
10x Security Bitcoin Guide

How to store bitcoin without any single point of failure.

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1 Preface

1.1 Purpose

Multisig security is a difference in kind and not in degree. It affords you the ability to avoid loss while making 1 (or more) catastrophic failures in securing your bitcoin. By using a security system that is fault-tolerant, you can move much faster (with less caution) through each step and still attain far higher levels of security vs any single-key system. This guide will show you how.

The purpose of this guide is to make multisig accessible to a tech-savvy audience who does not write code. While it may be helpful if you are comfortable using the command line (especially for some of the optional advanced steps), it is not required.

1.2 Project Status

This guide is currently a work in progress. While the ultimate goal is for the process to be easy enough for non-technical users, there may be kinks to work out. Pull requests are welcome.

1.3 Compensation

While I do not accept any compensation from bitcoin companies in connection with this project, the following companies have sent me their hardware devices for free to play with:

- Trezor
- Coldcard
- Cobo Vault
- Specter DIY (parts)

Note that I have written bitcoin wallet software for a number of companies in the space since 2013, though none of them are involved in the hardware wallet space.

1.4 Contributors

1.4.1 Project Lead

[Michael Flaxman](#)

1.4.2 Contributors

- Stephan Livera
- PDF and Ebook: [Holger Nahrstaedt](#)

1.4.3 Reviewers

- TODO: add

1.4.3.1 Wallet Manufacturers Thank you to all the hardware wallet developers who have sent me sample units, fixed bug reports and responded to feature requests. In particular:

- Coldcard: [Rodolfo Novak & Peter Gray](#)
- Cobo Vault: [Lixin Liu & Aaron Chen](#)

- Trezor: [Pavol Rusnak](#)
-

Note that being on this page does **not** mean you endorse the recommendations given. [Pull requests](#) to improve this guide are always welcome.

1.5 Disclaimer

1.5.1 1. Information published on btcguide.github.io

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2 Why Multisig?

[“Your keys, your bitcoin. Not your keys, not your bitcoin.”](#)

While this is certainly true, managing your own keys is **really** hard. The math behind the bitcoin protocol is bulletproof, but being your own bank requires you to be near perfect in your execution. When it comes to cryptography, you are only as strong as your weakest link. For traditional single-key signature schemes, the only thing between your bitcoin and an attacker is a single mistake! Learn more about some of these risks by listening to [SLP Episode 97 with Michael Flaxman](#).

The central principle of the guide is to avoid having any single point of failure. To accomplish this, you will setup your own multisig wallet using multiple hardware wallets from multiple different vendors. The goal of this guide is to achieve a basic multisig setup:2-of-3signatures from different hardware wallets made by different manufacturers.

Remember that your multisig setup requires an attacker to break multiple redundant systems, which due to [the additive power of multisig](#) is *incredibly challenging*. On account of this, your level of caution/paranoia/effort (vs a traditional single-key signature) can be much lower and yet still achieve much higher security.

If you follow these instructions, you can suffer at least one catastrophic failure and not lose any bitcoin. This could include things like:

- An exploitable software/firmware bug on your hardware wallet
- A pwned (or fake) hardware wallet
- An unscrupulous trusted third party (lawyer/accountant/custodian/etc) with access to a key for recovery
- A lost/stolen hardware wallet / seed
- An upstream supply channel attack
- A forgotten PIN / passphrase

- A lost seed
- A compromised random-number generator
- An [evil-maid attack](#)
- Malware on your computer
- A rogue bank employee snooping in your safe deposit box
- An eager heir
- Etc

While this setup is far more secure than a traditional single key signature with no fault tolerance, be mindful that the wrong combination of 2+ major mistakes could be enough to lose all of your bitcoin!

Switching to fault tolerant multisig is the most important thing you can do to improve your security. A lot of people stick with a bad setup – trusted custody or single key signature – for fear of change. Don't make [the perfect the enemy of good](#); upgrade to multisig today for a solid foundation and you can still iterate in the future!

