

# Taste the Rainbow

Dave Hartley - MWR InfoSecurity




# GREETINGS! PROGRAMS!

- Director @mwrinfosecurity | @mwrlabs - UK.
- CHECK TL, CREST CC, CSAS & CSAM.
- 
- CBEST (UK), TBEST (UK), GBEST (UK), TIBER (NL) & ICAST (SG).




# Agenda

- Rainbow Teaming
- Evolving TTP's
- Defenses



# TEAM RAINBOW



# Pink Team?

- **Black** - Physical
- **Red** - Digital Offensive
- **Blue** - Detection and Response
- **Purple** - Red & Blue working together
- **Gold** - Crisis Management



# What is Rainbow Team(ing)?

- I've been around long enough to see the consulting industry come full circle.
- When I started we were invited to 'penetrate' a client and get as far as we could. Often the challenge was "put a file on my desktop" with 0 knowledge.
- It then became you can't do this, you can't do that, just do this, only do that. Tight and narrow scoped assessments of \$thing in isolation.
- Now we're back to come at me bro.



# What is Rainbow Team(ing)?

- Red Team means different things in UK vs US.
- PRA/FCA (BoE) have created a Red Team for compliance purposes.
- Power and Energy, Telco, Space, etc also.

# Full Spectrum Cyber

- Full Spectrum Cyber - Northrop Grumman.
- Full Spectrum Attack Simulation - NCC.
- Targeted Attack Simulation - MWR.
- Simulated Attack - CREST.
- Rainbow Team?




- It doesn't really matter what you call it - as long as it has value!
- Should be a custom solution built around objectives and have business impact.
- Not going to cover Black. Following is in order I would prioritize.



**IS IT PLUGGED IN?**

# Blue

- Validate and verify your assumptions / confirm your existing investment - does what it says on the tin?
- Tune those detection sensors / boxen with blinkenlights.
- Att&ck - Caldera | MWR AttackSim | Roll Your Own
- Christopher Payne (Target) - Steel Sharpens Steel: Using Red Teams to improve Blue Teams.





- Run a **Red** to put **Blue** through a live fire round.
- Get maximum value by including a **Purple** session and using the exercise as basis for a post op **Gold** workshop.

*Purple*  
*and*  
*Gold*

A stylized, hand-drawn font logo. The word "Purple" is written in purple cursive, "and" is in smaller yellow cursive, and "Gold" is in large yellow cursive. The words are layered and overlap each other.

# Evolving TTP's




**TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND  
PROCEDURES GUIDE**



# Good Old Days



# Browsers & Extensions




# Blinkenlights & Boxen



# Back Orifice



# Post Compromise



- Cobalt Strike | Powershell Empire
- PowerUp | Kerberoasting
- SPN | Find-InterestingFile | AD Control Map (MWR Bloodhound)
- Credential theft shuffle PSEXEC | Mimikatz | Pass-The-Hash et al.



S P E C T E R O P S



# EDR | ETDR | NGAV



cybereason




Carbon Black.

COUNTERCEPT




# Spoilsports



- PS - the ride is over. They're on to us. Logging, Constrained Language Mode, Just Enough Admin support.
- Macro (from untrusted) blocked, DDE Disabled, no more executable Outlook rules (HKCU key).
- App Locker / SRP / White Listing - people are starting to take this seriously.

# Thrunters are Thrunting





impervious



# Get In & Get Out

- Get a foothold and persist.
- Gather some intel and do some recon.
- Move laterally and persist.
- Execute.
- Get out alive.



# FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE



**John Lambert**

@JohnLaTwC

General Manager, Microsoft Threat  
Intelligence Center,  
[johnla\(AT\)microsoft.com](mailto:johnla@microsoft.com),  
[linkedin.com/in/johnjlambert](https://linkedin.com/in/johnjlambert)



# Payloads

- Avoid attachments, if you can. Usually less controls on web downloads, not often sandboxed.
- Client side script JS / VBS (avoid Kernel32 API calls) - e.g. CACTUSTORCH from MDSEC and SharpShooter (includes sandbox evasion); both leverage DotNet2Jscript from James Forshaw.
- Stageless custom executables that also leverage COM / DLL hijacking techniques.
- Take heed of DLL / memory injection / process hallowing, look to Doppelgänging also? See CS OpSec blog.



