories to make them more tangible and applicable to the types of scenarios that are integral to Peace and Conflict Studies. By drawing on these pre-existing theories that are still in circulation in other fields of inquiry, Peace and Conflict Studies also opens up new opportunities for constructive collaboration and debate among scholars and practitioners of Peace and Conflict Studies and those from other fields. In the revision of these theories, and in the novel methods of applying those theories to real-world events, Peace and Conflict Studies seeks to enrich and expand the engagement with theory in the effort to create new possibilities for a more peaceful environment, whether at the local, national, or global level.

Two theories that are of exceptional importance and relevance to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies are cosmopolitanism and nonviolence. Cosmopolitanism is a complex theory that is hard to summarize, but at the heart of the theory is the belief that human societies hold far more in common than they do in difference, and that one of the things that is held in common is a shared set of values that transcends religious, social, or cultural differences. If true, this would obviously be of particular value to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, given that so many of the violent conflicts that exist in the world are conflicts generated by perceived differences—social, ethnic, religious, and so forth—that somehow translate into animosity and violence. Alternatively, nonviolence as a theoretical perspective is independent of religious, social, or cultural differences and looks instead to the potential of one particular principle to resolve any and all conflicts. The goal of nonviolence as a theory is to show that the choice of violence is always the inferior choice, either because it does not produce the results desired by those who have chosen to deploy violent methods or because nonviolent methods have proven themselves consistently more effective than violent ones in any situation and in any given context. Nonviolence as a theory is not without a certain amount of controversy, and there is considerable debate on whether Peace and Conflict Studies should adopt nonviolence as *the* unifying theory of the field, or whether nonviolence should be considered only as one theory among many.

Since theory is nothing more than a structured way of seeing what would otherwise appear to be incomprehensibly complex events, there is a certain affinity between theoretical ways of viewing events and other structured perspectives such as those derived from religion or culture. Considering that cosmopolitanism is of particular interest to scholars and practitioners in Peace and Conflict Studies, and considering that cosmopolitanism advocates that at a fundamental level all different structured perspectives based on religious, cultural, and social differences are in essence reconcilable and compatible, it comes as no surprise that Peace and Conflict Studies as a field also devotes considerable energy to understanding situations where more than one structured perspective is in play. Multicultural conflict resolution, for instance, is an integral part of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, one that draws on different perspectives as much as it also tries to reconcile them. In volatile situations where these types of social and cultural and religious divisions seem

intractable and impervious to change and resolution, those in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies work tirelessly to open up new pathways of dialog and action using the increasingly sophisticated toolkit offered by the methods and tactics of multicultural conflict resolution. These methods and tactics require not only an intimate and detailed knowledge of the different perspectives in play, but also a creative and constructive awareness of how these differences can be utilized to resolve the very conflict they originally generated. It is never easy work, but it is always preferable to doing nothing. It is also another example of how theory can and does have beneficial real-world applications.

The Real World

Theory is only one part of Peace and Conflict Studies—an important part, but only one part nevertheless. As valuable as the contribution of theory has been in Peace and Conflict Studies, it would be quite meaningless if it could not be matched with or tested by the tangible results of real-world actions. Peace and Conflict Studies is therefore driven as much by case studies as it is by theoretical models. Case studies can come in a wide variety of different formats—they can be case studies of individuals, of specific conflicts, of specific groups, or comparative case studies involving different actors—and they can play a variety of different roles. Case studies can be used to test a particular theory or to illustrate a particular theory, or they can be used to refine or expand a particular skill-set in Peace and Conflict Studies, such as conflict resolution. Indeed, the case-study counterpart of conflict resolution is what is known as conflict analysis. Conflict analysis is the detailed investigation of a particular conflict to determine the identity and influence of every possible factor and variable that is involved with the conflict in the effort to plot out the progression and trajectory of that conflict. Since Peace and Conflict Studies has forcefully argued that there are different types of peace, it stands to reason that a well-crafted peace is a peace that is specifically designed to address and resolve all of the causal factors that went into a specific conflict. Case studies and conflict analysis thus help us to refine and improve the process of creating well-crafted and more durable peace proposals and peace agreements, even in complex and exceptionally violent situations.

One way of understanding the relationship between case studies and a well-crafted peace is to look at the interplay of words that are used in the everyday language of international conflict and pair them with some of the standard terminology used in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. In the world of international conflict, one often hears the word "peacekeeping," for instance in relation to the deployment of peacekeepers by the United Nations. But what exactly do peacekeepers do? For the most part, peacekeepers are entrusted with the task of positioning themselves between fighting parties in a way that prevents those parties from fighting with each other. It is a classic example of what Peace and Conflict Studies calls a negative peace—a peace that is merely the absence of war. Another term that is used in Peace and Conflict Studies to refer to a situation like the deployment of peacekeepers is conflict management. In conflict management, the conflict is being managed in the sense that additional hostilities are not occurring, but it is not being resolved. Someone or some group has managed to stop the fighting, but the conflict itself has not been resolved. Peacekeeping thus corresponds to the concept of conflict management.

A stronger step in the direction of a well-crafted peace is to take advantage of the cessation of hostilities created by peacekeeping and to move in the direction of what is often called peacemaking in the parlance of international actors. Peacemaking is the direct and intentional step to engage in a bit of conflict analysis

to try to understand the causal factors that created the conflict and then to resolve or address those factors to mitigate the possibility that the conflict will reignite once the peacekeepers are removed. In Peace and Conflict Studies, this process is referred to as conflict resolution, where the elements of a particular conflict are engaged, both singularly and collectively, to create a better peace that resolves and defuses the catalysts of the original conflict. Peacemaking thus corresponds to the concept of conflict resolution.

The final step up in terms of sophistication and complexity is the idea of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding refers to the long-term process of moving beyond the elements of peacemaking and conflict resolution and addressing even indirect influences and other, more structural problems that may have played a role in exacerbating a particular conflict. In peacebuilding, elements such as economic inequality, economic development, democratic enhancement, security sector reform, judicial reform, and even anti-corruption programs are considered and implemented (where appropriate) in order to create a situation where there is almost no possibility for the re-emergence of conflict and the renewal of hostility. In Peace and Conflict Studies, this process is referred to as conflict transformation. Conflict transformation is the most comprehensive approach to any conflict situation, and hence is best positioned to offer insight as to how to devise the most well-crafted peace in any environment where hostility and conflict are present. It should be noted that it is not mere coincidence that after decades of work on the idea of conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, the United Nations created its first Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 in an effort to incorporate the ideas and tactics of conflict transformation into its approach to international conflict. For those critics who have always felt that Peace and Conflict Studies is a field that is characterized by an overabundance of naïve idealism and a scarcity of practical application, this is but one example of how Peace and Conflict Studies has endeavored—successfully—to put ideas into action and to use action to craft better ideas.

The Future Challenges of Peace and Conflict Studies

Like all fields of inquiry, Peace and Conflict Studies has struggled to deal with and engage new challenges that have emerged in recent years. Sometimes these new challenges call for the revision of existing methods and tactics and theories, and sometimes these new challenges render existing methods and tactics and theories obsolete, necessitating the creation of entirely new approaches. The new challenges for Peace and Conflict Studies, the challenges with which it is currently grappling to find a constructive way to respond, stem largely from three different areas of activity: new technologies, new types of conflict, and new institutional processes.

In the area of new technologies, the most important and pressing challenges stem from the development of new communicative technologies. Whether in the form of new social media such as Facebook and Twitter, among many others, or new threats that have emerged in an online format, ranging from cyberwar to cyber-bullying, new communicative technologies offer both promise and peril to fields like Peace and Conflict Studies. For a field that has cultivated a fluid versatility in moving from the interpersonal to the international, new social media provide exciting opportunities to interact with new people and the new ideas they offer. There is even the possibility of creating an inspired version of global civil society through the creative use of online communicative technology and social media. Global civil society is something that is closely linked with the idea of cosmopolitanism, so this is of particular interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. On the flip side, there is also the growing chorus of concern from

those who feel that new social media are overrated if not actually counterproductive in their ability to create a more social experience for individual users. Added to that is the ever-present plethora of online hate-speech that seems to move in an opposite direction to what social media is supposed to provide, and so dealing with the complexity of online communication, or trying to establish something that might be called cyberpeace, remains a challenge for Peace and Conflict Studies.

New types of conflict also present a challenge to Peace and Conflict Studies. The resurgence and expansion of global terrorism is just one of a number of new types of conflict that have made many fields, not just Peace and Conflict Studies, reevaluate their approaches to conflict, since many of those approaches were based on more predictable models of conflict. The growing prevalence of non-state actors in conflicts, or of other militant actors (such as mercenaries or local militias) that seem to defy standard definitions of what constitutes a legitimate combatant in a recognizable chain of command, has made it a difficult to predict the nature and direction of conflict and to create a well-crafted and durable peace for these new types of conflicts.

Lastly, new institutional processes in the context of new types of global circulation have created challenges for Peace and Conflict Studies. The movement for global governance, for instance, has been part of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies for quite some time. The idea of creating new global institutions with stronger enforcement powers for international law and enhanced participatory options for citizens around the world is particular attractive to Peace and Conflict Studies. Yet the movement for global governance has stumbled in recent years, as the details of how such a thing would work, if it would work at all, have been scant, sketchy, and impractical. Similarly, the response of Peace and Conflict Studies to global economic processes such as globalization, which promises enhanced economic security for all as much as it presages a new type of global inequality, has been somewhat inconsistent. Other global problems such as public health, organized crime and the trafficking of women and children, climate change, and food security, to name a few, have also strained the capacity for Peace and Conflict Studies to respond effectively and pragmatically to these new challenges.

Nevertheless, Peace and Conflict Studies as a field has risen to these new challenges and is clearly engaged in the arduous work of providing better answers and more effective solutions to the questions and problems that these new challenges create. Considering the complexity of these new challenges, and the effect they have on so many people and at so many levels, it is clearly a good thing that Peace and Conflict Studies has emerged onto the scene, in spite of the fact that some of its critics continue to grumble. The more different voices we have working on these issues, and the more different perspectives we can understand, the better it is for all of us.

Conclusion

Peace and Conflict Studies has earned a place at the heart of the academic environment as much as it has at the center of global institutions. It has impressed many with its sense of adaptability and versatility, and with its ability to move from the local level to the international and back again with relative ease. As the field continues to grow, it will no doubt move in different directions and will no doubt engage in internal debates about which of those directions is best for the field. The pursuit of peace has been a part of humanity for

as long as there has been a humanity to speak of—as some would have it, it even transcends humanity and moves into other species and other environments—and the fact that the pursuit of peace has been frustratingly unsuccessful time after time does not in any way mean that it is not something worth fighting for with passion, with insight, and with principle. In essence, that is what Peace and Conflict Studies has always tried to do, and will continue to do into the future. Even if we never arrive at peace as the endpoint to the journey, it will always be a good path on which to travel.

1. Nonviolence

By Tracy Sugarman

INTRODUCTION

Nonviolence has always been a central concern of the field of Peace Studies, both as a principle and as a practice. In this short essay, Tracy Sugarman shows how nonviolence was used as a unifying element in the American south during the early stages of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. It also addresses, in a very personal way, the different racial and cultural mediations of nonviolence, and the different ways that nonviolence can be perceived in different political and social contexts. This is a valuable contribution to the discussion of nonviolence, where all too often, advocates of nonviolence assume a universal preference for the principle and practice of nonviolence and as a result, tend to gloss over the difficulties that often arise in complex movements when nonviolence is engaged.

There's a whole story could be written about guns and Mississippi," said Charlie Cobb. "Nonviolence was never an issue when I came to the Delta in 1961; it never came up. Maybe if you were doing sit-ins, where you had to protect yourself, it would be something to talk about. But we weren't doing sit-ins in the Delta. Violence in Mississippi was always mob violence, and the way to protect yourself from a mob was not a question of violence or nonviolence. It was a simple question: 'How can I survive this?' It's not like a cowboy film where you're at one end of the street with your righteous gun and the Klan is at the other end, and you're going to face each other in a shootout.

"No." His voice was quieter, more intense than it had been. "You're driving your car at night in the Delta, and all of a sudden a shot rings out. And it hits you, like it did with Jimmy Travis, or it misses you." He swallowed hard, and plunged ahead. "Or you're in a church, and it gets blown up. Or you're in a house in Ruleville with Mr. and Mrs. McDonald, as McLaurin and I were, when faceless people fire shotguns into their living room. These are not situations that get resolved around the philosophy of nonviolence."

Charlie's face was taut as he relived that night. "The McDonalds had to jump into the bathtub to escape the bullets, and Mac and I had to figure out how to not get killed." His expression softened, and a sardonic smile crossed his face. "The next morning Mayor Durrough came with the police and arrested me for the shooting. He said that I did it for publicity, that I had set the whole thing up. His deputy, the man who killed Emmett Till, the fourteen-year-old kid, for whistling at a white woman, hauled me off to jail."

The subject of nonviolence, whether as a tactic in the struggle as seen by Charlie Cobb or as a moral North Star for other icons of the civil rights movement like John Lewis, has always been evocative. In a conversation with Martha Honey that followed our meeting with John Lewis, it seemed clear that one's position on nonviolence was the result of experience rather than of doctrine. When we chatted in Martha Honey's Maryland home, the comfortable living room was alive with sculptures, wall hangings, and native graphics. They were affectionate souvenirs of reportorial assignments shared with her husband, Tony Avrigan.

"Did your time in the movement ever make you question your early Quaker commitment to nonviolence, Martha?"

"In the context of the United States in 1964, given its social and political history, nonviolence absolutely made political sense," she said, ruminating. "Mississippi showed me a part of the United States I didn't know was there. The depth of hatred that was there." Martha's voice echoed the wonder she had felt on her tour of duty in the Delta. "I remember riding along in an interracial car and these carloads of whites going past us, sticking their arms out and screaming and yelling at us … " Her voice broke. "I had never seen hatred like that before … hurling hatred at people who were just wanting to exercise their constitutional rights. It was astounding. Mississippi in 1964 was like a foreign land. But my time in Mississippi made me want to go to Africa, to Central America, to see other foreign lands."

Her eyes drifted to the artifact-adorned wall of the living room, lingering briefly. "So Mississippi changed my life. I didn't just want to *see* those places. I wanted to sink my teeth into them. To live the experience." She smiled, nodding at her conclusion. "The rest of my life, and I'm fifty-five, has been trying to recapture that depth of feeling, that commitment and passion, the way I felt in Mississippi, where everything was so heightened."

She looked up sharply, and her voice was very firm. "I'm a product of enormous privilege, so I haven't really been tested the way I'd have to be to know if I'd always adhere to nonviolence. But what happened when Tony and I went off to Africa made me realize that other people in different circumstances can rightly make other decisions. But I still believe that in the United States' context, nonviolent direct action, assertive, not passive, can be absolutely the right tactic." The couple had lived for long periods away from the United

States. Their reporting on the conflicts in Central America nearly cost Tony his life. After moving to Africa, they wrote of the struggles of the newly emerging states on that continent to break free of colonialism.

Still youthful and vibrant, Martha retains the calm, dedicated, and humorous qualities I recalled so well. Her grown children away at college, and her journalist husband off on an assignment dealing with the accelerating conflict in Afghanistan, we had the chance to get reacquainted after decades.

I had first known Martha when she was a high school student in my town of Westport, Connecticut. Shortly after I arrived in the Delta in 1964, I learned that she had gone to work as a volunteer in Holmes County as a Freedom School teacher, and drove over to visit with her. I was concerned that as an eighteen-year-old freshman from Oberlin she might be finding rugged Holmes County tough to handle. When I found her with the Turnbow family, relaxed and happy, I realized my concerns were unwarranted. Martha had decided to go south because the cause seemed that important, and now she was starting to do what she wanted to do. There was no sign of apprehension in her young eyes in 1964.

When I reminded her now of my early worries about her, she smiled appreciatively. "My interest in peace and human rights started very early, long before going to Holmes County that summer. It's just been part of my life since I was very young. I went to Quaker work camps, worked in Harlem on weekend projects, and went to Appalachia to a work site there." She paused, "Do you remember a group called 'Concern' in West-port, Tracy? Well, I was one of that bunch, one of those disaffected young people who didn't quite fit in with the stereotypes of what upper-class suburbia was all about."

I laughed. "Of course I remember. My daughter, Laurie, was part of 'Concern' a few years later!"

"I guess I'm not surprised. It was a great group. We picketed Woolworth's, though we didn't 'sit in.'" She chuckled, remembering. "'Concern' was sort of a mixture of emotional support, political action, and folk music … all on Friday nights and weekends! And when it was time to think about college, I picked Oberlin because I heard it was the first college to integrate and had been part of the Underground Railway! Oberlin was a pretty activist school, but I think I was the only student who decided to go to the orientation in Oxford."

"How did your folks take the news?"

"They were supportive, and they were nervous. Dad called me into his study, and that was always serious. 'We have to talk about this trip you're planning to Mississippi,' he said. Since his whole professional life had been spent in academia, I assured him that some of the organizers of the Summer Project came from Yale. So he called one of them to the house so he could make sure I would be well looked after. "And this young law student promised he would take care of me, and I would be all right." She burst out laughing. "Well, he had no way to promise that. And secondly, this young law student turned out to be Jonathen Bingham!" She hooted at the memory. "Jonathen Bingham! He ended up later helping a Black Panther to escape and had to go underground himself!" Her laughter now was unconstrained. "The antithesis of what my father thought a patrician Yale law school student was!"

Serious now, she settled back on the couch. "It was mixed emotions for my folks. Being a parent now, I can understand those feelings." I waited for her to continue. Quietly, she said, "To me it was just the right thing to do. I went without a lot of fears. The fears came later." She looked at Gloria and me, seeking to find the right words to describe what that hard summer had meant to her. "It was a marvelous summer for me." She hesitated, and grinned. "*Mostly* marvelous. I felt so privileged to be there, so humbled by meeting people who really had put their lives on the line, *on the line,* for just trying to get basic human rights! So moved by the experience, by the overwhelming generosity of the local black community. Mr. Turnbow and his wife and his daughter took us in, and we basically ate up their winter food. And they wouldn't take any money from

us. We were hardly even aware of the depth of their need, or their thin margin for just getting by." There were tears in Martha's eyes. "For just getting by …

"Toward the end of the summer, Mr. Turnbow was chosen to go as one of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegates up to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. And the other woman volunteer and I told Mrs. Turnbow, 'You must go with him.' And she said, 'I can't. I don't have anything to wear to Atlantic City.' So we bought her a dress, and Mrs. Turnbow went with Mr. Turnbow to the convention!" She looked enormously pleased at the memory. But then her face became reflective. "That was *all* they ever accepted from us."

I looked at the solemn, still young face, remembering the girl I saw at the Turnbows nearly four decades before. "How would you advise your child today about going into an apartheid situation, as you did then in Mississippi?"

Her gaze was steady. "From a very early age, our daughter has always been an activist. I guess I would have many of the emotions my parents had. But Mississippi was such an incredible learning experience for me that I long for my kids to have that same kind of experience. I want them to, and yet I'd worry about them. I would encourage anybody, even my kids, to have the life-changing experience that Mississippi gave me."

The pluck and resilience that so characterized Martha Honey were some of the astonishing discoveries I made first at Oxford, and then on a regular basis during that summer of '64. The young white women, mostly nurtured in protective middle-class homes, who chose to go to work in the movement, were tough. Many, like Martha Honey and Linda Davis, had ventured south to be teachers in Freedom Schools. But in quick order they became visible, courageous civil rights workers, daring the fury of the white establishment as they canvassed, picketed, and willingly shared the lives of the Negro families who had taken them in. It was striking how that process of racial immersion during those times of violence would often acutely alter their political perceptions. It might well be true that back home in the North concepts like "Black Power" were riling and upsetting many of the movement's liberal supporters, but very different perceptions existed within the movement itself.

"After Stokely Carmichael launched 'Black Power' as a uniting principle of the movement, some white civil rights workers were deeply offended, Martha. Some even left the movement. How did that affect you?"

"As you probably remember, a lot of us workers in the movement were critical of Martin Luther King. He just didn't seem militant enough. We approved of his nonviolence, but we had the feeling he was kind of 'selling out' by working so closely with the white establishment. So some of the ingredients for 'Black Power' were already apparent in SNCC. I had always had the feeling that I was in Mississippi serving a movement that was led by African Americans. In Holmes County, I was taking directions from the black community leaders. So I didn't feel really angry or hurt. I thought that that was the stage that things were at. But later we found that it was a more complicated matter. Part of it was learning that there had been outside infiltrators who had used 'Black Power' as a device to break up the movement, to split black and white unity. With hindsight, I think maybe I might not have been as positive and accepting, more wary that this was not a healthy path to be going down."

On the day that followed, we had the chance to explore that critical time of racial separation in SNCC with Linda Davis. No white whom I knew in the movement had volunteered as selflessly as she, or had so won and earned the love and respect of the black community in the Delta. "You had developed such a tight relationship with the community during this whole time, Linda. It was so mutually trusting," I said. "And then there was this rupture in the SNCC leadership which suddenly ended the racially integrated movement in Mississippi, and the white volunteers were no longer welcome. How did that affect you?"

Her face was reflective, and she slowly shook her head from side to side. "Oh, it was so sad, so disappointing. That all happened at the fall meeting in '64. And what a tense meeting that was. It was the time when Stokely Carmichael called for running the whites out of SNCC. There was a whole lot of discussion, a lot of argument that times had changed, that it was time for blacks to assert themselves. Stokely called for 'Black Power.' We whites should go organize in the white communities." She paused. "I don't think that any of us whites who were working down there ever worried about who was leading. I don't think that was the issue. I think the real issue was the black reaction to the racism that became so clear when the three workers were murdered. All of a sudden the country took notice of a brutal racism in Mississippi that had killed blacks for generations, and nobody had seemed to care. But when two of the murdered boys were whites from the North, the response was very strong and immediate. That was something that every black American recognized, and Stokely capitalized on it."