We support users being as paranoid as they want to be, but think that with proper multisig it is overkill for all but the largest HODLers. At each step, there are recommendations for how you can harden your security, and you alone will have to decide how much time/money you want to spend to sleep better at night.

This guide is free, and there are no refunds. [There are no bailouts in Bitcoin](#). We **highly** recommend you practice all of this first. See disclaimer [here](#).

2.1 Why Multisig Advanced?

Multisig has always been amazing in theory, but in practice it has been too difficult for non-expert users.

Multisig is still [not as easy as we would like it to be](#), but it is getting better every day. It is finally at the point where the security benefits far outweigh the costs for large HODLers. Here are some changes that have made multisig mainstream accessible:

- **BIP174 (PSBT) created a standard for multisig interoperability** between hardware wallets.
- **Multiple hardware wallets now support multisig**, and their quality is increasing (better air-gaps, hardware, UX, compatibility, etc).
- **Multiple software implementations now exist** to coordinate multisig transactions (Electrum, specter-desktop, Caravan) as well as paid services (Casa, Unchained Capital, etc).
- **Reduction in popularity of airdrop coins** that were harder (or sometimes impossible) to claim for bitcoin multisig users.

- **Open-source paper wallets** like [SeedPicker](#) have been released that lets you add seed(s) to your multisig quorum for recovery without having to purchase additional hardware wallets to get started (until/unless you need to perform emergency recovery).
- **Lower fees:** segwit gives a witness discount for p2wsh transactions, which has led to them being labelled “[Unfairly Cheap](#)”!
- **Running a node has never been easier** - not only do the resources required continue to be low (an engineering marvel!), but there are now many companies that will sell you a node-in-a-box as well as open source scripts/tutorials for simplifying node deployment/administration.
- **Safer airgap signing:** [BIP143 \(segwit\)](#) allows hardware wallets to sign the input values on transactions directly, making it harder to exploit vulnerabilities in the rest of your stack.

There have been [so many hardware wallet vulnerabilities](#) and we expect new ones will continue to be discovered; multisig fundamentally doesn’t change that. The big difference is that a proper multisig scheme allows for 1 (or more) catastrophic failures without putting funds at risk.

2.1.0.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme Multisig is strictly superior to [Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme](#) (SSSS), and while SSSS is elegant in theory it is very easy to mess up in practice. SSSS also reintroduces a single point of failure; in order for a key to be generated (or used) it must be recombined in a single place. We prefer to call it [Shamir’s Secret Snakeoil](#). SSSS should only be considered for expert users **after** you’ve maxed out your multisig scheme (3-of-5 for most use-cases) and need additional protection. For that use-case, you may want to look into [SLIP-0039](#) or alternatively divide 1 (or more) of the BIP39 seed passphrases using Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme. The open-source software available to do this is still unfortunately [somewhat lacking](#), but should improve over time.

2.2 Pick Quorum

The main theme of this guide is to create fault tolerance by **avoiding a single point of failure**. This means multiple signatures (“multi-sig”) to move your bitcoin is an absolute **must**.

We’re recommending 2-of-3 by default, as we’ve found it’s an excellent balance of security/usability for most use-cases. Once you’ve got that down, you may want to pick larger numbers in the future (see [advanced section](#)).

You’ll need three hardware wallets, made by three different manufacturers. In order to avoid having to buy three hardware wallets (and because there are only [very few high-quality hardware wallets with good multisig support](#)), we’ll generate this third key less securely on your computer **offline**.

2.3 Pick Quorum Advanced

2.3.1 Picking Your M and N

It might seem easy, but this choice is actually complex, especially since we want no hardware wallet vendor to be used for a quorum of seeds. We'll see below that you want your m-of-n multisig threshold to be $1 < m < n$.