MWR - **Inappropriate Touch** (custom implant - in Dev).



';--have i been pwned?



Office 365



skype™



yammer®



# Custom Command & Control (C3)



**Dropbox**



Google Drive



**OneDrive**



**Office 365**



# Don't get Burned



- Post exploitation avoid PS and stay away from system.management.automation (InsecurePowerShell?).
- Recon via limited SPN / Kerberoasting. Live off The Land and use WMI, LDAP, biz tools like SCCM (hunt with it too), Intranet (SharePoint, Confluence, Wiki). Stay away from DCs.
- Lateral Movement via Trojan files, RDP, SCCM / Altiris, GPO Tasks - try not to leave a straight line / trail. Use tickets if you can (Silver). Use AES for Over-PTH, Golden Tickets.

# Know your Enemy

- Turn your targets defenses against them and/or operate within them.
  - Smash and Grab (MTTD).
  - Deception.
  - Diversions.






# Defense



# Defense

- E-Mail gateway security solution block attachments from untrusted sources, sandbox all incoming, crawl to site and do same (also SPF, DKIM and DMARC).
- 2FA on all external services (including 3rd party cloud).
- Web proxy and only resolve internal DNS internally.
- Isolate workstations and restrict to their BizOps servers and services (segment critical systems). Operate least privilege for all.
- Red Forest (ESAE) - LAPS, PAW & PAM, JEA & JIT?



# Defense: endpoint

- Run latest and greatest everything.
- Whitelist / App Locker / SRP etc. disable and/or remove / Macro, VBA, PowerShell, JScript, VBScript - all the things.
- Deploy AV, NGAV, EDR, ETDR - stick it all on.




# Defense: people

- Benchmark, invest and train Blue Team.
- Educate, enable, support and enlist users (DevSecOps philosophy). Give them a channel to raise alarms / come and speak to SecOps etc.
- Keep Blue Team match fit with regular Red Team sparring matches (Purple philosophy).



# Good People & Tool Smiths

- Dominic Chell and Vincent Yiu (MDSec) - A Year In The Red.
- Christopher Payne (Target) - Steel Sharpens Steel: Using Red Teams to improve Blue Teams.
- @malwareunicorn - .NET Hijacking to Defend PowerShell (presentation and paper).
- @retBandit (IBM) - Red Team Techniques for Evading, Bypassing & Disabling Advanced Threat Protection and Advanced Threat Analytics.



# The End




**@mwrlabs | @mwrinfosecurity | @countercept**

# FAQ

- I only have budget for **Red**, **Blue**, **Purple** or **Gold** - which one do I do first?
- Investing in people is expensive, how do I get budget / buy in?
- I spent a fortune on \$tech, is it worthless / what \$tech is best?





# Offensive Tooling

- PEAS is a tool for running commands on an ActiveSync server e.g. Microsoft Exchange - <https://github.com/mwrlabs/peas>.
- WePWNise generates architecture independent VBA code to be used in Office documents that automagically bypasses application controls and exploit mitigations - <https://github.com/mwrlabs/wePWNise>.
- C3 uses Cobalt Strike External C2 feature to implement beacon compatible esoteric C2 channels.
- XRulez is a tool for creating malicious outlook rules - <https://github.com/mwrlabs/XRulez> for persistence purposes.



# Light Reading

- Recon - <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/active-directory-users-in-nested-groups-reconnaissance>, <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/visualising-organisational-charts-from-active-directory> & <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/offline-querying-of-active-directory>.
- Code execution (avoiding command line logging) using COM objects from within VBA or DLL (whitelist bypass) - <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/dll-tricks-with-vba-to-improve-offensive-macro-capability>
- Safer Implants: <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/safer-shellcode-implants> & Hiding Implants in plain sight - <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/masquerading-as-a-windows-system-binary-using-digital-signatures>.
- Office Persistence - <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/publications/one-template-to-rule-em-all> & <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence>.
- Lateral Movement - <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/abusing-putty-and-pageant-through-native-functionality> & <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/trust-years-to-earn-seconds-to-break>.

B  
8  
S  
O  
D  
E  
S  
  
NYC

