

# insurance JCR

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## insurance JCR

Let agent  $i$  have distribution of insured losses  $F_i$  and a  $\text{CARA}(\sigma_i)$ .

The contract  $y_i = (R_i, P_i)$  where reimbursement  $R_i$  is a function of  $L$  and  $P_i$  is the premium. There is a no-insurance option  $y_0 = \emptyset = (0, 0)$ .

The certainty equivalent of a contract  $y = (R, P)$  for  $i$  is  $V_i(R) - P$ , with

$$V_i(R) = -\frac{1}{\sigma_i} \log \int \exp(\sigma_i(L - R(L))) dF_i(L)$$

The participation constraint is  $V_i(R_i) - P_i \geq V_i(0)$ , so define

$$U_i = V_i(R_i) - P_i - V_i(0)$$

so that  $P_i = V_i(R_i) - V_i(0) - U_i$ .

We have by (IC):

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &\geq V_i(R_j) - P_j - V_i(0) \\ &= (V_i(R_j) - V_i(0)) - (V_j(R_j) - V_j(0) - U_j), \end{aligned}$$

that is  $U_i - U_j \geq (V_i(R_j) - V_i(0)) - (V_j(R_j) - V_j(0))$ . The RHS should be  $b_i(R_j) - b_j(R_j)$  so we define  $b_i(y) = V_i(R) - V_i(0)$  for  $y = (R, P)$ .

The monopoly insurer's objective function on agent  $i$  is, given a loading factor  $l$ :

$$P_i - (1 + l) \int R_i(L) dF_i(L) = S_i(y) - U_i$$

where the first-best surplus is

$$S_i(y) = V_i(R) - V_i(0) - (1 + l) \int R_i(L) dF_i(L) = b_i(y) - (1 + l) \int R_i(L) dF_i(L),$$

so we take  $\lambda = 1$ .

## the algorithm

We need

$$\Lambda_{ij}(y) = b_i(y_j) - b_j(y_j)$$

and

$$((\Lambda'(y))^* u)_j = \sum_i (b'_i(y_j) - b'_j(y_j)) u_{ij}.$$

$$y_i^{(k+1)} = \text{prox}_{-\tau f_i S_i} \left( y_i^{(k)} - \tau \left( (\Lambda'(y^{(k)}))^* v^{(k)} \right)_i \right)$$

then

$$\tilde{y}^{(k+1)} = 2y^{(k+1)} - y^{(k)}$$

and

$$v^{(k+1)} = \text{proj}_K \left( v^{(k)} + c\tilde{y}^{(k+1)} \right).$$

We need  $c\tau M^2 < 1$ , with  $M$  an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant of  $\Lambda$ , that is the sup of  $|b'_i(y) - b'_j(y)|$  over  $i, j$ , and  $y$ .

### the proximal

$\text{prox}_{-\tau f_i S_i}(z_i)$  is obtained by minimizing

$$-S_i(y_i) + \frac{1}{2\tau f_i} \|y_i - z_i\|^2.$$

Here  $z_i = y_i^{(k)} - \tau \sum_j (b'_j(y_i^{(k)}) - b'_i(y_i^{(k)})) v_{ji}^{(k)}$ .

Now denote the first best  $y_i^*$ . By definition, at least close to  $y_i^*$  the derivative  $\frac{\partial S_i}{\partial y_i}$  has positive (negative) components on every axis to the left (right) of the corresponding component of  $y_i^*$ . Since  $S'_i(y_i) = (y_i - z_i)/(\tau f_i)$ , each component of  $(y_i - z_i)$  must be positive (negative) to the left (right) of  $y_i^*$ .

It follows that (assuming concavity of  $S_i$ ) each component of  $y_i$  is between the corresponding components of  $y_i^*$  and  $z_i$ .

### the projection

To get  $v = \text{proj}_K(w)$ , we define the function

$$v_{ij}(\beta) = \max(0, w_{ij} - \beta_i + \beta_j)$$

for  $\beta \in \mathbb{R}^N$ .