2.3.1.1 Problems with 1-of-n This has similar security to a single-key signature, with many possible single keys that are capable of signing. A vulnerability in any one of these seeds (random number generation, the hardware wallet used, etc) could lead to loss of all your bitcoin. You suffer [the negatives of multisig](#) without the positive.

Recommendation: only expert users with a unique use-case should ever consider this.

2.3.1.2 Problems with 2-of-2 A common fallacy is to take your 1-of-1 and convert it to a 2-of-2, as multisig's security model is additive. However, **a 2-of-2 multisig introduces a new single point of failure**; should you have an issue with either wallet, you could be locked out of your funds. The most likely scenario would be key loss, but even with excellent backups something as simple as a software bug in one of your hardware wallets could harm you. For example, if one hardware wallet were displaying an extended public key for which it didn't have the associated private key, you could be locked out of your funds. In some clever attacks involving bip32 derivation paths, an attacker could even try to ransom your funds back to you (kind of like [CryptoLocker](#)).

2.3.1.3 2-of-3 is Good This is a good default choice:

- It is *relatively* easy to implement
- Has few moving parts
- Minimal hardware purchasing requirements

The big negative is that it only has tolerance for one catastrophic failure (vs zero in single-key signature schemes), and your use-case might desire greater distribution of your keys (more locations, or trusted parties). We'll see below why 3-of-5 helps address (some of) these concerns.

2.3.1.4 Problems with 2-of-4 It's good that you need multiple signatures, but eliminating a single point of failure requires having 4 different HW wallet vendors! Imagine you have 4 seed but only 3 different hardware wallet vendors: 1 seed generated/protected by vendor A, 1 by vendor B, and 2 by

vendor C. If there were a serious bug with vendor C where 2 of your seeds are known to an attacker, then in the worst case they can spend all of your bitcoin!

Note: 2-of-5 is even worse.

Recommendation: expert users can avoid this problem on receiving funds by performing their own random number generation for multiple paper wallets in their quorum as described [here](#). However, keep in mind that there are currently very few high-quality hardware wallets with good multisig support, so if you need to use those recovery keys you may be forced to use the same hardware wallet vendor for 2+ seeds.

2.3.1.5 3-of-5 is Excellent Like 2-of-3, 3-of-5 is a great choice. It offers more redundancy vs 2-of-3 (you can suffer two serious issues and not lose funds). The obvious negative is that you now need to buy and keep track of five hardware wallets (instead of 3). Since there are currently very few high-quality hardware wallets with good multisig support, your keys will almost certainly not be guarded by 5 wallets from 5 different vendors.

Recommendation: this is a good quorum to use. For simplicity, this guide is focused on 2-of-3 but a future version may include explicit instructions for 3-of-5. Advanced users will be able to figure out how to adopt the steps in the guide to a larger quorum.

2.3.1.6 4-of-5 Works, But Is Risky Lose two seeds and all your funds are lost. This is the same as 2-of-3, but instead of having 3 seeds to protect, you now have 5. This tradeoff makes sense for very few people; those who are far more worried about theft vs loss. Keep in mind that on average loss is far more common than theft.

Recommendation: only expert users with a strong use-case should ever consider this.

2.3.1.7 N > 5 is Costly and Risky N > 5 is technically possible (see e.g. [this demonstration of 15-of-15](#)).

But unless you know exactly what you're doing and why, you should avoid N > 5. At that point, the cost and complexity likely exceeds any additional security benefits.

Furthermore, N > 5 can be dangerous. Due to size limits ([legacy](#), [segwit](#)), using M and N values that are too large carries the additional risk of creating “nonstandard” transactions (unlikely to be propagated and mined) or even invalid transactions, which could result in *permanent loss of funds!*

Recommendation: only expert users with a strong use-case should ever consider this.

2.4 Equipment

TODO: add diagram showing how all these pieces interact.

This guide will assume your computer is running the free and open source [Ubuntu](#) operating system, because it offers a good mix of security, bitcoin software compatibility, and end-user configurability. Advanced users should be able to get other operating systems to work, but you will be on your own to figure that out for now.

