Towards Vulnerability Discovery Using Staged Program Analysis

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Introduction

- Fixing **vulnerabilities** early in systems code **still relevant**
- Critical infrastructure, mass deployed embedded systems run C/C++ code
  - Memory corruption vulnerabilities
  - Variety of attacks: ROP, heap-spray

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But, hasn't static analysis been tried-and-tested?

- Yes, and no
- Yes, because
  - Frameworks like ITS4 to Coverity today use static analysis to find vulnerabilities
- No, because
  - **C++** static analysis is relatively **new**
  - How to deal with
    - **dynamic** language features?
    - novel programming paradigms e.g. **object-oriented programming**
  - Bug reporting is crucial yet underappreciated
    - Bug reported but unpatched is still a bug

Why is C++ a big deal?

```
1   class foo {
2    public :
3            int x ;
4            foo () {} // Constructor doesn't initialize "x"
5            bool isZero ();
6   };
```

```
1   # include "foo.h"
2
3   bool foo :: isZero () {
4        if ( !x )          // Potentially uninitialized
5            return true ;
6   }
```

```
1   # include "foo.h"
2
3   int main () {
4        foo f;  // Calls constructor (in header)
5        if ( f.isZero() ) // Calls method (in source)
6            return 0;
7        return 1;
8   }
```

Bug manifests **across** source file boundary

Institute of
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Problem

Current open-source tools don't flag bugs spanning source boundaries

- Maybe, this isn't as big an issue? **Wrong!**
- Majority of **Chromium**, **Firefox** bugs span file boundaries
- Same is true for other large codebases e.g. **MySQL**

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Our proposal

Melange

- Tackle multi-source-bugs by splitting analysis into **two stages**
- Stage 1: Analyze individual source files building up list of potential bugs
- Stage 2: Validate findings of stage 1 by doing whole-program analysis

Overview

How it works (1/2)

- Analyze object implementations one-by-one

```
1   #include "foo.h"
2
3   bool foo :: isZero () {
4           if ( !x )         // Potentially uninitialized
5                   return true ;
6   }
```

- Analysis happens alongside native compilation
- Flag potential bugs → *foo* :: *x* may be used uninitialized

How it works (2/2)

- Validate list of potential bugs

```
1    # include "foo.h"
2
3    int main () {
4            foo f;   // Calls constructor (in header)
5            if ( f.isZero() )  // Calls method (in source)
6                    return 0;
7            return 1;
8    }
```

- Analysis happens post compilation and program linking
- Output a bug report

Bug Report

```
1    // Source−level bug report
2    // report−e6ed9c.html
3    ...
4    Local Path to Bug: foo::x−>_ZN3foo6isZeroEv
5
6    Annotated Source Code
7    foo.cpp:4:6: warning: Potentially uninitialized object field
8     if (!x)
9        ^
10   1 warning generated.
11
12   // Whole−program bug report
13   ———————— report−e6ed9c.html ————————
14   [+] Parsing bug report report−e6ed9c.html
15   [+] Writing queries into LLVM pass header file
16   [+] Recompiling LLVM pass
17   [+] Running LLVM BugReportAnalyzer pass against main
18   ——————————————————————————————————————
19   Candidate callchain is:
20
21   foo::isZero()
22   main
23   —————————————————————————
```

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Extensible

Analysis can be extended to **multiple bug classes**

- Prototype supports the following bug classes
  - Type confusion
  - Garbage reads
  - Sign extension/conversion
- Adding support for a bug class entails
  - Clang Static Analyzer plug-in, AND
  - LLVM optimizer plug-in
- Analysis complexity orders of magnitude lesser than analyzed programs
  - Melange spans $\approx$ 2.6 thousand LoC
  - Largest analysis target $\approx$ 14 million LoC

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Evaluation

- **Effort** required to use
- **Benchmark** results
- **Effectiveness** in finding bugs in large codebases
- **Runtime** results

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Usability

Melange is easy-to-use

- Package with a production compiler toolchaing (Clang/LLVM)
- Our analysis plugs into standard compiler
- This means running our analysis is a matter of adding a few extra flags
  - No knowledge of build system required
  - Analysis invocation transparent to user (developer)

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Benchmark results

- Our analysis can be applied to multiple bug classes
- We have higher true positive rates compared to baseline
- Overall false positive rate is also higher but manageable
  - Security analyst/Developer can wade through them without being overwhelmed

Controlled evaluation

- Going through PHP bug reports, type confusion seems to be widespread
- We wrote a type checking Melange plugin and found five known exploitable vulnerabilities

Codebase	CVE ID	Bug ID
PHP	CVE-2015-4147	69085
PHP	CVE-2015-4148	69085
PHP	CVE-2014-3515	67492
PHP	Unassigned	73245
PHP	Unassigned	69152

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
Uncontrolled evaluation

- We analyzed Chromium, Firefox, MySQL releases from late 2015
- We found 3 bugs out of which 2 were rediscovered (previously found by fuzzing+dynamic analysis)
- Consistently found a handful of interesting potential bugs

Codebase (MLoC)	Bug reports		True positives
	Stage 1	Stage 2	
Chromium (14)	2686	12	2
Firefox (5)	587	16	1

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Our analysis is **much slower** than native compilation time...

- Total analysis time varies between 30-45x compilation time
- Some codebases are particularly suited for staged analysis
  - Modular build system permits incremental analysis

Fraction of Total Analysis Run-time (%)

Performance (2/2)

...But, it's **fast enough in practice**

- We rented an EC2 compute VM at $\approx$ 2 Euros/hour
- Total analysis runtime $\approx$ 48 hours $\approx$ **100 Euros**[1]
  - Firefox $\approx$ 31 hours $\approx$ 62 Euros
  - Chromium $\approx$ 13 hours $\approx$ 26 Euros
  - MySQL $\approx$ 4 hours $\approx$ 8 Euros
- Ours is a research prototype $\rightarrow$ Lots of room for optimizations

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[1]For first analysis only. Incremental analyses are cheaper

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Take aways

- Modern programming paradigms benefit from **staged analysis**
- Static analysis is **viable**
- Tools such as Melange
  - **complement** existing program testing techniques
  - Help **find** and **fix** bugs early

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Source code

- Melange checker source code at
  `https://github.com/bshastry/melange-checkers`
- Demo box at `https://github.com/bshastry/vagrant-pallang`

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