The solution  $v$  is  $v(\beta)$  for the  $\beta$  that minimizes

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} v_{ij}(\beta)^2 + f \cdot \beta.$$

The objective is  $C^1$ , with gradient wrt  $\beta_i$

$$\sum_{k,l} \max(0, w_{kl} - \beta_k + \beta_l) 1(w_{kl} > \beta_k - \beta_l) (1(l = i) - 1(k = i)) + f_i,$$

that is

$$\sum_k (v_{ki}(\beta) 1(w_{ki} > \beta_k - \beta_i) - v_{ik}(\beta) 1(w_{ik} > \beta_i - \beta_k)) + f_i.$$

We can get the minimizing  $\beta$  by Nesterov AGD:

- we start from some  $\beta^{(0)} = \bar{\beta}^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^N$  and  $M \geq$  the largest eigenvalue of  $DD^*$ , with

$$(Du)_{ij} = u_i - u_j; \quad (D^*v)_i = \sum_j (v_{ij} - v_{ji})$$

$$(DD^*v)_{ij} = \sum_k (v_{ik} - v_{ki} - v_{jk} + v_{kj})$$

so that

$$(DD^*)_{ij,kl} = 1(k = i) - 1(l = i) - 1(k = j) + 1(l = j).$$

The largest eigenvalue of  $DD^*$  is  $2N - 2$  if  $n_0 = n_1$ .

- then we iterate

$$\beta^{(k+1)} = \max \left( 0, \beta^{(k)} - \frac{1}{M} (f - D^*v(\bar{\beta}^{(k)})) \right)$$

then

$$\bar{\beta}^{(k+1)} = \beta^{(k+1)} + \frac{t^{(k)} - 1}{t^{(k+1)}} (\beta^{(k+1)} - \beta^{(k)})$$

with  $t^{(k+1)} = \left( 1 + \sqrt{1 + 4(t^{(k)})^2} \right) / 2$  and  $t^{(0)} = 0$ .

the algorithm in `proj_K` works better.

### 0-L (degenerate) example

If  $F_i$  has mass  $(1 - p_i)$  in 0 and mass  $p_i$  in  $L$ , then with a straight deductible contract  $y = D$  (with  $D \leq L$ ) we get for agent  $i$  with  $\text{ARA}(\sigma_i)$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
V_i(D) &= -\frac{1}{\sigma_i} \log(1 - p_i + p_i \exp(\sigma_i D)) \\
b_i(y) &= \frac{1}{\sigma_i} \log \frac{1 - p_i + p_i \exp(\sigma_i L)}{1 - p_i + p_i \exp(\sigma_i D)} \\
S_i(y) &= b_i(y) - p_i(L - D).
\end{aligned}$$

Only one instrument here so not that interesting (is it even covered in the paper?)

### general CARA

Suppose agent  $i$  has type  $(\sigma_i, \delta_i)$  with  $F_i(L) = F(L, \delta_i)$ ; and  $R_i$  has parameters  $y_i$ :  $R_i(L) = R(L, y_i)$ , with  $R(L, \emptyset) \equiv 0$  for the no-insurance contract  $\emptyset$ .

Then

$$b_{\sigma, \delta}(y) = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \log \int \exp(\sigma(L - R(L, y))) dF(L, \delta) + \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \int \exp(\sigma L) dF(L, \delta)$$

and

$$S_{\sigma, \delta}(y) = b_{\sigma, \delta}(y) - \int R(L, y) dF(L, \delta).$$

The proximal projector requires solving

$$y - \tau f_{\sigma, \delta} S'_{\sigma, \delta}(y) = z,$$

that is

$$y - \tau f_{\sigma, \delta} \int \frac{\partial R}{\partial y}(L, y) \left( \frac{\exp(\sigma(L - R(L, y)))}{\int \exp(\sigma(t - R(t, y))) dF(t, \delta)} - (1 + l) \right) dF(L, \delta) = z$$

since

$$b'_{\sigma, \delta}(y) = \int \frac{\partial R}{\partial y}(L, y) \frac{\exp(\sigma(L - R(L, y)))}{\int \exp(\sigma(t - R(t, y))) dF(t, \delta)} dF(L, \delta).$$

We need to study the integral

$$\begin{aligned}
I_{\sigma,\delta}(y) &\equiv \int \exp(\sigma(L - R(L, y))) dF(L, \delta) \\
&= F(0, \delta) \exp(-\sigma R(0, y)) \\
&\quad + \int_{0^+}^{y_0} \exp(\sigma L) dF(L, \delta) \quad ; \\
&\quad + \int_{y_0}^{\infty} \exp(\sigma(y_1 L + y_0(1 - y_1))) dF(L, \delta),
\end{aligned}$$

and  $b_{\sigma,\delta}(y) = (\log I_{\sigma,\delta}(\emptyset) - \log I_{\sigma,\delta}(y)) / \sigma$ , where  $\emptyset$  denotes no insurance.