The purpose of the computer will be to run [Specter-Desktop](#), which will communicate blockchain information between [Bitcoin Core](#) and your hardware wallets for verification and signing. You will need an up-to-date Bitcoin Core Full Node, which can be running on this same computer or another. For more information about this, see the section called [Running Bitcoin](#). Bitcoin Core's initial block download takes a few days to sync, so we recommend you get started on that while you wait for your hardware wallets to arrive.

2.4.0.1 Minimum Equipment to Buy:

- 1 low-end computer with webcam - see below for more information about system requirements
- 1 [Coldcard Mark3 Hardware Wallet](#) with 1 microSD card - must be \leq 32 GB for FAT formatting, but *much* smaller is fine. The previous Mark2 version may work, but since this is a security product it is always recommended to buy the latest version.
- 1 [Cobo Vault](#) - Essential or Pro model.
- 1 DVD-R (if your computer has a DVD drive) or USB stick for installing [Ubuntu](#)
- 1 pen + 3 pieces of paper (or notecards) to write down your BIP39 seed phrases
- 1 printer, 2 pieces of paper, + scissors - to print out [2 pages](#) of non-sensitive (public) information. You don't need to buy a printer if you can ask someone else to print these pages out for you. You will use the scissors to cut out the words.

2.4.0.2 Computer System Requirements The software you're running on this machine has very low resource requirements, so you can likely repurpose an old laptop that you have laying around. You can read the exact Ubuntu Desktop System requirements [here](#). Most notably, you'll want the machine to be 64-bit, have at least 4GB RAM, and a 2 GHz dual-core processor.

While the optimal laptop would not be used for anything else, it is acceptable for this to be a multi-purpose machine that you use day-to-day; by design this laptop will not see bitcoin private key material and we will always treat it as-if it is infected by malware.

You do not need to use a laptop, any desktop computer can work. We find laptops ideal because:

- They are portable and have batteries, meaning they can easily be taken into secure rooms (like bank vaults) that may not have a power source.
- They usually have built-in webcams, which are needed for a high-quality [airgap](#) (via QR code) that we will be using. It's also easy to physically pick up laptops to scan QR codes if needed.
- They have less cables for the mouse/keyboard, which is helpful when dealing with the clutter of multiple hardware wallets.

2.4.1 Bitcoin Core Node

For regular users, we recommend using [RaspiBlitz](#), [MyNode](#), or [Nodl](#) (more [here](#)).

For advanced users, you can [run your own bitcoin core node](#) for more details.

2.4.2 Recommended Additions

2.4.2.1 Tweezers It is very hard to remove the SD card from the Cobo Vault, and can occasionally be challenging to do so from the Coldcard. Any cheap pair of tweezers (the kind you might use to remove a splinter) will make this easy.

2.4.2.2 Physical Bitcoin Seed Storage The best choice is to etch your seed words into metal. This is far more durable than words written on paper that can be destroyed by fire or water. Here are [reviews of several metal seed storage products](#).

A cheaper alternative that is not nearly as durable is [archival paper](#) with an archival ink pen. These are available online or at your local stationary store. If you go this route, you'll want to place this paper into a plastic bag with a good seal (vacuum seal is even better) so that it doesn't get destroyed in the event of water damage.

You can also use fireproof document bags for ~\$10-\$20 USD each. This is a [popular brand](#) (not an endorsement, just an example).

However you secure these backups, you want one set of gear for each seed, or a minimum of 3 in total.

2.4.2.3 Hardware wallet storage bags Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bags, also known as a Faraday cage or bag, should be used to store your hardware wallets. EMP bags may protect your hardware wallets from damage by electromagnetic radiation such as cellular, GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi, RFID, NFC radio waves etc. which may damage your devices.