Linda's voice was hushed, and her eyes held mine. "SNCC's leadership decision to make it a black movement was perhaps a proper decision. But it ignored the truth that our white presence had helped generate attention and action, and opened up Mississippi. It was hard for me not to react in fury, even though I recognized that a pernicious racism lay beneath all of it."

"I think very many volunteers felt that way, Linda," I responded, but I was sobered by Linda's perceptions of the motivation of the racial anger, and annoyed at my own blindness in perceiving it. How difficult it is to think outside the racial box you were born in. No black friend in the movement, I realized, had been that candid with me about that gulf of sensitivity.

The Meaning of Violence

2.

By Sidney Fine

INTRODUCTION

At around the same time that Tracy Sugarman was struggling to find a way to put nonviolence at the center of the civil rights movement in the south, other areas experienced periodic outbreaks of violence as part of the same movement. While many nonviolent activists tended to view the use of violence and militancy as tactically unacceptable and morally indefensible, there was always an alternative view held by others that nonviolence was too slow, too ineffective, or too elitist to achieve justice. Sidney Fine details these types of debates in the context of expanding urban violence in the 1960s in Detroit. In this essay, Fine make three central points: (1) that at least some activists in the civil rights era felt that violence was an acceptable and necessary strategy, and opposed other activists who argued to the contrary; (2) that riots were not just spontaneous outbreaks of senseless violence, but in fact had complex layers of structure and strategy; and (3) that the efforts to control the representation and description of the riots themselves were strongly contested among activists and authorities alike.

The Detroit riot and the other riots of the 1960s were quite unlike the "communal riots" of an earlier time that were characterized by interracial conflict between blacks and whites. Was it, indeed, a riot at all, or was it, as at least some blacks to this day prefer to label it, a "rebellion"? By a four-to-one margin (48 to 13 percent), Detroit blacks questioned on this point in a survey conducted just after the riot preferred the term "riot." In the Campbell-Schuman survey a few months later, however, the percentages were reversed, 56 percent as compared to 19 percent of Detroit's black respondents choosing to characterize the disturbance as a "rebellion or revolution." It has been suggested in this regard that, at that time in any event, "revolutionary labels" for events like rioting "generally had favorable connotations for blacks." Since, however, those involved in the disturbance in Detroit can hardly be described as having been engaged in "organized armed resistance to an established government," as rebellion is commonly defined, that word hardly fits what took place. Because of the sniping that occurred, some chose to see the disturbance as a form of "urban guerrilla warfare," but this not only grossly exaggerates the amount of sniping but suggests the existence of some kind of organization, a plan of operation, and sanctuaries to which the guerrillas could withdraw, elements lacking in the Detroit disturbance.

Seeking to avoid racial labeling, liberals on the race question dubbed the riots of the 1960s "civil disorders," the term used by the Kerner Commission. Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen have defined "civil violence" as violence directed against the "symbols of the civil order." They characterize riots as a form of civil violence that does not involve an attempt to seize or overthrow "state power" and that is largely "spontaneous, unplanned, and disorganized." The Detroit violence fits this description of riots as a form of civil violence.

The Kerner Commission aptly described the civil disorders of the 1960s as "racial in character" but not "interracial." The Detroit rioters, after all, were mainly although not entirely black, the disturbance occurred in black neighborhoods, and it was policemen and firemen, the overwhelming majority of whom were white, and business establishments, mostly white-owned, that the rioters attacked. A looter thus stated that although there was no "fighting" between blacks and whites, it was "a race riot because the negroes was trying to get the goods from the white folks because the white folks own everything and they [blacks] was just trying to get something so they can own it." There was, as a matter of fact, a very small amount of interracial fighting during the riot, and some rioters were very hostile to whites; but the arrestees, it will be recalled, overwhelmingly rejected the interpretation of the riot as "an anti-white event." Whites in the riot area were sometimes treated with derision, but they were rarely menaced.

Those who wished to play down the racial character of the 1967 riot were able to point to the fact that some whites joined blacks in the rioting. In one disturbance area that included a large number of poor whites, the latter, according to an observer, held out at first but "went out and got into it" when they saw blacks fighting the police. "They don't like the cops either," a resident said of the whites. "This wasn't no Negro riot," a black woman said. "It's an all of 'em riot. They're puttin it on one side, but it's both sides." A reporter saw a white, his arms full of groceries, fleeing a looted store along with a black who had helped the white free a trouser leg caught in a broken window of the store. A black exiting a looted store with four rolls of toilet paper gave two of them to a white woman about to enter the store and said, "Don't bother, honey. That's all that's left." A reporter thought that Detroit had witnessed "the first integrated looting in history," and a black in Barbara Tinker's novel commented, "The riot was about the most integration I have ever seen in Detroit." Twelve percent of the arrestees, it will be recalled, were white.

Some of those who have sought to explain the Detroit riot have stressed what they regard as the class character or, at least, the class component of the disturbance. This interpretation hinges to a limited degree on the participation of poor whites in the disturbance. In a sample survey of Twelfth Street adult blacks

conducted just after the riot, more than 75 percent of the respondents thought that black and white rioters had been "fighting on the same side." Among the Elliot Luby group's community sample of blacks, 68 percent, similarly, believed whites and blacks joined in the riot for "the same reasons." It is hard to know precisely what black respondents meant by answers of this sort, but the little information we have about white rioters (insofar as they were included among the riot arrestees) does not suggest that it was class consciousness that brought them out on the streets.

It has been more common for the class interpretation of the riot to be stated in terms of poor blacks rising up against well-to-do blacks as well as whites. Jeffrey Paige thus concluded that "apparently class position as defined purely by economic position is the major determinant of rioting." This, no doubt, is what John Conyers meant when he described the riot at its outset as "a war of the haves against the have nots." Economic class, indeed, may have been "the major determinant of rioting" in Newark, but it was not so in Watts, and it is, at best, a difficult hypothesis to sustain in explaining the Detroit riot. Many lower-class blacks in Detroit were hostile to middle-class blacks, but, judging from the available arrestee and black community data, there is little reason to think that this provides a major clue to the Detroit rioting.

Social scientists and others seeking to explain the riots of the 1960s have generally related the disturbances to one or another explanatory model for collective behavior. Some, to be sure, have seen the riots as "meaningless outbursts completely devoid of any logic, rationality or justification." This was the view of the McCone Commission, which investigated the Watts riot, and of Edward C. Banfield, who viewed the riots as less a reaction of blacks to whites, slums, and the police than as "outbreaks of the animal spirits" of predominantly youthful slum dwellers who rioted "mainly for fun and profit." The *Detroit Free Press* concluded ten years after the Detroit riot that it had been, after all, "a meaningless event that stimulated nothing, contributed nothing, revealed nothing of any substance or durability." There were, nevertheless, it remarked, "people who felt a substantial stake in interpreting the riot as something more than random law breaking, mob response, carnival." To accept views of this sort, however, one has to assume what cannot be assumed, namely, that blacks had no real grievances that might have induced some of them to riot.

In the view of some who have minimized the purposefulness of the riots, the rioters were "riffraff," either criminals or outcasts or part of an underclass, "a class below the working class" that was uneducated, unemployed, on the welfare rolls, and really "outside of our society." That the rioters in Detroit did not conform to the riffraff model, however, is abundantly evident from both the arrestee and self-reported rioter data. These same surveys demonstrated that the rioters were not recent migrants to the city unable to adjust to urban living and suffering from "culture shock."

Five percent of the blacks and 21 percent of the whites in the Luby community sample attributed the Detroit riot to "agitators" both from inside and outside the city. Although two young blacks outside the blind pig on Twelfth and Clairmount helped to stimulate the spectators to action, there is little reason to accept the agitator theory for the riot that followed. As Senator Philip Hart noted, agitators running up and down the street in fashionable Grosse Pointe urging the residents to riot would have been ignored if not arrested.

Most explanations of the Detroit and other riots of the 1960s have taken the form of one or another variant of the frustration-aggression model. "How," a *Michigan Chronicle* reporter asked, "do you convey the sense of frustration and alienation a rioter feels, the small sense of exhilaration and retribution that comes with a hurled firebomb against whitey, to a person who has never been seriously thwarted in his life?" A black male in the Twelfth Street riot area, seeking on July 24 to explain the riot to a reporter, provided a man-on-the street version of this hypothesis. "Everybody's full of tension right up to the top of their neck," he declared. "It grows and grows and then some damn fool throws a brick and away it goes on a grand scale."

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is a much disputed formulation since frustration does not necessarily lead to aggressive behavior and aggression does not need to be preceded by frustration. Social scientists applying the hypothesis to the riots have commonly phrased it in terms of deprivation. Blacks rioted, these scholars have posited, because they were absolutely or relatively deprived or because their rising expectations were not being satisfied. Bryan T. Downes, an exponent of the absolute deprivation thesis, a thesis that informed the approach of the Kerner Commission, thus contended that a civil disturbance might occur when the social condition in a city reached "a particularly explosive point." Employing regression analysis for an analysis of disturbances in 673 cities between 1961 and 1968, Seymour Spilerman, however, concluded that racial disorders were most likely to occur when the condition of life for blacks was "least oppressive according to objective measures," not most oppressive. Detroit riot arrestees, to be sure, were more deprived in some respects than community blacks, but they were by no means at the bottom of the black community in socioeconomic terms.

Relative deprivation, as applied to black rioters, refers to the discrepancy between their objective condition and an alternative state deemed desirable, specifically a white middle-class income. "The greater the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable," Ted Gurr has contended, "the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression." Those blacks who were "objectively advantaged" relative to other blacks might nevertheless have felt themselves "subjectively deprived" compared to whites. Irving J. Rubin, director of Detroit's Regional Transportation and Land Use Study, thought that this theory helped to explain why Detroit, where blacks saw themselves as better off than blacks in other cities, nevertheless experienced a major riot and also why the riot did not occur in the city's poorest black neighborhoods.

Although there is a certain plausibility to the relative deprivation explanation of riot participation, it has proved difficult to sustain the thesis empirically with regard to the 1960s riots. In Newark, for example, Nathan S. Caplan and Jeffrey M. Paige found that there was no difference between the self-reported rioters and the noninvolved when asked whether they thought the gap in income between themselves and whites was increasing. Also, in his investigation of the personal attributes and attitudes of rioters and various measures of riot participation, Clark McPhail found little to support the thesis that either absolute or relative deprivation led individuals to become rioters.

According to the rising expectations theory, a version of the relative deprivation theory, an increase of expectations, as the result of some but insufficient actual improvement will increase the level of tension in affected individuals and lead to feelings of frustration. It was easy enough in the 1960s to apply this argument to blacks who had improved their condition somewhat as the result of the civil rights movement and had been led to expect further gains but had not, for the most part, received what they considered their "fair share" and did not enjoy the advantages enjoyed by whites. "We've raised expectations," Cavanagh conceded after the riot, "but we haven't been able to deliver all we should have." It was not surprising, following this kind of reasoning, that Detroit, where blacks had made greater progress than blacks elsewhere but where they had been led to expect still greater advances, experienced the worst riot of all. "Detroit," the *New York Times* editorialized during the July riot, "may be viewed as a victim of its own limited success." "As people get a little help to get off the bottom," the head of Detroit's war on poverty declared in explanation of the city's riot, "they want more from life and they don't want to wait."

The Luby team believed that its arrestee data were consistent with the rising expectations theory. "It's not that things are so bad," Luby and James Grisell asserted in summarizing the perspective of riot arrestees, "it's that things aren't getting better as fast as they are for white people. And that hurts more than believing

things can never get better." The difficulty with this speculation, however, is that arrestees in the Luby sample did not, for the most part, differ substantially from the control group of nonrioters in assessing the progress they had made in the preceding five years. In Newark, similarly, Caplan and Paige found no difference in the response of self-reported rioters and the noninvolved when asked if their condition had improved, gotten worse, or remained the same during the preceding few years.

Rejecting the applicability of the various deprivation theories, Caplan and Paige concluded that the "blocked-opportunity" thesis best explained the 1960s riots. According to these two scholars, the riots were the result of "the prolonged exclusion of Negroes from American economic and social life" because of "white discrimination." The blacks who rioted, Caplan and Paige maintained, were more sensitive to racial discrimination and had experienced it more frequently than blacks who did not riot. They pointed out that their Newark data supported this position and that in both Newark and Detroit the self-reported rioters had stronger feelings of racial pride and identity than the noninvolved and hence, presumably, were more sensitive to racial discrimination. There is no question that blacks in Detroit had suffered from discrimination and believed themselves, on the whole, excluded from the larger society. "They are not a part of what is happening in the city," Councilman Mel Ravitz replied when asked in 1968 why Detroit blacks had rioted. "I work in Detroit [and] live in Detroit but I don't Feel Free," a riot-area black declared just after the disturbance. "There are so many places closed to me." Blacks who felt this way were undoubtedly among the rioters, but the data collected by the Luby team indicated that the riot arrestees, at least, did not believe themselves more victimized by discrimination than blacks in the control group.

In addition to the riffraff and the various frustration-aggression theories, the so-called "contagion theory" has been advanced to help explain the spread of rioting across the nation in the 1960s. One version of this theory stresses "the immediate environmental forces acting upon an individual who by chance happens to be near the action and is caught up in the spirit of the moment as the excitement spreads contagiously through the crowd." Another version is that television, by depicting the tactics of rioters and the "gratifications" they derived from their actions, raised the tension level among some viewers, created a sense of "black solidarity," reduced the viewers' inhibitions to participate in a riot in their own community, and taught them, as it were, how to riot. "All you hear when you turn on the television set," a seventeen-year-old Detroit black girl said, "is riot, riot, riot." Asked why the rioters were looting, a riot-area respondent declared, "it goes with riots," and a Detroit sniper told the FBI that he had learned from Newark that snipers could strike at the police.

Eighty percent of 470 riot arrestees the Singer team interviewed reported that they had viewed riots on television. Television, Singer and associates concluded, raised expectations in Detroit that a riot was likely to occur in the city. "Each time they heard about one [riot] some place else," a riot-area resident declared, "they said Detroit would be next." Another near west side resident remarked that there had been "too much news on riots in Watts and Chicago about shooting and fires so [Detroit rioters] did it too."

Rioters in Detroit, it can be said in defense of the contagion theory, appeared anxious to compare what they were doing with what had happened in other riots. The *Detroit Free Press* reported that riot arrestees it had interviewed "could not divorce themselves from Watts and Newark." "Man, it took them three days in Watts to do as much damage as we did in eight hours," a rioter told a *Newsweek* correspondent. Another rioter asked a United Press correspondent, "Is this as bad as Newark?" Remarks of this sort, however, should not lead one to make too much of the contagion theory. As David O. Sears and John B. McConahay pointed out in their study of the Watts riot, if the theory were valid, "demographic and attitudinal factors" would not be "strongly related" to riot participation, as the former factors, at the very least, appeared to be.

Quite apart from the centrality assigned to television by the contagion theory, some Detroiters with whom John Hersey spoke criticized television as "the *agent provocateur* of the black masses." "The rebellion," Hersey quoted a Wayne State University student as saying, "it was all caused by television. I mean you saw all those things you'd never been able to get—go out and get 'em." Agreeing, the associate director of the Neighborhood Service Organization asserted that mass communications had stimulated dissent by exhorting people to acquire goods that they could not afford to buy. In Watts, to be sure, "scales of exposure" to the media appeared to be unrelated to riot participation, but it is difficult to determine on the basis of the available data whether the same generalization applies to Detroit.

None of the efforts to relate participation in the riots of the 1960s to one or another explanatory model for collective behavior has been fully successful. This, and the widespread character of the racial disturbances, lead one back, in a sense, to the view of Howard Schuman and Barry Gruenberg that so many riots occurred in that decade because all cities with a sizable black population were above a "riot threshold." "What produces riots," T. M. Tomlinson thus stated, "is the shared agreement by most Negro Americans that their lot in life is unacceptable, coupled with the view by a significant minority that riots are a legitimate and productive mode of protest." Cavanagh essentially adopted this line of argument in explaining the Detroit riot, telling the Kerner Commission that the disturbance in his city was but "one flame in … a nationwide fire."

Given "the lot in life" of Detroit's blacks and their legitimate grievances regarding education, housing, jobs, and the police, as well as the general state of race relations in the city, there was certainly a good deal of combustible material lying around in Detroit that could be ignited. The hard question is whether it was inevitable that some spark would ignite the tinder, as the raid on the blind pig actually did. We cannot, of course, recreate the Detroit of the second half of the 1960s with the blind pig raid left out and then await the occurrence or nonoccurrence of another triggering event to answer that question. But even if we could, that would still leave unexplained why some blacks rioted and more did not and why some cities experienced major riots, some very minor ones, and some no riots at all. To assume the inevitability of the Detroit riot is to negate the uniqueness of historical events and to ignore the role that chance so often plays in history.

The importance assigned to television in some efforts to explain the 1960s riots raises the question of the role of the media in reporting the Detroit riot. Although Cavanagh told the Kerner Commission that he did not believe the media had contributed to "the extension of the disorder," he reported that Ron Hewitt, a Neighborhood Conservation official who had been on Twelfth Street during the riot's first day, had seen cameramen "sort of incense the people as if they were trying to get certain responses from the crowd," like throwing bottles, "in order to get a certain kind of picture." Hubert Locke maintained that newsmen monitored police calls and, unaware that many of them were inaccurate, ended up reporting incidents that had not occurred. False rumors were also broadcast that added to the fear engendered by blaring headlines about looting, burning, sniping, and alleged guerrilla warfare.

Drawing on 36,608 feet of film compiled by nine newsreel crews that covered the riot on a twenty-four-hour basis, WWJ-TV in Detroit presented a ninety-minute special on July 30 that portrayed the riot as "a chaotic and irrational collection of fires, crime and blind anger." The same station ran pictures of the funerals of two law enforcement officers but none of the funerals of blacks slain in the riot. The *Detroit News* offered rewards on August 2 for information concerning the death of four riot victims, all of them white. Its defense regarding this latter matter was that all the slayings of blacks had been solved by that time!

After studying the media treatment of riots in Detroit, Cincinnati, New Haven, Phoenix, and Tampa, Robert E. Smith concluded that the *Detroit Free Press* had provided "the most balanced riot coverage." Its riot coverage won the newspaper a Pulitzer prize in 1968 for "local general reporting."

In the riot areas of Detroit, 49 percent of the black respondents thought that television stations had reported the riot "fairly," as compared to 39 percent who thought the opposite. In the city as a whole, according to the Campbell-Schuman survey, 55 percent of the black respondents agreed that television and the newspapers had reported the riot fairly, whereas 33 percent regarded the coverage as unfair. The principal complaint of blacks who thought the media treatment unfair was the failure to report white participation. Although some Detroit blacks claimed that the media had failed to expose police brutality in the riot, this was a more common complaint of blacks in other riot cities than in Detroit.

Whatever the quality of the riot coverage by the Detroit media, it was more restrained than accounts by the media outside the city, which generally portrayed Detroit as "a city in ashes." Overseas also, the media were inclined to play up the devastation in Detroit. Robert Roselle recalled that an Englishman, persuaded by the BBC that Detroit was burning to the ground, phoned him from London to inquire about the safety of his relatives. Soviet citizens were told that American soldiers were "murdering" blacks on the streets of Detroit.

The available evidence for the riot appears to sustain the view of social scientists and others that the disturbance was "a spontaneous form of protest," a "signaling device" to those in power that concessions must be made. One rioter put the point succinctly: "You wouldn't pay attention to us before; now you will be forced to." At the outset of the riot, militants went through the crowd saying, "Think the man will get the message now." The destruction was terrible in the view of many among the Luby sample of arrestees, but they thought that "it got the message across."

Survey data confirm the view of the riot as protest. Asked directly whether the riot should be seen as "a Negro protest," 60 percent of the Luby arrestee sample responded in the affirmative. Surveys of riot-area residents and of city blacks also indicate their belief that the rioters were protesting unjust conditions and "calling attention to their needs."

One of the "needs" rioters appear to have had in mind was to be treated like human beings by the white community. "They have to stop treating us like things and start treating us like people," declared the public relations director of the West Central Organization. When asked what she wanted from whites, a looter answered, "respect." Another looter told an interviewer that he was seeking "respect as a man, as a first-class citizen."

Some students of the 1960s riots and some members of the Kerner Commission staff thought that the disturbances not only constituted a protest against existing conditions but also "a concerted attempt to achieve political objectives that had not been gained through other means." What the riots entailed, David Boesel thus contended, was "the breaking of white control over black territory and the autonomous exercise of power over that territory by the black masses themselves." The evidence for this was the young black shouting at the police during the riot, "Get off this street, motherfuckers, it belongs to us!" More important, according to Joe Feagin and Harlan Hahn, was the fact that 75 percent of the adult black respondents on Twelfth Street in a postriot survey indicated that they expected to have more say about their neighborhood as the result of the riot and 50 percent thought that they would have more power.

