

# Out of Hypervisor (OoH)

Pr Alain Tchana - (alain.tchana@ens-lyon.fr) ENS Lyon

EuroDW'22 - March, 5

## About me

- ► Originate from Cameroon, in Africa
- ► Moved to France for an internship in 2008
- ▶ 2030, back to Cameroon
  - ▶ President of the republic:  $2032 \rightarrow \infty$



## Some famous cameroonians



Roger Milla Wold cup'90



Manu Dibango plagiarised by Michael Jackson ("mamasa mamako mamamakossa")



Pierre Tchana Salsa



Alain Tchana Dakar 2021

# My group

#### PhD students

▶ 2 females (S. Bitchebe, J. Kouam) and 3 males (K. Nguetchouang, Y. Kone, and T. Dubuc)

#### Interns

ightharpoonup 0 female (:() and 3 males (B. Teguia, A. Leberre, R. Colin)



OoH

2 OoH for Intel SPI

OoH for Intel PM

# OoH: Out of Hypervisor

#### Make nested virtualization practical

- OoH exposes <u>relevant</u> <u>hypervisor-oriented</u> hardware virtualization features to the guest OS so that its processes can also take benefit from them
- ► OoH is nested feature virtualization
  - ▶ nested virtualization (NV) is hypervisor stacking to run VMs inside a VM
  - ► NV is nice, but too ambitious, requires a lot of research efforts for very few use cases (testing, demo, continous delivery)
- OoH targets one hardware virtualization feature at a time
  - especially those which can improve applications

## Muller-ization




## Muller-ization



► OoH is about a new research axis

# OoH in the design space



NHVF = Non Hardware Virtualization Features (e.g., set CR3 register on x86)

Dune is A. Belay et al. OSDI'12

## OoH

#### Grants

- ► Stella Bitchebe
  - ► NEC Student Research Fellowship 2021
  - ► Microsoft Research PhD Fellowship 2021
  - French ANR Scalevisor

## This talk illustrates OoH with 2 features

#### OoH for Intel SPP

- ► to reduce memory overhead of guard page-based secured heap memory allocators
- ▶ work in progress
- ▶ by Yves Kone, Augusta Mukam and Stella Bitchebe

#### OoH for Intel PML

- ► to improve process/container checkpointing, concurrent GCs
- work completed!
- ▶ by Stella Bitchebe

1 Ool

2 OoH for Intel SPP


OoH for Intel PMI

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## Intel SPP

#### Overview

► EPT-based, 4KB page size, organised into 32 sub-pages (128 B each)



# Buffer overflow vulerability

# Unsafe languages such as C int tab[4] int \*tab = (int \*) malloc(sizeof(int) \* $\frac{4}{1}$ ); for (int i = 0; i < 6; i++) { tab[i] = i;int tab[4] OVERFLOW int tab[4]

# **Buffer overflow vulerability**


## Guard pages




- ► Avantage: sync detection
- ► Limitations: memory waste

# **Buffer overflow vulerability**

## Canari




- ► Avantage: low memory waste
- ► Limitations: asyn detection



► Avantage: sync detection, low memory waste (maximum 128KB instead of 4KB  $\rightarrow$  32 $\times$ )


## Challenges

- ► SPP is only managed by the hypervisor
- A naive solution would lead to several costly hypercalls



## Approach: Pre-initialized SPP page pool

- ► On demand allocation of pre-initialized SPP pages
  - ▶ with different write protected sub-page frequencies



#### In the guest kernel

- ► Addition of a new memory allocator: for SPP pages
- struct page \*spp\_get\_page(int freq): allocate an SPP pre-initialized page
- ▶ int spp\_put\_page(struct page \*page, int freq): the inverse
- ► Some VMAs are tagged spp
- ► New madvise flags: MADV SPP2,...,MADV SPP32

## In the heap memory alocator (e.g., Slimguard)

- mmap a buffer, which creates a new VMA
- ▶ madvise the buffer using MADV\_SPP2,..., or MADV\_SPP32
- ▶ use that buffer to allocate secured malloced buffers

#### On page fault

- ► Check if the target VMS is tagged SPP
- ▶ If yes, use the new allocator, else use the default buddy allocator

#### Implementation

- Xen hypervisor
- ► Linux guest kernel
- ► Slimguard secured heap memory allocator

#### **Evaluations**

- ► In progress
- ▶ We expect
  - ► 32× memory waste reduction
  - with no performance overhead

# Back to "Some famous cameroonians"



Roger Milla Wold cup'90



Manu Dibango plagiarised by Michael Jackson ("mamasa mamako mamamakossa")



