

The Cost of Clarity:

Trade-offs to Public Investments in Rural Diagnostic Care

Brad Curtis

John Munro Godfrey, Sr. Department of Economics
University of Georgia

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Abstract

Rural hospitals face persistent financial constraints that limit investment in advanced medical technologies, creating disparities in health care quality between rural and urban areas. This paper examines the cost-access trade-off associated with deploying expensive diagnostic equipment in rural markets by studying the diffusion of 3D-mammography (3DM) technology for breast cancer screening in Georgia. I exploit quasi-exogenous variation in rural 3DM supply generated by a state subsidy program that increased adoption rates by 20 percentage points. Using patient-level screening records from 2016–2019, I find that 3DM adoption triples local utilization of the technology, primarily through substitution from 2D-mammography. Distance significantly affects technology choice: being one mile further from the nearest 3DM provider reduces the probability of receiving a 3D-screening by 0.08 percentage points, though this sensitivity varies with patient risk factors and socioeconomic status. I estimate a structural model of screening demand to quantify welfare effects, finding that rural 3DM investments generated \$0.95 in total surplus per dollar invested. Counterfactual simulations reveal substantial heterogeneity across hospitals. Targeting investments toward more remote hospitals with sufficient local populations maximizes social returns by reducing socially redundant business stealing while ensuring technology deployment at economically viable scale.

1 Introduction

Rural hospitals face persistent financial constraints that hinder investment in physical capital. Declining cash flows have eroded profit margins, making it difficult for rural hospitals to acquire medical technologies that are commonplace in better-resourced urban facilities (Joynt et al., 2011; Adler-Milstein et al., 2015; Horwitz et al., 2018). This technology gap contributes to disparities in health care quality, particularly in capital-intensive service lines like radiology, where reliance on outdated equipment can impede the delivery of high-quality care (AHRQ, 2024). As a result, many patients who live in rural areas face a choice between local, low-quality diagnostic care or high-quality diagnostic care that requires travel.

The widening technology gap between rural and urban hospitals has prompted calls for increased public investment in rural health care infrastructure (Deryugina and Molitor, 2021). Empirical evidence shows that distance is an important factor in hospital choice, suggesting that funding technology adoption at rural hospitals will increase local utilization of high-quality diagnostic care (Scoggins et al., 2012; Syed et al., 2013). However, given the unique features of rural health care markets, publicly funded efforts to close technology gaps may not be cost-effective. Because the fixed costs of adoption are large, small rural hospitals may lack the patient volume needed to deliver upgraded services at a reasonable unit cost. Moreover, distance may not be a meaningful barrier to access for all patients in rural markets. If willingness to travel for high-quality screenings is a function of underlying health risks, deploying advanced diagnostic tools at local hospitals may be socially redundant. These conflicting forces create a trade-off between expanding access and maintaining cost-efficiency in rural health care markets.

This paper evaluates the cost-access trade-off in the market for breast cancer screening. As the second leading cause of death for women in the United States, biennial screenings for breast cancer are recommended for all women ages 50–74 USPSTF (2016). Traditionally these have been performed with 2D-mammography (2DM). However, recent technological advances have brought a new tool to this market. Approved by the FDA in 2011, 3D-mammography (3DM) offers clear clinical advantages over traditional 2D-screenings. By the end of 2017, 3DM supplanted 2DM as the predominant mode of screening for women in the United States. However, the diffusion of this technology has been slower in rural markets where hospitals are less likely to house expensive 3D-scanners (Richman et al., 2019).

To quantify the trade-off between access and cost in this setting, I use quasi-exogenous

variation in the supply of 3DM at rural Georgia hospitals to estimate a model of individual screening decisions. The model recovers patients’ preferences over screening technologies and the disutility of travel. These estimates provide insight into how rural 3DM adoption affects the allocation of patients across hospitals and screening services. I can assess the degree of substitution from 2D to 3D-screenings versus substitution from regional to local providers. I use a revealed preference approach to construct back-of-the-envelope welfare calculations in which the benefits of increased access are weighed against the fixed cost of technology adoption. Finally, I use the estimated structural parameters to simulate counterfactuals that alter the distribution of rural 3DM supply. These analyses explore the effect of alternative allocation rules which assign 3D-scanners to rural hospitals based on distance to incumbent 3DM providers and potential market size. By varying the location of 3DM across hospitals, I illustrate how the social returns to adoption vary across characteristic space providing insight into the features of rural markets where the cost-access trade-off binds.

My analysis centers on the market for breast cancer screenings in Georgia where a subsidy for rural hospitals lowered financial frictions to capital investment, facilitating 3DM adoption. To quantify the effect of the subsidy on Georgia’s rural 3DM supply, I estimate an event-study model comparing adoption rates between subsidized Georgia hospitals and rural hospitals in other southern states. I find that the subsidy sharply increased 3DM investment estimating a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of 3DM adoption over the first three years of the policy.

This quasi-exogenous variation in the supply of 3DM at rural Georgia hospitals plays a key role in my analysis. Using patient-level screening records from 2016-2019, I exploit changes in geographic access to 3DM over time to measure the relationship between distance and technology choice. I estimate that local utilization of 3DM triples after it becomes available at the nearest hospital. I find that this increase is driven by substitution between screening technologies rather than an increase in overall breast cancer screening participation. Leveraging geographic variation in access to 3DM across rural Georgia, I show that distance strongly mediates access in this market. Utilization of 3DM increases sharply in rural areas once the technology becomes available at a local hospital. However, I find that the salience of travel cost varies with patient characteristics. Patients with higher underlying risk factors are willing to travel farther to access 3D-screenings. Conversely, minority groups of lower socioeconomic status are less likely to utilize 3DM as distance increases.

These reduced form estimates show a clear relationship between local access to 3DM and

technology choice, but the mechanisms which drive this pattern are unclear. To investigate the underlying factors that affect patient choice, I estimate a structural model of demand for breast cancer screenings. Demand estimates show that while patients prefer higher quality 3D-screenings, they have stronger preferences for screenings at local providers where travel costs are lower. As a result there is sharp substitution toward local 3D-screenings in the post adoption period. The model predicts that in lieu of adoption, 60% of patients utilizing local 3DM would have received 2D-screenings.

Finally, I quantify the welfare effects of rural 3DM adoption by comparing patients' willingness to pay for local 3DM to the fixed cost of adoption. On net, I find that the observed adoptions increased total welfare. These back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that every dollar invested in the rural 3DM supply generated \$0.95 in total surplus. However, I document wide heterogeneity in these effects across hospitals. To disentangle this heterogeneity, I simulate counterfactuals which alter the set of rural 3DM suppliers based on market characteristics. I find that targeting 3DM investments at hospitals that are at least 12 miles from incumbents reduces investment in markets where adoption is socially redundant due to business stealing. However, total surplus is improved by concentrating the rural 3DM supply at the set of hospitals that are at least 12 miles from incumbents with local populations above the 25th percentile of the distribution. This two-part allocation criteria helps to isolate the socially desirable set of rural 3DM suppliers by ensuring that the technology is not deployed in sparsely populated markets where local 3DM cannot be delivered at scale.

This paper contributes to several strands of research. First, it adds to the literature on rural health care access. Prior work underscores the essential role rural hospitals play in delivering critical services to isolated communities. For example, Gujral and Basu (2020) show that rural hospital closures increase local mortality rates for emergency patients by 8 percentage points, while Kozhimannil et al. (2020) document the substantial gaps in obstetric care caused by such closures. I extend this literature by focusing on access to higher-quality diagnostic care. In particular, I examine how proximity to advanced screening technologies shapes screening patterns in rural areas, a key factor in assessing whether current diagnostic networks meet the needs of these populations.

Second, I add new evidence to the broad literature studying the impacts of provider entry, service adoption, and technology diffusion in health care markets. Much of this literature draws on Mankiw and Whinston (1986), which theoretically shows that when fixed costs are present, the marginal entrant's effect on welfare depends on the size of the product diversity

and business stealing effects relative to fixed cost. Horn et al. (2021) explore these effects in the context of robotic surgery. While they find evidence that the market for surgical interventions expands as more hospitals adopt this technology, adoption also leads to business stealing by changing the allocation of patients across hospitals. Similarly Rosenkranz (2021), studies the repeal of entry regulation for dialysis centers in North Carolina and finds that marginal centers reduce patients' distance to higher quality peritoneal dialysis, expanding the market for high-quality care. I contribute to this literature by focusing on medical technology diffusion in rural health care markets where 3DM adoption may substantially reduce local patients' distance to 3D-technology. Following adoption, I find that the degree of business stealing versus technology substitution is directly related to patients' pre-adoption distance to incumbent 3DM providers, suggesting that the impact of rural technology adoption is dependent on proximity to the existing network of care.

