

RAFT:


FAIL - STOP - RESTART

Attendance

SAFETY, LIVENESS (AVAILABILITY)

Nothing bad happens

Something good happens often





See last class
for details | heartbeats



Considered

1. Leader only accepts 1 rev at a time
2. FAIL-STOP (no restart)

Vote for candidate: if my log entries are a prefix (or exactly same)
as a candidate

MORE GENERAL CASE

1. Leader can accept multiple requests from a client
2. FAIL-STOP-RESTART allowed



Note: According to old "prefix rule"

the old leaders won't vote for each other as their log entries are very different

Index	1	2	3	
entry	inst1 $\uparrow > \frac{N}{2}$ ACK commit (exec.) and reply			

NEW RULE FOR ELECTING LEADER

Vote for a candidate if it is more (or as) up-to-date as myself

RULE FOR BEING MORE UP-TO-DATE

Compare last entries in logs
if Candidate has a higher term, it is more up-to-date

if terms are the same, the node with longer log is more up-to-date


LIVENESS

Broadcast time << (Avg.)
Election
Timeout

$\gamma \ll \text{Avg. Time}$

Between node
failures

Then we have liveness




BROADCAST TIME: Time for
leader to send msg to
all.

BYZANTINE FAILURES

→ any deviation from protocol

$1 \Rightarrow$ attack
 $0 \Rightarrow$ don't attack



How to solve?

- 1) Use digital signatures. Assume forging is not possible
↳ replay attack (send old msgs) still possible

2) Use Quorums

Suppose

$$N = 3f + 1$$

then we assume at most f nodes are Byzantine

and the rest are honest

(Practical Byz. Fault Tolerance

→ Liskov, ...)

1999

We say we have a Quorum if $2f+1$ nodes (or more) agree on something.

Intersection Property: If set of node Q_1 forms a Quorum, and set Q_2 forms another Quorum then $Q_1 \cap Q_2$ must contain an honest node

Proof: Assume there is no honest node in $Q_1 \cap Q_2$
Hence $|Q_1 \cap Q_2| \leq f \Rightarrow -|Q_1 \cap Q_2| \geq -f$

$$|Q_1 \cup Q_2| = |Q_1| + |Q_2| - |Q_1 \cap Q_2| \geq 2f+1 + 2f+1 - f \\ = 3f+2 > N$$

Not possible

Availability Property: Even if all Byz. nodes remain silent

the honest nodes are enough in number to potentially form a Quorum

SAFETY

→ Same as RAFT

→ guaranteed even if network is Aynchronous

LIVENESS: Clients eventually receive replies to their requests


If a msg is sent out for the first time at time t_i , then it is received by others by $t_{to}(t)$ delay

Impossibility Result : FLP, CAP, -

(1985) FISHER, LYNCH, PATTERSON : It is impossible to have a deterministic protocol that solves consensus in a message passing asynchronous system in which

- at most one process may fail by crashing
- STRONG CONSENSUS
- a) (AGREEMENT) All honest gens. must reach same decision
→ (if they reach a decision)
 - (b) (Termination) All honest gens. must eventually make a decision
 - (c) (Validity) If Genl (leader) is honest, then all honest gens. must agree to his command

High Level idea of PBFT



Lok Lender → Primary
(Raft) (PBFT)

index (i)

entry(message, m)

`term(VIEW, v)`

gossip about
Quorum
heard in
PREPARE phase
(E.g. Node 2 says
"Quorum in PREPARE
not $\langle u, m, v \rangle$ ")