### fixed deductible + proportional copay

Suppose  $y = (y_0, y_1)$  and we look at contracts with a fixed deductible  $y_0$  and proportional copay  $y_1$  above the deductible:  $R(L, y) = (1 - y_1) \max(L - y_0, 0)$ .

No insurance is  $y_1 = 1$ ; full insurance is  $y_0 = y_1 = 0$ .

Then  $L - R = L$  if  $L < y_0$  and  $L - R = y_1 L + y_0(1 - y_1)$  if  $L > y_0$ . Moreover

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial y_0} = (y_1 - 1) \mathbf{1}(L > y_0)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial y_1} = \min(y_0 - L, 0).$$

### censored normal losses

Let's go crazy:  $L = \max(0, N(\delta, s^2))$  for type  $(\sigma, \delta)$ , so that  $L = 0$  with probability  $\Phi(-\delta/s)$  and at  $L > 0$ , the pdf is  $\phi((L - \delta)/s)/s$ .

Lemma 1:

$$\int_{\alpha}^{\beta} \exp(\gamma u + \nu) \phi(u) du = (\Phi(\beta - \gamma) - \Phi(\alpha - \gamma)) \times \exp(\gamma^2/2 + \nu).$$

Lemma 2:

$$\begin{aligned}
\int_a^b \exp(cL + d) \frac{1}{s} \phi\left(\frac{L - \delta}{s}\right) dL &= \int_{(a-\delta)/s}^{(b-\delta)/s} \exp(csu + c\delta + d) \phi(u) du \\
&= \left( \Phi\left(\frac{b-\delta}{s} - cs\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{a-\delta}{s} - cs\right) \right) \\
&\quad \times \exp(c^2 s^2 / 2 + c\delta + d).
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}
I_{\sigma,\delta}(y) &= F(0, \delta) \times 1 + \int_{0^+}^{y_0} \exp(\sigma L) dF(L, \delta) + \int_{y_0}^{\infty} \exp(\sigma(y_1 L + y_0(1 - y_1))) dF(L, \delta) \\
&\equiv A_{\sigma,\delta} + B_{\sigma,\delta}(y) + C_{\sigma,\delta}(y) \\
&= \Phi(-\delta/s) \\
&\quad + (\Phi((y_0 - \delta)/s - \sigma s) - \Phi(-\delta/s - \sigma s)) \times \exp(\sigma^2 s^2/2 + \sigma \delta) \\
&\quad + \Phi(\sigma y_1 s - (y_0 - \delta)/s) \times \exp(\sigma^2 y_1^2 s^2/2 + \sigma y_1 \delta + \sigma y_0(1 - y_1)).
\end{aligned}$$

The no-insurance case is

$$I_{\sigma,\delta}(0, 1) = A_{\sigma,\delta} + C_{\sigma,\delta}(0, 1) = \Phi(-\delta/s) + (1 - \Phi(-\delta/s - \sigma s)) \exp(\sigma^2 s^2/2 + \sigma \delta).$$

This gives us  $b_{\sigma,\delta}(y) = (\log I_{\sigma,\delta}(0, 1) - \log I_{\sigma,\delta}(y)) / \sigma$  and its derivatives:

$$\frac{\partial b_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_0} = -\frac{1}{\sigma I_{\sigma,\delta}} \frac{\partial (B_{\sigma,\delta} + C_{\sigma,\delta})}{\partial y_0}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial b_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_1} = -\frac{1}{\sigma I_{\sigma,\delta}} \frac{\partial C_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_1}.$$