A more extreme, but unlikely, attack vector that an EMP bag may protect you from is an EMP. EMPs are strong waves of electromagnetic energy that can damage electronic devices like hardware wallets. EMPs are usually associated with nuclear weapons or solar weather events like a coronal mass ejection, but minor EMPs can also occur from lightning strikes or even power line surges.

Various Faraday cage / EMP bag products exist on the market but a cheap but effective option is to vacuum seal your hardware wallets in Mylar which can be found cheaply on [Amazon](#). [Silent Pocket](#) is one of many companies that offer a range of Faraday cage products (not an endorsement, just an example).

2.4.2.4 DVD Drive Instead of USB Drive Using a DVD for installing Ubuntu is slightly preferred over a USB drive. It's read-only, and has less attack surface vs the whole USB stack. If your DVD drive is built into a laptop, then it's also nice that it doesn't require using up one of your USB ports. You can also use this for ferrying public information (extended public keys, fingerprints, bip32 paths, etc) between computers, see [Setup Your Hardware Wallets](#) for more info.

2.4.2.5 Extra DVDs or USB Sticks for Backing Up Public Key Material The data these protect will only affect your privacy (not security), so you can secure it in many ways (store on your hard drive, print to paper, backup to cloud, etc). Since this is longer than a seed phrase, a digital medium (DVD or USB drive) is strongly preferred. If you keep 2 copies per seed (and have 3 seeds in total), then you're going to need 6 DVD-Rs (or 6 USB pen drives). Read more about backing up your public keys [here](#).

2.4.3 Sourcing Hardware Wallets

To reduce the risk of tampering or counterfeits, you can buy your hardware wallets directly from the manufacturer in-person at a conference/meetup. If buying online, purchase directly from the manufacturer and avoid resellers.

Protect your operational security by taking delivery to an alternate address instead of your home address (e.g. company address, PO box, shipping locker, etc)

2.4.4 Dedicated Hardware

Hardware wallets are designed to protect you from malware-infected computers, but malware on your computer could still try to trick (or even compromise) your hardware wallets. Using a dedicated computer (not your day-to-day computer), can reduce the attack surface.

It may be even safer to buy your computer and other equipment (USB sticks, DVDs, microSD cards, etc) offline at a physical store to reduce the risk of targeted tampering en-route.

Advanced users can get by on **very** cheap computers (like a Raspberry Pi), but since we're using Ubuntu we need to meet their (still lightweight) minimum requirements.

2.4.5 Bitcoin Core Node

For improved security, build your own bitcoin-core node from scratch! You can read more about Bitcoin Core's requirements [here](#). Some node operators take pride in getting by on extremely minimal hardware, others use an SSD drive and/or a more powerful CPU for extra performance.

Specter-Desktop can connect to a node anywhere, so your bitcoin core node does *not* need to be on the same computer. Some people with laptops like to run Specter-Desktop on that as their primary device and connect to a Bitcoin Core Node that they control.

A node hosted on a machine you physically control (in a [colo](#) or more realistically your home/office) is better than one in a cloud provider. If your cloud provider is malicious (or government-compelled) and clever they could:

- Snoop on your bitcoin addresses and see your transaction history.
- Try to trick you with information about a (fake) received payment.

The author of this guide is proud to have written [a privacy-preserving defense against this using merkle proofs](#) (currently only for advanced users).

2.4.5.1 Pruning Bitcoin Core If you run a pruned full node, you can use very little disk space (currently ~5GB vs ~300GB) and massively lower your hardware requirements. However, for now pruning your node is only recommended for expert users.

2.4.5.1.1 Rescan There are unlikely edge cases where you may need to –rescan the blockchain. This might happen during a reinstallation/recovery process, if funds are stored on the bitcoin blockchain in an address not yet added to your bitcoin core watch-only wallet. A pruned node must be –reindexed (can take many hours/days), whereas a regular (non-pruned) node can be quickly –rescan-ed (currently < 1 hour). Expert-user users can [rescan from a specific block height](#).