Finally, by studying 3DM adoption, this paper provides new insight into the impact of service adoption at rural hospital. Much of the literature in this area has focused on services that exhibit quality-returns-to-scale (Cutler and Kolstad, 2010; Trogon, 2009; Yang, 2023; Dingel et al., 2023). However, less evidence exists regarding the impact of rural service expansions in clinical settings without strong quality-returns-to-scale. By studying the adoption of a high-cost medical technology with clear clinical advantages, this paper isolates the trade-off between duplicating fixed costs and improving geographic access to care. My results show that there are large potential welfare gains from increasing the supply of advanced diagnostic services at rural hospitals, but that these effects are tempered by reductions in cost-efficiencies, creating a risk of over-investment in small markets that cannot sustain sufficient demand for these services.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details and introduces my data. Section 3 shows reduced form analysis of the effect of the policy on the rural 3DM supply and the impact of adoption on screening patterns. Section 4 outlines the model and the estimation strategy while section 5 presents results. Section 6 shows welfare and counterfactual analysis. Section 7 concludes.

2 Setting and Data

2.1 Technology Gaps in Rural Health Care Markets

Over time, rural hospitals have faced mounting financial challenges. Depopulation and increased competition from urban providers generated demand volatility, lowering profit margins. From 2008-2010, 60 percent of rural hospitals earned negative annual profits, and since 2013, 8 percent of rural hospitals have closed (Sheps Center, 2024). This financial fragility hampers investment in new technology as hospitals may lack the liquidity needed for capital investments (Hegland et al., 2022). Moreover, financial uncertainty raises borrowing costs as lenders view rural hospitals as risky investments. These factors deter rural hospitals from purchasing expensive diagnostic equipment. As a result, rural areas often lag in availability of high-quality care, such as advanced imaging (AHRQ, 2024).

A notable rural-urban technology gap exists in the market for breast cancer screenings. While urban hospitals have rapidly integrated 3DM, it is less likely to be offered at rural providers (FDA, 2025; Lee et al., 2021). This disparity is attributed to the fact that rural facilities often lack the liquidity required to finance the fixed cost of upgrading to this advanced technology. Compelling evidence for this gap is observed in Georgia, where in 2016, women in rural counties had to travel twice as far on average to access 3DM due to the sparsity of the technology among local providers. This paper centers on the mammography technology gap in rural Georgia. My analysis leverages variation in access to 3DM following a subsidy that spurred 3D-technology adoption at rural Georgia hospitals.

2.2 Georgia’s Rural Hospital Tax Credit

In 2017, Georgia implemented the Rural Hospital Tax Credit (RHTC), an innovative funding mechanism that effectively turned private donations to rural hospitals into 100% state tax credits. Each eligible hospital (non-profit or public, in counties < population cut-off) could receive up to \$4 million annually; in practice, eligible hospitals received an average of \$650,000 per year from 2017–2019. Table A1 shows eligibility for the program and the evolution of donations received from 2017-2019. In 2017, RHTC funds were only available to non-profit or public hospitals in counties with populations below 35,000. In 2018, the population limit was raised to 50,000 and the number of participating hospitals increased to 58.

Over this time period, nearly every qualifying hospital received RHTC funds. The statewide cap on donations was raised by \$50 million in 2018, which led to a sharp increase in total and average funds received. Importantly, these funds were unrestricted in use, effectively boosting liquidity at participating hospitals. Table A2 reports aggregate information on reported use of RHTC funds in 2018. On average, hospitals spent 80% of funds available and held the remaining 20% as cash reserves. The bottom half of Table A2 shows that on average \$250,000 of subsidy funds were spent on medical equipment in 2018, roughly 30% of all spending. Within these spending reports, hospitals claim to have used RHTC funds to purchase a wide variety of equipment, but the most commonly reported equipment acquisition is of a 3DM unit. My analysis is consistent with these reports as I find that by the end of 2019, 22 of the 58 subsidized hospitals acquired a 3DM scanner.

2.3 Data

This analysis relies on two primary datasets. To measure changes in the supply of 3DM across Georgia, I use technology adoption records. To measure changes in mammography utilization patterns, I use screening records for the entire state of Georgia.

Technology Adoption Records: I use administrative data from the FDA’s X-Ray Installer database, which records every new installation of radiology equipment at U.S. health care providers. Each record contains the facility’s name and location, the type of equipment installed, and the installation date. Importantly, the records indicate if the equipment is for mammography and whether it has 3D capability. I use these records to construct a panel of 3DM adoption at hospitals across the southeast from 2014-2019.

Breast Cancer Screening Data: I incorporate patient-level data to observe mammography utilization. This data comes from the health care Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), which records outpatient discharge records for all hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers in Georgia.¹ Each of these records includes information on when a patient visits a given facility and which procedures were performed during the visit, which allows me to observe whether a patient received a 2D or 3D-screening. Each record lists a patient’s home zip code and demographic information on race, age, and insurance type. Records also include a unique patient identifier, which allows each encounter to be connected to a patient’s care history

¹I do not observe screenings in office-based imaging centers. However, I validate my data coverage against aggregate claims counts from Medicare Claims data in Table A5. Subsetting my data to match the FFS population, I capture 87% of 3DM screenings and 76% of 2DM screenings at the state level.

over time. I use HCUP data from 2016-2019 to measure changes in hospital mammography service offerings and patient treatment patterns over time. I use the CPT procedure codes listed in Table A4, and the service identification algorithm introduced by Richman et al. (2022) to identify the type of technology used in a screening encounter. In the HCUP data, I observe 22 subsidized rural hospitals that start offering 3DM between 2017 and 2019. This aligns exactly with the 22 new installations recorded in the FDA data for rural Georgia, giving confidence that the adoption events are measured consistently across data sources. My analysis focus exclusively on screening mammography encounters.

Supplementary Data: I use information on hospital size and financial health from Medicare Cost Reports. To measure the resource cost of 3DM adoption and utilization, I rely on data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services Practice Expense Files. These files provide line item estimates of the expenses associated with mammography service lines which I use to measure the incremental cost of 3DM. Finally, I use the American Community Survey for information on zip code demographics.

3 Reduced Form Evidence

This section first explores regional differences in geographic access to mammography and screening patterns across Georgia. I then measure the impact of Georgia’s RHTC on the rural 3DM supply. Finally, I exploit geographic variation resulting from adoption of 3DM at subsidized rural hospitals to identify key factors influencing 3DM utilization. Specifically, I estimate how changes in relative distance to 3DM, defined as the difference between a patient’s nearest 2DM and 3DM providers, impact technology utilization among women in rural areas.

3.1 Descriptive Screening Patterns

Rural women in Georgia face large gaps in access to 3DM. Table 1 shows that in 2016, the year before the subsidy, there were significant disparities between these groups. The average distance for rural women to 3DM services was 22.5 miles, nearly double that of non-rural women at 12.5 miles, a difference that persists across the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution. In contrast, there is a small difference in the distance to 2DM between the two groups which is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the share of rural women screened with 3DM is considerably lower at 12.1%, compared to 30.6% for non-rural women. While the 25th percentile for 3DM screening is small for both groups, there is a

sharp gap at the 75th percentile where 45% of non-rural women screening with 3DM relative to 30% of rural women.


Figure 1 shows how distance shapes screening technology choice among the sample of rural women receiving mammography screenings in 2016. The left plot shows how the probability of screening with 2DM or 3DM varies across bins of travel distance. There is a steep but continuous decrease in the probability of screening with 3DM from the first to fourth distance bin. Interestingly, beyond distance bin four, the share of women screening with 3DM remains constant at roughly 10% suggesting that a subset of patients are willing to travel significant lengths to access 3DM. The x-axis of the right plot show relative distance bins, defined as the additional distance in miles that patients must travel to reach the nearest 3DM provider relative to the nearest 2DM provider. The share of women screening with 3DM declines as differential distance increase. However, there is a sharp drop between distance bin zero, where a patient’s closest provider already offers 3DM, and distance bin of ten. This non-linear relationship suggests that small differences in proximity to 3DM can strongly influence screening decisions.

