


中国，一个复兴的帝国

A Chinese Empire Reborn

黄安伟
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2015年，在北京举行的阅兵式。 JONAH M. KESSEL/THE NEW YORK TIMES

I am the son of two empires, the United States and China. I was born in and raised around Washington in the Nixon-to-Reagan era, but my parents grew up in **villages** in southern China. My father was a **member of the People's Liberation Army** in the 1950s, the first decade of Communist rule, before he soured on the revolution and left for Hong Kong.

我是两个帝国的儿子，一个是美国，另一个是中国。虽然我是在从尼克松到里根的时代在华盛顿附近出生、长大的，但我的父母都生长在中国南方的村子里。在共产党统治的头十年，也就是1950年代，我父亲曾在**中国人民解放军当过兵**，后来他对革命失望，离开大陆去了香港。

So it was with excitement that I landed in Beijing in April 2008 to start an assignment with The New York Times that stretched to almost a decade. I had just spent nearly four years reporting on **the bloody failure of the American imperial project in Iraq**, and now I was in the metropole that was building a new world order.


所以，当《纽约时报》派我到中国工作时，我怀着激动的心情于2008年4月来到北京，在中国住了将近十年的时间。在那之前，我已经为报道**美国帝国伊拉克计划的惨重失败**工作了近四年；而此刻，我来到了正在建立一种世界新秩序的国家的首都。

China had entered a honeymoon phase with other nations. For years, anticipation had built for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Though China had **suppressed a Tibetan uprising** that spring, it earned international good will after a **devastating earthquake**.

中国当时与其他国家进入了蜜月时期。人们对2008年的夏季奥运会已期待了好几年了。虽然中国在那年春天镇压了**西藏的一次起义**，但在经历了一次**破坏性极大的地震**之后，中国再次赢得了国际社会的好感。

People flocked to Beijing for China's "coming out" party. Foreign leaders gawked at **gleaming architecture** and opening ceremonies that signaled the nation's ambitions. After the festivities ended, the world arrived at another inflection point — the implosion of the American financial system and the global economic crisis. China's growth buttressed both the world economy and a belief among its officials that its economic and political systems could rival those of the United States.

人们蜂拥而至来到北京，参加中国在世界舞台上“首次亮相”的聚会。**耀眼的建筑和标志着中国雄心的奥运会开幕式**，让外国领导人看得目瞪口呆。庆典结束后，世界步入了另一个转折点——美国金融体系的突然崩溃和全球经济危机。中国经济的持续增长不仅支撑了全球经济，也支撑了中国官员中的一种信念，那就是，中国的经济和政治体系可以与美国的相匹敌。



习近平主席在阅兵。 NG HAN GUAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Though unabashedly authoritarian, China was a magnet. I was among many who thought it might forge a confident and more open identity while ushering in a vibrant era of new ideas, values and culture, one befitting its superpower status. When I ended my China assignment last year, I no longer had such expectations.

尽管中国对威权主义毫不掩饰，但这个国家仍具有强大的吸引力。我曾和许多人一样，认为中国在开启一个具有新观念、新价值和新文化的充满活力的时代。一个适合其超级大国地位的时代的**同时**，可能会稳步进入一个自信的、更加开放的状态。但当我在去年结束我在中国的工作时，我已不再这样指望了。

Of the global powers that dominated the 19th century, China alone is a rejuvenated empire. The Communist Party commands a vast territory that the ethnic-Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty cobbled together through war and diplomacy. And the dominion could grow: China is using its military to test potential control of disputed borderlands from the **South China Sea** to the **Himalayas**, while firing up nationalism at home. Once again, states around the world pay homage to the court, as in 2015 during a huge **military parade**.


在曾经主宰19世纪的全球大国中，只有中国是一个正在复兴的帝国。中国共产党统治着一片广阔的疆域，这片领土是清朝的满族统治者用战争和外交手段拼凑起来的。而且，这个版图可能还要扩大：中国正在使用自己的军事力量来测试对**南中国海**和**喜马拉雅山脉**有争议边疆的潜在控制权，同时在**国内**激发民族主义情绪。世界各国再次纷纷前来朝廷表敬意，这次是在2015年举行的一个盛大阅兵式上。

For decades, the United States was a global beacon for those who embraced certain values — the rule of law, free speech, clean government and human rights. Even if policy often fell short of those stated ideals, American "soft power" remained as potent as its armed forces. In the post-Soviet era, political figures and scholars regarded that American way of **amassing power through attraction** as a central element of forging a modern empire.