2.4.5.1.2 Merkle Proofs Pruned nodes [currently do not support merkle proofs](#). This may be fine for locally hosted nodes, but is inherently risky for cloud-hosted nodes.

2.4.6 Simplify Receive Address Verification

Verifying receive addresses on a quorum of trusted devices **is incredibly important**. Unfortunately, this can be cumbersome, especially if they're in separate geographic locations. One hack people use is to setup a clean machine that can generate addresses from extended public key information without being connected to the internet.

Not relying fully on your trusted hardware devices introduces new risks and should only be considered by expert users. You can read more about this [here](#).

2.4.6.1 Option A - Eternally Quarantined Machine This machine is setup once and never needs to be configured/updated again, so it is strongly recommended to have no internet access. If you choose to do this, you can use a very low-end machine. It's a great way to use a Raspberry Pi for example.

TODO: update with exact resource requirements for various methods.

2.4.6.2 Option B - Print Out Addresses An eternally quarantined machine is good, but requires another electronic device to be permanently configured and available to use. Some users prefer to print out many hundred (or even thousands) of receive addresses at wallet creation and then use this physical paper to aid in verification. If you go this route, you will need a printer and paper.

3 Setup Computer Overview

We will sometimes refer to this computer as “watch-only” because it can only see transactions/balances, and cannot spend. If your computer is infected by malware it can try to deceive you, but unlike your hardware wallets, it does not have access to your private keys. For this reason, it may be reasonable for you to skimp on many of the advanced security/validation steps.

Your computer will run two important pieces of software:

- [Bitcoin Core full node](#) - to interact with (and validate!) the bitcoin blockchain
- [Specter-Desktop](#) - to interact with your hardware wallets when verifying receive addresses and signing transactions

For Windows and MacOS users, it often makes sense to simply use your existing laptop or desktop for ease of setup. Bitcoin Core and Specter Desktop have executable ‘double click’ install versions available. You may need to buy an extra ~1TB hard drive to store bitcoin blockchain data (see detailed instructions linked below).

Other users may prefer using a pre-built bitcoin node package which includes Bitcoin Core and Specter-Desktop:

- [RaspiBlitz](#) - free to make or can be bought as a pre-made device ([example](#)).
- [myNode](#) - can be bought outright, or built and [Specter-Desktop is included in myNode premium](#)
- [Nodl](#) - can be bought outright

Advanced users who have an extra focus on security and/or enjoy customization may prefer to setup their own computer, bitcoin core node, and specter-desktop following these instructions:

1. [Setup Computer](#)
2. [Run Bitcoin Core Node](#)
3. [Install Specter-Desktop](#)

3.1 Configure Computer

3.1.0.1 A Note on Caution In a perfect world, you'd carefully verify the software you're installing. However, since this machine won't store private key material* (and multiple signatures will be required to move funds) it may be acceptable for you to install software that seems correct without properly verifying it using the command-line.

**While we recommend that no private key material ever touch this machine, that setup is slightly more involved and thus you may choose to generate 1 seed on this machine (and then wipe it after). Remember that this alone is not sufficient to steal/lockup funds, so it may present an acceptable tradeoff for smaller HODLers. For more details, see [Paper Wallet Setup steps](#).*

3.2 Install Ubuntu

You'll want to download and install the latest long term stable (LTS) version of [Ubuntu Desktop](#) (currently 20.04.1). Put the installer on a USB stick or burn it onto a DVD. Both options are good, though we find DVDs are slightly preferable as they are slightly more secure and don't take up a USB port. See [these step-by-step instructions](#).

3.2.1 Setup Computer Overview Advanced

3.2.1.1 Instructions to Verify Ubuntu Download <https://ubuntu.com/tutorials/how-to-verify-ubuntu>

3.2.1.2 Encrypt Your Hard Drive Use a long passphrase, so that anyone who gets physical access to your computer will not be able to see private info like your balances and transaction history.

https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Full_Disk_Encryption_Howto_2019

3.3 Configure Bitcoin Node

Think of your bitcoin node as a fake bitcoin detector, it will confirm that bitcoin's consensus rules are being followed so that when you receive a payment you can validate that you are getting real bitcoins. It will also help with fee estimation, coin selection, and generating transactions.