Table 1: Disparities in Rural 3DM Access (2016)

Sample Characteristics	Rural	Non-Rural	<i>p</i>-value
<i>Distance to 3DM (mi)</i>			
Mean	22.5	12.5	0.000
25th %	13.5	8.5	
75th %	35.5	23.3	
<i>Distance to 2DM (mi)</i>			
Mean	14.6	11.1	0.450
25th %	8.9	8.2	
75th %	20.75	14.95	
<i>Share Screened with 3DM</i>			
Mean	12.1%	30.6%	0.000
25th %	3.4%	5.1%	
75th %	30.0%	45.5%	

Notes: Table reports mean, 25th, and 75th percentiles of distance to nearest mammography provider and the share of screenings performed with 3DM. Sample includes all Georgia women screened in 2016. Distances are calculated at the zip code level using patient residence and provider location. P-values test for differences in rural versus non-rural means. Data source: HCUP screening records.

Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Variation in Technology Choice (2016)



Notes: The plots show the average probability of screening technology choice across bins of distance. The x-axis of the left plot shows absolute distance. The x-axis of the right plot shows relative distance, defined as the difference between the closest 2DM and 3DM. These probabilities are calculated at the zip code level. This figure is constructed using the sample of mammography screenings in rural Georgia in 2016.

3.2 Policy-Driven Expansion of 3DM Supply

Next, I measure variation in the supply of 3DM driven by Georgia’s RHTC which subsidized technology upgrades at financially constrained rural hospitals beginning in 2017. I compare the sample of subsidized rural Georgia hospitals to a comparable set of control hospitals drawn from other states in the southeast.² To select control hospitals, I identify the set of hospitals in each state that would be eligible to receive RHTC subsidies if an analogous program were to exist in their state. Table A3 shows 2016 summary statistics for treated and control hospitals. Both are similar in size and baseline financial health.


$$Y_{ht} = \sum_{k \neq -1} \beta_k GA_h \cdot D_{kt} + \lambda_t + \mu_h + \epsilon_{ht} \quad (1)$$

I estimate the event study model in equation 1 where Y_{ht} is an indicator for whether hospital h offered 3DM in year t . Coefficients β_k measures the change in the cumulative probability of 3DM adoption relative to the period before subsidy receipt. The estimates are plotted in Panel A of Figure 2 and show no distinguishable difference in adoption trends between these groups across the pre-periods. However, post-period estimates reflect a sharp

²Including: Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North-Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Georgia did not expand Medicaid during this period, so I limit my sample to other non-expansion states.

break in trend across the groups.

Figure 2: Effects of Subsidization on 3DM Supply



Notes: This figure in panel A shows event study estimates for the 3DM investment outcome. This model is estimated using radiology equipment installation records from 2014-2019 for RHTC hospitals (N=58) and a group of rural hospitals in other southern states (N=95), creating a total of 918 hospital year observations. Relative year zero corresponds to 2017, the first year Georgia hospitals received subsidy funds. All estimates are normalized to relative year negative 1, the year before subsidy receipt. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. The coefficient plots in panel B show estimated differences in mean characteristics between rural hospitals offering 3DM in GA vs control states in 2016 and 2019. Source: FDA / HCRIS.

By relative period 2, I estimate that subsidization increased the cumulative probability of adoption by approximately 20 percentage points.

Panel B of Figure 2 reports coefficients from differences-in-means tests comparing characteristics between rural hospitals offering 3DM in Georgia and control states. In 2016, the two groups were statistically similar in size, financial structure, and facility age. However, by 2019, the group of rural hospitals offering 3DM in Georgia were on average smaller with fewer financial resources suggesting that the subsidy enabled adoption at resource constrained hospitals.

3.3 The Effect of Adoption on Local Screening Patterns

I exploit the staggered timing of 3DM adoption at rural hospitals to measure the effect of distance to 3DM on rural patients’ screening decisions. To quantify the relationship between local access and screening patterns, I use screening records from all Georgia patients whose nearest mammography provider is an RHTC hospital over the 5-year period from 2016–2019. My analysis exploits changes in patients’ access to 3DM following its adoption at subsidized rural hospitals. I construct a time-varying, zip code-level measure of local access based on relative distance to 3DM. Specifically, I define local access as a binary indicator equal to one for zip code z in period t if 3DM is offered at z ’s nearest mammography provider. To precisely measure changes in access over time, I define calendar time periods in 6-month intervals. I supplement these results in Appendix B.2 which considers the effect of changes in absolute distance.


To measure changes following the adoption of 3DM, I estimate the event study regression:

$$Y_{zt} = \sum_{k \neq -1} \phi_k \cdot \mathbb{1}(t - e_z = k) + \lambda_t + \mu_z + \epsilon_{zt} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{zt} is screening volume measured separately for each technology type. Treatment begins at event period (e_z) when 3DM becomes available at the provider nearest zip code z . Equation 2 is estimated using the imputation method proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024). To avoid compositional bias, I restrict attention to the set of hospital adoptions for which I observe at least 18 months of pre- and post-adoption data within my sample window. The final sample includes 78 treated zip codes who gain local access and 94 control zip codes who do not gain local access over my sample period, so that ϕ_k s are identified by variation within and across zip codes over time. Identification hinges on the assumption that the timing of adoption can be treated as plausibly exogenous to short-run shocks in local screening demand. Alternatively, the counterfactual trends of zip codes with different degrees of access to 3DM would have evolved in parallel. I evaluate the plausibility of this assumption by testing for differences in pre-trends across groups.

Figure 3 presents ϕ_k estimates from model 2. Panel A illustrates the estimated effect of local 3DM access on zip code level screening volumes for both 2DM and 3DM. The flat pre-trends for both outcomes provide plausible support for the identification assumption. Post-adoption I estimate a sharp increase in 3DM utilization. By relative period 2, average 3DM volume increased by roughly 100 scans in treated zip codes.

Figure 3: Effects of Gaining Local Access to 3DM on Screening Patterns




Notes: This figure shows estimates from model 2. Panel A shows estimated relative time coefficients for zip code screening volume across 2DM and 3DM. Respective means in relative period -1 are 2DM=210 and 3DM=22. Panel B shows estimates for overall screening counts. Each model is estimated using the sample of 172 rural zip codes from 2016–2019. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

This rise in 3DM is mirrored by a decrease of similar magnitude in 2DM utilization suggesting that the local availability of 3DM prompts patients to substitute between screening technologies, rather than encouraging individuals who previously did not screen to begin screening. Estimates in Panel B, which show the effect of adoption on total breast cancer screening counts, are statistically indistinguishable from zero and small across the entire pre and post-period. Together, these outcomes show strong evidence that local access to 3DM primarily drives a shift in the choice of screening technology.

Panel C of Figure 3 includes level estimates of 3DM volume at adopting hospitals which show that nearly all of the increase in 3DM utilization is attributable to screenings at adopting hospitals. Moreover, Panel D of Figure 3 shows that adopters experience a decline in 2DM volume that is similar in magnitude to the total zip code level estimates suggesting that most patients who screen with 3DM in the post adoption period are substituting away from 2DM to 3DM at their local hospital.

Next, I consider how these effects vary across patient characteristics. Figure 4 plots estimates from Equation 2 using the share of screenings performed with 3DM as the outcome variable. I find that the share of screenings performed with 3DM increases more for non-white patients, and patients classified as Medicaid or self-pay. This suggests that lowering travel barriers to 3DM may have a larger effect on access for minority groups of lower socioeconomic status. Conversely, I estimate a smaller change in the share of 3DM screenings among women with a family history of breast cancer. The effects of increased access are muted for this group of women with observably higher health risk because they were more likely to travel to access 3DM before it became locally available. Panel D highlights heterogeneity across patient age by estimating the model for the subgroups of patients above and below 55. I select this age threshold because empirical evidence shows that 3DM leads to a larger reduction in recall rates among younger patients (Conant et al., 2019; Sharpe et al., 2016). I find that substitution patterns evolve similarly in both groups.

Figure 4: Heterogeneity in Response to Local 3DM Access



Notes: This figure plots event study estimates using the conditional share of patients choosing 3DM in a given zip code as the outcome variable. Each Panel highlights heterogeneity in the effect of gaining local access to 3DM on screening patterns across patient characteristics. Standard Errors are clustered at the zip code level.