It appears that those who thought the Detroit riot had a political dimension, that it was aimed at restructuring political power since other means had failed, were reading too much into the event. Black radicals, to be sure, seized on the riot to call for self-determination for blacks, and it is possible, although by no means certain, that that is what Twelfth Street blacks meant by having more say over their neighborhoods. When, however, community blacks, three-quarters of whom resided in the disturbance areas, were asked in the Luby survey about the "way to prevent future riots," only 1 percent on the basis of first mentions and

2 percent on the basis of three mentions gave "Negro power" as their answer. In the Campbell-Schuman survey, only 3 percent of the city's black respondents selected "self-determination" as the best way for blacks to gain their rights. What blacks in the riot areas and in Detroit at large said after the riot does not, of course, necessarily tell us what the rioters had in mind in taking to the streets. There is, however, little in the arrestee data to suggest that they intended anything more than to protest the conditions under which they lived, to secure, somehow, a redress of grievances, and to be treated with respect. The rioters, after all, made no demands whatsoever, nor did they seek to negotiate with city officials. It is certainly possible to construe the riot as "the conduct of politics by other means," as an "unruly" means of expressing one's views outside the electoral process, but if so, the politics being conducted was more inarticulate than articulate.

One of the many difficult questions to answer regarding the Detroit riot is whether it was entirely spontaneous in character. Although there is every reason to believe that the disturbance, like the other riots in 1967, was entirely unplanned in its origin, there has been a good deal of speculation that the spread and continuation of the disorder owed something, at least, to organization.

In a series of articles beginning on August 6, 1967, the black journalist Louis Lomax claimed that a "highly organized and well-trained" group of "revolutionaries," largely from outside Detroit, had operated within the city for more than a month before July 23, 1967, laying the groundwork for a riot. According to Lomax, a small number of young blacks, acting as representatives of a New Jersey publishing company, went through black areas offering to sell a range of black magazines to residents. Once admitted to a home, they allegedly preached "Black Power," asked about the community and why it permitted "whitey, particularly the Jews," to run the stores in the neighborhood, and sought to learn who in the neighborhood wanted the stores burned down. The battle plan of "Operation Detroit," as Lomax described it, was to "remain as obscure as possible until the police-ghetto dynamics provided the proper setting for … 'the revolution.' "

According to Lomax, after the initial "normal breaking-and-looting scene," "professionals moved in" and directed the riot. They went down Twelfth Street smashing windows with hammers and crowbars and shouting, "Come on baby, help yourself." Another squad of revolutionaries, Lomax claimed, raced down the street several blocks away urging people to go to Twelfth and Clairmount since the police were permitting looting. One of these "professionals," spotting Dewey Shanks, a Detroit poverty-agency worker, said to Shanks that he had not seen the Detroiter since the Newark riot. Shanks had not been in Newark, Lomax noted, but the "professional" obviously had been.

Lomax contended that although some snipers did it for "kicks," "the hard core of sniper activity was organized." The organized snipers, he claimed, were "Detroit's own sons—Black Power advocates … trained in guerilla warfare." By Tuesday, according to Lomax, "the professionals had taken over," and Detroit "had fallen." By Wednesday, the professionals had left the city.

One point of the Lomax story can be confirmed: the reported exchange between a rioter and Dewey Shanks did indeed occur. The rest of the Lomax story, however, is suspect. Neither the Police Department, following a thorough investigation of the Lomax account, nor the FBI was able to corroborate the journalist's charges. The FBI discovered that a sales group from the Publishers Marketing Corporation of New Jersey and its Publix Circulation Service had been in Detroit for a couple of weeks before the riot, but the crew manager and company officials in New Jersey denied the Lomax story of the salesmen's behavior, and the FBI found no reason to dispute their denials.

The Lomax articles found little support among well-informed people in Detroit, including the head of the Field Division of the Commission on Community Relations (CCR). The *Detroit Free Press's* Gene Goltz told a Kerner Commission interviewer that knowledgeable blacks and whites in Detroit thought Lomax was

"full of shit." The managing editor of the *Michigan Chronicle* at the time later stated that Lomax had gathered his information from a desk in the offices of the *Chronicle,* had done little investigating on his own, and had invented much of what he reported.

Another version of a riot that was organized was provided to the Kerner Commission by Anthony P. Loccricio and eventually became the core of an NBC documentary. Loccricio had studied at St. John's Seminary in Plymouth, Michigan, been an attorney, school teacher, and social worker, done defense work for ghetto residents, headed up a day-camp project as part of the Archdiocesan Opportunity Program, joined the staff of Mayor Cavanagh toward the end of the riot, and was a consultant for the NBC program of September 15, 1967, "Summer '67: What We Learned." He claimed that he had begun to hear from his contacts with blacks that there would be a "small riot" in Detroit in the summer of 1967 aimed at uniting the diverse elements in the black community and that there would then be a larger riot in the summer of 1968. The blind pig raid, he reported, had not been part of the plan, but shortly thereafter, as he told the story, "organized groups" pulled up in cars at stores in different parts of the Twelfth Street area, broke windows, and said, "Let's get a piece of whitey," which led to further window breaking and also looting. Two hours later the same cars returned, and the same occupants passed the word that the police were on their way and urged that the stores be torched. This pattern, according to Loccricio, was followed in at least three different locations in the disturbance areas.

Loccricio claimed that "key sources" had told him that during the first morning of the riot fifty to seventy-five militants and "extremists" attended a meeting run by a man and a woman—he eventually named them—at which "separate arson teams" were told to set fires in a prescribed pattern along Twelfth Street, Linwood, Livernois, and Grand River, a pattern that corresponded with a graph of riot fires later prepared by the Detroit Fire Department. Those at the meeting, according to Loccricio, were given a Kercheval address where, later that day, two white men and a white woman handed out rifles to rioters, who took to the rooftops and shot to kill. The organizers, according to the NBC program, had not anticipated that the destruction that began on July 23 would "take off like that."

On the basis of information provided by "several informants," one of whom must have been Loccricio, Walter Sheridan of NBC, who had worked in Detroit for a month preparing for the September 15 NBC program, provided John Doar with additional details concerning the alleged organization of the riot. According to Sheridan, an unidentified group of black militants, in preparation for the riot, had rented ten apartments, including one just off Twelfth and Taylor, where they stored gasoline drums, rags, and a few guns. These apartments were supposed to be burned once the riot began—the one on Twelfth Street was. When the disturbance seemed to be lagging following the blind pig arrests, some of the "group," Sheridan reported, broke into two clothing stores and two loan companies, seizing guns in one of the latter that they distributed to rioters. Most of the rest of the Sheridan account appears to have come from Loccricio. Doar relayed the substance of Sheridan's story to the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover later informing the White House that the information was based on "faceless informants and anonymous sources," was not subject to verification, and some of it was certainly false.

Loccricio refused to reveal the names of his sources or to testify under oath. Neither the head of the CCR's Field Division nor Conrad Mallett believed Loccricio's story, and Deputy Superintendent John Nichols later stated that the story was "not accurate." The NBC program, in particular, came under sharp attack in Detroit. Although NBC stated that it had confirmed what the witnesses it presented claimed they had done in Detroit, an ex-convict who had been arrested for looting and who had allegedly been working with Greensleeves and been present at the July 23 meetings described by Loccricio declared that he had lied on

camera and had been coached as to what to say. Loccricio and NBC responded that the recanting witness was not, as he had claimed, one of the two principal informants who had been filmed for the program in "protected darkness," whose voices had been distorted, and one of whom had been shot after giving his interview. Cavanagh reported that it had proved impossible on the basis of information available to the police and other sources to corroborate the program's allegations.

The Loccricio story remains uncorroborated, but there are numerous, less elaborate accounts of at least some degree of instigation and organization in the spread of the riot. There were many rumors and reports during the first four days of the riot, for example, about automobiles with out-of-town licenses in the riot areas, cars filled with black passengers and guns on their way to Detroit, and "strangers" and black power representatives from outside the city who "tried to encourage" the riot once it began. The FBI, after checking with, fifty-seven different agencies, found nothing to substantiate stories and rumors of this sort, and Girardin and Kerner Commission investigators agreed.

Some observers and many riot-area residents detected what they believed were organization and "patterns" in the looting, burning, and sniping that occurred. "The streets were organized despite official denials," declared a black *Newsweek* reporter. "We're as organized as the Viet Cong, baby," a young rioter declared. A former president of the Catholic Interracial Council, Charles Peck, who was in the west side riot area during the early hours of July 24, thought that the disturbance "seemed to move in phases," from Twelfth Street, to Dexter, to Linwood, to Grand River. "There were certain cars and certain groups," he observed, "who seemed to be initiating the breaking in, stirring up things before the looters arrived, starting the violent action." Peck saw the same cars, moreover, on Twelfth Street and the other locations noted. He thought that "there was a pattern" to all this, but he "lost" the pattern as the rioting continued.

Reporters, city officials, merchants, police officials, riot-area residents, and a Kerner Commission staffer concluded that the looting was directed and organized, at least to some extent. According to a *Detroit News* reporter, youths aged seventeen to nineteen did the window breaking, and after an establishment had been looted, "a special 'match man'" set the store on fire. "And they seemed to know just where to head next," the reporter noted. Locke described an almost identical pattern of window breaking, looting, and burning. Juvenile Court Judge James Lincoln recalled that a Juvenile Court black probation officer saw two black men and a white woman with walkie-talkies directing window breaking on Twelfth Street, heard them say that they would do the same farther out on the same street, and discovered when he drove there that this was not idle talk. Stephen Slingsby, a California political scientist who witnessed the looting, noted that small boys carried lists of goods on which they checked off items as they were looted.

When Councilman Nicholas Hood came down Linwood at about 1:00 P.M. on July 23, he discovered that the street was blocked with railroad ties, apparently placed there to prevent police from driving into the street to check the looting. Since there was no railroad within miles, Hood presumed that this indicated some kind of planning. Proceeding to Twelfth Street, he saw a male with a walkie-talkie "communicating" with some looters. "Little things like that," Hood said later, "made you wonder just what was going on." An 82d Airborne captain reported that looters on the east side operated in small bands, with one member serving as a lookout and using a walkie-talkie to warn the others of the approach of law enforcement officers.

Although police officials saw no pattern in the firebombings, George Romney told the Kerner Commission that the pattern of fires was not "accidental." The Detroit Fire Department, the Michigan State Police, the executive director of Wayne County Suburban Legal Services, and Detroit's former police commissioner, George Edwards, agreed. Edwards thought that the pattern of fires, one-eighth to one-quarter of a mile apart in a straight line down main thoroughfares, the selection of targets, and the fact that it took some

premeditation to prepare Molotov cocktails indicated that the firebombing, at least to some degree, was "planned and organized." It was "the pattern of firebombing," Edwards asserted, that "turned a local riot into a city-wide conflagration."

Romney told Attorney General Ramsey Clark on July 24 that the police were picking up on short-wave radio conversation by "a bunch of young hoodlums" about "keeping the fires going" in the city. A black businessman who lived one block away from the main riot area and was listening on his walkie-talkie provided a Senate subcommittee with an affidavit stating that he had overheard walkie-talkie conversation on July 23 and 24 that included a command to burn a drugstore and another business establishment and talk of spreading the disorder to the east side before that had actually occurred. "Some of the burning was planned," Richard Henry told Garry Wills, "in fact, a lot of it was."

After interviewing the prisoners arrested as alleged snipers, the FBI concluded that the sniping was not organized and did not involve either "hate or subversive groups." Since those arrested for sniping, however, were not necessarily snipers and since, in talking to the FBI, they probably would have concealed their organizational affiliation, if any, and their role in the riot had they been snipers, the FBI's evaluation of the matter is hardly persuasive.

In contrast with the FBI, a "top law enforcement officer" with the Detroit Police Department concluded, according to a *Detroit News* report, that the sniping was "very well organized" and was "part of the network of the Black Power movement." "These people have some kind of communication," the source noted, one of several allegations of the use of citizens band or two-way radios to direct sniping. Locke thought that the widely scattered sniping at the same time on July 24 and 25, coupled with reports of a communications system, suggested organization although not necessarily prior planning, and others talked about a "pattern of sniping" or a "very loose" or "informal" organization of snipers that functioned in some instances. Assertions of this sort, however, were based almost entirely on inference rather than real proof and cannot be accepted as fact.

Toward the end of the riot *Detroit Free Press* reporter Gene Goltz met with two young "snipers," Eddie and Frank, who described their role in the riot. Highball in hand, a short-wave radio at his feet on which Frank and he could hear police calls—Girardin confirmed that the police radio system had been monitored during the riot—Eddie claimed that he had been shooting at police and firemen all week. He referred also to a group of six "shooters" who had sniped from rooftops for two and one-half days while consuming twenty-four pints of liquor. The two youths alleged that out-of-towners had brought guns and ammunition into the city for the use of the snipers and that the rioters had secured additional weapons by looting gun shops and pawnshops. The purpose of the riot, Eddie said, was "to burn every Whitey store to the ground," and the role of the snipers was to prevent policemen and firemen from interfering with that goal. At first, Goltz thought that what he had heard was "just bragging and puffing up," but information he later received left him uncertain as to the credibility of Eddie and Frank.

Since Detroit was a major center of black militancy and black nationalism, there has been considerable speculation as to the possible role of black militants and extremists in the riot. George Edwards contended that although black power activists had not planned the riot, they moved in once it had begun and intensified it. An anonymous source wrote June Garner of the *Michigan Chronicle* that once the riot began, "certain groups had very special things to do." According to this source, "Do-Rag Brothers," young nationalists organized into gangs, allegedly led the looting, Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) members were responsible for the "systematic burning," and the snipers were supposedly RAM members and white "gun-nuts." *Newsweek's* John Dotson reported that hard-core black nationalists, including RAM members, were

among the snipers, and many years later, Edward Vaughn, who was in a position to know, alleged that some of the "brothers" in RAM had joined in the sniping. The Police Department, the Michigan State Police, and the FBI all concluded, however, that there was no RAM participation in the riot. The FBI, indeed, had no information to indicate that any black power group "took over and directed the riot."

On July 25 a black male attempted to buy potassium chlorate in a Flint drugstore. Since the Flint Police, because of the rioting in the state, had requested businesses in the city not to sell inflammable liquids, the druggist refused to make the sale. The customer then sought in vain to purchase ammonium dichromate, another chemical that could be used to make Molotov cocktails. The druggist copied the license number of the Cadillac in which the frustrated purchaser departed, and its owner turned out to be Milton Henry. The State Police placed Henry under surveillance and tried to develop a case against him for "conspiracy to incite [a] riot" or for violating the state's anarchy law. It failed in this effort, nor was any law enforcement agency able to develop a case of this sort against any of Detroit's prominent black militants. The Detroit police, as a matter of fact, had placed most of the known black militants in the city under surveillance immediately after the riot began and discovered that they were not leaders of the disturbance.

Many of Detroit's black militant leaders had attended the Black Power Conference in Newark, which ended on July 22, and did not return to Detroit until July 23. After spending an evening with Kenneth Cockrell and other black power advocates, the journalist Saul Friedman concluded that they had been caught "entirely unprepared" by the riot. "They appeared bewildered and disorganized," Friedman reported, "and were asking themselves where they could have gone wrong, that they were not able to make use of the riot situation." Several black extremists told Friedman during the riot that the leadership in the disturbance had not come from the "brothers" in RAM, Forum 66, the Malcolm X Society, the Northern Student Movement, or the Inner City Organizing Committee but rather from young blacks who hung around the corners, the poolrooms, and the barber shops. Locke agreed, telling the Kerner Commission that the "real leaders" in the riot were inconspicuous individuals who did not emerge as an "active force" until the riot's fourth day.

When asked whether the riot had been "planned in advance," 26 percent of the male and 54 percent of the female arrestees in the Luby sample answered in the affirmative. Among adult blacks on Twelfth Street in another postriot survey, 37 percent thought that "the people who started the trouble were mainly organized," and about one-third thought that the arsonists and snipers "knew each other." In the Campbell-Schuman survey, 60 percent of the Detroit black respondents thought that the riot involved at least some planning.

No law enforcement agency agreed with survey respondents who thought the riot was, at least in some degree, a planned event. President Johnson pressed the FBI to search for a conspiracy that explained the riot's origin, but the Bureau was unable to find any such thing. Although the assistant army chief of staff for intelligence, Major General William Yarbrough, firmly believed that the rioters in Detroit and elsewhere were "tied in with each other," that "they were trained in Havana or Peking or some damned place," army intelligence concluded that there was no "overall direction" of the rioting. Army intelligence, however, as well as the Kerner Commission field team that studied Detroit, the Michigan State Police, the Michigan Commission on Crime, Delinquency, and Criminal Administration, Ray Girardin, and John Nichols all believed that there was some "organized element" in the streets that sustained the riot once it had begun.

Despite widespread agreement that the intensification and prolongation of the riot following the triggering incident were not entirely spontaneous, hard evidence is lacking to support this judgment. If there was any organized effort to spread the riot, it was of a "rudimentary" sort, developed on the street and involving small groups of looters, arsonists, and snipers acting independently of one another or possibly responding

to an informal leadership. It is fairly safe to say that there was no mastermind, no "riot central" directing the flow of events as rioters surged through the streets looting and burning and occasionally sniping. As Cleage said, the riot was "a monster without a head."

What emerges from the welter of data concerning the Detroit riot and the Detroit rioters is that, although less aggrieved than blacks in other big cities, Detroit blacks were sufficiently discontented with their lot so that, given the racial climate of the 1960s and what had already occurred in places like Watts and Newark, a particular kind of incident, especially one involving the police, could trigger a riot. The incident that actually led to the riot was the product, to a large degree, of a series of chance factors, which does not exclude the possibility that some other event might have had the same result.

Those who rioted were not riffraff, but neither were they the cream of the crop among blacks in the city. A minority among them were militants and particularly resentful of the treatment they had received from the police, employers, and merchants. Although the rest were drawn into the riot for a variety of reasons, one cannot ignore the opportunity that police restraint presented at the riot's outset or the contagious effect of the rioting once it got underway. No single explanatory model of collective behavior, in any event, accounts for the fact that while some blacks rioted, the overwhelming majority did not.

The riot is best seen as a form of protest designed to call attention to the condition of blacks, but it does not appear to have been aimed at restructuring political power in the city. It enjoyed less support in Detroit's black community than riots did among blacks in other cities that had experienced major civil disorders. Detroit's blacks also appear to have been more pessimistic about what the event portended for their future than blacks in other cities about the consequences of riots in their communities. Some reactions of Detroit blacks may have been the result of a continuing belief that Detroit, for all its faults, was still a better place than most for blacks to live. Some reactions were probably a byproduct of the damaging character of the Detroit riot, the nation's most severe.

On Sovereignty 3

By Gabriella Slomp

INTRODUCTION

Peace studies has often and rightfully questioned the state-centric bias of most discussions of peace and conflict in the international arena, but it is still important to understand the structure of the nation-state and along with it, foundational concepts such as sovereignty. One simply cannot understand the role of the nation-state in international politics without also understanding the meaning and pervasive influence of sovereignty. Gabriella Stomp offers a brief outline of the origins of the idea of sovereignty, and then explains not only the different interpretations of sovereignty that have evolved over time, but also the different practices that nation-states have adopted under the protection of sovereign rights. From the perspective of peace studies, sovereignty can be both an asset and a liability, depending on the context. This essay introduces the foundational reasons for why this is so.

Gabriella Slomp, Treevor C. Salmon, and Mark F. Imber, "On Sovereignty," *Issues in International Relations*, pp. 33–45.

There is widespread agreement that sovereignty is a so-called master noun of international relations. However, there remains disagreement concerning the meaning, role and significance of sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

State sovereignty can be invoked to defend a people's right to establish an identity and to protect autonomy and self-determination against external interference. On the other hand, state sovereignty can equally be responsible for enabling bad governments to commit domestic atrocities, and even genocide, with impunity.

Phenomena such as liberation movements, nationalism and humanitarian intervention are also related to issues of sovereignty and indirectly paint a picture of modern sovereignty. For example, interventions in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1993) reveal a general mistrust that state sovereignty does enough to protect state citizens; international failure to later intervene in conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-1990s suggests a revival of the idea of inviolable state sovereignty (perhaps as a consequence of the lack of success of previous interventions); international commitments in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 expose another crisis of the sovereignty idea, probably following guilt feelings for not intervening in Rwanda, and so forth. The contemporary relevance of sovereignty cannot be underestimated, and consequently to understand the meaning of sovereignty enhances any understanding of international affairs. This chapter will provide an explanation of sovereignty, and will analyse the implications of state sovereignty on international relations. First, the works of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes will be used to explain the definition and purpose of sovereignty. Second, there will be a consideration of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century responses to classical theories of sovereignty, paying particular attention to the views of Immanuel Kant. Third, sovereignty will be considered in terms of three adjective-pairs—external and internal, legal and political, hard and porous.

Towards a Definition

According to Aristotle, the definition of any object—be it a knife, a flute, or the state—requires a consideration of the object's function or purpose. A blade with a handle may look like a knife, but cannot be defined as such if it is made of sugar and water because it would not be able to fulfil any of the basic functions of being a knife. Bearing in mind Aristotle's advice, any definition of sovereignty must first establish when and for what purpose sovereignty entered the world of politics and penetrated the political discourse. The philosophical issue of what came first, the egg (the concept of sovereignty) or the chicken (the reality of the sovereign state) is second to understanding if there was ever a time when there was no egg and no sign of a chicken.

On the origins of sovereignty there are, as with almost everything in International Relations, different schools of thought. Primordialists believe that the concept of sovereignty always existed with precursors in ancient writers such as Aristotle, Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius is noted by Jean Bodin for having 'touched on all the principal points of sovereignty' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 47). The concept of sovereignty, though not the word itself, is also found in the writings of Ulpian, Augustine, Dante, Ockham, Marsilius and Machiavelli. Modernists, however, believe that sovereignty is a modern phenomenon linked to the birth and growth of the nation state in the seventeenth century and was first theorized by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.