Keep in mind that while a malicious full node can try to deceive you, it does not have access to your private keys.

You can install Specter-Desktop on your home computer alongside Bitcoin Core. Alternatively, you can use a product to setup your Bitcoin Core Node, such as [RaspiBlitz](#), [Nodl](#), [Umbrel](#), and [MyNode](#) (Premium edition). They all come with Specter-Desktop packaged, but only RaspiBlitz is free (Nodl and myNode Premium are paid products).

3.3.0.1 Required Configuration In order for [Specter-Desktop](#) to connect to this full node, you'll need to configure some settings in your `bitcoin.conf` file. You can do this by going to the directory where Bitcoin is installed, and opening the `bitcoin.conf` file in a text editor (e.g. Notepad). Insert the following 3 lines:

```
server=1  
blockfilterindex=1  
disablewallet=0
```

(you don't want to store private keys in Bitcoin Core, but you need wallet functionality enabled for building unsigned transactions)

Then save, close, and reopen Bitcoin Core for the changes to apply.

3.3.0.2 Remote nodes You'll also need a way to authenticate a connection to your node. If this node is run on a different computer (a "remote" machine), you'll need to know the `rpcuser` and `rpcpassword` that your bitcoin core node is using. We recommend setting `rpcuser` to `specter` (if you can) for simplicity.

3.3.0.3 HWI Bridge Note that for physically connecting hardware wallets using your laptop/desktop with Specter packaged on another device e.g. myNode, RaspiBlitz or Nodl, you may need to set up [HWI Bridge](#).

3.3.0.4 Optional Configuration If you can tweak your settings, we recommend the following (optional):

- Do **not** run your node in **pruning mode** as this disables rescan functionality. In some edge cases you may need to rescan your node, and a pruned node will instead have to (automatically) reindex the whole blockchain (can take many hours to many days).
- If you have set **blockfilterindex=1**, as suggested above, it takes just a few GB of storage and helps speedup blockchain rescaning.

3.3.1 Verify Software

3.3.1.1 Simple: Verify Signature Luke Dashjr has a good guide on “ensuring your install of Bitcoin is secure and free of malware”:

[<https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/how-to-securely-install-bitcoin-9bfeca7d3b2a>] (<https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/how-to-securely-install-bitcoin-9bfeca7d3b2a>)

3.3.1.2 Complicated: Build from Source TODO: add link

3.3.2 Run Node Over Tor

Jameson Lopp has a good guide on increasing the privacy of your node (as well as the Bitcoin network in general) by running your node over Tor:

<https://blog.lopp.net/how-to-run-bitcoin-as-a-tor-hidden-service-on-ubuntu/>

3.3.3 Guide to Deploying Node on AWS:

<https://wolfdmcnally.com/115/developer-notes-setting-up-a-bitcoin-node-on-aws/>

3.4 Install Specter-Desktop

3.4.0.1 Download Grab the latest release of the Specter-Desktop app:

<https://github.com/cryptoadvance/specter-desktop/releases>

For Windows the installer is `specter_desktop_setup.exe` and for MacOS it is `SpecterDesktop-v0.x.x.dmg` (where `x.x` represent the current version number).

3.4.0.2 Connect Specter-Desktop to Your Bitcoin Core Node If your node is run on the same computer as Specter, Specter will likely be able to automatically detect authentication info from a .cookie file that bitcoin core created on your computer.

TODO: add screenshot.

3.4.0.3 Enable Merkle Proofs That way, if your node is compromised it will have a hard time tricking you into believing you've received a fake payment (while still preserving your privacy):

1. Visit Bitcoin Core settings page and click on General tab ([this link](#) should work if you have Specter-Desktop running).
2. Toggle Validate Merkle Proofs button and hit Save.