4 Demand Model

4.1 Demand Specification

I model a woman's choice of breast cancer screening provider and modality as a differentiated product discrete choice problem. In period t , individual i in market m chooses among a set of hospital, modality options j, s that maximizes utility:

$$U_{ijsmt} = \underbrace{\delta_{jsmt} + \mu_{ijsmt}}_{V_{ijsmt}} + \epsilon_{ijsmt} \quad (3)$$

where δ_{jsmt} is the mean utility of screening service s at hospital j in market m at time period t , which reflects vertical differentiation in individuals' preferences over hospitals and screening technologies. The idiosyncratic terms, $\mu_{ijsmt} + \epsilon_{ijsmt}$, capture individual-specific variation from mean utility. I specify μ_{ijsmt} as:

$$\mu_{ijsmt} = \gamma_1 d_{ij} + \gamma_2 d_{ij}^2 + \sum_{c=1}^C \kappa_c (d_{ij} * \underbrace{Z_{ic}}_{\text{Demographics}}) + \alpha_1 \mathbb{1}(\text{Prev}_{ijst} = 1) \quad (4)$$

where d_{ij} is round trip distance between i 's zip code and provider j in ten-mile increments, enters utility nonlinearly. To capture heterogeneity in travel cost, I interact distance with Z_{ic} , a vector of observable patient characteristics, including race, an indicator for Medicaid or self-pay insurance status, and an indicator for family history of breast cancer. I include an indicator denoting whether i 's last scan was with technology s at hospital j to capture inertia in patients' choices across time.³

Mean service utility is specified as:

$$\delta_{jsmt} = \beta_{3D} 3DM_{jmt} + \underbrace{\xi_j}_{\text{Hospital FE}} + \underbrace{\xi_{mt}}_{\text{Market} \times \text{Period FE}} + \underbrace{\Delta \xi_{jsmt}}_{\text{Unobserved Taste Shock}} \quad (5)$$

Mean utility of screening at hospital j varies with technology type. I define $3DM_{jmt}$ as an indicator for 3D-technology so that parameter β_{3D} reflects additive effect of 3DM on the mean utility of receiving a screening at provider j . I include fixed effects ξ_j to capture unobserved hospital quality and ξ_{mt} to capture time-varying market demand shocks. The remaining unobserved component $\Delta \xi_{jsmt}$ reflects hospital-service specific deviations in un-

³I use data from 2014–2019 to define this variable, which ensures adequate coverage for my primary sample window 2016–2019.

observed taste over time.

I do not model the choice to delay or forgo screening and thus assume the market size is equal to the total number of patients receiving scans. I choose to model this limited form of substitution because my model relies on variation from changes in access to higher quality services. While some patients do in fact choose to delay recommended screenings, I do not find evidence that this behavior is impacted by changes in local access to 3DM.⁴ In each market, I define a particular hospital screening service combination as the outside good. Assuming ϵ_{ijsmt} follows a type one extreme value distribution, the individual probability of patient i in market m and period t choosing service s at hospital j can be written:

$$s_{ijsmt} = \frac{\exp(\delta_{jsmt} + \mu_{ijsmt})}{\sum_{j,s} \exp(\delta_{jsmt} + \mu_{ijsmt})} \quad (6)$$

4.2 Estimation and Identification

Sample and Market Selection: I estimate the model for Georgia hospitals that offer either 2DM or 3DM from 2016–2019 outside of Atlanta. This includes 42 rural hospitals and 37 non-rural hospitals. When conducting analyses related to the effect of rural 3DM adoption, I restrict attention to the set of rural hospitals that adopted 3DM by the last month of 2018 to ensure adequate coverage before and after adoption. To highlight the impact of changes in access to higher quality diagnostic care, I also limit this adoption sample to hospitals that had prior 2DM services.⁵ Finally, I require that hospitals consistently report discharge data across each quarter year from 2016–2019. The final sample includes 16 rural adopters or 72% of all subsidized Georgia hospitals who adopt 3DM from 2017-2019.

Markets are constructed based on the Georgia Department of Community Health’s defined state health planning regions. Each of these designated regions typically encompasses approximately 10 counties, with an average of seven mammography providers operating within each county. The providers located within these defined markets collectively capture an average of 92% of observed screenings for patients residing in these regions. I normalize the utility of screening with an out-of-market provider to zero. The health planning region corresponding to the Atlanta metro area is excluded from this analysis since it does not contain any subsidized rural hospitals.⁶ The final sample includes a total of 79 hospitals

⁴Appendix B.3, shows a null relationship between local screening compliance and 3DM adoption.

⁵This only excludes two adopting hospitals.

⁶Additionally, travel cost in this market may not be reflective of the broader state due to traffic patterns and the availability of public transit.

with each operating in one of twelve unique markets.

Estimation: I estimate the parameters of this model using a two-stage maximum likelihood procedure. Following Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), I estimate the idiosyncratic taste parameters $\theta=(\gamma,\kappa_c,\alpha,\rho)$ in the first stage by maximizing the log-likelihood function (7). Where $I_{i,j,s,m,t}$ is an indicator for patient i in market m at time t choosing to screen at hospital j with technology s . Conditional on any candidate value of θ , I solve for the vector of option specific mean utilities, $\hat{\delta}_{jsmt}(\theta)$, such that the observed market shares match those predicted by the model (Berry, 1994).

$$LL(\theta) = \sum_{i,j,s,m,t} I_{i,j,s,m,t} \cdot \log \left(\frac{s_{ijsmt}(\theta)}{\sum_{j,s} s_{ijsmt}(\theta)} \right) \quad (7)$$

Travel cost sensitivity is identified by patients' substitution between local and more distant providers, but I also leverage variation in the timing of 3DM adoption at the local rural hospital which changes the minimum distance to 3DM over time. This provides an additional source of identification and helps to separate preferences for screening modalities and hospitals from travel sensitivity. Similar variation is used to identify α , which captures inertia. Using patient identifiers to link patients' choices over time, α is identified by the tendency for patients to re-visit the provider where they received their last scan. Identification is strengthened by variation in these patterns when new screening modalities are added to the choice set. Accounting for inertia is crucial in identifying patient's preferences for screening technologies. By accounting for switching cost, I am able to distinguish patients' preferences for local 3DM from preferences for familiar providers.

After recovering mean utilities, at the optimal values of θ^* , I estimate the technology preference parameter β_{3D} in a second stage linear regression:

$$\hat{\delta}_{jsmt}(\theta^*) = \beta_{3D} 3DM_{jms} + \xi_j + \xi_{mt} + \Delta\xi_{jsmt} \quad (8)$$

Hospital fixed effects, ξ_j absorb all time-invariant differences across hospitals while market-by-period fixed effects ξ_{mt} control for common shocks that affect all hospitals in the same market at period t , such as changes in insurance coverage, screening campaigns, or demographic trends. The remaining variation that identifies β_{3D} comes from within-hospital changes in mean utility when a hospital begins offering 3DM, relative to other hospitals in the same market-year that have not yet adopted. Consequently, β_{3D} captures the aver-

age incremental effect of 3DM availability on patient utility, net of average preferences over providers and market-wide demand fluctuations.

However, if the adoption of 3DM is influenced by hospital level, time-varying demand shocks $\Delta\xi_{jsmt}$ then the estimates from model 8 will be biased. To address this endogeneity concern I employ an instrumental variables approach that exploits quasi-experimental variation from the disbursement of RHTC subsidies targeted at financially constrained rural hospitals. These funds facilitated the adoption of 3DM equipment but are likely unrelated to contemporaneous local demand shocks once hospital and market-by-year fixed effects are controlled for. Specifically, I instrument for the 3DM indicator with an indicator for whether a hospital received funds in year t , interacted with a 3D service dummy to create service-specific first-stage variation. This strategy isolates plausibly exogenous shifts in the propensity to adopt 3DM driven by subsidy timing and eligibility, rather than by endogenous investment responses to rising demand. Under the exclusion restriction that the subsidy affects patient utility only through its effect on 3DM availability, the IV estimates recover patients' taste for 3DM technology. Importantly, this IV estimate should be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE) reflecting the impact of 3DM adoption among the subset of marginal, financially constrained hospitals whose investment decisions were influenced by the subsidy.

5 Results

5.1 Preference Estimates

Results from the maximum likelihood stage of estimation, are reported in Panel A of Table 2. Patients exhibit a distaste for distance, with a γ_1 coefficient of -0.668. This aversion to distance is stronger among Medicaid/Self-Pay patients and non-white patients. The positive estimate for γ_2 suggests that incremental disutility of distance is diminishing as distances increases. Patients demonstrate a strong preference for familiar providers, as reflected by a large positive value for α_1 .