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Alain Tchana Dakar 2021


1 Ool

OoH for Intel SPF

3 OoH for Intel PML

#### Intel PML

# **Functioning**



#### Intel PML

► to accelerate CRIU and Boehm GC

# OoH PML: dirty page tracking in userspace

#### Some definitions

- ► Tracker: the monitoring thread
  - ► e.g., CRIU, Boehm GC (C and C++ applications)
- ► Tracked: the thread whose memory is monitored
  - any application


#### Current approach

- page write protection
- ► two main solutions
  - ▶ bit 55 of /proc/<PID>/pagemap
  - userfaultfd (ufd)


# Dirty page tracking in userspace


#### Overall functioning

- ► Tracker's activity can be organized in four phases:
  - ► the initialization of the tracking method,
  - the monitoring
  - the collection of dirty page addresses
  - the exploitation of the latter (e.g., for checkpointing)



# Dirty page tracking in userspace





# Page write protection

#### Limitations


- ufd
  - ▶ we measured an overhead of up to 1,462% and 1,349% for 1GB on Tracked and Tracker respectively.
  - ► due to page fault handling
- /proc
  - ▶ page table parsing and to flush the TLB (about 2.234ms when the monitored memory is 1GB), soft-dirty bit setting (about 33.5us)
  - /proc/PID/pagemap parsing in userspace (about 594.187ms for 1GB)

#### Challenges

- $\triangleright$  ( $C_1$ ) PML can only be managed by the hypervisor
  - ► (C<sub>2</sub>) PML now works at coarse-grained, that is it concerns the entire VM.
- ► (C<sub>3</sub>) PML only logs GPA.

#### Two solutions

- ► Extended PML (EPML): small hardware changes
- ► Shadow PML (SPML): no hardware modification
  - ▶ its huge overhead justifies EPML



#### **SPML** limitations

- ► Costly reverse mapping (takes about 15.739 s for 1GB working set)
- $\triangleright$  Costly hypercalls (4.49 $\mu s$  to perform an empty hypercall)

#### **EPML**

- ► We leverage VMCS shadowing to allow the guest to perform vmread and vmwrite instructions
- ► At load time, OoH Module calls the hypervisor to enable and configure VMCS shadowing

#### OoH for PML

#### Hardware changes

- We introduce in VMCS's VM-Execution Control area a new field (called Guest PML Address)
- ▶ We extend the page walk to make the processor log GVA to the guest-level PML buffer and the GPA to the hypervisor-level PML buffer.
- ► We modify the hardware so that when the guest-level PML buffer is full, the processor raises a virtual self-IPI (Inter-Processor Interrupt)

### Implementation

- ► We implemented EPML's hardware changes in BOCHS
- ► We used Xen as the hypervisor and Linux as the guest OS
- ► We integrated OoH Lib with CRIU and Boehm GC

### **Evaluations**

- What is the potential overhead or improvement of SPML and <u>EPML compared</u> to e/proc and ufd?
- 2 What is the scalability of SPML and EPML?

# Methodology

- ▶ We used DELL Intel Core i7-8565U (which provides PML) for experiments
- ► Micro-benchmarks: Array parsing and GCBench
- ► Macro-benchmarks: tkrzw tkrzw applications (key value store) and Phoenix applications (MapReduce)
- ▶ We considered three working set sizes (Small, Medium and Large)

#### **Evaluations**

- ► How to accurately evaluate EPML?
- Approach
  - build a formula
  - show the accuracy of that formula on other techniques, which are measurable
  - by construction, the formula is accurate for EPML

#### **Evaluations**

ightharpoonup The execution time of Tracker when it implements technique x

$$E(C_{tker}) = E(C_x) + E(C_p) + I(C_x, C_p)$$
 (1)

where E(C) is the execution time of code C and  $I(C_1, C_2)$  is the impact of  $C_1$  on  $C_2$ .

#### Impact on Tracker

$$E(C_{/proc}) = E(C_{echo \ 4} > /proc/PID/clear\_refs)$$

$$+ E(C_{page \ table \ walk \ in \ userspace})$$

$$E(CUFD) = E(C_{ioctl \ write\_protect})$$

$$+ E(C_{ioctl \ register})$$

$$+ E(C_{ioctl \ write\_unprotect})$$

$$E(C_{SPML}) = E(C_{ring \ buffer \ copy})$$

$$+ E(C_{reverse \ mapping})$$

$$+ E(C_{enable/disable \ PML})$$

$$E(C_{EPML}) = E(C_{ring \ buffer \ copy})$$

$$+ E(C_{enable/disable \ PML})$$

#### **Evaluations**

► The execution time of Tracked when it is monitored by a tracker using the technique *x*:

$$E(C_{tked\_tker}) = E(C_{tked}) + E(C_{tker}) + I(C_x, C_{tked})$$
 (3)

where  $I(C_x, C_{tked})$  consists of page faults, vmexits, etc.. Thus, the overhead of x on Tracked is  $E(C_{tker}) + I(C_x, C_{tked})$ .

