

# PoW

# vs. Naive PoS

Attendance

Energy


Noth. at Stake,

Long-range attacks


Pre-computing attack

$N$  is very large

Another Issue



POW + POS : last class



SLASHER: BUTERIN (2014)

Energy


SLASHER

$\frac{1}{50}$  every year

BITCOIN

$\frac{1}{2}$  mining reward  
every 4 years

↓  
energy consumption  
less here



## RULES FOR SLASHER



$B_{k+3000}$



1. BLOCKS ARE MINED BY POW, BUT MINING REWARD DECREASES BY FACTOR OF 50 EVERY YEAR

2. WHEN  $B_k$  is produced, person with address 'a' checks if  $\text{Hash}(a \parallel \text{hash}(B_k)) < \text{bal}(a) * \text{target}$   
If true, then 'a' is potential signer of  $B_{k+3000}$
- Annotations:
- An arrow points from the condition in step 2 to the inequality  $\text{Hash}(a \parallel \text{hash}(B_k)) < \text{bal}(a) * \text{target}$ . A yellow bracket groups the entire condition.
  - An arrow points from the condition to the text "possibly only has".
  - An arrow points from the condition to the text "set so that true for 15 addresses on avg".
  - An arrow points from the condition to the text "common".

(3) Any potential signer can volunteer to sign  $B_{k+3000}$ , by sending a volunteer txn on chain between  $B_{k+1}$  and  $B_{k+64}$ . It is called a

### DESIGNATED SIGNER

(4) When blocks at ht.  $k+3000$  are generated, votes for 1 blk



$k+3000$

vote here

TxN




designated signer

SLASHING: Cut (slash)

stake of misbehaving

person

→ proof of  
misbehavior



His voting reward:  $x_1$

$(PK_2, SK_2)$  gives  
 proof of  
 misbehaviour

and collects  $\frac{x_1}{3}$   
 and  $\frac{2x_1}{3}$  is BURNED


voters for  $B_{k+3000}$   
 collect reward  
 here

How To Burn? Pay to pub.key we know  
no one has secret key

Ex:  $PK = 0$ , pay to 0 address

5. Anyone can SLASH a misbehaving voter by  
publishing a txn before Blkt 6000.

6. Designated Signer collects voting reward after Blkt 6000



Committee



Q. What to do now?

Q. Why require  $> \frac{2}{3}$  of  
✓ Signers to vote for blk?

Suppose  $< \frac{1}{3}N$  are malicious

Require  $> \frac{2}{3}N$  to vote for  
blk for it to  
be valid

Prove: There cannot be  
2 blks signed by  $> \frac{2}{3}N$  of  
voters.

Suppose Set A signs  $h_1$   
Set B signs  $h_2$   $\Rightarrow$  competing

$$N \geq |A \cup B| = |A| + |B| - |A \cap B|$$

↓ size


$$|A \cap B| \geq |A| + |B| - N$$

must  
be  
malicious

$$> \frac{2}{3}N + \frac{2}{3}N - N = \frac{1}{3}N$$

$\Rightarrow$  # malicious nodes (voters)  $> \frac{N}{3}$   $\rightarrow$  contradiction

SLASHER  
7.




Suppose a blk skips  
'n' levels, then PoW  
reqd. to generate it  
is  $8 \times 2^{n-1}$  a regular  
blk  
And the mining  
reward is  
 $6 \times 2^{n-1}$  the  
reward of a  
regular block.

## Problems addressed


Energy ✓

Nothing at stake?



→ SLASHED  
LONG-RANGE ATTACK

partly handled by PoW  
requires purchase of old keys



# Pre-computing attack