Table 2: Utility Parameter Estimates

Parameter	Estimate	\mathcal{E}_d
Panel A:	(1A)	(2A)
Maximum Likelihood Estimation		
α_1 (Inertia)	3.238 (0.004)	
γ_1 Round Trip Distance (10 mi)	-0.668 (0.001)	-1.6
γ_2 Distance Squared	0.009 (0.000)	-1.6
Distance Interactions		
κ_{race} (White)	0.0221 (0.001)	-1.5
κ_{ins} (Medicaid/ Self-Pay)	-0.016 (0.004)	-1.75
κ_h (Family-History)	0.054 (0.001)	-1.4
Screening Observations	1,192,078	
Panel B:	(1B)	(2B)
Technology Preference Estimates	OLS	2SLS
β_{3D}	2.292*** (0.441)	1.93** (0.788)
Hospital FE:	Y	Y
Market \times Period FE:	Y	Y
Hospital Year Observations	1041	1041
First Stage F-stat		96.60

Notes: Panel A shows results of the logit choice model. Point estimates for utility parameters are shown in column 1A. Standard errors shown in parentheses. Column 2A reports the average marginal effects of a 10 mile increase in relative distance to 3DM on the probability of 3D-screening. The model is estimated using 1,192,078 unique screening observations from 2016–2019. Panel B reports the results from the regression decomposing the effect of 3D-technology on mean utility. 1B reports the OLS estimates where the independent variable is a binary indicator for 3D. Column 1B shows the results from the 2SLS estimator where the subsidy is used as an instrument for 3DM availability.

Next I quantify the elasticity of screening choice with respect to distance. Column 2A reports the average own-distance elasticities across sub-groups. Consistent with the results from Table 2, non-white patients insured by Medicaid are more sensitive to distance exhibiting a distance elasticity that is 25% above the baseline estimate.

Panel B of Table 2 presents the results from the second-stage estimation procedure, where preferences for technology are recovered. The estimates from the naive Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are reported alongside the results from the two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. The instrument for 3D availability demonstrates a strong first stage, satisfying the relevance criteria with an F-statistic of 96.6, indicating that the policy created meaningful variation in the availability of 3DM. The larger point estimates for $\beta_3 D$ in Column 1B suggests that the OLS model likely overstates patients' preferences for 3DM. The adjusted estimate in Column 2B is equal to 1.93. This reflects a strong average preference for 3D-screening, implying that patients would be willing to travel an additional 30 miles round trip to access 3D technology when compared to the estimated travel costs.

5.2 Patient Level Effects of Adoption

To measure the value patients in rural Georgia place on local access to 3DM, I use revealed preference estimates to calculate patients' willingness to pay for local access to 3DM. Denoting the option to screen with 3DM at a given rural adopter as k_{3D} and omitting market, time notation for brevity, equation 9 gives the change in travel miles needed to compensate patient i for the expected utility loss between choice set J and J' , which excludes 3DM at the adopting rural hospital. I then average across patients and monetize $CV_i(J, J')$ to construct a measure of the average value patients place on 3DM at rural hospital k . I monetize this measure at a rate of \$0.77 per-mile to determine each patient's willingness to pay for local access to 3DM.⁷


$$CV_i(J, J') = \frac{1}{\tau_i} \left\{ \ln \left(\sum_{j,s \in J} \exp(V_{ijs}) \right) - \ln \left(\sum_{j,s \in J'} \exp(V_{ijs}) \right) \right\} \quad (9)$$

Figure 5 plots the average willingness to pay measure at the zip code level across changes in distance to 3DM post-adoption. I find a strong linear relationship between remoteness and average willingness to pay for local 3DM. In Panel B, I plot the total consumer surplus

⁷This value is based on the IRS's reimbursement rate for a mile of travel in 2017 \$0.53 times 1.417 driving miles per straight-line mile (Boscoe et al., 2012).

gain at the zip code level. Total consumer surplus is generally increasing in distance, but the relationship is weaker as the zip codes initially furthest from 3DM tend to have lower populations.

Figure 5: Consumer Surplus Gains Across Distance



Notes: This figure plots average compensating variation (right) and total consumer surplus (left) from local 3DM adoption against reductions in travel distance. Points reflect zip code averages of estimated willingness-to-pay. Dollar values are calculated by monetizing travel miles at \$0.77 per mile.


Next, I quantify the effect of adoption on rural 3DM take-up. I use my model to construct choice removal diversion ratios. I use these diversion estimates to simulate patient demand in a counterfactual where 3DM is not available at rural adopters.

$$D_i(k_{3D} \rightarrow j_s) = \frac{(\hat{s}_{ijs})}{1 - \hat{s}_{ik\ 3D}} \quad (10)$$

$$\Delta P_i(3D) = 1 - \sum_{j_{3D} \in J} D_i(k_{3D} \rightarrow j_{3D}) \quad (11)$$

Equation 10 gives the probability that patient i would be diverted to a given hospital screening alternative, j_s , if k_{3D} were removed from the choice set. Aggregating the set of alternative 3DM providers in a patient's choice set, I use equation 11 to measure how technology diffusion at subsidized rural hospitals impacted the likelihood of 3DM utilization. Figure 6 plots the average percentage change in the predicted probability of 3DM use across distance bins.

Figure 6: Technology Substitution Across Distance Bins



Notes: Panels show the predicted change in 3DM utilization after local adoption by patient subgroup. Each panel plots average percentage changes in the probability of 3DM screening across differential-distance bins. Estimates come from the structural demand model, which incorporates travel costs and heterogeneous preferences by insurance status, race, and family history of breast cancer.

Panel A shows this relationship for patients based on insurance status. Across each distance bin, the model predicts that adoption will increase the probability of screening more for self-pay and Medicaid patients. A similar pattern is present in Panel B where non-white patients see a larger increase in the probability of 3DM usage. Notably, the gaps

between subgroups are largest for the first distance bin, suggesting that smaller absolute travel burdens have a more salient impact on non-white patients of lower socioeconomic status. Finally, Panel C plots the same relationship based on whether patients have a family history of breast cancer. Consistent with the reduced form estimate, the model predicts that women with a family history of breast cancer are less responsive to distance when making screening decisions.

Table 3 reports the effect of rural 3DM diffusion across the distribution of observed rural adopters. Each estimate is calculated using the subgroup of patients for whom hospital k is the closest 3DM provider. Column 1 shows that rural 3DM adoption increases the mean probability of 3DM screening by 59 percentage points. I use technology substitution probabilities to predict the total reduction in false-positive screenings attributable to substitution to 3DM at hospital k . Assuming a false-positive reduction probability of 0.016 per scan, column 2 reports an average annual drop in the frequency of false-positive screenings equal to 24 (Friedewald et al., 2014). Columns 3-4 show that on average, rural patients value local 3DM at 24.74 travel miles, or \$19.03 based on a travel monetization rates of \$0.77 per-mile.

Table 3: Impact of Rural 3DM Adoption on Consumer Welfare

	$\Delta P(3D)$	$\Delta T1$ Error	\overline{CV} (miles)	\overline{WTP} (\$)
Mean	0.59	24	24.74	19.03
25th pct	0.48	10	17.86	13.75
75th pct	0.65	29	31.20	24.02

Notes: This table compares the impact of observed 3DM adoptions on share of patients screened with 3DM, expected false positive scans, consumer surplus and expected travel miles.

6 Welfare Effects and Counterfactual Simulations

6.1 Social Welfare

$$\Delta TS_k = \sum_i \sum_t \beta^t (\Delta CS_{it} - \Delta c_{it} - F_{it} + \underbrace{\Delta T1_{it} \cdot R(\text{Diagnostic})}_{\text{Downstream savings}} + \underbrace{\eta^{SV} \cdot \Delta \pi_{it}^k}_{\text{Profit transfers}}) \quad (12)$$

I perform a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to measure the welfare effects of 3DM diffusion in rural markets. Equation 12 quantifies the change in social welfare per-screening due to the availability of 3DM at a given rural hospital k . I define adoption's impact on social welfare as the change in consumer surplus net of the change in marginal resource cost of screening and the fixed cost of 3DM adoption. I take estimates of the purchase price and annual service cost of 3DM equipment from CMS's Practice Expense File. Assuming a discount rate of 3 percent over a useful equipment life of 8 years, gives a per period fixed cost $F_{kt} = \$23,800$. I assume the marginal costs of screenings are constant across hospitals, but set the relative incremental cost of providing screening 3D-screening for hospital j at \$13.7. Since 3D-screenings are less likely to return false-positive results, technology substitution likely reduces the incidence of unnecessary follow-up screenings. To reflect the positive spillovers from technology substitution, I calculate the expected reduction in health care spending by monetizing the change in the probability of a false positive recall for patient i at the Medicare reimbursement rate for a follow-up diagnostic scan.