Taking either a primordialist or modernist perspective, there can be no argument that the formulation of state sovereignty offered by Bodin and Hobbes formed the foundations of the theory and practice of sovereignty that was endorsed during the Westphalian period. Why did Jean Bodin devote four chapters of *Six livres de la Republique* to the definition and discussion of sovereignty? Why did Thomas Hobbes provide detailed explanations of the need for state sovereignty throughout his political writings? A brief look at the

historical circumstances in which Bodin and Hobbes were writing can help to explain their concern with this issue and shed light on the notion of sovereignty that they developed.

Purpose and Meaning of State Sovereignty According to Jean Bodin

Jean Bodin (1530–1596) witnessed the bloody religious wars that affected Europe in the sixteenth century and observed how the authority of monarchs was constantly challenged on internal and external fronts. In particular, being a Frenchman, Bodin was concerned with the predicament of France that had suffered a four decades long civil war as a consequence of the Reformation. Bodin published *Six livres de la Republique* in 1576, four years after the massacre of Huguenots, with the intention of providing a theoretical explanation as to why the power of the king was the only way to promote the peace and unity of the state. Bodin was intellectually close to a group of political thinkers known as Politiques who were similarly concerned by the implications of religious intolerance and eager to defend French identity regardless of religious disagreement. Historians such as George Sabine see the Politiques as among the first in the sixteenth century to envisage the possibility of tolerating several religions within a single state. Sabine remarks that the Politiques, although mostly Catholic themselves, were above all nationalists and advocated holding together French nationality even though unity of religion had been lost. Bodin shared the concerns of the Politiques and pointed out that regardless of differences in religion and in customs, the unity of a political community is guaranteed by the acknowledgement of a common sovereign. State sovereignty was seen by Bodin as a vehicle for internal cohesion, order and peace and such qualities, in turn, were needed for a so-called just commonwealth.

From George Sabine to Preston King, and from M.J. Tooley to Julian Franklin, generations of interpreters have argued that Bodin's theory of sovereignty contains many ambiguities and even contradictions. However, it is worth considering Bodin's definitions that: 'Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 1). Bodin goes on to distinguish between the attributes and the characteristics of the sovereign power. The primary attribute of Bodinian sovereignty is the power to give laws 'without the consent of any other, whether greater, equal, or below him' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 56). Bodin explains that the other attributes of sovereignty—the power to declare war and to make peace, the power to appoint magistrates and officers, the power to levy taxes and so on—are all consequences of the position of the sovereign as legal head of state (Bodin [1576] 1992: 48).

Additionally, in order to enable the sovereign power to perform all the above tasks, Bodin ascribes to the sovereign power a long list of characteristics. First, the sovereign power is described as absolute in the Latin sense of the word, *ab legibus solutus* (or unbound by the law). Bodin explains that sovereignty cannot be restricted by law because the sovereign is the source of the law:

> [A] king cannot be subject to the laws … Thus at the end of edicts and ordinances we see the words, 'for such is our pleasure' which serve to make it understood that the laws of a sovereign prince, even if founded on good and strong reasons, depend solely on his own free will.
>
> (Bodin [1576] 1992: 12–13)

Second, sovereignty is unconditional: 'sovereignty given to a prince subject to obligations and conditions is properly not sovereignty or absolute power' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 8). Third, sovereignty is unaccountable just

as the king is not accountable to his subjects. However, Bodin does point out that God and natural law impose limits on the power of the sovereign, and hence sovereign power is not arbitrary. Accountability to God prevents rulers from forgetting about their mission to promote the well-being of the commonwealth. Fourth, sovereignty is indivisible. Although Bodin preferred monarchy to other forms of government, he believed that sovereignty can lie in a person or an assembly. For Bodin, the important point is that sovereignty cannot be divided between different agencies but must reside in one single place, whether it be king, assembly, or populace. Finally, Bodinian sovereignty is humanly unlimited and irrevocable or perpetual: 'Sovereignty is not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time', (Bodin [1576] 1992: 3) and 'the law is nothing but the command of a sovereign making use of his power' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 38). Hence any limits imposed on the power to command cannot be but extra-legal. Bodin concludes that 'he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is greater than himself ' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 4).

BOX 3.1 BODINIAN SOVEREIGNTY

- Absolute
- Unconditional
- Indivisible
- Unlimited
- Unaccountable
- Irrevocable

Bodin defined sovereignty as the absolute, unconditional, indivisible, unlimited, unaccountable and irrevocable power to make, interpret and execute the law. Bodin argued that all the sovereign's other powers (to make peace, to wage war, to tax, to make coins and so on) were derived from this single law-making power. He believed that only such a formidable and supreme power would be able to protect the commonwealth from internal and external enemies and to provide order and peace. By formulating the first theory of state sovereignty of the modern age, Bodin revealed a great historical sensitivity to the growing importance of the nation state.

Purpose and Meaning of State Sovereignty According to Thomas Hobbes

Just as Bodin had first-hand experience of the civil war in France, so Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) witnessed the English civil war. Distraught by what he saw and at times fearing for his own life, Hobbes realized that without order or peace there is little much else that can function in a society. Hobbes understood that in a civil war as much as in a state of nature, there is:

> [N]o place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation … no commodious Building … no account of Time; no Arts; no letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
>
> (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 89)

Bodin had observed that 'wrong opinion leads subjects to revolt from the obedience they owe their sovereign prince' (Bodin [1576] 1992: 19) and similarly Hobbes blames ignorance about the function of the sovereign power as the main cause of civil disobedience and civil strife. In *Behemoth*, Hobbes explains that the English Civil War occurred because people had false beliefs and wrong opinions about their political obligations. Hobbes claims that bad teachers, bad priests and bad parliamentarians had taken advantage of the people's lack of understanding of the purpose of the sovereign state. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes writes: 'The End of the institution of Sovereignty [is] the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common Enemy' (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 150). Hobbes explains that sovereign power can be acquired by force, or created by institution but that the rights and consequences and ends of sovereignty are the same in both cases. Hobbes echoes Bodin and argues in favour of absolute, unlimited, irrevocable, humanly unaccountable, inalienable and indivisible sovereignty. For the sake of security and peace, Hobbes recommends that the 'Sovereign Power … is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it' (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 144). Hobbes concedes that such a power could be dangerous but never tires to highlight its advantages in terms of security and protection:

> And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse
>
> (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 144–5)

As Bodin condemned resistance and claimed that 'it is not licit for a subject to contravene his prince's laws on the pretext of honesty and justice' (Bodin [1571] 1992: 33), so Hobbes argues that a citizen only has the right to resist if the sovereign endangers his life (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 151). But whereas Bodin is happy to list the various characteristics of the sovereign power without offering a supporting argument, Hobbes tries to justify in some detail each and every one of those characteristics. For example, Hobbes attempts to offer a rational explanation for ascribing unlimited power to the sovereign. He points out that, by nature, we have the right to use all available means for self-defence. In spite of this right, in a state of nature or during a civil war, our life is in constant danger. We enter the political state with a view to entrusting the sovereign with our defence and security. As the end of the sovereign power is the protection of our life and the preservation of peace, it would be irrational to impose restrictions on the sovereign as this would limit its ability to protect our survival. Hence, sovereign power must be unrestricted and from a Hobbesian perspective, there is no escape from unlimited sovereign power: 'And whosover thinking Soverign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater' (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 145).

In summation, Hobbes ascribes to sovereign power all the attributes and characteristics listed by Bodin. Moreover, using a more forceful and unambiguous argument than Bodin, Hobbes spells out that the sovereign provides protection in exchange of obedience and that therefore absolute protection requires absolute obedience to an absolute sovereign power.

Sovereignty and the Protection/Obedience Function

Hobbes and Bodin both agree that the purpose or function of state sovereignty is to provide protection for citizens or subjects in exchange for obedience. For the sake of protection from internal and external enemies, both Bodin and Hobbes ascribe absolute, indivisible, unlimited, inalienable, unaccountable, irrevocable power to the sovereign, be it located in a man (monarchy), in an assembly (aristocracy) or in the populace (democracy). The protection/obedience principle forms the foundation of the Bodinian and Hobbesian concept of the sovereign state. Indeed, for Hobbes, a state that cannot provide protection cannot command obedience and hence is not a state at all. Furthermore, regardless of any differences in size, wealth or power, all sovereign states rely on the protection/obedience principle as the formative identifier of statehood.

From Hobbes to the modern era, the protection/obedience principle has remained the main function of the sovereign state by political thinkers and philosophers from many different ideological backgrounds. Realist writer Hans Morgenthau, as well as philosophers linked with liberalism and cosmopolitanism such as Immanuel Kant have all embraced the protection/obedience principle of state sovereignty. Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci and Nationalists such as Carl Schmitt have also endorsed the Hobbesian principle. Indeed, Carl Schmitt famously stated in *The Concept of the Political* that: 'The "*protego ergo obligo*" is the "*cogito ergo sum*" of the state' (Schmitt [1927] 1996: 52). In other words, Schmitt claims that as much as the Cartesian dictum 'I think, therefore I am', captures the identity of the individual, so the motto 'I protect, hence I oblige' captures the essence of the sovereign state.

BOX 3.2 PROTECTION AND OBEDIENCE

Hobbes and Bodin both argue that the state's protection requires the citizen's obedience.

- Sovereignty provides the basis of the modern legal view that all states have equal rights in international relations, or 'sovereign equality'
- The duty of the state to protect its citizens is shared by a wide range of contemporary political ideologies of left and right

Immanuel Kant on Sovereignty

From the seventeenth century onwards there exist two main debates related to the Bodinian–Hobbesian concept of sovereignty. Philosophers and political theorists such as Benedict Spinoza, John Locke and J.S. Mill engaged with the problem of what the state ought to provide domestically in exchange of obedience, while lawyers and jurists such as Grotius, the Salamanca School, Christian Wolff and Emeric de Vattel addressed the issue of whether and how an international system of sovereign states could enable each state to protect its own citizens (Brown 2002: 30–3).

An outstanding contributor to both debates was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). If Hobbes were placed at one end of the ideological spectrum, Kant would occupy the other, and hence Kant's take on sovereignty

is particularly relevant. Indeed, while Hobbes is associated with absolutism and realism, Kant is regarded as one of the founding fathers of liberalism and of cosmopolitanism.

First, as argued by Richard Tuck and Howard Williams, Kant attempted to combine the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty with a theory of limited constitutional government. In an essay entitled *On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'* Kant challenges Hobbes's view that the state can protect only the life of its citizens. Disagreeing with Hobbes, Kant contends that a sovereign state ought to protect basic human rights such as freedom, equality and independence of the individual (Kant 1991: 74). Additionally, Kant also challenges the Hobbesian claim that a state operating in an international system characterized by anarchy (derived from the Greek, lack of *arche*, or rule) can adequately protect its citizens.

For Hobbes, domestic politics and international politics are independent spheres. Hobbes saw his own political theory as a solution to civil war and to the problem of domestic political disorder. He did not, however, believe that there was a solution to potential international anarchy. Indeed, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes promises eternal peace domestically but does not envisage the end of inter-state wars. Against Hobbes, Kant insists that the international and domestic political orders are, in fact, closely linked. It follows that the stability and justice of one is dependent on the stability and justice of the other. In his 1784 essay *Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* Kant states that 'the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the other is also solved' (Kant 1991: 52).

While Kant accepts the Hobbesian principle that the function of the sovereign state is to provide protection in exchange for obedience, he expands the list of rights that the state is supposed to protect and argues that only a federation of republican states, and not a system of totally independent states, can offer true protection, security and perpetual peace. Of course, doubts have been raised about Kant's view that Hobbesian sovereignty is compatible with liberal principles and international institutions. Indeed many scholars have maintained that the doctrine of state sovereignty is inimical to the very notion of international law. In the realist camp, Hans Morgenthau has argued that 'sovereignty is consistent only with a weak, non-interventionalist international legal order' (Morgenthau 1950: 246). At the other end of the spectrum, David Held has pointed out that the greatest obstacle to the development of international democracy is the idea that states are sovereign and that international institutions may limit their sovereignty.

BOX 3.3 IMMANUEL KANT

- Kant's writing greatly enlarges the range of citizen's rights that the sovereign state should protect
- Kant creates a strong connection between order and stability as practised internally and order and stability at the international level
- For some modern authors sovereignty remains the basis of international order, for others it is an obstacle to international order

The Location of Sovereignty

The notion of sovereignty developed by Bodin and Hobbes is often associated with the absolutist monarchies that dominated Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but during this time questions were also raised regarding whether or not sovereignty must lie in a single body, as Hobbes and Bodin claimed, or whether it could be divided. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the disagreement developed into a discussion of whether sovereignty was best located in a king, an assembly or the whole people. By the twentieth century, however, the debate shifted towards the question of whether it was possible or desirable for one such body to exist at all. Many writers pointed out that the belief that sovereignty lies in a single place or body was being increasingly undermined by the experience of pluralist societies. Simultaneously, a growing number of thinkers from different ideological perspectives claimed that the diffusion and fragmentation of power in pluralistic societies is superficial and that systems of checks and balances only hide the concentration of power within liberal democracies.

From Carl Schmitt to Giorgio Agamben, it has been argued that in an emergency or the case of exceptional danger—from either inside or outside the state in the form of terrorism or any other lethal threat—the location of supreme sovereign power becomes unambiguous. These writers believe that in any state—liberal or totalitarian—we can find the true location of sovereign power by looking at the will responsible for the final decision-making. The opening sentence of Carl Schmitt's study of the concept of sovereignty is very well-known: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (Schmitt [1922] 1985: 5)

Internal and External Sovereignty

It is often said that one of the characteristics of modernity was the creation of great dichotomies such as nature vs. artifice, private vs. public, reason vs. passion and so on. It is therefore not surprising that sovereignty—regarded by many as a quintessentially modern concept—is predicated on a dichotomous inside/outside principle.

Internal sovereignty is the supreme power that the state has over its own citizens within its own borders or the supreme decision-making and enforcement authority in a specific territory and towards a population. Conversely, external sovereignty embodies the principle of self-determination and implies that in international relations each state is in a position of independence vis-à-vis all other states. External sovereignty refers to and assumes the absence of a supreme international authority. In a nutshell, 'the doctrine of sovereignty implies a double claim; autonomy in foreign policy and exclusive competence in internal affairs' (Evans and Newnham 1998: 504).

Internal and external sovereignty may not be mentioned specifically in classical international relations texts, but the concepts exist nonetheless. Both Bodin and Hobbes suggest that domestic and external sovereignty, although distinct, stand and fall together—a view that can also be found in earlier writers such as Machiavelli. Bodin explains that internal disorder fosters external attacks. Hobbes too stresses that a state afflicted by internal discord is vulnerable to attacks from external enemies; similarly, when the external sovereignty of a state is in crisis, its domestic sovereignty could also be challenged because the citizens may want to submit to a stronger state that is more capable of protecting them from external enemies.

Internal sovereignty is said to go hand in hand with domestic hierarchy and vertical order, whereas external sovereignty implies equality and the possibility of horizontal disorder. Hobbes explains that equality among agents (be they 'natural men' or 'artificial men', i.e. states) brings about confrontation, conflict and

ultimately war because every agent tries to dominate every other agent. In the political state the sovereign power introduces inequality between the rulers and the ruled and the resulting hierarchy ensures order and peace (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 238). Hobbes illustrates this inequality with the following image:

> As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are Equall, and without any honour at all, so are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.
> (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 128)

In international relations, however, all agents remain in a state of equality and the result is a situation of potential horizontal disorder or anarchy. Hobbes famously describes international relations thus:

> But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War.
> (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 90)

In previous centuries attention was predominantly focused on internal sovereignty, but during the twentieth century external sovereignty has occupied central stage. Indeed, in contemporary times, issues related to the external sovereignty of states raise not just very heated debates among scholars but also deep disagreements within the international community. The external sovereignty of states is fiercely defended as the right of peoples to define their own identity and to shape their own future free from external interference. External sovereignty, however, can be criticized on the grounds that it can be seriously abused. For example, events in Kosovo and Rwanda raised serious questions concerning whether or not there exists a moral duty to question the external sovereignty of states when atrocities are committed within their borders.

The distinction between external and internal sovereignty aims at attracting attention to the issues of self-determination and to the independence of states. The concept of external sovereignty raises high feelings both from the supporters of nationalism and from the supporters of universal human rights and of humanitarian intervention.

BOX 3.4 THE LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

- Sovereignty may be vested in a monarchy, in an elected government or the whole people (popular sovereignty)
- Sovereignty has both internal and external dimensions

Legal and Political Sovereignty

In addition to the internal/external dichotomy, there exists another distinction between legal and political sovereignty. Originally articulated by the nineteeth-century thinker A.V. Dicey there remains much disagreement concerning the meaning of legal and political sovereignty and their relationship.

Legal or *de jure* sovereignty is said to differ from political or *de facto* sovereignty as much as the concept of authority differs from the concept of power. Legal sovereignty is based on the *right* to command, political sovereignty instead is based on the *power* to ensure compliance. The former has much to do with the law; the latter has to do with force. In textbooks, legal sovereignty is sometimes exemplified (Heywood 1994: 90) with reference to Bodin. In particular, interpreters draw attention to the fact that Bodin was very keen to offer an account of sovereignty in terms of legal authority and to oppose the Machiavellian argument that princes are not bound by promises in their international dealings. Conversely, political sovereignty is sometime elucidated (Heywood 1994: 91) by reference to Hobbes and his view that the sovereign has the monopoly of coercive power. Hobbes's remark that 'there is scarce a common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified' (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 486) is often cited to support the claim that he believed that sovereignty is about force.

No careful reader of Hobbes or Bodin, however, could deny that both their writings reference both legal and political sovereignty and that the difference between the two writers is mainly one of emphasis. Indeed Hobbes, like Bodin, believed that sovereignty is not just about power and force but also about authority, legality, and legitimacy. However Bodin, like Hobbes, pointed out that the origin and foundations of commonwealths lie in force and violence. Most thinkers agree that neither political nor legal sovereignty constitute a viable form of sovereignty on their own. As observed by Antonio Gramsci, political sovereignty based entirely on the monopoly of coercive power is not sufficient ground for a regime to last. This is why, for example, both Hitler and Mussolini were keen to claim the legality and legitimacy of their regimes. Conversely, legal sovereignty without the ability to enforce a command 'will carry only moral weight, as the peoples of the Baltic States—Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania—recognized between their invasion by the Soviet Union in 1940 and their eventual achievement of independence in 1991' (Heywood 1994: 92). Indeed, the political/legal distinction does not describe two different types of sovereignty but two facets of the same phenomenon, and as such the value of the political/legal distinction is mainly heuristic and analytical in that it highlights the multi-layered nature of the concept of sovereignty.

Hard Sovereignty Versus Porous Sovereignty

There is also a distinction to be made between porous and hard sovereignty, with the twenty-first century experiencing a very different type of sovereignty to that described by Bodin and Hobbes. Globalization theory suggests that the boundaries of states are permeable, and that the line of demarcation between the internal and external spheres of a state's existence has also become blurred. Consequently, there exists the argument that the notion of sovereignty will eventually be abandoned as a result of integrative developments such as the EU. For many scholars, the idea of state sovereignty is already anachronistic as a result of developments in human rights regimes, in international norms and in international law. Twenty-first-century economic interdependence and the power of multinationals also feed into the discussion that state sovereignty is becoming a nostalgic memory. All such claims to the erosion of sovereignty are to some extent

well grounded. What is less convincing is the view that there once existed a time when sovereignty was truly impenetrable. Consider, as an example, the following remark by Bodin:

> For if we say that to have absolute power is not to be subject to any law at all, no prince of this world will be sovereign, since every earthly prince is subject to the laws of God and of nature and *to various human laws that are common to all peoples [lex omnium gentium communis]*
>
> (Bodin [1576] 1992: 10, emphasis added)

Bodin repeatedly supports the idea that human laws common to all peoples (*jus gentium*) served to limit and restrain sovereigns in international affairs. Moreover, the contention that the twenty-first century is experiencing the demise of sovereignty is exaggerated:

> The continued relevance of the idea of sovereignty in international affairs is testified by the fact that at the political level it remains the primary organizing principle of world politics. Since sovereignty implies constitutional independence from other states, a decentralized international system will always have recourse to some such ideas.
>
> (Evans and Newnham 1998: 505)

BOX 3.5 SOVEREIGNTY IN REVIEW

- Sovereignty has both political and legal dimensions
- The worst dictatorships will seek a legal justification
- Claims that sovereignty is being eroded or penetrated are associated with globalization and interdependence
- Claims to statehood, and the emergence of over twenty new members of the United Nations since 1990 suggest that sovereign statehood remains a powerful goal for those who do not already possess it

Conclusion

Bodin and Hobbes first developed the principle of state sovereignty as a result of their experiences of war and their desire to protect states from religious interference, as well as interference from the emperor and from other potential external and internal enemies. A superficial reading of Bodin and Hobbes suggests that a state system predicated on their notion of unlimited, indivisible, and absolute sovereignty would imply that sovereign states are the ultimate judges in their own cases, have an absolute right to go to war as they please and can treat their own citizens as they want. In this respect historians and International Relations

scholars such as Krasner (1999) and Brown (2002) have pointed out that states were never able to act in such a way. A more careful reading of Bodin and Hobbes suggests that their notion of state sovereignty is much subtler than is generally acknowledged. Neither Bodin nor Hobbes identified sovereign power with arbitrary power—for both Bodin and Hobbes the function of state sovereignty (and its justification) was the protection of the well-being of the commonwealth. This important insight needs to be revisited not only for a fairer assessment of Bodin and Hobbes but, more importantly, because it can enrich current debates on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.