Define  $d = (\delta - y_0)/s$  and  $d_1 = \sigma s y_1 + d$ . We have

$$B = (\Phi(\delta/s + \sigma s) - \Phi(d + \sigma s)) \exp(\sigma^2 s^2/2 + \sigma \delta)$$

and

$$C = \Phi(d_1) \exp(\sigma^2 y_1^2 s^2/2 + \sigma(y_0 + s d y_1)).$$

We calculate

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial B_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_0} &= \phi(d + \sigma s) \exp(\sigma^2 s^2/2 + \sigma \delta)/s; \\
\frac{\partial C_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_0} &= (\sigma(1 - y_1)\Phi(d_1) - \phi(d_1)/s) \\
&\quad \times \exp(\sigma^2 y_1^2 s^2/2 + \sigma(y_0 + s d y_1));
\end{aligned}$$

and, denoting  $H(x) \equiv \phi(x) + x\Phi(x)$ ,

$$\frac{\partial C_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_1} = \sigma s H(d_1) \times \exp(\sigma^2 y_1^2 s^2/2 + \sigma(y_0 + s d y_1))$$

Finally, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
D_{\sigma,\delta}(y) &\equiv \int R(L, y) dF(L, \delta) \\
&= (1 - y_1) \int_{y_0}^{\infty} (L - y_0) \phi((L - \delta)/s) dL/s \\
&= (1 - y_1) \int_{(y_0 - \delta)/s}^{\infty} (su + \delta - y_0) \phi(u) du \\
&= (1 - y_1) \left[ -s\phi(u) + (\delta - y_0)\Phi(u) \right]_{(y_0 - \delta)/s}^{\infty} \\
&= s(1 - y_1)H(d)
\end{aligned}$$

and  $S_{\sigma,\delta}(y) = b_{\sigma,\delta}(y) - (1 + l)D_{\sigma,\delta}(y)$ .

Note that

$$\frac{\partial D_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_0} = -(1 - y_1)\Phi(d)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial D_{\sigma,\delta}}{\partial y_1} = -sH(d).$$

### the first best

The first best maximizes  $S = b - (1 + l)D$ . We know that it is a straight deductible contract, with  $y_1 = 0$  and an  $y_0 > 0$  if  $l > 0$ .

At  $y_0 = y_1 = 0$ , there is full insurance so  $I = 1$  and the value of  $\partial S / \partial y_0$  is

$$\frac{1}{\sigma s} \left( \phi(\delta/s) - \phi(-\delta/s - \sigma s) \exp(\sigma^2 s^2 / 2 + \sigma \delta) \right) + l\Phi(\delta/s).$$

Since  $\phi(-\delta/s - \sigma s) \exp(\sigma^2 s^2 / 2 + \sigma \delta) = \phi(\delta/s)$  this gives  $l\Phi(\delta/s)$  which is always positive, hence  $y_0 > 0$ .

The first-best  $y_0$  is given by

$$\sigma(1 + l)\Phi(\delta/s)I(y_0, 0) = \frac{\partial(B + C)}{\partial y_0}(y_0, 0).$$

### calibration

We take a loading factor  $l = 0.25$ . Consider the ratio  $r = \delta/s$ . The probability of an accident is  $\Phi(r)$ ; it should be between 0.03 and 0.1 (per year), which means  $-1.9 < r < -1.2$ . Then the expected positive

loss  $E(L|L > 0)$  is  $s \times (\phi(r)/\Phi(r) + r)$  which is between  $0.4s$  and  $0.5s$ . We want it to be about 2 (in k-euros) so we take  $s = 4$ ; this gives us  $\delta$  between  $-8$  and  $-5$ .

For risk-aversion  $\sigma$ , we note that with no copay, the first-best deductible when we have a 0-1 loss with probability  $p$  is given by

$$\sigma D^* = \log \frac{(1-p)(1+l)}{1-p(1+l)}.$$

for small  $p$ , this gives  $\sigma D^* \simeq \log(1+l)$ , which in our case is  $0.22$ . Say we want  $D^*$  between  $0.5$  and  $2$  k-euros; then we need  $\sigma$  between  $0.1$  and  $0.5$ .