Finally, η^{SV} reflects the social value of screening profits at adopting rural hospitals, where $\eta^{SV} > 0$ relaxes the assumption that profit transfers between firms are welfare neutral. I calibrate this parameter using data on supplemental payments received by Georgia hospitals made under the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital program (DSH) which reimburses hospitals for a portion of financial losses from providing care to indigent patients (Dranove et al., 2022). States have broad discretion in how they distribute these supplemental payments often distributing funds based on hospitals underlying financial health to mitigate the risk of closure. In 2016, rural hospitals meeting the criteria for the RHTC program received an additional \$0.19 in DSH payments for every dollar of uncompensated care implying that the state of Georgia places higher weight on their financial health. To reflect this preference, I set $\eta^{SV} = 0.19$.

Table 4 shows the components of total surplus, for the observed set of rural adopters. Column 1 shows the total effect across the entire sample while Column 2 reports hospital level averages. All dollar values are reported in thousand. I calculate an increase in total consumer surplus of \$4.3 million. Accrued fixed-cost spending totals to \$2 million while marginal screening costs increased by \$990 thousand. In my preferred specification, reductions in errors saves \$440 thousand while adopter profits result in a welfare increase of \$1 million. After accounting for these spillovers, I calculate a net welfare increase of \$2.1 million. However, even without accounting for the positive spillovers adoptions are on net welfare improving.

Table 4: Impact of Rural 3DM Adoption on Social Welfare

	Total	Average
ΔCosts		
Fixed	-2,200	-137.50
Marginal	-990	-61.88
ΔVariety Gains		
CS	4,300	268.75
ΔSpillovers		
Error-Costs	440	27.50
$\eta^{SV} \cdot \pi_k$	660	41.25
Δ Welfare	2,100	131.25

Notes: This table reports welfare effect of 3DM adoptions for my primary sample of RHTC hospitals. Dollar values are reported in thousands.

6.2 Counterfactual Simulations


Finally, I perform counterfactual exercises, using my model to simulate the effect of alternative distributions of rural 3DM supply from 2017-2019.

I consider the set of 33 rural Georgia hospitals who offered 2DM but not 3DM in 2016. This sample of potential rural adopters includes the 16 hospitals who actually adopt 3DM after receiving subsidies as well as the 17 never-adopters who only offer 2DM from 2016–2019. This analysis, requires out-of-sample predictions for demand at hospitals not observed to adopt 3DM. I simulate counterfactual demand for 3DM at these hospitals using my technology preference estimates to predict service mean utilities via equation 5. To address concern that non-adopters may have lower latent demand, I draw values of ξ_{jsmt} from the bottom 10th percentile of the empirical distribution. For each counterfactual period, I draw 200 ξ_{jsmts} for each non-adopter to compute the corresponding logit choice probabilities and report final counterfactual demand and welfare estimates as averages across the 200 simulation draws.

The left plot of Figure 7 plots the welfare effects of rural 3DM adoptions at each rural hospital in characteristic space. The y-axis shows screening eligible Hospital Service Area population as a proxy for potential market size while the x-axis shows distance between the adopting hospitals and the nearest incumbent 3DM provider, a proxy for horizontal differentiation. Both axes are normalized by z-scores. I plot the welfare effect of each adoption, with the color of each bubble reflecting whether the change in total surplus was positive (dark

bubbles) or negative (clear bubbles). The size of each bubble corresponds to the absolute value of the adoption's impact on total surplus. There is a clear concentration of welfare negative adoptions in the left region of the graph where rural adopters are located relatively close to incumbent 3DM providers. Conversely, hospitals with low potential market sizes are also more likely to have a negative impact on social welfare since screening volumes are insufficient to justify the large fixed cost of 3DM upgrades.

Figure 7: Welfare Effects Across Market Characteristics.



Notes: Each bubble represents a rural Georgia hospital in counterfactual adoption simulations. Bubble size is proportional to the absolute welfare effect, with color indicating sign (dark = positive, light = negative).

These patterns are reflective of the underlying trade-off between access and cost efficiency in rural health care markets. The right plot of Figure 7 illustrates this trade-off by tracing a iso-welfare frontier across distance–population space. This boundary approximates the combinations of distance and market size for which the incremental welfare effect of adoption is constant. Thus, its convex slope represents the marginal rate of substitution between remoteness and market size. The shape of this curve reflects the fact that the social value of adoption is increasing in both market size and differentiation, but at a diminishing rate. As a result, gains from adoption are concentrated among hospitals that are simultaneously far enough from incumbents and large enough in potential patient volume. This relationship between welfare and market characteristics suggests that allocation mechanisms that account for remoteness and potential market size can more efficiently direct funds to hospitals where

welfare gains from adoption are largest.

Finally, I explore counterfactuals, using my model to simulate demand for breast cancer screenings in rural Georgia under alternative distributions of rural 3DM supply. First, I use the model to solve for the optimal allocation of 3DM by simulating all possible combinations to find the set of providers that maximize social welfare. Second, I show the effect of a blanket investment approach, where all rural Georgia hospitals offer 3DM. Finally, I test selective allocation rules that limit 3DM adoption to hospitals above the 25th percentile of the distance or population distributions, and a two-part criterion combining a 25th percentile distance cutoff with a 25th percentile market size cutoff.

Table 5: Welfare Effects Under Counterfactual 3DM Allocations

	Optimal	Universal	Dist >12 mi	M >2.5k	Dist >12 mi + M>2.5k
N	14	33	24	25	16
ΔTS	4,500	453	3,338	3,110	3,927
Share $\Delta TS_k > 0$	100%	36%	63%	68%	88%
Social Return on Investment	2.30	0.10	0.99	0.90	1.80

Notes: This table reports welfare effect of simulated technology upgrades across alternative supply distributions. Dollar values are reported in thousands.

Table 5 summarizes the effects of each counterfactual allocation on total surplus. Column 1 illustrates the welfare gains at the optimal set of rural 3DM suppliers. I solve for this set by iterating over all possible combinations of rural 3DM adoptions within each market selecting the group of potential 3DM adopters that maximize total surplus. This first-best allocation includes 14 hospitals which all have a positive effect on welfare increasing total surplus by \$4.5 million which corresponds to a \$2.3 social return on every dollar of investment in the rural 3DM supply. Column 2 reports the effect of universal 3DM adoption. While this allocation would have a positive net effect on social welfare, it is poorly targeted. Only 36% of hospitals offering 3DM under this blanket approach have a positive effect on net welfare.

Column 3 shows that the selective allocation rule based purely on distance, increase social welfare relative to universal adoption. These gains come from improved targeting of funds toward hospitals that are horizontally differentiated from incumbents in terms of dis-

tance, highlighting the importance of product variety in this setting. However, 10 of the 24 adopters in this set have a negative effect on welfare suggesting that allocating investments based on distance alone is insufficient since this approach tend to select adopters with insufficient scale compared to the optimal set. Similarly, the population based allocation performs better than the blanket approach. This targeting mechanism eliminates investment at the subgroup of providers who operate in sparsely populated markets, where screening volumes are insufficient to justify the large fixed cost of 3DM upgrades. However it still does not preclude socially redundant investments in markets where pre-existing access to 3DM was high.

Finally, I consider a two-part allocation criterion that targets funds based on distance and potential market size. This counterfactual combines the previous two conditions targeting investments at hospitals above the 25th percentile of the distance and market size cutoff. Preventing 3DM investment at hospitals at the tails of the characteristic distribution substantially increases the welfare effect of adoption achieving 86% of the welfare gains relative to the optimal allocation.