In contemporary times there seems to be widespread consensus among scholars that a commitment to human rights conflicts with the principles of state sovereignty. Indeed it is often pointed out that in order to protect human rights one has sometimes to violate state sovereignty; and vice versa, that the respect of the state for sovereignty may sometimes imply the impossibility of preventing domestic injustice. However, the founding fathers of the concept of sovereignty maintained a very different approach. Although the notion of human rights (as we currently understand it) was foreign to Bodin and Hobbes, they both maintained that state sovereignty had one specific function: the protection of citizens. In other words, both Hobbes and Bodin defended state sovereignty not for its own sake but as a vehicle to protect the life of people, and a state that commits atrocities against its own citizens, arguably, does not deserve its own sovereignty.

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For Hobbes' *Leviathan* see: http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/hobbes/leviathan.html

A Natural History of Peace

4

By Robert M. Sapolsky

INTRODUCTION

Just as the debate over nonviolence and violence has been a central element in the conceptual evolution of the field of peace studies, so too has the question over the "naturalness" of peace and war. On the one hand, there have been those who have argued that humans, like all species, have evolved with and are hard-wired for a natural predilection for violence and war. On the other, there are those who have argued that we have evolved with and are hard-wired for a natural predilection for peace, and thus war is an unnatural aberration to be explained by other factors. In one of most original articles to appear on this topic, Robert Sapolsky weighs in on this debate to show that both sides have dangerously oversimplified the issue. Using a primatologist's perspective, Sapolsky argues that the world of social and political conflict is not composed exclusively either of aggressive chimpanzees or affectionate bonobos. Instead, we end up with a number of complex variables in play that can help determine whether the outcome of any situation is peaceful or not. Understanding the interplay of these variables and how they determine different outcomes is far more productive than trying to prove that one specific variable is natural and unchangeable.

Robert Sapolsky, "A Natural History of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 104–120.

The Naked Ape

The evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky once said, "All species are unique, but humans are uniquest." Humans have long taken pride in their specialness. But the study of other primates is rendering the concept of such human exceptionalism increasingly suspect.

Some of the retrenchment has been relatively palatable, such as with the workings of our bodies. Thus we now know that a baboon heart can be transplanted into a human body and work for a few weeks, and human blood types are coded in Rh factors named after the rhesus monkeys that possess similar blood variability.

More discomfiting is the continuum that has been demonstrated in the realm of cognition. We now know, for example, that other species invent tools and use them with dexterity and local cultural variation. Other primates display "semanticity" (the use of symbols to refer to objects and actions) in their communication in ways that would impress any linguist. And experiments have shown other primates to possess a "theory of mind," that is, the ability to recognize that different individuals can have different thoughts and knowledge.

Our purported uniqueness has been challenged most, however, with regard to our social life. Like the occasional human hermit, there are a few primates that are typically asocial (such as the orangutan). Apart from those, however, it turns out that one cannot understand a primate in isolation from its social group. Across the 150 or so species of primates, the larger the average social group, the larger the cortex relative to the rest of the brain. The fanciest part of the primate brain, in other words, seems to have been sculpted by evolution to enable us to gossip and groom, cooperate and cheat, and obsess about who is mating with whom. Humans, in short, are yet another primate with an intense and rich social life—a fact that raises the question of whether primatology can teach us something about a rather important part of human sociality, war and peace.

It used to be thought that humans were the only savagely violent primate. "We are the only species that kills its own," one might have heard intoned portentously at the end of nature films several decades ago. That view fell by the wayside in the 1960s as it became clear that some other primates kill their fellows aplenty. Males kill; females kill. Some kill one another's infants with cold-blooded stratagems worthy of Richard III. Some use their toolmaking skills to fashion bigger and better cudgels. Some other primates even engage in what can only be called warfare—organized, proactive group violence directed at other populations.

As field studies of primates expanded, what became most striking was the variation in social practices across species. Yes, some primate species have lives filled with violence, frequent and varied. But life among others is filled with communitarianism, egalitarianism, and cooperative child rearing.

Patterns emerged. In less aggressive species, such as gibbons or marmosets, groups tend to live in lush rain forests where food is plentiful and life is easy. Females and males tend to be the same size, and the males lack secondary sexual markers such as long, sharp canines or garish coloring. Couples mate for life, and males help substantially with child care. In violent species, on the other hand, such as baboons and rhesus monkeys, the opposite conditions prevail.

The most disquieting fact about the violent species was the apparent inevitability of their behavior. Certain species seemed simply to be the way they were, fixed products of the interplay of evolution and ecology, and that was that. And although human males might not be inflexibly polygamous or come with bright red butts and six-inch canines designed for tooth-to-tooth combat, it was clear that our species had at least as much in common with the violent primates as with the gentle ones. "In their nature" thus became "in our nature." This was the humans-as-killer-apes theory popularized by the writer Robert Ardrey,

according to which humans have as much chance of becoming intrinsically peaceful as they have of growing prehensile tails.

That view always had little more scientific rigor than a *Planet of the Apes* movie, but it took a great deal of field research to figure out just what should supplant it. After decades' more work, the picture has become quite interesting. Some primate species, it turns out, are indeed simply violent or peaceful, with their behavior driven by their social structures and ecological settings. More important, however, some primate species can *make* peace despite violent traits that seem built into their natures. The challenge now is to figure out under what conditions that can happen, and whether humans can manage the trick themselves.

Pax Bonobo

Primatology has long been dominated by studies of the chimpanzee, due in large part to the phenomenally influential research of Jane Goodall, whose findings from her decades of observations in the wild have been widely disseminated. National Geographic specials based on Goodall's work would always include the reminder that chimps are our closest relatives, a notion underlined by the fact that we share an astonishing 98 percent of our DNA with them. And Goodall and other chimp researchers have carefully documented an endless stream of murders, cannibalism, and organized group violence among their subjects. Humans' evolutionary fate thus seemed sealed, smeared by the excesses of these first cousins.

But all along there has been another chimp species, one traditionally ignored because of its small numbers; its habitat in remote, impenetrable rain forests; and the fact that its early chroniclers published in Japanese. These skinny little creatures were originally called "pygmy chimps" and were thought of as uninteresting, some sort of regressed subspecies of the real thing. Now known as bonobos, they are today recognized as a separate and distinct species that taxonomically and genetically is just as closely related to humans as the standard chimp. And boy, is this ever a different ape.

Male bonobos are not particularly aggressive and lack the massive musculature typical of species that engage in a lot of fighting (such as the standard chimp). Moreover, the bonobo social system is female dominated, food is often shared, and there are well-developed means for reconciling social tensions. And then there is the sex.

Bonobo sex is the prurient highlight of primatology conferences, and leads parents to shield their children's eyes when watching nature films. Bonobos have sex in every conceivable position and some seemingly inconceivable ones, in pairs and groups, between genders and within genders, to greet each other and to resolve conflicts, to work off steam after a predator scare, to celebrate finding food or to cajole its sharing, or just because. As the sound bite has it, chimps are from Mars and bonobos are from Venus.

All is not perfect in the bonobo commune, and they still have hierarchies and conflict (why else invent conflict resolution?). Nonetheless, they are currently among the trendiest of species to analyze, a wonderful antidote to their hard-boiled relatives. The trouble is, while we have a pretty good sense of what bonobos are like, we have little insight into how they got that way. Furthermore, this is basically what all bonobos seem to be like—a classic case of in-their-nature-ness. There is even recent evidence for a genetic component to the phenomenon, in that bonobos (but not chimps) possess a version of a gene that makes affiliative behavior (behavior that promotes group cohesion) more pleasurable to males. So—a wondrous species (and one, predictably, teetering on the edge of extinction). But besides being useful for taking the wind out of we-be-chimps fatalists, the bonobo has little to say to us. We are not bonobos, and never can be.

Warriors, Come Out to Play

In contrast to the social life of bonobos, the social life of chimps is not pretty. Nor is that of rhesus monkeys, nor savanna baboons—a species found in groups of 50 to 100 in the African grasslands and one I have studied for close to 30 years. Hierarchies among baboons are strict, as are their consequences. Among males, high rank is typically achieved by a series of successful violent challenges. Spoils, such as meat, are unevenly divided. Most males die of the consequences of violence, and roughly half of their aggression is directed at third parties (some high-ranking male in a bad mood takes it out on an innocent bystander, such as a female or a subordinate male).

Male baboons, moreover, can fight amazingly dirty. I saw this happen a few years ago in one of the troops I study: Two males had fought, and one, having been badly trounced, assumed a crouching stance, with his rear end up in the air. This is universally recognized among savanna baboons as an abject gesture of subordination, signaling an end to the conflict, and the conventional response on the part of the victorious male is to subject the other to a ritualized gesture of dominance (such as mounting him). In this instance, however, the winner, approaching the loser as if to mount him, instead abruptly gave him a deep slash with his canines.

A baboon group, in short, is an unlikely breeding ground for pacifists. Nevertheless, there are some interesting exceptions. In recent years, for example, it has been recognized that a certain traditional style of chest-thumping evolutionary thinking is wrong. According to the standard logic, males compete with one another aggressively in order to achieve and maintain a high rank, which will in turn enable them to dominate reproduction and thus maximize the number of copies of their genes that are passed on to the next generation. But although aggression among baboons does indeed have something to do with attaining a high rank, it turns out to have virtually nothing to do with maintaining it. Dominant males rarely are particularly aggressive, and those that are typically are on their way out: the ones that need to use it are often about to lose it. Instead, maintaining dominance requires social intelligence and impulse control—the ability to form prudent coalitions, show some tolerance of subordinates, and ignore most provocations.

Recent work, moreover, has demonstrated that females have something to say about which males get to pass on their genes. The traditional view was based on a "linear access" model of reproduction: if one female is in heat, the alpha male gets to mate with her; if two are in heat, the alpha male and the second-ranking male get their opportunity; and so on. Yet we now know that female baboons are pretty good at getting away from even champions of male-male competition if they want to and can sneak off instead with another male they actually desire. And who would that be? Typically, it is a male that has followed a different strategy of building affiliative relations with the female—grooming her a lot, helping to take care of her kids, not beating her up. These nice-guy males seem to pass on at least as many copies of their genes as their more aggressive peers, not least because they can go like this for years, without the life-shortening burnout and injuries of the gladiators.

And so the crude picture of combat as the sole path to evolutionary success is wrong. The average male baboon does opt for the combative route, but there are important phases of his life when aggression is less important than social intelligence and restraint, and there are evolutionarily fruitful alternative courses of action.

Even within the bare-knuckle world of male-male aggression, we are now recognizing some surprising outposts of primate civility. For one thing, primates can make up after a fight. Such reconciliation was first described by Frans de Waal, of Emory University, in the early 1980s; it has now been observed in some 27

different species of primates, including male chimps, and it works as it is supposed to, reducing the odds of further aggression between the two ex-combatants. And various primates, including male baboons, will sometimes cooperate, for example by supporting one another in a fight. Coalitions can involve reciprocity and even induce what appears to be a sense of justice or fairness. In a remarkable study by de Waal and one of his students, capuchin monkeys were housed in adjacent cages. A monkey could obtain food on its own (by pulling a tray of food toward its cage) or with help from a neighbor (by pulling a heavier tray together); in the latter case, only one of the monkeys was given access to the food in question. The monkeys that collaborated proved more likely to share it with their neighbor.

Even more striking are lifelong patterns of cooperation among some male chimps, such as those that form bands of brothers. Among certain primate species, all the members of one gender will leave their home troop around puberty, thus avoiding the possibility of genetically deleterious inbreeding. Among chimps, the females leave home, and as a result, male chimps typically spend their lives in the company of close male relatives. Animal behaviorists steeped in game theory spend careers trying to figure out how reciprocal cooperation gets started among nonrelatives, but it is clear that stable reciprocity among relatives emerges readily.

Thus, even the violent primates engage in reconciliation and cooperation—but only up to a point. For starters, as noted in regard to the bonobo, there would be nothing to reconcile without violence and conflict in the first place. Furthermore, reconciliation is not universal: female savanna baboons are good at it, for example, but males are not. Most important, even among species and genders that do reconcile, it is not an indiscriminate phenomenon: individuals are more likely to reconcile with those who can be useful to them. This was demonstrated in a brilliant study by Marina Cords, of Columbia University, in which the value of some relationships among a type of macaque monkey was artificially raised. Animals were again caged next to each other under conditions in which they could obtain food by themselves or through cooperation, and those pairs that developed the capacity for cooperation were three times as likely to reconcile after induced aggression as noncooperators. Tension-reducing reconciliation, in other words, is most likely to occur among animals who already are in the habit of cooperating and have an incentive to keep doing so.

Some deflating points emerge from the studies of cooperation as well, such as the fact that coalitions are notoriously unstable. In one troop of baboons I studied in the early 1980s, male-male coalitions lasted less than two days on average before collapsing, and most cases of such collapse involved one partner failing to reciprocate or, even more dramatically, defecting to the other side during a fight. Finally, and most discouraging, is the use to which most coalitions are put. In theory, cooperation could trump individualism in order to, say, improve food gathering or defend against predators. In practice, two baboons that cooperate typically do so in order to make a third miserable.

Goodall was the first to report the profoundly disquieting fact that bands of related male chimps carry out cooperative "border patrols"—searching along the geographic boundary separating their group from another and attacking neighboring males they encounter, even to the point of killing other groups off entirely. In-group cooperation can thus usher in not peace and tranquility, but rather more efficient extermination.

So primate species with some of the most aggressive and stratified social systems have been seen to cooperate and resolve conflicts—but not consistently, not necessarily for benign purposes, and not in a cumulative way that could lead to some fundamentally non-Hobbesian social outcomes. The lesson appears to be not that violent primates can transcend their natures, but merely that the natures of these species are subtler and more multifaceted than previously thought. At least that was the lesson until quite recently.

Old Primates and New Tricks

To some extent, the age-old "nature versus nurture" debate is silly. The action of genes is completely intertwined with the environment in which they function; in a sense, it is pointless to even discuss what gene X does, and we should consider instead only what gene X does in environment Y. Nonetheless, if one had to predict the behavior of some organism on the basis of only one fact, one might still want to know whether the most useful fact would be about genetics or about the environment.

The first two studies to show that primates were somewhat independent from their "natures" involved a classic technique in behavioral genetics called cross-fostering. Suppose some animal has engaged in a particular behavior for generations—call it behavior A. We want to know if that behavior is due to shared genes or to a multigenerationally shared environment. Researchers try to answer the question by cross-fostering the animal, that is, switching the animal's mother at birth so that she is raised by one with behavior B, and then watching to see which behavior the animal displays when she grows up. One problem with this approach is that an animal's environment does not begin at birth—a fetus shares a very intimate environment with its mother, namely the body's circulation, chock-full of hormones and nutrients that can cause lifelong changes in brain function and behavior. Therefore, the approach can be applied only asymmetrically: if a behavior persists in a new environment, one cannot conclude that genes are the cause, but if a behavior changes in a new environment, then one can conclude that genes are *not* the cause. This is where the two studies come in.

In the early 1970s, a highly respected primatologist named Hans Kummer was working in Ethiopia, in a region containing two species of baboons with markedly different social systems. Savanna baboons live in large troops, with plenty of adult females and males. Hamadryas baboons, in contrast, have a more complex, multilevel society. Because they live in a much harsher, drier region, hamadryas have a distinctive ecological problem. Some resources are singular and scarce—like a rare watering hole or a good cliff face to sleep on at night in order to evade predators—and large numbers of animals are likely to want to share them. Other resources, such as the vegetation they eat, are sparse and widely dispersed, requiring animals to function in small, separate groups. As a result, hamadryas have evolved a "harem" structure—a single adult male surrounded by a handful of adult females and their children—with large numbers of discrete harems converging, peacefully, for short periods at the occasional desirable watering hole or cliff face.

Kummer conducted a simple experiment, trapping an adult female savanna baboon and releasing her into a hamadryas troop and trapping an adult female hamadryas and releasing her into a savanna troop. Among hamadryas, if a male threatens a female, it is almost certainly this brute who dominates the harem, and the only way for the female to avoid injury is to approach him—i.e., return to the fold. But among savanna baboons, if a male threatens a female, the way for her to avoid injury is to run away. In Kummer's experiment, the females who were dropped in among a different species initially carried out their species-typical behavior, a major faux pas in the new neighborhood. But gradually, they assimilated the new rules. How long did this learning take? About an hour. In other words, millennia of genetic differences separating the two species, a lifetime of experience with a crucial social rule for each female, and a miniscule amount of time to reverse course completely.

The second experiment was set up by de Waal and his student Denise Johanowicz in the early 1990s, working with two macaque monkey species. By any human standards, male rhesus macaques are unappealing animals. Their hierarchies are rigid, those at the top seize a disproportionate share of the spoils, they enforce this inequity with ferocious aggression, and they rarely reconcile after fights. Male stump tail

macaques, in contrast, which share almost all of their genes with their rhesus macaque cousins, display much less aggression, more affiliative behaviors, looser hierarchies, and more egalitarianism.

Working with captive primates, de Waal and Johanowicz created a mixed-sex social group of juvenile macaques, combining rhesus and stump tails together. Remarkably, instead of the rhesus macaques bullying the stump tails, over the course of a few months, the rhesus males adopted the stump tails' social style, eventually even matching the stump tails' high rates of reconciliatory behavior. It so happens, moreover, that stump tails and rhesus macaques use different gestures when reconciling. The rhesus macaques in the study did not start using the stump tails' reconciliatory gestures, but rather increased the incidence of their own species-typical gestures. In other words, they were not merely imitating the stump tails' behavior; they were incorporating the concept of frequent reconciliation into their own social practices. When the newly warm-and-fuzzy rhesus macaques were returned to a larger, all-rhesus group, finally, their new behavioral style persisted.

This is nothing short of extraordinary. But it brings up one last question: When those rhesus macaques were transferred back into the all-rhesus world, did they spread their insights and behaviors to the others? Alas, they did not. For that, we need to move on to our final case.

Left Behind

In the early 1980s, "Forest Troop," a group of savanna baboons I had been studying—virtually living with—for years, was going about its business in a national park in Kenya when a neighboring baboon group had a stroke of luck: its territory encompassed a tourist lodge that expanded its operations and consequently the amount of food tossed into its garbage dump. Baboons are omnivorous, and "Garbage Dump Troop" was delighted to feast on leftover drumsticks, half-eaten hamburgers, remnants of chocolate cake, and anything else that wound up there. Soon they had shifted to sleeping in the trees immediately above the pit, descending each morning just in time for the day's dumping of garbage. (They soon got quite obese from the rich diet and lack of exercise, but that is another story.)

The development produced nearly as dramatic a shift in the social behavior of Forest Troop. Each morning, approximately half of its adult males would infiltrate Garbage Dump Troop's territory, descending on the pit in time for the day's dumping and battling the resident males for access to the garbage. The Forest Troop males that did this shared two traits: they were particularly combative (which was necessary to get the food away from the other baboons), and they were not very interested in socializing (the raids took place early in the morning, during the hours when the bulk of a savanna baboon's daily communal grooming occurs).

Soon afterward, tuberculosis, a disease that moves with devastating speed and severity in nonhuman primates, broke out in Garbage Dump Troop. Over the next year, most of its members died, as did all of the males from Forest Troop who had foraged at the dump.[1] The results were that Forest Troop was left with males who were less aggressive and more social than average and the troop now had double its previous female-to-male ratio.

The social consequences of these changes were dramatic. There remained a hierarchy among the Forest Troop males, but it was far looser than before: compared with other, more typical savanna baboon groups, high-ranking males rarely harassed subordinates and occasionally even relinquished contested resources to them. Aggression was less frequent, particularly against third parties. And rates of affiliative behaviors,

such as males and females grooming each other or sitting together, soared. There were even instances, now and then, of adult males grooming each other—a behavior nearly as unprecedented as baboons sprouting wings.

This unique social milieu did not arise merely as a function of the skewed sex ratio; other primatologists have occasionally reported on troops with similar ratios but without a comparable social atmosphere. What was key was not just the predominance of females, but the type of male that remained. The demographic disaster—what evolutionary biologists term a "selective bottleneck"—had produced a savanna baboon troop quite different from what most experts would have anticipated.

But the largest surprise did not come until some years later. Female savanna baboons spend their lives in the troop into which they are born, whereas males leave their birth troop around puberty; a troop's adult males have thus all grown up elsewhere and immigrated as adolescents. By the early 1990s, none of the original low aggression/high affiliation males of Forest Troop's tuberculosis period was still alive; all of the group's adult males had joined after the epidemic. Despite this, the troop's unique social milieu persisted—as it does to this day, some 20 years after the selective bottleneck. In other words, adolescent males that enter Forest Troop after having grown up elsewhere wind up adopting the unique behavioral style of the resident males. As defined by both anthropologists and animal behaviorists, "culture" consists of local behavioral variations, occurring for nongenetic and nonecological reasons, that last beyond the time of their originators. Forest Troop's low aggression/high affiliation society constitutes nothing less than a multigenerational benign culture.

Continuous study of the troop has yielded some insights into how its culture is transmitted to newcomers. Genetics obviously plays no role, nor apparently does self-selection: adolescent males that transfer into the troop are no different from those that transfer into other troops, displaying on arrival similarly high rates of aggression and low rates of affiliation. Nor is there evidence that new males are taught to act in benign ways by the residents. One cannot rule out the possibility that some observational learning is occurring, but it is difficult to detect given that the distinctive feature of this culture is not the performance of a unique behavior but the performance of typical behaviors at atypically extreme rates.