## intro

It is nonlinear; it is not clear what the second derivatives  $\frac{\partial b_i}{\partial i \partial y}$  look like, so even less so what the implications of

$$\frac{\partial b_i}{\partial i_k \partial y_0} \frac{\partial y_0}{\partial i_l} + \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial i_k \partial y_1} \frac{\partial y_1}{\partial i_l} \gg 0$$

for the properties of  $i \rightarrow (y_0, y_1)$  might be.

If we compare two nearby types with the same value of  $y_1$ , then we have

$$\frac{\partial b_i}{\partial i_k \partial y_0} \frac{\partial y_0}{\partial i_l} \gg 0,$$

a bit better.

On the other hand, there is a clear "top": when risk aversion and risk are at their highest the WTP for insurance is maximal and there we have SB=FB, a straight deductible contract.

## to do

### plots and stats

Compute the expected claims  $(1 - y_1)E_{\sigma, \delta} \max(L - y_0, 0)$  under both FB and SB; the surplus loss  $S_{SB} - S_{FB}$ .

Get the informational rents  $U_i$ . Start from  $U_i^{(0)} = 0$  and iterate

$$U_i^{(k+1)} = \max_j (U_j^{(k)} + \Lambda_{ij}(y))$$

where  $\Lambda_{ij}(y) = b_i(y_j) - b_j(y_j)$ . Plot the  $U_i$ ,  $S_i$ , and  $S_i - U_i$ .

IR is binding for  $i$  iff  $U_i = 0$ ; IC  $i \rightarrow j$  is binding iff  $U_i - U_j = \Lambda_{ij}(y)$ .



### try straight deductible contracts

$R(L, y) = 0$  for  $L \leq y_0$  and  $R(L, y) = L - y_0$  above; like the 2-parameter contract with  $y_1 = 0$ .

$A$  and  $B$  are unchanged;  $C$  becomes

$$\Phi((\delta - y_0)/s) \exp(\sigma y_0)$$

and  $D$  becomes

$$s\phi((y_0 - \delta)/s) + (\delta - y_0)\Phi((\delta - y_0)/s).$$

### try more contract parameters

Zero bracket:  $R(L, y) = 0$  for  $L \leq y_0$ .

For contracts of dimension  $2K$ : choose  $(y_0 <) y_2 < \dots < y_{2K-2}, 0 < y_1, \dots, y_{2K-1} < 1$ .

Bracket  $k = 1, \dots, K$  has  $y_{2k-2} \leq L \leq y_{2k}$ ; there  $R(L, y) = A_k(y) + (1 - y_{2k-1})(L - y_{2k-2})$  with

$$A_k(y) = \sum_{l=1}^{k-1} (1 - y_{2l-1})(y_{2l} - y_{2l-2}).$$

This gives  $2K$  parameters. The 2-dimensional contract has  $K = 1$ .

### maybe optimize further

#### imposed penalties

We need interior optima, so allow  $y_0, y_1$  to take any values but penalize  $y_0 < 0, y_1 < 0, y_0$  large,  $y_1 > 1$ . Still, sometimes we get stuck with  $y_0 = y_1 = 0$  for some type. To avoid that, penalty on  $y_0 + y_1 < 0.1$ .

#### fix at the top

Easy: just fix the SB at the first B and run the proximal part only on the lower types.

#### interpolate

If we solved for an  $(n, n)$  grid, then we can interpolate linearly any point in the square, on a  $(n+k, n+k)$  grid for instance, and start from there.

#### new calibration

January 4, 2024: keep  $s = 4$ , make  $\delta = -8$  to  $-4$  so probabilities of accident are between 0.02 and 0.16.

The resutst are better, in `n0xn1new`.

optimized `JLambda` to `JLambda_j`

It was the most costly piece by far. Now it runs 10 times faster.

## todo

- how should the algorithm change with bounds on contract variables?
- make it general (number of types/contract vars, utilities)
- test it on the linear examples of the paper.
- try reasonable distributions (not uniform in square)
- play with slack coefficients on the IC constraints

That is:

$$U_i - U_j \geq b_i(y_j) - b_j(y_j) - K$$

with  $K$  starting large and then decreasing.

- play with range of  $(\sigma, \delta)$   
Start small and increase.