

# B(lue)Sides

Experiences from four years in the trenches  
that will change the way you think about your detection capability

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# About me

- Cybersecurity consultant @PwC
- Three years @BankOfEngland SOC
- Intelligence Driven ID&R proponent
- I think a lot about models and methods

# About this talk

Misperceptions and insights  
(tech and beyond) on building a  
(truly) effective detection capability

# What am I presenting?

Not the #HolyGrailOfDetection but rather my personal experience and views on building an effective detection capability

On pretty  
good  
detection  
capability

- that isn't



For the past year, I've  
been asking my  
clients...

“How do you detect attacks against your assets?”

#1

“We have contracted  
an **MSSP** to monitor  
our network...”

- but have no idea what they are doing

# #2

“We have invested in  
best of breed security  
**products....**”

- but are not absolutely sure why
- we have **some** idea what they are doing

#3

“We are collecting all  
logs in a SIEM...”

- still not sure what to do with those  
(i.e. nobody really monitors because it's a mess)

# #4


“We are doing regular  
pentests and red team  
exercises...”

- and they find critical findings every time so...

# (Heart)breaking news

- It **ain't** gonna work!

#ButYouAlreadyKnew



**BUT.....**

**WHHHHYYYYYYYY?????**

#1

“We have contracted  
an **MSSP** to monitor  
our network...”

#1

You know your  
organisation better than  
any MSSP ever will

...if you don't, how are  
you **sure** your MSSP is  
doing a good job?

#2

“We have invested in  
best of breed security  
**products...**”

#2

Even the best products  
**cannot detect all**  
attacks.

No tool can substitute a  
capable analyst.

#3

“We are collecting **all**  
logs in a SIEM...”

#3

Collecting the logs is  
not enough.

Collecting ***all*** the logs is  
a **very bad idea**.

#4

“We are doing regular  
pentests and red team  
exercises...”

#4

Pentests and Red Teams  
are **not designed** to  
substitute your blue  
team.

Just saying...

# 404

# Detection

# Capability

# Not Found!



On pretty  
good  
detection  
capability  
- that actually is!




“You don’t reach the mountaintop from the mountaintop. You start from the bottom and climb up”.

# The Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs

- Matt Swann

Most companies start here...

...instead of here



Know **WHAT** you are defending before you try defending it!

“Every battle is won before it is fought”

**THREAT INTELLIGENCE**

**SO HOT RIGHT NOW**

# The ATT&CK Matrix

- MITRE

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impact
11 items	33 items	59 items	28 items	67 items	19 items	22 items	17 items	13 items	22 items	9 items	14 items
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Domain Trust Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Data Encrypted	Defacement
External Remote Services	Compiled HTML File	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe
Hardware Additions	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Data from Local System	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe	Endpoint Denial of Service
Replication Through Removable Media	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing Attachment	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Network Sniffing	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Inhibit System Recovery
Spearphishing Link	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Network Denial of Service	
Spearphishing via Service	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation Algorithms	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Resource Hijacking
Supply Chain Compromise	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Runtime Data Manipulation
Trusted Relationship	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	Component Object Model Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop	
Valid Accounts	Launchctl	Component Firmware	File System Permissions Weakness	DCShadow	Kerberoasting	Query Registry	Replication Through Removable Media	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels	Stored Data Manipulation	
Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Hooking	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Keychain	Remote System Discovery	Security Software Discovery	Video Capture	Multiband Communication	Transmitted Data Manipulation	
LSASS Driver	Create Account	Create Account	Image File Execution Options Injection	Disabling Security Tools	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	SSH Hijacking	SSH Hijacking				
Msihta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content					
PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Dylib Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	System Network Configuration Discovery	Third-party Software					
Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	External Remote Services	Path Interception	Execution Guardrails	Private Keys	System Network Connections Discovery	Windows Admin Shares				
Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	Plist Modification	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Securityd Memory	System Owner/User Discovery	Windows Remote Management				
Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Hidden Files and Directories	Port Monitors	Extra Window Memory Injection	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Service Discovery					
Scheduled Task	Hooking	Hooking	Process Injection	File Deletion		System Time Discovery					
Scripting	Hypervisor	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion					
Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File System Logical Offsets							
Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	Gatekeeper Bypass							
Signed Script Proxy Execution	Launch Agent	Launch Agent	SID-History Injection	Group Policy Modification							
Source	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon	Startup Items	Hidden Files and Directories							
Space after Filename	Launchctl	Launchctl	Sudo	Hidden Users							
Third-party Software	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Sudo Caching	Hidden Window							
Trap	Local Job Scheduling	Local Job Scheduling	Valid Accounts	HISTCONTROL							
Trusted Developer Utilities											
User Execution											

Attacker Techniques

Anyone said...knowledge base of attacker TTPs?

attack.mitre.org/groups/

finance 2/2

APT37		Group, Comment Panda	its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.
APT38	APT12	IXESHE, DynCalc, Numbered Panda, DNSCALC	APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. The group has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments.
APT39	APT16		APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.
Axiom	APT17	Deputy Dog	APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.
BlackOasis	APT18	TG-0416, Dynamite Panda, Threat Group-0416	APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.
BRONZE BUTLER	APT19	Codoso, C0d0so0, Codoso Team, Sunshop Group	APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.
Carbanak	APT28	SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127	APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. APT28 has been active since at least 2004.
Charming Kitten	APT29	YTTRIUM, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke	APT29 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.
Cleaver	APT3	Gothic Panda, Pirpi, UPS Team, Buckeye, Threat Group-0110, TG-0110	APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.
Cobalt Group			MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.
CopyKittens			
Dark Caracal			
Darkhotel			
DarkHydrus			
Deep Panda			
Dragonfly			
Dragonfly 2.0			
DragonOK			
Dust Storm			
Elderwood			
Equation			
FIN10			

WHO would target your assets?

“Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom”

# What do you see?

- Data sources their **quality** and the **visibility** they give you

## ApplInit DLLs

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the ApplInit\_DLLs value in the Registry keys

`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows` or

`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows` are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. [1] Similar to [Process Injection](#), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. [2]

The ApplInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. [3]

ID: T1103

Tactic: Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Platform: Windows

System Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later

Permissions Required: Administrator


Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry

Version: 1.0

# Understanding your visibility


Check it Out:  
 ATT&CK Navigator  
<https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/>



“A petabyte of data is a terrible thing to waste”

# Developing Detection Analytics


1. Something you **read**
2. Something you **tried**
3. Something you **know**



METTA

# Understanding your detection coverage

Detection coverage is bias prone!  
-no, you have not covered everything



“One Team, Two Team, Red Team, Blue Team!”

# Building confidence in your detection capability

-a.k.a. how to know it's working

Four approaches:

1. Test it yourself (but Bias!)
2. Test it with someone else (think Purple Team)
3. Have someone put it to the test (think Red Team)
4. Wait for someone to put it to the test (ATTAAACK!)

# Use that to identify the gaps...

Tip: Maps of your detection capability can be overlaid with maps of what the Red Team has tried, or what your top adversaries are usually doing to uncover your detection gaps!

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impact
11 items	27 items	42 items	21 items	57 items	16 items	22 items	15 items	13 items	21 items	9 items	14 items
Supply Chain Compromise	Control Panel Items	Security Support Provider	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Input Capture	Password Policy Discovery	Logon Scripts	Input Capture	Domain Fronting	Data Compressed	Endpoint Denial of Service
Drive-by Compromise	Service Execution	PowerShell	AppCert DLLs	Extra Window Memory Injection	Control Panel Items	Credential Dumping	Remote System Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Port	Uncommonly Used	
Spearphishing Attachment	Regsvr32	Rundll32	Logon Scripts	Process Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection	Credentials in Registry	System Information Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Email Collection	Remote Access Tools	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Scripting	Scheduled Task	Image File Execution Options Injection	AppCert DLLs	Masquerading	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	System Owner/User Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	User Execution	Scheduled Task	Application Shimming	Image File Execution Options Injection	Process Injection	Regsvr32	Account Discovery	Automated Collection	Data Obfuscation	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Hardware Additions	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Application Shimming	Scheduled Task	Brute Force	System Network Configuration Discovery	Process Discovery	Clipboard Data	Standard Application Layer Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Defacement
Replication Through Removable Media	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	Accessibility Features	Image File Execution Options Injection	Credentials in Files	Pass the Ticket	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Communication Through Alternative Protocol	Exfiltration Over Disk Structure Wipe	
Spearphishing Link	Compiled HTML File	Compiled HTML File	Appnlt DLLs	Timestamp	Exploitation for Credential Access	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Local System	Connection Proxy	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Package	Applnit DLLs	Obfuscated Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Remote File Copy	Data from Removable Media	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Inhibit System Recovery	
Trusted Relationship	Execution through API	Execution through Module Load	Bypass User Account Control	Binary Padding	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Removable Media	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Scheduled Transfer	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	BITS Jobs	BITS Jobs	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Input Prompt	File and Directory Discovery	Network Share Discovery	Data Staged	Man in the Browser	Data Encoding	Runtime Data Manipulation	
	Bootkit	Bootkit	Kerberoasting	Kerberoasting	Network Sniffing	Taint Shared Content	Screen Capture	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Service Stop	Stored Data Manipulation	
	Browser Extensions	Browser Extensions	Network Sniffing	Network Sniffing	Private Keys	Peripheral Device Discovery	Video Capture	Domain Generation Algorithms			
	Change Default File Association	Change Default File Association	Code Signing	Code Signing	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Third-party Software					
	Component Firmware	Component Firmware	Compile After Delivery	Compile After Delivery	Component Firmware	Windows Admin Shares					
	Component Object Model Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Compiled HTML File	Compiled HTML File	DCShadow	Query Registry					
	Create Account	New Service	Component Object Model Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Security Software Discovery					
	DLL Search Order Hijacking	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Port Monitors	Port Monitors	Disabling Security Tools	System Network Connections Discovery					
	External Remote Services	External Remote Services	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	DLL Search Order Hijacking	System Service Discovery					
	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness	SID-History Injection	SID-History Injection	DLL Side-Loading	System Time Discovery					
	Hidden Files and Directories	Hidden Files and Directories	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	Execution Guardrails	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion					
	Hooking	Hooking	Web Shell	Web Shell	Exploitation for Defense						

legend

Multi-hop Pro

Multi-Stage Channels

Multiband Communication

Multilayer Encryption

Remote File C

Standard Cryptographic Protocol

Standard Non Application L

Add Item

Clear

# TL;DR

If you want to detect attacks against your assets...

## 1. Prepare to **get your hands dirty**

- MSSPs, Products, SIEMS and Pentests cannot do the trick if you don't.

## 2. Adopt a **structured** approach

- Two models to get you started: The Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs and ATT&CK

## 3. **Visualise, visualise, visualise**

- To know where you are at, where you are going to and track your progress.



**ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY**

**SAY THANK YOU WITHOUT A MEME**

# Go Explore!