To date, the most interesting hint about the mechanism of transmission is the way recently transferred males are treated by Forest Troop's resident females. In a typical savanna baboon troop, newly transferred adolescent males spend years slowly working their way into the social fabric; they are extremely low ranking—ignored by females and noted by adult males only as convenient targets for aggression. In Forest Troop, by contrast, new male transfers are inundated with female attention soon after their arrival. Resident females first present themselves sexually to new males an average of 18 days after the males arrive, and they first groom the new males an average of 20 days after they arrive (normal savanna baboons introduce such behaviors after 63 and 78 days, respectively). Furthermore, these welcoming gestures occur more frequently in Forest Troop during the early post-transfer period, and there is four times as much grooming of males by females in Forest Troop as elsewhere. From almost the moment they arrive, in other words, new males find out that in Forest Troop, things are done differently.

At present, I think the most plausible explanation is that this troop's special culture is not passed on actively but simply emerges, facilitated by the actions of the resident members. Living in a group with half the typical number of males, and with the males being nice guys to boot, Forest Troop's females become more relaxed and less wary. As a result, they are more willing to take a chance and reach out socially to new arrivals, even if the new guys are typical jerky adolescents at first. The new males, in turn, finding themselves treated so well, eventually relax and adopt the behaviors of the troop's distinctive social milieu.

Natural Born Killers?

Are there any lessons to be learned here that can be applied to human-on-human violence—apart, that is, from the possible desirability of giving fatal cases of tuberculosis to aggressive people?

Any biological anthropologist opining about human behavior is required by long-established tradition to note that for 99 percent of human history, humans lived in small, stable bands of related hunter-gatherers. Game theorists have shown that a small, cohesive group is the perfect setting for the emergence of cooperation: the identities of the other participants are known, there are opportunities for multiple iterations of games (and thus the ability to punish cheaters), and there is open-book play (players can acquire reputations). And so, those hunter-gatherer bands were highly egalitarian. Empirical and experimental data have also shown the cooperative advantages of small groups at the opposite human extreme, namely in the corporate world.

But the lack of violence within small groups can come at a heavy price. Small homogenous groups with shared values can be a nightmare of conformity. They can also be dangerous for outsiders. Unconsciously emulating the murderous border patrols of closely related male chimps, militaries throughout history have sought to form small, stable units; inculcate them with rituals of pseudokinship; and thereby produce efficient, cooperative killing machines.

Is it possible to achieve the cooperative advantages of a small group without having the group reflexively view outsiders as the Other? One way is through trade. Voluntary economic exchanges not only produce profits; they can also reduce social friction—as the macaques demonstrated by being more likely to reconcile with a valued partner in food acquisition.

Another way is through a fission-fusion social structure, in which the boundaries between groups are not absolute and impermeable. The model here is not the multilevel society of the hamadryas baboons, both because their basic social unit of the harem is despotic and because their fusion consists of nothing more than lots of animals occasionally coming together to utilize a resource peacefully. Human hunter-gatherers are a better example to follow, in that their small bands often merge, split, or exchange members for a while, with such fluidity helping to solve not only environmental resource problems but social problems as well. The result is that instead of the all-or-nothing world of male chimps, in which there is only one's own group and the enemy, hunter-gatherers can enjoy gradations of familiarity and cooperation stretching over large areas.

The interactions among hunter-gatherers resemble those of other networks, where there are individual nodes (in this case, small groups) and where the majority of interactions between the nodes are local ones, with the frequency of interactions dropping off as a function of distance. Mathematicians have shown that when the ratios among short-, middle-, and long-distance interactions are optimal, networks are robust: they are dominated by highly cooperative clusters of local interactions, but they also retain the potential for less frequent, long-distance communication and coordination.

Optimizing the fission-fusion interactions of hunter-gatherer networks is easy: cooperate within the band; schedule frequent joint hunts with the next band over; have occasional hunts with bands somewhat farther out; have a legend of a single shared hunt with a mythic band at the end of the earth. Optimizing the fission-fusion interactions in contemporary human networks is vastly harder, but the principles are the same.

In exploring these subjects, one often encounters a pessimism built around the notion that humans, as primates, are hard-wired for xenophobia. Some brain-imaging studies have appeared to support this view in

a particularly discouraging way. There is a structure deep inside the brain called the amygdala, which plays a key role in fear and aggression, and experiments have shown that when subjects are presented with a face of someone from a different race, the amygdala gets metabolically active—aroused, alert, ready for action. This happens even when the face is presented "subliminally," which is to say, so rapidly that the subject does not consciously see it.

More recent studies, however, should mitigate this pessimism. Test a person who has a lot of experience with people of different races, and the amygdala does not activate. Or, as in a wonderful experiment by Susan Fiske, of Princeton University, subtly bias the subject beforehand to think of people as individuals rather than as members of a group, and the amygdala does not budge. Humans may be hard-wired to get edgy around the Other, but our views on who falls into that category are decidedly malleable.

In the early 1960s, a rising star of primatology, Irven DeVore, of Harvard University, published the first general overview of the subject. Discussing his own specialty, savanna baboons, he wrote that they "have acquired an aggressive temperament as a defense against predators, and aggressiveness cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. It is an integral part of the monkeys' personalities, so deeply rooted that it makes them potential aggressors in every situation." Thus the savanna baboon became, literally, a textbook example of life in an aggressive, highly stratified, male-dominated society. Yet within a few years, members of the species demonstrated enough behavioral plasticity to transform a society of theirs into a baboon utopia.

The first half of the twentieth century was drenched in the blood spilled by German and Japanese aggression, yet only a few decades later it is hard to think of two countries more pacific. Sweden spent the seventeenth century rampaging through Europe, yet it is now an icon of nurturing tranquility. Humans have invented the small nomadic band and the continental megastate, and have demonstrated a flexibility whereby uprooted descendants of the former can function effectively in the latter. We lack the type of physiology or anatomy that in other mammals determine their mating system, and have come up with societies based on monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry. And we have fashioned some religions in which violent acts are the entrée to paradise and other religions in which the same acts consign one to hell. Is a world of peacefully coexisting human Forest Troops possible? Anyone who says, "No, it is beyond our nature," knows too little about primates, including ourselves.

Note

1. Considerable sleuthing ultimately revealed that the disease had come from tainted meat in the garbage dump, which had been sold to the tourist lodge thanks to a corrupt meat inspector. The studies were the first of this kind of outbreak in a wild primate population and showed that, in contrast to what happens with humans and captive primates, there was little animal-to-animal transmission of the tuberculosis, and so the disease did not spread in Forest Troop beyond the garbage eaters.

The Politics of Identity and the Challenge of Unity

5

By Francis Deng

INTRODUCTION

What is often referred to as the politics of identity—the various ways that identities are constructed and contested from the interpersonal to the international levels—plays a central and influential role in many aspects of peace studies. Whether in civil war or civil society, there is almost always some element of identity politics that is in play. Francis Deng shows the complex and challenging ways that nation-states in Africa struggle to create a unified national identity out of competing sub-national, local, and regional identities. If sovereignty represents the political and legal foundations of the state, then the creation of national unity among citizens represents the social foundation of the state. As this article shows, in situations of complex demographics, this is often at best an imperfect fit. Deng argues that the struggle to balancing legal and political aspects of the state with social elements of identity is an essential part of maintaining civic peace.

Francis Deng, "The Politics of Identity and the Challenge of Unity," *Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa*, pp. 31–44.

Perhaps the most important challenge facing African countries today lies here: How does the African state transform its component identities—its ethnic diversities inherited from colonial boundaries—into nation-states? As Olara Otunnu, former permanent representative of Uganda to the United Nations and Ugandan foreign minister, describes it, the political identity of an African state is rather like a three-tier edifice. At the top is an overarching sense of continental identity shared by all Africans, who can say without any hesitation, "We are Africans." At the base of the edifice lies a sense of ethnic identity, a powerful force that enables most Africans to proclaim with complete confidence, "We are Kikuyu" or "We are Yoruba" or "We are Baganda." The crisis arises in the middle, the national level. Those who can truly affirm with conviction that "We are Ugandans" or "We are Ethiopians" are still far too few. Of course, there is still lip service given to this inclusive national identity, but deep down, sentiments and actual practice betray a different reality, where allegiance is placed more commonly with the religious or ethnic identity group, tribe, or clan, and not with the nation-state.

The result is that the sense of national identity remains the least developed of all the levels of political identity in Africa. This problem has assumed tragic proportions in recent times because of the policies of some African leaders who, instead of correcting the legacies of colonialism, have adopted the same stratagem of divide-and-rule that manipulates ethnic loyalties and diverse identities in order to gain or retain power.

Consequently, various groups within Africa—claiming their own distinct identity—have begun to demand greater self-determination in their struggles for justice and power. The challenges these demands pose for African governance and constitutionalism center on the pluralistic composition of the African state and its ability to manage these identity conflicts.

Subjective and Objective Elements of Identity

Among the most common bases of identity are race, ethnicity, culture, language, and religion. As a concept of identification, territory—either a distinct geographical location in which the group is found or to which the group maintains a historical, cultural, or spiritual attachment—usually overlaps with one or more of these factors and is, therefore, a complementary or an affirmative factor. Self-identification and identification by others are also relevant sources of identity and imply elements of subjectivity and objectivity. For analytical and policy purposes, the relative emphasis placed on these types of identity can lead to complexities. In Africa, as indeed elsewhere, while ethnic groups identify themselves and are identified by others as distinct from others, and may indeed be distinguished by their language, culture, and perhaps territory, there is often a great deal of myth behind the labels as well as much overlapping.

Two sets of discrepancies might arise in the identity debate. The first has to do with the degree to which the subjective factors of self-identification match the objective elements of the claimed identity (that is, physical or genetic factors). Under normal circumstances, this is a personal matter that should not concern others. The second set of discrepancies has to do with the degree to which exclusive individual or group identities are reflected or represented in the definition of the collective national identity framework. The discrepancy between the exclusive identities and the collective national identity makes the issue of identity, in its subjectivities and objectivities, a matter of public policy concern. To the extent that the issue impinges on the interests of other citizens, identity enters the public domain and ceases to be purely personal or exclusive to the group.

Several themes need to be highlighted regarding identity as a factor in conflict. First, it is recognized that identity is basically a subjective concept; it is what people perceive themselves to be that principally

establishes what they are. Second, an important element of such subjective identification is, rightly or wrongly, genetically related; in many instances this associates the concept with ethnicity or race. Third, recognizing identity (including its genetic or racial component) as subjective does not mean that it cannot be challenged by objective facts or criteria; one's personal identification may be in sharp conflict with what one actually is according to established standards. To the extent that this discrepancy has public policy implications, it cannot be left as a private matter for the individual. And fourth, as a matter of policy, if one or more exclusive identities conflict with the requirements of national unity in a framework of diverse identity, then a need arises either to remove the divisive elements and redefine the national identity framework to be all inclusive, or to design a system of coexistence among the diverse groups through constitutional arrangements that accommodate at least the more significant diversities (perhaps through greater local autonomy or self-governance), or, as a third option and last resort, to allow the diverse parts to go their separate ways and break away from the existing nation-state.

Ethnicity (or race) usually implies that the group is, in large part, biologically related and self-perpetuating; shares fundamental values, realized in the unity of cultural forms; has a relational framework of interaction and communication; and is made up of members who identify themselves, and who are identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from others residing within the nation-state. Consequently, the concept of a distinct character, or an identity group, depends on a number of criteria that may appear in combination. "Race (or nationality) is one of the more important of the relevant criteria, but the concept of race can only be expressed scientifically in terms of more specific features, in which matters of culture, language, religion and group psychology predominate." There is, therefore, considerable ambiguity over the concept of race, as there indeed is over ethnicity and nationality. This reflects broader debate over the relevance of socially constructed identity, which, while not scientifically verifiable, exists in the collective mind of human beings as a real force. "The physical indicia of race and nationality may be evidence of the cultural distinctiveness of a group, but they certainly do not inevitably condition it. Indeed, if the purely ethnic criteria were applied exclusively many existing national identities would be negated on academic grounds."

While many fairly objective indicators exist, the general tendency among scholars is to recognize self-identification with a particular group as the crucial determinant of identity. As Crawford Young puts it, "In the final analysis, identity is a subjective, individual phenomenon; it is shaped through a constantly recurrent question to ego, 'Who am I?' with its corollary, 'Who is he?' Generalized to the collectivity, these become 'Who are we?' and 'Who are they?' " According to Nelson Kasfir, ethnicity "encompasses all forms of identity that have at their root the notion of a common ancestor-race as well as tribe." Focusing on the Sudanese situation, Kasfir goes further to link religion and region with ancestor-race and ethnicity. Although he concedes that the choice "depends on the particular situation, not merely on the individual's preference," he concludes with an emphasis on personal choice: "Though objective ethnic characteristics (race, language, culture, place of birth) usually provide the possible limits, subjective perception of either the identifier or the identified—whether objectively accurate or not—may turn out to be decisive for that social situation."

In Nigeria, where the religious divide is somewhat similar to that of Sudan, A. O. Olukoshi and L. Laakso suggest, "Ethnic identities are matched by religious identities which have a similar potential for overriding other kinds of identity. It is precisely for this reason that ethnic and religious conflicts can have a tendency to become a zero-sum game, affecting the very definition of citizenship by tying it organically to the endowment of the state with an exclusive ethnic or religious character." Writing on Nigeria, Vanessa Jimenez and Ricardo Laremont describe government attempts to diffuse ethnic and religious identities by demarcating state borders that cut through lands occupied by different ethnic and religious groups to create multi-ethnic

and multireligious entities. In their assessment, this strategy appears to have had the mixed result of breaking up groups—a negative—and creating new pluralisms—also problematic—but by the same token dissuading secessionist tendencies—a positive. Young adds the qualification that "subjective identity itself is affected by the labels applied by others." These may become internalized and accepted as part of the subjective sense of self. The main point, however, is that "although identity is subjective, multiple, and situationally fluid, it is not infinitely elastic. Cultural properties of the individual do constrain the possible range of choice of social identities. Physical appearance is the most indelible attribute; where skin pigmentation serves to segment communities, only a handful of persons at the color margins may be permitted any choice of identity on racial lines."

Inevitably, a discrepancy emerges between what is subjective and what is objective with regard to ethnicity or race and can manifest itself within a number of attributes including language, physical appearance, territory, political unit, or common value systems. While certain attributes are obvious, a number of gray areas continue to exist at the margins and, unfortunately, none of this mitigates the discriminatory aspects of self-perceptions. Race, the breeding ground for racism, the "stepchild of prejudice," is based "on conspicuous physical differentiation … which facilitate(s) the stereotyping process." There are, however, situations where subjective and divisive racial or ethnic identifications defy objective factors that are more closely connected with shared characteristics. Even in apartheid South Africa, an example of a racially stereotyping model, particularly among certain categories of the "coloreds," borderline cases would still raise issues of subjectivity and objectivity. Sudan is a particularly problematic example of the application of racial or ethnic standards. The Northern Sudanese, who are commonly referred to as Arabs, are primarily Africans who speak Arabic, are Muslims, are culturally Arabized, and have some elements of Arab racial characteristics, such as they are. The claim to be from the Arab race can only be valid for a negligible few, yet this "Arabism" permeates the North and, in fact, the country as a whole and is one of the major reasons for the conflict with the South and between the government and the non-Arab elements in the North. Often, educated Northern Sudanese play down this racial aspect by arguing that Arabism is cultural, not racial, but this is obviously designed to deflect accusations of racism, as though cultural chauvinism were more acceptable.

Ethiopia is another country where the issue of identity is controversial both in the narrow sense of what an individual or group identity means in subjective and objective terms, and in the extent to which the national framework is identified with a dominant group. Historically, the Amhara have played a role similar to that played by those who claim to be Arabs in Sudan. The only difference, but a major one, is that except for the royal lineage of the emperor, which attached importance to ancestral origins and genealogy, the Amhara placed more importance on their culture than on ancestry or genealogy as the source of their identity, which then became synonymous with the national Ethiopian identity. While Amhara culture was used as the basis of nationwide assimilation, which in itself is contestable, Amhara descent did gain preeminence over other indigenous groups in the country. In this respect, the Ethiopian case is similar to that of Sudan.

As Edmond Keller explains, various nationalities in Ethiopia asserted their separate identities, first ignored under the imperial rule and by the Marxist regime that overthrew it, but were eventually recognized by the current government, which has adopted a highly controversial ethnoregional federalism, with the right of conditional self-determination for the diverse, regionally based nationalities. Ironically, Keller sees this as a tactic to avoid the nationality issue and to undermine the causes of the ethnic groups. He notes that this allowed the regime "to repartition the country so as to minimize the importance of large and relatively homogeneous regions," and improve the government's "ability to control politics as well as the economy."

Subjective assumptions about peoples are well illustrated by the cases of Burundi and Rwanda, where the key questions of identity are "Who is a Tutsi?" and "Who is a Hutu?" The Tutsi are racially classified as Nilo-Hamitic, and the Hutu as Bantu-Negroid, but the labels *Tutsi* and *Hutu* are only very loosely "racially" based identifications, which historically correlated to material status determined largely by cattle wealth. Individuals were, therefore, able to cross the dividing line on the basis of economic and concomitant social status. Moreover, there is considerable intermarriage and fusion between the Tutsis and Hutus, complemented by residential mixing. As a result of that intermingling, while there are Tutsis and Hutus who meet the stereotypical criteria of ethnic identity, many would challenge the standard models.

In most African countries, identities that are based on distinctions within a broad racial or ethnic categorization, and may be grounds for tension and conflict, do not pose the same issues of race and ethnicity as the apartheid South African, Ethiopian, or Sudanese models. Consequently, the discrepancies between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the local and the national identities, though still applicable, are less striking. Ultimately, race, ethnicity, tribe, and even clan are various means of expressing the same notion of exclusive, as opposed to inclusive, identity. As Donald Rothchild and Alexander J. Groth poignantly note, "Identity is as frequently based on myth as on fact, and one of the main means of its preservation is through the principles of exclusion." Karl Deutsch also underscores this point, when he observes that a "nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors."

The issue of the discrepancy between what people think they are and what they are in fact, as well as how that discrepancy affects the collective structures or frameworks, may be more noticeable with respect to race or ethnicity. However, it also applies to the supposedly more circumscribed "tribal" identities and even to clans, lineages, and families. There is usually more intermarriage and mixing than people realize or care to admit, which often challenges the myths of identity. Whatever the level of the identity crisis, the generated conflicts become most acute in the context of the state power struggle. To the extent that these conflicts result from inequitable allocations made on the basis of these fictions of identity, or create structures or common frameworks that then discriminate through the stratification of these assumed identities, too many interests become involved for the matter to be left as the private affair of the individual or the group whose identity is in question. Seen from this perspective, the issue of identity is by no means only a matter of concern to a few countries. To the contrary, it is safe to say that most, if not all, countries suffer from some form of identity crisis based on the two sets of discrepancies, one between the subjective and the objective, and the other between the exclusive and the collective.

The point that should be emphasized when discussing identity conflicts is that it is neither the number of distinct identities nor the differences of identities, but rather the incompatibilities of their objectives or interests that generate conflicts. As David Lake and Donald Rothchild observe, "Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and groups." Incompatibilities can relate either to such tangible issues as the distribution of power, wealth, and other assets, or to intangible issues such as how a nation is defined and what role is played by various entities within that nation in nationalistic, cultural, or moral and spiritual terms. As already noted, it is not how individuals and groups perceive themselves that is in question, but how the state recognizes those self-perceptions in its common framework and what status is given the groups concerned. Lake and Rothchild caution, "The most widely discussed explanations of ethnic conflict are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, simply wrong. Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, 'ancient hatreds' and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy. Nor were ethnic passions, long

bottled up by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end of the Cold War. We argue instead that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future."

It can, however, be argued that ethnic conflicts begin for many reasons, are at times managed and contained, and temporarily resolved, but are potentially persistent. Apart from an inherent sense of identity and integrity, and the pride and sensitivity attached to them, a material aspect nearly always is at the heart of these conflicts. Muna Ndulo argues that conflicts in Africa "have typically been rooted in struggles for political power, national privilege, and scarce resources." Emphasizing the point, Ndulo goes on to say that "underlying the prevalence of conflict in Africa is a crisis of government and poverty, leading to a scramble for resources. … In conditions of prosperity, conflicts are less likely to arise and more likely to be resolved quickly and peacefully if they do arise."

In Ethiopia, as Keller explains, the economics of power have been at the center of the Ethiopian political system and its evolution. The nobility demanded a portion of the agricultural produce from the peasants who worked on the land. Even more significant, the emperor used his appointment of noblemen to political and administrative positions as a form of patronage to ensure loyalty and support.

With respect to Nigeria, Jimenez and Laremont argue that "the question of resources and access to resources for governance remains overwhelmingly in the hands of the central government," an "imbalance that has led some observers to describe Nigeria's governing structure as a unitary state in federal disguise." The critical issue of resource distribution, which is a root cause of conflict of identities in the modern state context, becomes compounded by the center-state periphery distribution patterns that make devolution of power meaningless. Even in Botswana, which is relatively homogenous, Gilbert Khadiagala reports that "the current politicization of ethnicity stems largely from deepening socio-economic inequalities and the decay of the social consensus that underwrote postcolonial stability." This paradox of a successful African model, turned into a free-market economy, with its sharply stratifying class structures, has been described as a case of the "flower of success" containing "the seeds of its own destruction."

In the case of South Africa, where racial and ethnic differentiations went hand-in-hand with economic and social stratification and discrimination, postapartheid reform has had to focus on the material aspect of politics rather than on issues of identity per se. As Ndulo explains, the postapartheid South African constitution, "includes in the Bill of Rights justiciable socio-economic rights; environments rights; land access rights; housing rights; the right to healthcare services; the right to food and water; the right to social security benefits; and children's rights to these same benefits, with the added right of access to education. The government is obliged to ensure the progressive realization of these rights."

