BSIDES

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The ultimate Authentication Brute-Force detection using super stats



stats values(*) Alex Teixeira

- Over 15y of professional experience in Infosec
- Former Splunker (Top PS Sales Contributor FY'16)
- Last 4y solely dedicated to writing SPL (detection use cases) for enterprise Security Teams as a freelancer
- Recently joined an MDR provider based in NY as a Senior Content Engineer (SPL, KQL, Detection Research)



Why this?

Problem Statement

Because SPL is awesome, and I'd like to share how I use it! Because *virtually* every computer system is a potential target of bruteforce attacks

MITRE's ATT&CK T1110

- Password Guessing (.001)
- Password Spraying (.003)
- Password Cracking
- Credential Stuffing

Brute Force

Sub-techniques (4)

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.






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
However, it must be said that *Hacking* and even breaches in general are driven by credential theft. Over 80% of breaches within

Hacking involve Brute Force or the Use of lost or stolen credentials.



https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/2020-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf









What makes it a *potential* attack?

- 1. How many accounts are targeted?
- 2. What's the attack timespan?
- 3. How many origins are involved in the attack?
- 4. What's the # of attempts per target account?
- 5. Was there a successful authentication involved?



Data Sources

RAW (majority)

- VPN logs
- Eventlogs
- SignIn/Cloud logs
- Nix/Net devices

Data Model (some)

- Splunk's CIM
- tag=authetication
- action field
- Acceleration

Custom (few)

- Summary index
- Tstats-enabled index via selective 'IFX'

- Origin (src host/IP)
- Target (user acc + [dest host/IP])
- Action (success/failure)

Relevant fields

O365, AD auth differ from local one!



Brute-Force Attack types

Type \ Attributes	Trigger Condition (Threshold)	Scenario	Footprint	
Account Brute-Force	- Single account, single origin - More than A (attempts per target) within short \mathcal{T} (timespan) from same origin towards the same account	Vanilla attack, too many attempts against the same target from the same origin.	Medium	
Mass Account Brute-Force	Multiple instances of above from same origin, affecting too many accounts	Noisy version of above (ex.: Internet Scanners, Bots, etc).	High	
Password Spray	 Multiple accounts, single origin More than U (account targets) from same origin are seen Avg # of attempts per target is <= A 	Detects attacks below vanilla threshold towards multiple targets, even if they are 'low and slow'.	Vary	
Targeted Account Brute-Force	 Single account, multiple origins More than O (origins) observed towards same target account – not matching a default one 	Multiple origins targeting a single, non-default. Default includes <i>administrator</i> , <i>admin</i> , <i>root</i> , <i>guest</i> , etc.	Low	

 [∴] Overlapping possible, alert aggretaion makes a big difference. More on that later.



Demo Dataset

Multiple BF attack instances and types, easily customizable via simple SPL commands




```
I makeresults ``` all events within 1h (demo rule detection interval) ``
I where 0=1 ``` filters out empty record ```
| append [ | makeresults count=3 | eval time=relative time(now(), -0s"), src="pokev", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="admin" ] ... vanilla attack...
| append [ | makeresults count=3 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-1s"), src="pokey", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="admin"]
| append [ | makeresults count=6 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-100s"), src="blinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="backup" ] `` successful attack ``
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-99s"). src="blinky", signature="User login successful", action="success", user="backup" ]
   noisy attack ""
| append [ | makeresults count=8 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-10min), src="speedy", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user=mvappend("admin", "root", "test", "administrator", "guest"
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-30min , user="princesspeach", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src=myappend("bird", "jordan", "johnson", "pippen", "ro
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-50min ), user="larrykoopa", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src=mvappend("bird", "jordan", "johnson", "pippen", "robin
  `slow targeted attack``
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -10min*), user="donkeykongjr", signature="User login successful", action="success", src="bird" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -15min ), user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src="jordan" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -20min ), user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src="johnson"]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time_(now(), -25min"), user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src="pippen" ]
| append [ | makeresults counted to authenticate", action="failure", src="robinson"], user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src="robinson"]
                   📈 s count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 🖁 -35min 放, user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", src="clyde" ]
           makeresults count=1 | eval_time=relative_time(now(), -40min ), user="donkeykongjr", signature="User failed to authent<u>icate", action="failure", src="malone"</u>]
   fast password spray
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), "-55min"), src="shadow", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user=mvappend("admin", "root", "test", "administrator", "guest
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -10min , src="pinky", signature="User login successful", action="success", user="admin" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -15min , src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="root" ]
                                                                                                                                                                                 Some noise/legit events
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -20min -, src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="test" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -25min , src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="administrator" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval time=relative time(now(). -30min . src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="guest" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -35min-, src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="info" ]
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -40min ), src="pinky", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="contact" ]
   random noise/legit sessions
| append [ | makeresults count=4 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), | -6s"), | src="workstation10", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="administrator" ] ** 4 failed, then success (FP) **
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -0s"), -src="workstation10", signature="User login successful", action="success", user="administrator"]
| append [ | makeresults count=3 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), | -1s"), | src="speedy", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="backup" ] *** speedy below threshold (FP) ****
| append [ | makeresults count=3 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), -10s"), src="laptop1", signature="User failed to authenticate", action="failure", user="root" ] ``` legit/noise (FP) ``
| append [ | makeresults count=1 | eval _time=relative_time(now(), 1-0s"), src="laptop2", signature="User login successful", action="success", user="admin" ]
```

The 'high-level' plot

Attack Type	Origin (src)	Target (user)
Account Brute-Force (BF)	- Pokey	- admin
Account brute-roice (br)	- Speedy	- multiple default accounts
Successful Account BF	- Blinky	- backup
Mass Account BF	- Speedy	- multiple default accounts
(Fast) Password Spray	- Shadow	- multiple default accounts
(Slow) Successful Password Spray	- Pinky	- multiple default accounts
(Fast, Slow & <i>Successful</i>) Targeted Account BF	- NBA Stars	- multiple Mario All Stars
Stealth BF Attack	?	?