几十年来，美国曾是信奉法治、言论自由、廉洁政府和人权等价值观的人的全球灯塔。即使美国的政策常常不能达到这些表述出来的理想，但美国的“软实力”仍保持着与其武力一样的强大效力。在后苏联时代，政治人物和学者们认为，**通过吸引来积累控制力**的美国方式是建立现代帝国的核心要素。

China's rise is a blunt counterpoint. From 2009 onward, Chinese power in domestic and international realms has become synonymous with brute strength, bribery and browbeating — and the Communist Party's empire is getting stronger.

中国的崛起与这种观点形成一个直截了当的对比。自2009年起，中国在国内和国际领域施展的控制力，已成为野蠻力量、贿赂和恫吓的代名词，而这个共产党的帝国正在变得越来越强大。



老挝琅勃拉邦，横跨湄公河的高铁建设工地外的海报。 ADAM DEAN FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

At home, the party has imprisoned **rights lawyers**, **strangled the internet**, compelled companies and universities to **install party cells**, and planned for a potentially Orwellian "**social credit**" system. Abroad, it is building military installations on disputed Pacific reefs and infiltrating cybernetworks. It pushes the "One Belt, One Road" **infrastructure initiative** across Eurasia, which will have benefits for other nations but will also allow China to pressure them to do business with Chinese state-owned enterprises, as it has done in recent years throughout Asia and Africa.

在国内，中共将**维权律师**关进监狱，**压制互联网**，强迫企业和大学**设置党组织**，还打算建立一个可能是奥威尔式的“**社会信用**”系统；在国外，中共正在有争议的太平洋珊瑚礁上建造军事设施，并悄悄打入计算机网络。中国在欧亚大陆推出的“一带一路”基础设施计划，虽然对其他国家有利，但也让中国能向那些国家施压，要求它们与中国国有企业建立业务往来，正如中国近年来在亚洲和非洲所做的那样。

So far, Chinese soft power plays a minor role. For one thing, the party insists on **tight control of cultural production**, so Chinese popular culture has little global appeal next to that of the United States or even South Korea.

迄今为止，中国的软实力起了次要的作用。部分原因是中国共产党**严格控制文化产品**，这使得中国的流行文化与美国的、甚至韩国的相比，在全球范围内几乎没有吸引力。

No nation knows China's hard ways better than Norway. China **punished it by breaking diplomatic and economic ties** for six years after the independent Nobel committee in 2010 gave the Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a pro-democracy writer imprisoned in China (he **died of cancer in July**).

没有任何国家比挪威更知悉中国的硬实力了。2010年，独立于政府的诺贝尔委员会把和平奖授予了身陷囹圄的亲民主中国作家刘晓波（他已于去年7月因癌症逝世）之后，中国用**切断外交和经济关系的方法惩罚了挪威**六年。

President Xi Jinping is the avatar of the new imperium. The 19th Party Congress in October was his **victory lap**. Party officials enshrined "Xi Jinping Thought" in the party constitution, putting him on par with Mao Zedong. Mr. Xi said China had entered a "new era" of strength and the party would be the arbiter of public life. Mr. Xi holds appeal for foreign leaders aspiring to strongman status — President Trump openly admires him.

国家主席习近平是新帝国的化身。去年10月召开的中共十九大是他庆祝胜利的时刻。中共官员把“习近平思想”写入党章，将他与毛泽东相提并论。习近平说，中国已进入一个强大的“新时代”，中国共产党将是公共生活的决定者。习近平对渴望成为铁腕人物的外国领导人有吸引力——特朗普总统公开对他表示钦佩。

Many Chinese people told me they still believed the country's top leaders looked out for ordinary people, even if the party was rotting. This belief was rooted in abstract hope rather than empirical evidence. It was like peering through the **toxic air enveloping Chinese cities** in search of blue sky.