7 Conclusion

This paper studies the welfare consequences of 3DM adoption at rural hospitals in Georgia. Using quasi-exogenous variation from the state’s Rural Hospital Tax Credit, I estimate both reduced-form effects of distance on screening choice and a structural model of patient demand. The results show that local access to 3DM substantially increases utilization of the technology, driven primarily by substitution away from lower-quality 2D-screenings. Patients exhibit strong disutility of travel, and the value they place on local adoption is highest in markets that were previously most remote from 3DM. Welfare analyses indicate that, on average, adoption improved total surplus. However, I find that the benefits of adoption vary widely across rural markets. While some adoptions generated large welfare gains, others produced net losses when placed in sparsely populated or already well-served markets. An allocation rule that conditions adoption on both remoteness and market size substantially improves targeting, delivering larger net welfare gains without unnecessary public spending.

These results highlight a fundamental tension in rural health policy: expanding geographic access to advanced medical technologies generates meaningful welfare gains, but those gains are highly heterogeneous and sometimes offset by cost inefficiencies. My analysis shows that adoption of 3DM at rural Georgia hospitals improved patient welfare on average,

with every public dollar invested yielding \$0.95 in total surplus. Yet, adoptions produced net welfare losses when new scanners were placed in markets with either limited patient volume or close proximity to existing 3DM providers. These findings underscore that technology subsidies, while effective in relaxing financial constraints and facilitating adoption, can lead to over-investment if not carefully targeted. This suggests that blanket subsidies may not be the most effective way to close technology gaps. Instead, allocation mechanisms that account for observable market characteristics can more efficiently direct funds to hospitals where the welfare benefits of adoption are largest. The targeting rule I propose balances the trade-off between serving isolated patients and ensuring sufficient scale, offering a transparent framework that could be applied to other rural service lines.

These findings contribute to broader debates in health economics and industrial organization. This study provides empirical evidence on how fixed costs, geographic frictions, and patient heterogeneity interact to shape welfare outcomes from technology diffusion. In particular, I complement prior work showing that provider entry often entails both beneficial increases in product variety and socially redundant business stealing. My results show that in rural markets, these forces can be balanced by targeting funds based on observable market characteristics.

My results have a number of caveats. First, the welfare calculations rely on back-of-the-envelope monetization of travel costs and fixed cost bounds which can be biased by measurement error. Second, while I document meaningful heterogeneity across patient subgroups, data limitations prevent a full accounting of unobservable health risks that may shape willingness to travel. Finally, my setting focuses on breast cancer screening and it is unclear whether the results would fully generalize to other diagnostic technologies where cost and quality differ.

Nevertheless, these findings illustrate that rural technology upgrades can yield important improvements in access to high-quality diagnostic care, but efficiency depends on where funds are targeted. This analysis provides a framework for designing allocation policies that better balance access and cost-efficiency. Overall, this analysis illustrates that investments in rural health care quality can yield meaningful welfare gains by bringing services closer to those in need, but maximizing those gains requires careful attention to where and how those investments are made.

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A Appendix Tables

Table A1: Program Information and Funding Allotments from 2017-2019

	2017	2018	2019
<u>Eligibility</u>			
County Population	35,000	50,000	50,000
Qualifying Hospitals	50	58	58
Participating Hospitals	49	58	58
<u>Donations (\$1,000s)</u>			
Statewide Cap	10,000	60,000	60,000
Total	9,227	59,505	46,516
Mean	188.3	1,025.9	802.0
25th Percentile	59.0	634.2	340.5
50th Percentile	128.0	865.0	579.5
75th Percentile	243.0	1,268.5	918.2

Notes: This table shows eligibility for the program and the evolution of donations received from 2017-2019. In 2017, RHTC funds were only available to non-private hospitals in counties with populations below 35,000. In 2018, the population limit was raised to 50,000 and the number of participating hospitals increased to 58. Over this time frame, nearly every qualifying hospital received RHTC funds. The statewide cap on donations was raised by \$50 million in 2018, which led to a sharp increase in total and average funds received. Source: Georgia Department of Community Health.

Table A2: Reported Use of Funds and Spending Across Categories in 2018

	Funds Available	Funds Spent	Funds Reserved
Mean	\$1,080,189	\$871,584	\$208,604
25th Percentile	\$684,623	\$415,541	\$0
50th Percentile	\$904,350	\$802,032	\$0
75th Percentile	\$1,292,252	\$1,234,524	\$386,388

Category	Mean Spending	Median Spending	Frequency of Spending
Operations	\$383,898	\$93,570	32
Personnel	\$32,329	\$13,125	16
Med-Equipment	\$249,948	\$82,409	36
Facilities	\$219,484	\$24,180	26
Other	\$147,725	\$35,741	53

Notes: This table shows summary statistics from hospital level reports on utilization of RHTC funds in 2018. Columns 2, 3, and 4 shows summary statistics for the amount of RHTC funds available to hospitals in 2018, funds spent in 2018, and unspent funds that hospitals kept as financial reserves. On average, hospitals spent 80% of funds available, and held the remaining 20% as cash reserves. The reported distribution shows that more than half of all hospital spent all available funds in 2018. The bottom half of panel B shows a breakdown of hospital spending across categories. The largest share of RHTC funds were spent on regular operating expenses. The second largest reported expenditure category in 2018 is purchases of medical equipment. Source: Georgia Department of Community Health.

Table A3: Summary Statistics

	Treated	Control	<i>p-value</i>
Panel A: Hospital			
Net Worth	14,417.7 [21,544.1]	16,359.51 [29,247.45]	(0.428)
Fixed Assets	14,537.8 12,426.8	13,876.4 14,227.5	(0.595)
Hospital Equipment	11,760.7 [7,438.6]	11,342.4 [8,906.7]	(0.59)
FTE	0.25 [0.16]	0.29 [0.32]	(0.37)
Inpatient Days	6.65 [6.42]	7.18 [8.54]	(0.475)
Beds	51.4 [41.00]	49.5 [56.49]	(0.80)
Government Owned	0.63	0.64	
Hospital Count	58	95	
Panel B: County			
County Population	23,808.9 [13,700.7]	27,623.9 [17,244.8]	(0.01)
Percent Uninsured	18.7 [3.2]	16.7 [3.6]	(0.01)
Percent Above 65	15.9 [4.1]	16.5 [2.7]	(0.05)
Percent Employed	89.6 [2.9]	87.5 [3.9]	(0.01)

Notes: This table displays mean 2016 characteristics for subsidized rural Georgia hospitals and rural control hospitals from other southern states. Standard deviations are shown in brackets and p-values are shown in parentheses. County demographic variables are taken from the American Community Survey. Source: HCRIS.

Table A4: Identifying Screening Mammograms from CPT Codes

Modality	Screening	Diagnostic
3DM	77063	G0279, G0204, G0206
2DM	77067, G0202, 77057, 77052	77065, 77066, 77051, 77055, 77056, G0204, G0206

Notes: This table displays the procedure codes used to identify screening and diagnostic mammography encounters across imaging modalities.

Table A5: Comparing HCUP Screening Counts to Medicare Claims

Service	Medicare	HCUP	Percent
Screening 3DM	85,515	74,859	87
Screening 2DM	173,719	132,223	76

Notes: This table displays a comparison of screening mammography procedure counts between my primary data source and public-use Medicare aggregate files across Georgia in 2018. To match the Medicare population, I subset the HCUP data to individuals insured by Medicare FFS. At the state level, I capture 87% of 3DM screenings and 76% of 2DM screenings.

B Supplemental Analyses

B.1 Triple Difference Estimates of Subsidized Adoption:

I test the robustness of these results by estimating the triple difference specification presented in Equation 13. This model accounts for potential Georgia-specific factors that may be occurring concurrently with the implementation of the subsidy and could bias my estimated treatment effects. I address these potential confounding state-specific factors by comparing adoption rates among non-rural Georgia hospitals with those of non-rural hospitals located in control states. By differencing out adoption trends between these two non-rural groups this model is robust to time-varying state-specific confounders.

$$Y_{ht} = \beta_1(GA_h \cdot post_{ht} \cdot rural_h) + \beta_2(post_{ht} \cdot GA_h) + \beta_3(post_{ht} \cdot rural_h) + \lambda_t + \mu_h + \epsilon_{ht} \quad (13)$$

Table A6 presents the estimated effects from a standard difference-in-differences specification alongside the triple difference results. I find a significant 11 percentage point increase in the annual probability of 3DM adoption under the difference-in-differences specification that is significant at the 5% level. The triple difference estimate of 7.5 percentage points is significant at the 10% level. Though smaller in magnitude, the qualitative nature of these results suggests that the increased adoption of 3DM in rural Georgia hospitals is driven by the implemented subsidy. This increase in 3DM adoption at rural Georgia hospitals created plausibly exogenous variation in rural patients access to 3D-technology. In the next section, I exploit these time-varying changes in access to the nearest 3DM provider to quantify the effect of distance on screening technology choice.