### Impact on Tracked

```
I(C_{/proc}, C_{tked}) = E(C_{PFH \ in \ kernelspace}) + E(C_{context \ switch})
I(C_{UFD}, C_{tked}) = E(C_{PFH \ in \ userspace}) + E(C_{context \ switch})
I(C_{SPML}, C_{tked}) = E(C_{vmexits}) + N \times E(C_{vmread/vmwrite})
I(C_{EPML}, C_{tked}) = N \times E(C_{vmread/vmwrite})
```

For  $I(C_{EPML}, C_{tked})$ , we use SPML's N (the number of context switches) as it is the same (validated by running SPML and EPML under BOCHS).

# Formula validation

Metric	Time (ms)
$E(C_{tker})$ measured	5503.79
$E(C_{tked\_tker})$ measured	135255.35
$E(C_p)$	251.35
$E(C_{copy\_rb})$	0.49
$E(C_{disable\ pml})$	2.06
$E(C_{rev.\ mapping})$	5419
$E(C_{tker})$ estimated	5672.9
$E(C_{vmexits})$	18000
N	39
$E(C_{vmread,vmwrite})$	$1.73 \times 10^{-3}$
$E(C_{tked\_tker})$ estimated	136919.85

(a) SPML


Metric	Time (ms)
$E(C_{tker})$ measured	1097.99
$E(C_{tked\_tker})$ measured	115283.98
$E(C_p)$	251.35
$E(C_{clear\_refs})$	1.409
$E(C_{PTwalk})$	0.89
$E(C_{tker})$ estimated	1116.09
$E(C_{PFHuser})$	0.27

(b) /proc


#### Formula validation

An accuracy of about 96.34% and 99% respectively for SPML and /proc formulas

#### Micro-benchmark results




**Figure:** Reverse mapping appears to be the bottleneck of SPML.



**Figure:** Overhead of each tracking technique on the micro-benchmark.

### Impact on Boehm



**Figure:** We highlight the first GC cycle during which Boehm performs reverse mapping with SPML.

# Impact on applications





Figure: Impact of Boehm GC.


#### Impact on CRIU



**Figure:** We highlight MD phase during which CRIU performs reverse mapping with SPML.

Pr Alain Tchana - (alain.tchana@ens-lyon.fr) ENS Lyon

# Impact on the checkpointed app



#### Summary

- ► Impact on the tracker
  - $\blacktriangleright$  SPML induces up to  $5\times$  slowdown on CRIU and  $3\times$  slowdown on Boehm GC.
  - ▶ EPML brings up to  $4\times$  speedup compared to /proc and  $13\times$  speedup compared to SPML for CRIU; up to  $2\times$  speedup compared to /proc and up to  $6\times$  speedup compared to SPML.

#### Summary

- Impact on the application performance
  - ▶ /proc, which is the default solution implemented in both CRIU and Boehm, incurs an overhead of up to 102% with CRIU on the Phoenix pca application, and up to 232% with Boehm on the Phoenix string-match application.
  - ► The overhead of SPML is up to 114% with CRIU and 273% with Boehm on the same applications.
  - ► EPML leads to the lowest overhead, which is about 7% with CRIU and 24% with Boehm.

### In this talk

### OoH for Intel SPP

- for reducing memory overhead of guard page-based secured heap memory allocators
- work in progress

#### OoH for Intel PML

- ► for improving process/container checkpointing, concurrent GCs
- excellent results

# The main message

► When thinking hypervisor-oriented hardware virtualization features, please think how they can be also used by processes from inside VMs, this may need few efforts

# For questions

- Stella Bitchebe
  - ▶ mail: celestine-stella.ndonga-bitchebe@ens-lyon.fr
  - ► Phone: 00 33 6 54 63 42 74
  - ► Address: 3 Rue du Kiwi, Lyon.
- Yves Kone
  - mail: yves.kone@ens-lyon.fr
  - ► Phone: 00 33 6 55 65 45 75
  - ► Address: 3 Avenue du buffle, Lyon.