许多中国人对我说，即使中共正在腐败，但他们仍相信中国的最高领导人在为普通民众着想。这种信念扎根于抽象的希望，而不是来自于经验的证据。这就像是透过**包围着中国城市的有毒空气**寻找蓝天那样。

The culture of hard power goes from top to bottom. In the provinces, party officials move quickly to suppress any challenges to their authority. When they sense rising mass resistance, they buy off or imprison the leaders.

硬实力的文化是自上而下的。在全国各省，中共官员迅速压制任何挑战他们权威的东西。当他们意识可能发生大规模抵抗时，他们收买或监禁领导抵抗的人。

I saw this in my first year in China, when officials separately broke the will of parents furious over deadly tainted milk and ones grieving over thousands of children **who had died in shoddily built schools** during the Sichuan earthquake. I learned this was typical of the approach taken by Chinese officials. Most Chinese do not run afoul of the party, but those who do pay a high price.

我在中国工作的头一年里就看到了这种情况，官员们打破了被**致命毒奶粉**激怒的父母的意志，也打破了哀思成千上万的在四川地震中**因豆腐渣校舍而死亡**的孩子们的父母的意志。我懂得了这是中国官员使用的典型方法。大多数中国人避免与党发生冲突，那样做的人会付出高昂的代价。

The abuse of power is frequent, and many Chinese say corruption is their top concern. All other issues, from environmental degradation to **wage inequality**, are linked to it. Mr. Xi is canny enough to capitalize on the discontent: He leads an anticorruption drive that allows him to **oust rivals** and enforce party discipline.

滥用权力的事情经常发生。许多中国人说，腐败是他们最关心的问题。从环境恶化到**贫富不均**，所有其他问题都与腐败有关。习近平精明地利用了腐败所引发的不满情绪：他领导了一场让他能够拿下对手、加强党内纪律的反腐败运动。

None of that results in the rule of law. And China's domestic security budget has exceeded that of its military in recent years, even as both grow rapidly, highlighting the nation's investment in hard power.

所有这些并没有带来法治。中国近年来的国内安全预算已经超过其军事预算，虽然两者都在迅速增长，这突显了中国对硬实力的投资。

By JONAH M. KESSEL 9:32
Tashi Wangchuk: A Tibetan's Journey for Justice

Watch in Times Video »

我在2016年得知，年轻商人扎西文色(Tashi Wangchuk)因向我讲述他倡导更广泛的藏语教育的努力，在自己的家乡玉树被警方拘留。扎西文色曾在微博上要求地方官员履行真正的双语教育，他曾出现在时报2015年的报道和视频**中**。

Mr. Tashi is the kind of citizen China should value — someone working within the law to recommend policies that would benefit ordinary people and ease tensions. But two years later, Mr. Tashi remains imprisoned. A court tried him on Thursday for "inciting separatism" despite **criticism from Western diplomats and human rights groups**.


扎西文色是那种应该受到中国珍视的公民，这种公民在法律框架之内，提出一些有利于普通老百姓、缓解紧张气氛的政策建议。但在被拘留了两年之后，他仍**在被监禁**。尽管有来自于西方外交官和人权组织的批评，但上周四，**法院仍以“煽动分裂国家”的罪名对他进行了庭审**。

The party's style of rule threatens to turn sentiments against China even as the empire grows in stature. History teaches us about an inevitable dialectic: Power creates resistance. While the state can bend people to its will, those people meet it with fear and suspicion. The United States learns this lesson each time it **over-relies on hard power**.

尽管中华帝国的地位不断提高，但是共产党的统治方式让人们产生对中国不利的看法。历史让我们懂得一个不可避免的辩证法：强权产生反抗。虽然国家可以让人民屈服于其意志，但人民将以恐惧和怀疑的态度面对国家。美国每次**过度依赖硬实力**时，都重温了这一教训。

I traveled often to the **frontier regions** because it was there that **the dynamic of power and resistance** was most evident, and that I got the clearest look at how China treats its **most vulnerable citizens**, those outside mainstream ethnic Han culture. No other areas better embody the idea of imperial China. Conquered by the Manchus and reabsorbed by Mao, **these lands** make up at least one-quarter of Chinese territory. Party officials fear they are like the Central Asian regions under Soviet rule — always on the verge of rebellion and eager to break free.