Dataset Summary

per src (origin)

Total events: 123



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
Detection Strategy

- Run every 1h and leverage multiple *stats
- For fast: **10s** window, other: rule's
- Aggregate alerts by "attack flows"
 - Faster alert triage
 - Focus on a bigger picture (attacker/target focus)
 - Leverage Data Analytics






Crafting the query: base search






Crafting the query: Vanilla Attack




Crafting the query: Mass & Spray

detection!



Crafting the query: Targeted attack





splunk >

Crafting the query: Summarization


```
| Stats min(start_time) AS start_time, max(end_time) AS end_time, values(target) AS target, values(signature) AS signature, values(reason) AS reason
| BY origin '' aggregate by origin of attacks (best bet for this sort of detection) ''
| eval attack_hash=md5(mvjoin(mvappend(reason, ""), "")) '' add as many distinct fields to mvappend() as necessary (sourcetype, customer) for distinct summarization ''
| stats min(start_time) AS start_time, max(end_time) AS end_time, values(origin) AS origin, values(target) AS target, values(signature) AS signature, values(reason) AS reason
| BY attack_hash '' aggregate by attack flow '''
| rename origin AS src, target AS user |
| fields - attack_hash '' you may use this for alert id (dedup, throttling, suppression, etc) '''
| fields - attack_hash ''' you may use this for alert id (dedup, throttling, suppression, etc) '''
```






Ready for ES' IR dashboard	start_time		src ✓	user \$ /	signature \$	reason \$			
	1618159121	1618159122	blinky	backup	Potential Successful Brute- Force Attack	Potential Successful Brute-Force Attack: There were [6] failed attempts and [1] successful login(s) observed from origin [blinky] towards [backup] over 2 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:38:41 and 2021-04-11 18:38:42. Rate: ~4 attempts/s.			
Contex	ext-rich	1618159220	speedy	admin administrator backup contact guest info root test	Mass Brute-Force Attack Potential Brute- Force Attack	Mass Brute-Force Attack: more than 4 brute-force targets observed from same origin [speedy]. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [admin] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [administrator] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [contact] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [guest] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [info] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [root] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [root] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s. Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [8] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [speedy] towards [root] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:30:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Rate: "8 attempts/s.	Lucky attacker		
Unlucky attacker	1618155921	1618155921	shadow	admin administrator contact guest info root test	Potential Password Spray Attack	Potential Password Spray Attack: there were [7] failed attempts (~1/attacked target) and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [shadow] towards [7] targets [admin, administrator, contact, guest, info, root, test] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 17:45:21 and 2021-04-11 17:45:21.		Attack Flows	
1	1618159220	1618159221	pokey	admin	Potential Brute- Force Attack	Potential Brute-Force Attack: There were [6] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from origin [pokey] towards [admin] over 2 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:40:20 and 2021-04-11 18:40:21. Rate: ~3 attempts/s.			
	1618156821	1618157421	malone	donkeykongjr princesspeach	Potential Successful Targeted Brute-Force Attack Potential Targeted Brute-Force Attack	Potential Successful Targeted Brute-Force Attack: there were [6] failed attempts and [1] successful login(s) observed from multiple origins [clyde, johnson, jordan, malone, pippen, robinson] towards target [donkeykongjr] over 1801 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:09:21 and 2021-04-11 18:39:21. Potential Targeted Brute-Force Attack: there were [7] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from multiple origins [bird, clyde, johnson, jordan, malone, pippen, robinson] towards target [princesspeach] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:10:21.	15		
All affected target accounts	1618156821	1618158621	pinky	admin administrator contact guest info root test	Potential Successful Password Spray Attack	Potential Successful Password Spray Attack: there were [6] failed attempts (-1/attacked target) and [1] successful login(s) observed from origin [pinky] towards [6] targets [admin, administrator, contact, guest, info, root, test] over 1801 second(s) between 2021-04-11 18:00:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21.			
	1618156221	1618158621	bird clyde johnson jordan pippen robinson	donkeykongjr larrykoopa princesspeach	Potential Successful Targeted Brute-Force Attack Potential Targeted Brute-Force Attack	2021-04-11 18:00:21 and 2021-04-11 18:30:21. Potential Targeted Brute-Force Attack: there were [6] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from multiple origins [bird, clyde, johnson, jordan, pippen, robinson] towards target [larrykoopa] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11 17:50:21 and 2021-04-11 17:50:21. Potential Targeted Brute-Force Attack: there were [7] failed attempts and [0] successful login(s) observed from multiple origins [bird clyde johnson jordan malone pippen robinson] towards target [princesspeach] over 1 second(s) between 2021-04-11		splunk>	

Under the radar: Stealth successful attack



Streamstats to the rescue!



Take it to the next level

- Consider these results as *indicators* in case you have custom alert frameworks in place (RBA/UBA), apply scores/factors per signature
- For MSSPs or multi-tenant environments: simply add tenant (customer) to each stats' *group by* clause
- For Splunk's Authentication DM, simply add sourcetype to the *group* by clause to get alerts per distinct data source
- Use macros or lookups for dynamic thresholds
- Consider "Potential Account Abuse/Compromise" use case next



Thanks!

Questions or feedback?

You can find me at "splunk-usergroups" Slack (Alex Teixeira)

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