Table A6: Effect of Subsidy on 3DM-Adoption

3D-Purchase	(DD)	(DDD)
Post x Subsidy	0.11** (0.035)	0.075* (0.042)
Controls		
Hospital FE	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y
Hospital-Year Observations	918	3,627

Notes: Column 1 reports estimates from the difference in differences model estimated using the sample of rural hospitals in GA and control states. Column 2 reports estimates from the triple differences model estimated using the sample of rural and urban hospitals in GA and control states. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Source: FDA

B.2 Marginal Changes in Distance to 3DM:

I exploit changes in rural patients' absolute distance to the nearest 3DM provider over time to estimate the elasticity of screening choice with respect to distance.

$$Y_{izt} = \rho d_{izt} + \lambda_t + \mu_z + X_i + County_i \cdot t + \epsilon_{zt} \quad (14)$$

Using the same sample of screening observations across 136 rural zip codes from 2016–2019, I estimate the model presented in equation 14. Outcome variable Y_{izt} is an indicator for whether individual i chooses to screen with 3DM. My preferred specification controls for zip code and period fixed effects, though I also test the robustness of results to patient level

controls and county-specific time-trends. Explanatory variable, d_{izt} , is a continuous measure of distance to the nearest 3DM provider in miles, so that ρ reflects the marginal effect of a change in distance to 3DM on the probability of screening with 3D-technology.

Table A7: Effect of Absolute Distance to 3DM on Technology Choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Reduced Form—Dependent Variable: Screened with 3DM			
Distance to 3DM	−0.0058*** (0.0008)	−0.0059*** (0.0009)	−0.0063*** (0.0008)
N	216,544	216,544	216,544
Panel B: First Stage—Dependent Variable: Distance Traveled			
Distance to 3DM	0.6951*** (0.0938)	0.6851*** (0.0928)	0.6478*** (0.0953)
N	72,595	72,595	72,595
Mean outcome	27.730	27.730	27.730
F-stat	64.9	37.6	5.348
Panel C: Second Stage—Dependent Variable: Screened with 3DM			
Predicted Distance to chosen provider	−0.0084*** (0.0012)	−0.0086*** (0.0013)	−0.0096 (0.0078)
Mean outcome	0.3352	0.3352	0.3352
Zip code FE:	X	X	X
Period FE:	X	X	X
Individual Controls:		X	X
County-Time-Trend:			X

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. This table displays the estimates from equation 14 quantifying the impact of distance to 3DM on 3DM utilization. Panel A reports the effect of distance to the closest 3DM provider in miles on the probability of 3DM screening. Panel B shows estimates of the relationship between minimum distance to 3DM and distance to the chosen 3D-screening provider. Panel C shows estimates from the second stage regression where predicted distance to the chosen 3DM providers is the explanatory variable. Each column includes period fixed effects. Column 1 includes zip code fixed effects, Column 2 adds patient level controls, Column 3 includes a linear time-trend at the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level, and bootstrapped using 500 iterations in Panel C.

To account for the fact that some women don't receive screenings at their nearest provider, I follow the approach of Gazze (2024) and supplement the results from equation 14 with a

two-sample two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) model. This model is estimated using the sample of women who screen with 3DM, where first stage regresses distance to the chosen screening provider on distance to the nearest 3DM provider. I use estimates from the first stage to construct a measure of predicted miles traveled to 3DM for the full sample which is the explanatory variable in the second stage of estimation. This two-stage procedure scales the reduced form estimates of distance’s effect on screening decisions by the share of compliers, that is, the individuals who change screening technology choice in response to a reduction in distance to 3DM. Standard errors for the second stage estimates are constructed via bootstrap.

Estimates in Panel A of Table A7 show that a one mile increase in distance to 3DM lowers the probability of 3D-take-up by -0.58 percentage points, equivalent to a 1.7% change in the mean outcome. This baseline estimated from column (1) is robust to alternative specifications including individual controls and time-varying trends. Panel B shows a strong first-stage relationship between minimum distance to 3DM and distance to the chosen provider for all specifications except column 3. This estimate implies that a one mile drop in distance to the nearest 3DM provider decreases the average distance traveled for 3D-screening by seven-tenths of a mile. Finally, I use the predicted distance estimate from the first-stage regression to estimate the scaled effect for the entire sample. Estimates in Panel C show that a one mile increase in predicted travel distance to 3DM reduces the probability of 3D-screening by -.084 percentage points. Together, these results show strong evidence that distance to 3D-technology is a key determinant in 3DM take-up.

Distance has a clear impact on screening decisions, but thus far, it is unclear whether these effects differ systematically across patient types. To quantify how changes in distance impact selection into 3D-screening, I estimate equation 14 on the sample of patients who choose to screen with 3DM, using patient characteristics as the outcome variable. These estimates measure changes in the average characteristics of rural 3DM screeners that result from marginal changes in distance to 3D-technology. Table A8 reports the results of this analysis across observable patient characteristics. Column 1 shows that women who opt into 3D-screenings at larger distances are more likely to have a family history of breast cancer, suggesting that patients’ willingness to travel to access 3DM is positively related to underlying health risk. Column 2 tests for differences in willingness to travel to 3DM across age. Qualitatively, younger women are more likely to travel further to access 3D-screenings, but the estimated effect is not distinguishable from zero. In columns 3 and 4, I find that women screened with 3DM when travel costs are higher are less likely to be non-white or

classified as Medicaid/Self-Pay. This suggests that lowering travel barriers to 3DM may have a larger effect on access for minority groups of lower socioeconomic status, but that the effects for women with observably higher health risk will be more muted.

Table A8: Changes in Mean Characteristics of 3DM Patients as Distance Varies

	Family History (1)	Age (2)	Non-White (3)	Medicaid/Self-Pay (4)
Distance to 3DM	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.001)
Sample Mean	0.115	62.07	0.244	0.092

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$,. This table shows the effect of distance to 3DM on the average characteristics of patients who select into 3D-screening. The model is estimated using the sample of rural patients who screen with 3DM (N=72,595). Each column shows the average change in patient characteristics for a one-mile increase in distance to the nearest 3DM provider. All regressions include zip code and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.

B.3 Alternative Measure of Screening Compliance:

This section tests for evidence of the effect of rural 3DM adoption on county level mammography screening compliance. I use two measures of screening compliance in this analysis, the first is constructed using Georgia HCUP data from 2016-2019. Over this sample period, the United States Preventative Service Taskforce recommended women ages 50 and up receive a screening mammogram every two years. I calculate two-year screening compliance at the county level using patient identifies in the discharge data to construct a measure of the number of unique screenings given to women in each Georgia county over a two year interval. I then scale this count by the ACS estimate of female county population for women 50 and up. I supplement this analysis with an additional county level compliance measure from the Dartmouth Atlas Dataverse’s Selected Primary Care Access and Quality Measures Data set. This data contains county level two year mammography screening compliance rates for women ages 67-69 in the fee-for service medicare population. For each data set, estimate the following two-way fixed effects model:

$$Y_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Rural * Post_{ct} + C + \tau + e_{ht}$$

Where Rural is an indicator for whether county c is defined as rural by the RHTC eligibility criteria, and $Post_{ct}$ is an indicator that equals 1 if any hospital in county c provides

3DM at time t . I estimate this model using county and year fixed effects. β_1 captures the average effect of rural 3DM adoption on county screening compliance rates, and is identified by differences in compliance trends between rural adoption counties all other counties in the state before and after adoption. Column 1 of Table A9 reports estimate of β_1 using the HCUP compliance measures while column 2 shows the estimate from the Medicare FFS sample. Both estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that rural 3DM adoption leads to substitution across screening types rather than an increase in screening compliance.

Table A9: County Screening Compliance and Rural 3DM adoption

	(1)	(2)
<i>Rural * Post_{ct}</i>	0.0103 (0.809)	0.002 (0.953)
Data Set	HCUP	Dartmouth Atlas
Sample Mean	0.68	0.71
County FE	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y
County Year Observations	415	415

Notes: This table shows estimates from a model regressing county level screening compliance rates on an indicator for rural 3DM adoption. Source: HCUP/Dartmouth Atlas.