Identity conflicts in the pluralistic context of the state become compounded and particularly acute when one of the parties involved insists that other groups give up what seem contradictory beliefs, values, interests, goals, and the like, or when each of the contending parties insists that its beliefs be accepted as superior, implying also a dominant role in the control of material resources. Any grossly disadvantaged party is likely to retaliate only if it believes that something will be gained, or little lost, in engaging in the conflict. The role of the elite, intermediaries, cultural mediators, or those who have been widely termed "political entrepreneurs," is pivotal in these conflicts, as they are instrumental in mobilizing group sentiment, organization, and action on ethnoregional, religious, or other factional terms. The core concern of the targeted group is fear—physical, psychological, and cultural: "Collective fears of the future arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups … physical security becomes of paramount concern. When central authority declines, groups become fearful for their survival. They invest in and prepare for violence, and thereby make actual violence possible. To counter these

fears, the dominant elite can undermine the dissident movement by denying it the conditions necessary for its success in challenging the status quo. But, while this may impede the progress of the dissident group, it may also deepen animosities and sharpen the incompatibilities behind the conflict.

All in all, self-identification, as Dauda Abubakar explains with special reference to Nigeria, is inherently a concept of contrasting one's self with others, and, in many respects, oppositionally: "The construction of the identity of one group could only be meaningful in relation to the way the identities of others are constructed and not in isolation. … The construction of Hausa-Fulani identity takes on more important meaning and political load, as it relates in a competitive sociopolitical environment with the Yorubas or Igbos, or even other minority ethnic groups in the north. … Simply, ethnicity does not exist or make sense outside inter- and intra-ethnic relations." As Rothchild and Groth observe, while there are notable

> differences among ethnonationalist entities, there is a range of routine activities in which they engage designed to strengthen various aspects of their identity. These may involve the teaching, learning, and dissemination of a language; the cultivation of a particular religion; the diffusion of distinctive symbols; the celebration of persons and achievements associated with the group's history; the attempt to achieve cultural, economic, and political recognition for the group, with claims to equity, equality, primacy, autonomy, or independence depending on particular situations.

Most, if not all, cultural groups in their relative isolation are ethnocentric and idealize their identities and correlative values. Conflict ensues in pluralistic contexts only when interactive groups perceive their identities and interests as incompatible. Since these perceptions are essentially functions of social conditioning, cultural values, or perceptions about them, the differences and incompatibilities associated with them may create misunderstandings, prejudices, and behavior patterns that become inherently offensive. Unless the pluralistic context has forced a group to recognize its comparative disadvantages, the perceptions involved often have a subjective parity. That is, each of the interactive groups sees itself as superior and therefore takes intractable positions that prevent them from negotiating anything *perceived* as tantamount to subordination or a threat to its continued existence—including that which might otherwise satisfy the aspirations of their people.

In addressing the dual discrepancies relating to subjectivity and objectivity and to exclusion and inclusion, African constitutionalism is called upon to adopt a pragmatic approach aimed at reconciling these discrepancies. On the one hand, it should recognize self-perceptions and the dynamics of self-identification, while, on the other hand, it should strive to encourage the development of inclusive national identities that are based on objective facts and on national aspirations for unity. This can be done through various forms of decentralization and devolution of power while also ensuring adequate representation at all levels of the national constitutive processes. In essence, what is needed is to correct the divisions and stratifications of the colonial state, which have persisted, and often have been aggravated, under the postcolonial governance systems. As Rothchild and Groth advise, "If states in the 1990s may be said to have an interest, all other things being equal, in domestic peace and stability; in economic efficiency; in being perceived as attractive outlets for foreign investment; in acting as legitimate participants in the international and regional organizations promoting economic, environmental, and security cooperation, then they must also be seen as having an important stake in dampening or defusing ethnic conflicts within their borders."

The Evolution of Ethnic Relations in Africa

To correct the mistakes of the past, it is necessary to understand the historical roots of the problems of diversity and disparity. Ethnic relations in African countries must be viewed contextually and historically with special reference to three phases—the precolonial, colonial, and independent periods. Each of these has shaped the sharing of power, wealth, social services, and development opportunities.

During the African precolonial period, the European concept of the state did not exist, and communities coexisted and interacted horizontally on the basis of relative parity and mutual accommodation in the common interest. It is commonly accepted that neighbors must inevitably interact and may come into conflict, but they develop ways to manage their conflicts to prevent them from occurring and to resolve them when they occur. That separate identities and intercommunal relations had survived the test of time in precolonial Africa is adequate testimony to both the relative balance of power and indigenous groups' mutual interest in peaceful, or at least functional, coexistence. Of course, a variety of societies operated during this precolonial era, ranging from acephalous "stateless" ones to centralized kingdoms, but the fundamental principles of autonomous mutual recognition and consensual decision making were widely shared.

After European intervention, the formation of centralized state systems responsible for the distribution of power and resources shifted the focus away from local arrangements. Although the colonial governments and their representatives were relatively neutral as agents of outside impartial justice, the colonial powers often favored certain groups and regions over others. This favoritism led to a stratification of power that had not existed in precolonial times. The tensions that this stratification generated were, nevertheless, contained by both an emphasis on law and order and the relative neutrality of the colonial administration as an outsider to the internal identity affiliations.

With independence, certain groups and regions—often those who had benefited from the colonial shaping and sharing of power, resources, public services, and development opportunities—became associated with the central government, leading to greater disparity. As Abubakar notes with specific reference to Nigeria, "After independence, regionalism and the 'ethnic trap,' whereby ethnoregional and religious identities significantly influenced the pattern and processes of political contestation, fundamentally characterized Nigeria's politics." Because the process was geared toward the center as the ultimate source of power, it commensurately empowered those who shared elements with the wielders of national power, while marginalizing and alienating those who did not. The local balance of power that had sustained mutuality of interest in coexistence was consequently disturbed.

For those groups at the local level that felt themselves advantaged and strengthened by these changes, the tendency to ally with the central authorities against their disadvantaged and weakened neighbors increased. As Maxwell Owusu notes, "Th[e] hallowed and fundamental principle of traditional government, that is, rule by consent of the ruled, was all but destroyed by the imposition of colonial rule and was cynically distorted and mangled when the one-party state allowed the emergence of ambitious, corrupt, and dictatorial African leaders, many in military uniform, after independence. This democratic principle has to be reaffirmed as the bedrock of Africa's second independence."

Ndulo quotes Bentsi-Enchill's observation that "our ancestors insisted that everything should be done on achieving the consensus of all key sectors of the community before a decision was made." This, of course, has not been the case. As a result, tensions and even violent conflicts have ensued. J. B. Adekanye observes, "Virtually all African states have seen a marked retreat from the state and behind the psychosocially protective shield of ethnic and religious identities and conflicts." And Claude Ake notes:

> Even after independence, the state in Africa has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it. It is largely regarded as a hostile force to be evaded, cheated, defeated and appropriated as circumstances permit. Accordingly, most people have turned away from the state to seek safety and fulfillment in their community, ethnic group, and nation. The demands that they make on these social formations have turned them into informal polities, in competition with the state.

But, as Rothchild and Groth explains, hostilities are not only directed against the state, but "may be directed by majorities against minorities, by minorities against majorities, and by various ethnic fragments against one another. Anxiety and stress are likely to be channeled toward scapegoat objects. They are also likely to be grossly exaggerated in relation to the objective world of observable and empirically verifiable phenomena. The ethnic 'alien' becomes an outlet for anguish, despair, confusion, and fear. The alien is likely to acquire oddly demonic characteristics."

During the Cold War, internal conflicts were both aggravated and contained by the involvement of the superpowers on both sides. The end of the Cold War removed the "third party" from internal African conflicts for the most part. Because the state is usually the main beneficiary of the international system, the loss of strategic alliances has led to its weakening, which, at least in part, accounts for the massive breakdown of law and order, and even the total or partial collapse of states.

External involvement in Africa has not entirely disappeared, however, and, after an initial post–Cold War withdrawal, the superpowers have reengaged with vigor on the continent in the quest for such vital resources as oil and allies in the global war against terrorism. In Ndulo's words, "Today, external interests continue to play a significant and sometimes a decisive role, both in suppressing and in sustaining conflict in the competition for oil, diamonds, base minerals, timber, and other natural resources in Africa." This involvement in Africa often plays into internal identity differences and creates alliances that weaken the conflicting internal factions through the classic notion of divide and conquer. The Africans see these internal conflicts more immediately as a war of identities.

Identity conflicts at their worst tend to be zero-sum, and in some cases genocidal, contests for the identity of the nation. What is at stake is the quality and level of participation of different groups in the political, civil, economic, social, and cultural life of the country. As one observer notes, "If ethnic groups or classes or political parties can capture the machinery of state, they can use the identity of the state to justify their domination and exploitation of the population." The larger the gap between the attributes considered representative of the national identity and the characteristics of a subordinated group, the more the marginalized group feels threatened and the higher the level of resentment and animosity toward the dominant group. Depending on the degree of parity or disparity, the resulting discrimination may trigger a separatist movement or contest for the redefining and restructuring of the national framework so that it is more accommodating of the groups that are excluded or grossly discriminated against. Since this would imply a major change in the status quo, the dominant group often resists it.

In a stratified society where there are major gaps between the preferred national identity and that of excluded or marginalized groups, the pyramidal segmentation, as opposed to a cross-cutting social organization, creates a higher level of ethnocentrism and destructive intergroup confrontation, which in turn fosters solidarity within the groups in conflict. It also generates a tendency toward self-promotion by identifying with the dominant group in the configuration of the conflict. In many instances, this means that conflicts within the component groups tend to be overridden by conflicts with other groups. The configuration of

the groups, the nature of the demands, and the intensity of the conflict are all concomitantly determined and affected by stratification and the dynamics of identification. In this state of affairs, involving stratification and the fluidity of identities in the process of self-enhancement, armed struggle becomes the inevitable means of attempting to resolve the conflict with paradoxical consequences, as Mahmoud Mamdani insightfully argues:

> The struggle for rights acquires the most significance where the issue of state power appears to be clearly settled, most notably as the result of a protracted armed struggle, itself evidence of both the limited development and organizational weakness of the so-called "civil society" or non-state sectors. However, such an outcome is likely to exacerbate this contradiction, because to have been successful, the armed struggle has almost certainly been supported by many civilian activists, and yet upon victory the new regime proceeds to reorganize the state, and only from that standpoint to develop an agenda for social change. If this is combined with a hegemonic perspective that sees in the growing insistence on greater democracy nothing but a demand for "bourgeois" rights, nothing but fresh evidence of "counter-revolution" rearing its ugly head under new conditions, the danger is that civil society is likely to be left even weaker than before!

This analysis logically leads to two policy options, most pertinent to some countries, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Rwanda, but with possibilities for broader application. The first option is for a dominant group and its identity to be recognized and given legitimacy as a basis for nationhood regardless of whether or not it represents a majority of citizens of that nation. In this case, nations, their constitutions, and governing frameworks should be fashioned along those identity lines, allowing for decentralization, power sharing at the national and local level, (for instance, self-administration or autonomy for a distinct group or groups), or possibly partitioning of the state. The second policy option suggests that the presumed group in control, and its identity, is questioned and invalidated on objective grounds thereby giving room for a more accurate and all-embracing concept of a unifying national identity. Sudan appears set on a course in this direction. Rwanda has already moved in favor of reaffirming and reasserting a unifying Rwandan national identity and subsuming separate Tutsi and Hutu identities within the state structure. Whether this will succeed or prove to be an imposed reconstruction of identity that ignores realities, only time will tell. It does, however, signify the need for exploring unifying national identity frameworks based on the equality of citizenship and a mutually accommodating common ground.

The Challenges of Unity within Diversity

The concept of unity within diversity is predicated on the assumption that a successful nation is one that can pool together its diverse social intermixtures in a manner that builds on their richness and does not alienate any group. As the United Nations Development Programme notes in a 2004 report:

> Cultural liberty is a vital part of human development because being able to choose one's identity—who one is—without losing the respect of others or being excluded from other choices is important in leading a full life. … People want the freedom to practice their religion openly, to speak their language, to celebrate their ethnic or religious heritage without fear of ridicule or

> punishment or diminished opportunity. … States face an urgent challenge in responding to these demands. If handled well, greater recognition of identities will bring greater cultural diversity in society, enriching people's lives. But there is also a great risk. … These struggles over cultural identity, if left unmanaged or managed poorly, can quickly become one of the greatest sources of instability within states and between them—and in so doing trigger conflict that takes development backwards. Identity politics that polarize people and groups are creating fault lines between "us" and "them." Growing distrust and hatred threaten peace, development and human freedoms.

Constitutional processes, substantive provisions, and public institutions (both traditional and modern) that are deliberately modeled to encourage "cultural liberty" are more likely to assist in creating a national commonality essential to nation building. On the negative side, as noted earlier, when groups are excluded or grossly discriminated, identity conflicts result. What makes such conflicts particularly resistant to resolution is because identity is rooted in complex and multidimensional psychological, historical, and cultural factors that are intangible and therefore very difficult to define.

Mediators and facilitators handling such conflicts tend to focus on interests that are more amenable to negotiation, such as representation, wealth sharing, and power sharing, than on questions of identity. Although these interests feature very strongly in identity-based conflicts, they overshadow the deeper elements at stake, and any peace agreement that focuses exclusively on those interests is unlikely to survive in the long term. Identity issues are often left unaddressed in peace agreements because, while deeply felt, they are highly intractable. But it is ultimately what is not said that divides.

For constitutionalism to succeed, stakeholders must address these deeper identity conflicts. To ignore them is to deny certain groups the full exercise of their right to self-determination and condemn any country to a future with little peace, security, and stability. As noted earlier, one way of reconciling the discrepancies between subjectivity and objectivity of identification and between exclusivity and inclusivity in the national identity framework is by recognizing groups that are self-defining, while at the same time fostering an inclusive sense of nationhood that builds on shared objective factors. This would allow for a gradual process of equitable integration as opposed to asymmetrical assimilation.

Neorealism and Neoliberalism

6.

By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

There is considerable overlap between the central theories of political science and the central theories of peace studies, even if the two fields approach these theories in slightly different ways. Realism and liberalism are two of the most frequently discussed theories in both political science and peace studies, and so a firm understanding of each theory, and how each theory relates to and contests the other, is essential to developing a sound grasp to the theoretical architecture of each field. In this essay, well-known political theorist Joseph Nye presents not just the basic tenets of realism and liberalism, but also explains how each theory developed new variants due to political pressures associated with Cold War politics. Neorealism and neoliberalism are simultaneously refinements of and departures from the original theories on which they are based, and Nye does a masterful job of explaining both the development of neorealism and neoliberalism and the differences that evolved between them.

International relations theory is constrained by the fact that history provides a poor substitute for a laboratory. In world politics, a relatively small number of states play major roles, along with many other entities that seek to influence events. Even if one focuses on state behavior, one is confronted by few independent events and by multiple causes of behavior at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, strategic interaction is inherently indeterminate, and states often have incentives to deceive observers. To use an analogy from another social science, multiple causality makes some aspects of international relations more like macroeconomics than like microeconomics, and strategic indeterminacy means that the relevant analogy in microeconomics would be the troubled area of oligopoly theory.

Moreover, most theorists of international relations suffer from being in the middle of events, rather than viewing them from a distance. Thus it is not surprising that international relations theory has always been strongly affected by current political concerns. This is true even for the Realists with their parsimonious efforts to state eternal truths. Thucydides, the founding father of Realism, presented a structural account of the origins of the Peloponnesian War in part because of the lessons he wished to teach his fellow citizens.[1] When Hans J. Morgenthau wrote his post-war classic, *Politics Among Nations*, he was clearly intent on instructing *his* fellow citizens about the importance of avoiding the idealist and isolationist fantasies of the interwar period. Even the neorealist structural theories of Kenneth Waltz can best be read as exhortations to policymakers and fellow citizens about how they *ought* to respond to the structure of power rather than as accurate accounts of how the two superpowers behave.

The Changing Context of Theory

In the early 1970s, many theorists, reflecting current concerns, overreacted to the traditional theories of Realism. There was widespread repugnance to the Vietnam War, and detente seemed to reduce the importance of the nuclear competition. At the same time, international trade grew more rapidly than world product. Transnational corporations not only developed patterns of international production, but in some instances played dramatic political roles as well. All this occurred against a backdrop of declining U.S. economic predominance—from one-third to less than one-quarter of world product. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of the development of a five-power world, and futurologists such as Herman Kahn predicted the imminent arrival of a multipolar international system.[2]

On top of all this came the oil crisis of 1973. Some very weak states extracted enormous resources from the strong. Even Hans Morgenthau described what he called an unprecedented divorce of military and economic power based on the control of raw materials.[3] The vulnerability of the Western societies at a period of high commodity prices encouraged many of the less developed countries to believe that a greater transformation of power had occurred than was actually the case. A number of theorists reflected these concerns. Among the modernist writers of the 1970s, a representative view was that

> the forces now ascendant appear to be leaning toward a global society without a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict—a *polyarchy* in which nation-states, subnational groups, and transnational special interests and communities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context of power relationships.[4]

By the late 1970s the mood began to change both in the United States and in the United Nations. East-West concerns started to supplant North-South issues at the top of foreign policy agendas. The experience of the Carter administration reflects the changes in American opinion: while campaigning in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to reduce the defense budget, but by 1980 his position was closer to that of his rival, Reagan, than to his own previous position. The election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency accentuated these trends. American policy focused on East-West confrontation and scaled down North-South issues and the role of multilateral institutions. The defense budget increased in real terms for five straight years, and the United States became more willing to use military force, albeit against extremely weak states such as Grenada and Libya. Arms control was downgraded and the modernization of nuclear forces was seen as restoring an "edge" for additional utility of military force. This shifting agenda of world politics saw a resurgence of Realist analysis, for history seemed to have vindicated the Realist model.

While some analysts in the 1970s tended to overstate the obsolescence of the nation-state, the decline of force, and the irrelevance of security concerns, some in the early 1980s unduly neglected the role of transnational actors and economic interdependence. Contrary to the tone of much political rhetoric and some political analyses, the world of the 1980s is not a return to the world of the 1950s. Just as the decline of American power was exaggerated in the 1970s, so was the restoration of American power in the 1980s. Looking carefully at military and economic indices of power resources, one notes that there has been a far greater change in psychology and mood than in these indicators of power resources. The diffusion of power, as measured by shares in world trade or world product, continues. Economic interdependence, as measured by vulnerability to supply shocks, has eased in a period of slack commodity markets, but this could change if markets tighten again and growth of economic transactions continues. Sensitivity to exchange-rate fluctuations has remained high. The costs of the great powers' use of force seem higher than in the 1950s—measured, for instance, by the ease with which the U.S. overthrew governments in Central America and Iran then as contrasted with the 1980s. Moreover, despite rhetoric, relations between the superpowers do not show a return to the Cold War period. Not only are alliances looser, but transactions are higher, and relations between the superpowers reflect a fair degree of "learning" in the nuclear area.[5]

Realism and Liberalism

In a sense, the contrast between the 1970s and the 1980s is merely the latest instance of a recurring dialectic between the two main strands in what has been called the classical tradition of international relations theory. Realism has been the dominant strand;[6] the second is the Liberal or Grotian tradition that tends to stress the impact of domestic and international society, interdependence, and international institutions. In their simplest forms, Liberal theories have been easily discredited. The proposition that the gains from commercial transactions would overcome the problems inherent in the security dilemma and make war too expensive were belied in 1914. Hopes that a system of international law and organization could provide collective security, which would replace the need for self-help inherent in the security dilemma, were disappointed by 1939. Nonetheless, the sharp disagreement between Realism and Liberal theories is overstated. In fact, the two approaches can be complementary. Sophisticated versions of Liberal theory address the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define

their interests. Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests, as well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests within states.

How states define their interests, and how their interests change, has always been a weak area in Realist theory. One of the most thought-provoking questions in international relations is how states learn. How do national interests become defined, and how do those definitions change? Can cooperation be learned? Realist theories maintain that states learn by responding to structural changes in their environment; to put it in game-theory terms, they adjust their behavior to changes in the payoff matrix. When mutual interests or a long shadow of the future suggest that rewards for cooperation are great, states may adopt new strategies in pursuit of their interests. In that case, Realists admit that cooperation can be learned. Although this is sometimes a satisfactory and parsimonious explanation of changing state behavior, it is often incomplete because it says little about how interests themselves are formulated or redefined. It does not show why the same situation may be perceived in totally different ways by successive governments or different leaders. A Bismarck, a Kaiser, and a Hitler can formulate different answers to similar geopolitical situations. Nor does Realist theory note how groups within societies can use partners in transnational coalitions or transnational norms and institutions to advance or retard the learning of new interests by their own governments.

Realist theory is better at explaining interactions than interests. A theory of interests defined solely in terms of power is an impoverished theory of interests. Here Liberalism can help. The more sophisticated variants of Liberal theory provide a useful supplement to Realism by directing attention to the ways in which domestic and international factors interact to change states' definitions of their interests. To say that states act in their self-interest is merely tautological (or "change" is reduced to merely a change in means) unless we have a reasonable account of how such interests are perceived and redefined. Both Realism and Liberalism can contribute to such an account.