我经常去**边境地区**旅行，因为**强权与反抗的互动**在这些地区最明显，在这里**我最清楚地看到了**中国如何对待自己**最易受伤害的公民**，这些人**不属于主流的汉族文化**。没有其他地方能更好地体现中华帝国的理念了。这些被满族人征服、被毛泽东纳入版图的**边缘地带**，构成中国领土的至少四分之一。中共官员担心，这些地区与苏联统治下的中亚地区一样：总是处于叛乱的边缘，总有挣脱束缚的渴望。



新疆喀什，警察在街头巡逻。北京担心新疆的维吾尔族穆斯林会为该地区带来不稳定因素。 GILLES SABRIÉ FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

In October 2016, I quietly entered the sprawling Tibetan Buddhist settlement of **Larung Gar** and watched the government-ordered demolition of homes of monks and nuns. In parts of Xinjiang populated by ethnic Uighurs, the tension is even greater, fueled by **cycles of violence and repression**. Uighurs speak in hushed tones of **restrictions on Islam** and mass detentions. Signs around Xinjiang forbid long beards and full veils, and surveillance cameras are everywhere. On my last reporting trip in China, to the **Silk Road oasis of Kashgar**, I saw police patrols in riot gear rounding up young men.

2016年10月，我悄悄来到藏传佛教一度日益兴旺的喇荣，目睹了政府下令拆除僧侣和尼姑住所的情况。在维吾尔族人聚居的部分新疆地区，**暴力和镇压的循环**加剧了当地的紧张气氛。维族人压低声音说起对伊斯兰教的限制和大规模的拘留。新疆各地都有禁止留长须、戴完全遮盖住脸的面纱的标牌，监控摄像头随处可见。在**丝绸之路绿洲城市喀什**，做在中国的最近一次旅行报道时，我看到了手持防暴工具的警察围捕几年轻男子。

An important bellwether is Hong Kong, the former British colony from which my parents emigrated to the United States. On this southern frontier, as in the west, the party works to **silence the voices of students, politicians and other residents critical of its rule**. Agents have even abducted booksellers. But those moves have actually led to more resistance and strengthened **Hong Kong and Cantonese identity**. They have also stoked greater fears of Beijing among citizens of Taiwan, the self-governing island that the party longs to rule.

一个重要的风向标是香港，这里是英国前殖民地，是我父母移民美国前所在的地方。在这个南部边境城市，就像在西部地区一样，中共在大力**压制批评其统治的学生、政客和其他批评者的声音**，中共特工甚至还绑架了书商。但这些做法实际上导致了更多的反抗，加强了香港和说粤语者的身份认同。这些做法也在台湾民众中激起了对北京的更大担忧，台湾是中共渴望统一的自治岛屿。

It is not a stretch to say the party's ways of governance perpetuate a lack of trust by the Chinese in their institutions and fellow citizens. And its international policies light the kindling of resistance overseas, from **Australia** to **Ghana**.

中共的执政方式让中国人对本国制度和本国同胞的不信任持久化，这种说法并不牵强。中共的国际政策也引起了从**澳大利亚到加纳**的海外反抗。

Chinese citizens and the world would benefit if China turns out to be an empire whose power is based as much on ideas, values and culture as on military and economic might. It was more enlightened under its most glorious dynasties. But for now, the Communist Party embraces hard power and coercion, and this could well be what replaces the fading liberal hegemony of the United States on the global stage.

如果中国作为帝国的实力能变为不仅依靠军事和经济实力，也依靠思想、价值观和文化的话，中国公民和全世界都会受益。中国最辉煌的朝代也是其更开明的朝代。但中国共产党目前靠的是硬实力和胁迫，而这很可能会成为取代美国在全球舞台上日渐式微的自由主义霸权的東西。

It will not lead to a grand vision of world order. Instead, before us looms a void.

这不会带来世界秩序的宏伟蓝图。相反，我们正面临一个真空。

四川洛若乡，佛教徒聚居地的和尚与尼姑。 GILLES SABRIÉ FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

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