The major developments in the Liberal tradition of international relations theory in the post-1945 period occurred in studies of regional integration. These studies did not explicitly refer to classical Liberalism; they were generally called "neofunctionalist." Nevertheless, their focus was clearly on issues emphasized in the Liberal tradition. Karl Deutsch concentrated on the development of pluralistic security communities—groups of states that developed reliable expectations of peaceful relations and thereby overcame the security dilemma that Realists see as characterizing international politics. Ernst Haas focused on the uniting of Europe and the transformation of the Franco-German hostility into a postwar economic and political community. Subsequent scholars extended these perspectives on economic, social, and political interdependence and integration to other regions.[7] What these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such interaction. In short, they emphasized the political processes of learning and of redefining national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes.

In a sense, the development of regional integration theory outstripped the development of regional communities. Predicted changes materialized more slowly than had been expected, which may account for the declining academic interest in the subject during the 1970s. The transformation of Western Europe into a pluralistic security community is real, however, and many of the insights from integration theory were transferred in the early 1970s to the growing and broader dimensions of international economic interdependence. Studies in transnational relations and interdependence broadened conceptions of how national interests are learned and changed. Some studies explicitly addressed the conditions under which assumptions of Realism were sufficient, or needed to be supplemented by a more complex model of change.[8] Rather than focusing primarily on formal and universalistic organizations such as the United Nations, they devoted much

attention to the role of international institutions. The concept of regime was borrowed from international law and broadened to incorporate the whole range of norms, rules, and procedures that constrain states' behavior and around which the actors' expectations converge within a given issue.[9] A rich set of studies applied the concept of regimes to a broad range of behavior in international political economy. But in the climate of the early 1980s, it seemed that the Liberal legacy was relevant only to the peripheral literature on political economy and had little to contribute to the central theory of the field. Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, was a well-timed and elegant restatement of Realism that explicitly cast doubt on the relevance of the writings on interdependence.[10]

The two books reviewed here provide a good opportunity to look at the latest turns in the classic dialectic between Realism and Liberalism. Richard Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* is clearly in the Liberal tradition. Rosecrance argues that an open trading system offers states ways to transform their positions through economic growth rather than through military conquest. All states can benefit from the enhanced growth. "The basic thrust of trade today is entirely different from what it was in the 1830s, the 1880s, and the 1930s" (p. 227). What is different in the world since 1945 "is that a peaceful trading is enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before. … " The main thesis of this book is that a new "trading world of international relations offers the possibility of escaping … a vicious cycle and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states" (p. ix).

Robert O. Keohane, in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, features four core chapters of Waltz's influential book and four criticisms of that work. In addition, he includes Waltz's first published reply to his critics. It is rare to have such clear intellectual dialogue in a single volume, and the whole issue is nicely framed by the editor's introductory essay.

Neorealist Theory

As Keohane points out, the significance of Waltz's work is not in elaborating a new line of theory, but in the systematization of Realism, which Robert W. Cox (one of the critics) has termed "neorealism." While Hans J. Morgenthau may be the most influential of the postwar Realists, his aspirations to create a science of international politics were marred by inconsistency in his use of the concepts of power and balance. Moreover, by basing international politics on human nature's drive for power, Morgenthau explained too little by explaining too much. Human nature does not adequately account for variation.

Waltz provides a more elegant theoretical basis for Realism. He avoids references to humans pursuing power as an end; pursuit of power as a means is sufficient for his theory. Balance-of-power behavior by states is predicted from the structure of the international system. A system is a set of interacting units having behavioral regularities and identity over time. Its structure defines the ordering of its parts. Structure involves an ordering principle, specification of the functions of different parts, and the distribution of capabilities. In international politics, the ordering principle is anarchy, interpreted as the absence of a higher government above states. The specification of differentiation drops out because states perform similar functions. Thus, the distribution of capabilities (multipolarity, bipolarity) predicts variations in states' balance-of-power behavior. Waltz provides not merely a systemic theory to predict the behavior of the units (states), but a parsimonious *structural* systemic theory.

In a sense, Waltz did for the classical Realists what they never did for themselves. His structural theory provides a simple deductive basis for what was hitherto a heterogeneous set of views about the importance

of power politics. In the eyes of the critics, however, Waltz's virtues and faults are two sides of the same coin. Parsimony has been purchased at too high a price. Robert Cox and Richard K. Ashley complain that Waltz's neorealism has sacrificed the interpretive richness of classical Realism as a critical theory in order to transform it into a positivistic problem-solving theory. Although that may be true, neither essay provides a compelling alternative, and Waltz in his reply is quite happy to let their remarks roll off his back.

Keohane and John G. Ruggie launch more telling criticisms. Keohane points out that Waltz's spare structural definition of system ignores international economic processes and institutions that can also have strong effects on states' behavior. Ruggie argues that Waltz has not only ignored changes in the density of interactions in systems, but has been too quick in assuming that the differentiation in units can be dropped as a characteristic of the structure of the international system. In the short term, states may be the dominant units and play a similar functional role, but over long periods other units may grow in importance, and roles may alter. Ruggie points to the evolution of the concept of territoriality at the end of the feudal era to illustrate such generative changes, and argues that Waltz's theory is too static to explain such changes.

Waltz replies that "a structural theory of international politics can fix ranges of outcomes and identify general tendencies. … We cannot hope to predict specific outcomes" (p. 344). He would not deny the importance of change at the unit level. "Realist theory by itself can handle some, but not all, of the problems that concern us. … Yet some successful predictions can be made without paying attention to states" (p. 331). Structural analyses "tell us a small number of big and important things" (p. 329). If we add more variables, theoretical acuity gives way to rich and dense description. Many unit-level factors, such as density of interactions, demographic trends, resource constraints, national ideologies, and political systems, can affect systemic outcomes. Indeed, in the case of nuclear weapons, "a unit-level change has much diminished a structural effect" (p. 327). But it is a mistake to mingle structural and unit levels. Just as "economists get along quite well with separate theories of markets and firms" (p. 340), we shall have to get along with separate theories of international politics and of states.

Waltz has a valid point about the selectivity of theory and the costs of mixing unit and structural characteristics. But his reply to his critics is not entirely satisfactory. First, as Keohane points out in his Introduction, many economists are unhappy about the disjunction between the assumptions of microeconomics and what is known about the behavior of firms. Moreover, oligopoly theory tends to be indeterminate, and efforts to establish a rational-expectations micro-basis for macroeconomics have been problematic. In the words of one economist, the danger for a clinical profession is that "the models become more real than more explicitly descriptive reality."[11]

Second, Waltz accuses Ruggie of reductionism—the explanation of the whole by explaining the behavior of the parts. That is neither good nor bad *per se*. In a parsimonious systemic explanation, the behavior of the parts is handled by assumptions of rationality and the constraining conditions produced by the structure of the system. "Socialization and competition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behavior and outcomes is reduced." Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly; unit theories explain why different units behave differently despite similar placement in a system. But Waltz's own assignment of characteristics to the systemic and unit levels seems odd. It is easy to understand why characteristics of a particular leader or political culture or domestic regime fit at the unit level. In his words, "a theory about foreign policy is a theory at the national level."[12] But why are demographic trends, transnational flows, and military technology that affect all (or many) states assigned to the unit level? It is particularly odd to see nuclear technology described as a unit characteristic that has had "system-wide" pacific effects (p. 327). Waltz has no way of knowing whether the vaunted stability of the bipolar system is caused by a structural

or a unit-level characteristic. Moreover, by assigning everything except the distribution of capabilities to the unit level, that category becomes a dumping ground hindering theory building at anything but the structural level. The result may be theoretical parsimony, but parsimony is not the only way by which one judges good theory. Good theory also requires a good explanatory fit.

A third problem with Waltz's reply to his critics relates to his handling of false predictions. Waltz correctly states that a few false predictions do not falsify a theory. He admits that he will often need to supplement his sparse neorealist theory with foreign policy explanations in order to account for anomalous cases. But sometimes his handling of anomalies runs the risk of being retrogressive in Lakatos's terms—i.e., it explains less and directs researchers away from new information.[13] In response to Keohane's evidence that Canada, a weak state, has often prevailed over the United States, Waltz introduces a power-activation hypothesis: "I suspect that American officials hardly cared about the outcomes or even noticed what they might be" (p. 333). But aside from the danger of tautology, such a reply ignores the evidence that the cases Keohane cites were at the presidential level, and that some, such as oil trade in 1974, were highly visible and politicized.

Some anomalies are forgiven for any theory that has a broad explanatory power and that points to the discovery of new empirical information. But Waltz's theory does not score well on those criteria: it describes a system as stable if it remains anarchic and there is no consequential change in the number of political units. By this definition, the multipolar system was stable for 300 years until World War II reduced it to the current bipolar system, which has been stable because no third state has been able to develop capabilities comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union.[14] But this portrayal of history by the theory leaves an enormous number of important changes unaccounted for, and lends credence to the charge that it is too static. There are so few strands in the web of Waltz's theoretical net that even very big fish slip through it. The change from a flexible alliance system to two rigid alliances before 1914 is not a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity for Waltz. Only the strength of single units counts in measuring bipolarity under his definitions. Thus, his theory tells us little about the onset of World War I. Instead, it disclaims any intent to predict particular wars. Neither is it clear that Waltz's theory tells us about what causes stability in the current world. There has been only one bipolar system as defined in Waltz's theory. Thus he has to test his conclusions about stability against evidence drawn from a sample of one. Waltz cannot determine which behavior is caused by structure and which by nuclear weapons (assigned by him to the unit level).

Moreover, Waltz's theory leads him to conclusions that seem to bury rather than uncover new information about the behavior of states. For example, he argues that "in a bipolar world, military interdependence declines even more sharply than economic interdependence. Russia and America depend militarily mainly on themselves."[15] But it is an odd definition of military interdependence that blurs the change from the 1930s to a world in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can each destroy the other in thirty minutes. Even if Waltz means his statement to refer only to the formation of alliances, he has a hard time explaining the enormous efforts which both sides devote to their "unnecessary" alliance structures. Waltz may be right that "a five percent growth rate sustained for three years increases the American gross national product by an amount exceeding one-half of West Germany's GNP, and all of Great Britain's," but that alleged evidence for low military interdependence leaves the anomaly of actual U.S. behavior unexplained. In extolling the virtues of economic growth as a path to power, Waltz sounds a bit like Rosecrance; but, unlike the latter, he uses a restricted definition of interdependence to argue that economic interdependence is declining in the modern world.[16] Once again, Waltz's theoretical lens focuses so tightly on bipolarity that it tends to generate anomalies and to direct attention away from the discovery of new information.

It is not true that Waltz's theory is completely static, for changes in the structure predict changes in unit behavior. But change at the structural level seems to have occurred only once in three hundred years for Waltz. That leaves an awful lot of the stuff of international politics to be explained at the unit level. Waltz would admit as much, but he is then left with a theory that is so spare that nothing seems to move. The charge that Waltz has explained less about more of what concerned traditional Realists seems justified. It is ironic that Robert Gilpin appears in the Keohane volume in a cameo role as the author of a brief reply to Ashley's scattergun criticism of neorealism. Gilpin's own work represents an updating of Thucydides' classical Realist theory of hegemonic transition, which has disappeared in Waltz's nearly static neorealist world. Like Thucydides, Gilpin focuses on the ways in which uneven growth leads to cycles of rising and declining hegemonic states and the onset of great systemic wars.[17] Whatever its own problems, Gilpin's version of Realism is dynamic and focused on explaining the major changes in world politics that slip through the coarse net of Waltz's neorealist theory. Gilpin achieves this, however, by eschewing a purely structural theory and reaching deep into the unit level of analysis.

The Revival of Liberal Theories

Partly in reaction to the inadequacies of neorealism, a number of theorists have begun to resurrect Liberal theory. While admitting the diversity of Liberal theories, they argue that the core of Liberalism is a concern for liberty. That philosophical perspective is often correlated with such features as an interest in limited government, institutional restraints, and open contacts (including trade) across borders.[18] Michael Doyle has pointed out different historical strands of Liberal thought in Schumpeter's economic theories of pacifism, Machiavelli's republican theories of imperialism, and Kant's liberal international confederation based on republican governments and transnational contacts.[19] Robert Keohane has identified three major causal strands of classical Liberal theory: (1) commercial Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government (at the unit level of analysis); and (3) regulatory Liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries.[20] One might add a fourth: sociological Liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests. Many of these Liberal causal theories were central to the neofunctionalist theories of regional integration developed in the 1950s and 1960s.

By and large, Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* fits mainly in the category of commercial Liberalism. His argument rests more upon the beneficial effects of trade than on the other three potential components of a neoliberal theory. Rosecrance's view (p. 218) that "if nuclear war can be ruled out, economic processes will progressively act to reshape the international world" bears a strong family resemblance to Richard Cobden's (1846) belief that "if we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust Trade will do that, a great impulse will from this time be given to social reforms."[21]

Rosecrance does not share all of the illusions of the classical free trade Liberals. He is fully aware that high levels of trade and other transactions did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, and that trade was often associated with conflict in earlier eras. But he argues that the world was different then: "the nineteenth and early twentieth century represent the apex of the military political system" (p. 88). In Rosecrance's view, "it was not until after 1945 that large-scale territorial expansion began to evolve as too costly—too dangerous and too uncertain as a general strategy of national advancement." As that lesson dawned, "one would have reached 'the Japanese period' in world politics … " (p. 20).

Even if Rosecrance proves to be correct in his projections, it is unclear to what extent the causation is due to factors stressed by Liberal or by Realist theories. Perhaps what happened after 1945 is that nuclear technology transformed a balance-of-power system into a balance of terror that encourages prudence about any territorial expansion that could raise nuclear risks. In this situation, Japan has found a more successful path to become the second-most-powerful economy in the world than it did in the 1930s. But it has done so while sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella and spending only one percent of its GNP on defense. Rosecrance admits that hegemonic stability theory may have some relevance, but he argues that it does not explain "why there has not *already* been a marked decline in international economic cooperation … well after the onset of decline in American economic and military power" (p. 57). The answer may lie in the success of economic regimes (which Rosecrance discusses only briefly); or in the exaggeration of the decline of American power; or in Waltz's theory of the stability of bipolarity; or in the paralysis of the territorial conquest system caused by nuclear risk.[22] Causation remains unclear in Rosecrance's account.

Because Rosecrance is cautious, there are really two versions of his argument—a strong form and a weak form. The strong form is close to classic commercial liberalism. "Since 1945, the world has been poised between … [a] territorial system … composed of states that view power in terms of land mass … and [a] trading system … based on states which recognize that self-sufficiency is an illusion," Rosecrance writes (p. 16). "A major crossroads is now approaching. … In the past the military-political world was efficient. It was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it" (p. 160). "The current equipoise … can scarcely be maintained," Rosecrance argues (p. 165). "The worst aspects of the Westphalian system with its emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty, and a spurious independence, are likely to be mitigated in the years ahead" (p. 211). "The increasing deconsolidation of traditional states and the decline of national loyalty as they seek to serve such purposes gradually undermines the military-political system" (p. 214).

But this strong liberal theory is eroded by the more cautious form of the argument. Dualism is proffered as "the minimum possible approach to an international theory" (p. 60).[23] Which strategy will be dominant cannot be predicted at present. One can commend Rosecrance for his cautious judgments when faced with a confusing reality, but such caution does not enhance theoretical development. One wishes Rosecrance had gone further in specifying the relationship between the Liberal and Realist components of the dualistic theory he suggests in the weak form of his argument. Perhaps if he had gone beyond commercial liberalism and explored more deeply the effects of transnational contacts on domestic political coalitions, or looked more carefully at the effects of regimes on learning (even in the security area where he discounts regimes), he might have begun to suggest such connections. Since he did not, we are left with a suggestive work, but one that hardly provides the neoliberal theory needed to accompany Waltz's neorealism.

Directions for Future Research

What do these works suggest for future research programs in international relations? Taken on its own terms, Waltz's theory is too static to provide a rich agenda of research questions. But it may be more fruitful when coupled with the rational-actor approach that has received increasing attention in recent years.[24] Neither game theory nor expected utility are really theories of international politics because they need to import theoretical assumptions about context.[25] Here Waltz's structural theory can be helpful, but only if handled with care.

Rational-choice theories can be parsimonious and powerful, but as research strategies, they run risks that are reinforced by the sparse structure of neorealism. How preferences are formulated and how learning occurs may be more important than the actual choice, yet both rational choice and neorealism are weak in this dimension and tend to turn attention in other directions. Moreover, while there is no *a priori* reason why game theory cannot be applied to transnational actors as well as to unitary state actors, such analyses are rare. The benefit of marrying rational choice with neorealist approaches is a double parsimony. The danger is that each already has a negative heuristic that directs attention away from preference formation and transnational interactions. Theorists who would make the marriage must be alert to such costs and open to the insights to be gained from other variants of Realist as well as Liberal theory.

Rosecrance's work suggests a number of interesting avenues for those who wish to develop neoliberal theory. Many of the questions he raises in the area of commercial Liberalism suggest both historical and contemporary research about the interconnection between power and nonpower incentives with which states are confronted. But the indeterminacy of his work also suggests the limits of commercial liberalism alone. Much more attention needs to be paid to the effects of norms and institutions, both in the economic and in the security area. More can be done with the ways in which transnational contacts and coalitions affect attitudes, learning, and formulation of preferences. A careful rereading of neofunctionalist integration theory can suggest numerous hypotheses. Finally, neoliberal theory should not neglect the unit level of analysis. Michael Doyle's work on the possible causal relationship between democratic governments and foreign policy choices is highly suggestive.[26]

Above all, it is important to pay more attention to the ways in which Liberalism and Realism relate to each other. One way is to be less restrictive in the basic assumption of anarchy. Alker attacks the metaphor of "anarchy" and argues for Hedley Bull's concept of an "anarchic society," which admits the absence of any formal government above states, but does not define anarchy as the absence of communication, cooperation, and governance.[27] In *Power and Interdependence*, Robert Keohane and I suggested that systemic theory could be enriched without (or before) retreating to the particularisms of the unit level of analysis by adding the concept of systemic process.

Systems have two dimensions: structure and process. We used the term "structure" in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the distribution of capabilities among units. "Process" refers to the ways in which the units relate to each other. In the metaphor of a poker game, the structure refers to the players' cards and chips, while the process refers both to the formal rules and the informal customs or conventions that affect interactions among the players. Variations in the ability of the players to calculate odds, infer the strength of opponents' hands, or bluff are at the unit, or actor, level.[28]

Factors such as the intensity of international interdependence and the degree of institutionalization of international rules do not vary from one state to another on the basis of their internal characteristics. Therefore, they should not be termed unit-level factors according to Waltz's own definition. Making the unit level a grab bag for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory. Not only does it complicate the task of analysis by confusing unit-level factors referring to domestic political and economic arrangements with factors at the level of the international system; it also leads neorealist analysts to forgo the opportunity to theorize at a systemic level about nonstructural determinants of state behavior.

At the systemic level, in addition to the distribution of power, states experience constraints and opportunities because of changes in levels of world economic activity, technological innovation, shifts in patterns of transnational interactions, and alterations in international norms and institutions. These systemic processes affecting state choices can be categorized as non-power incentives and the ability to communicate and cooperate. Nonstructural incentives alter calculations of national interest without necessarily affecting the

distribution of power among actors. For instance, the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, which Waltz assigned to the unit level, is better portrayed as a feature of systemic process that produces incentives not to engage in warfare regardless of whether the structure is bipolar or multipolar. Similarly, reduced costs of communications and transportation may increase the benefits of transnational business and encourage state policies of greater economic openness, without any changes in the structure of power.

The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redefinition of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political outcomes.

These two aspects of systemic process—non-power incentives and variations in the capacity to communicate and cooperate—have traditionally been emphasized by Liberal theory. Liberal theorists often stress the ways in which trade and economic incentives may alter states' behavior. Similarly, Liberal theorists often stress the effects of increased transnational (and transgovernmental) contacts on attitudes and abilities to communicate. Institutions and norms have always played a role in Liberal theory.

This is not to say that Liberal theory has addressed all processes at the systemic level. For example, most Realists have been concerned about technological changes even when they do not alter the distribution of power. And there is much in Liberal theory about the effect of domestic politics that does not belong at the systemic level. However, the addition of the process level to the concept of structure in defining international systems provides an opportunity to develop a "neoliberal" systemic theory that moves toward a synthesis rather than a radical disjunction between Realism and Liberalism. Neorealism would be most appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; neoliberalism would more often be fruitful at the process level.

The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has something to contribute to a research program that increases our understanding of international behavior. Perhaps work in the 1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic of the 1970s and the 1980s.

Notes

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12. Waltz (fn. 10), 77, 72.
13. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
14. Waltz (fn. 10), 162.
15. *Ibid*., 168.
16. Waltz ignored the criticism of narrow definitions of interdependence in terms of vulnerability alone that was published in *Power and Interdependence* (fn. 8). Had he considered a more complex treatment of interdependence, he might have come to different conclusions about its decline.
17. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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19. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1151–69.
20. Robert O. Keohane, "Economic Limits of Modern Politics: International Liberalism Reconsidered," unpub., 1986.
21. Cobden, quoted in Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 104.
22. For alternative explanations, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 207–31.
23. Rosecrance mistakes the argument in *Power and Interdependence* as being similar to his own. Keohane and I did not establish "dualistic categories: power and interdependence … power is the preeminent goal of a state-centric universe, but interdependence is a characteristic that only applies when states as entities have lost control" (p. 62). On the contrary, we argued the need to see asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power. Rosecrance seems to confuse the ideal type of complex interdependence developed in chapter 2 of our work with our larger argument about interdependence.
24. See Bruno Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), and the special issue of *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. (also published under that title by Princeton University Press, 1986).
25. Note the assertion by Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *ibid*., 25–57.
26. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983), 205–35.
27. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. "The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics," unpub., 1986. See also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977).
28. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), 725–53, for a fuller discussion of the concepts that are introduced here.