TODO: add screenshot

This is a nice-to-have feature on nodes hosted locally, and very important for nodes hosted in the cloud. Unfortunately, it is currently [only possible on non-pruned nodes](#).

3.4.0.4 Build from Source Follow [these instructions](#) to build Specter-Desktop from source. More details [here](#).

3.4.0.5 Run Behind Tor TODO: add link

4 Setup Hardware Wallet Overview

4.1 Overview

We're going to configure a 2-of-3 multisignature scheme, meaning you will have 3 wallets, with a quorum of 2 required to send funds (or safely verify an address to receive funds on).

In order to simplify the process, one of the wallets will actually be a seed that you generate on your computer. This "paper wallet" is only ever designed to be used for backup/recovery purposes and will hopefully never be used. The 2nd seed will come from your Cobo Vault, and the 3rd seed will come from your Coldcard.

While there are a lot of steps here, you only ever have to do them once. Then, your wallet can then generate (nearly) infinite addresses and sign (nearly) infinite transactions.

1. [Paper Wallet](#)
2. [Cobo Vault](#)

3. [Coldcard](#)
4. [Coordinate Multisig \(Specter-Desktop\)](#)

4.1.0.1 Update Your Firmware Updating firmware is a step where things could go wrong, so we want to do this **before** putting any funds on the hardware wallet.

Hardware wallets by default refuse to update their own firmware unless the manufacturer has cryptographically signed the update, meaning it should be impossible for a third party to trick you into installing their “update” instead. Still, it’s a good idea to exercise common sense and be a little paranoid here.

There are a lot of incentives for a hacker to try and override the behavior of your hardware wallet. The good news is that by using multiple signatures (from multiple different hardware wallet manufacturers) an attacker would need to trick you into installing the wrong firmware capable of exploiting a vulnerable simultaneously on multiple devices.

For extra security when updating firmware via SD Card, use a unique SD card for each hardware wallet. In the unlikely even that one of your hardware wallets is compromised and is attempting to push malware on another, this will make it harder for that attack to succeed.

4.1.0.2 Use a Passphrase for Each Wallet While this is a way to harden your security, in practice it is quite complex as users are terrible about:

- Generating strong random passwords, which by definition must be long (high entropy)
- Remembering strong passwords, especially when they’re long (and sometimes not used for many months/years).
- Implementing a secure backup/recovery system (like [Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme](#)).

We prefer instead to rely on the added security that multisig already provides.

For now, **this step should only be considered for expert users**, and only after [increasing your quorum](#) (from 2-of-3 to 3-of-5).

4.2 Setup Paper Wallet

For a video demo, check out [this example on Bitcoin Magazine](#).

By using a paper wallet generated in software, we eliminate the need to buy a third hardware wallet (you may later have to buy a hardware wallet if you need to use this key for emergency recovery).

Warning: this is the highest risk step in our multisig setup. Follow the instructions closely, and seriously consider hardening your security by using techniques described in the advanced section.

4.2.1 Generate Seed

In order to eliminate the risk of a compromised random number generator, you are going to be the random number generator!

You will draw the first 23 words out of a hat to create your seed phrase. The last word of a [BIP39](#) seed phrase is actually a [checksum](#), meaning you need a computer to calculate it for you. It will also calculate some extended public key information that will be used to identify payments and generate transactions for your hardware wallets to sign.

4.2.1.1 Print Out Seed Words You are going to print out all 2048 words from [the official BIP39 wordlist](#) so you can select your seed words randomly. Download [this nicely formatted PDF](#) and print out both pages (single-sided). There is no private information in this PDF, having it only reveals that you're interested in bitcoin. You don't need your own printer; you could safely ask a friend to print it out for you, print it out at work, go to a Kinko's location, etc.

4.2.1.2 Cut Out Seed Words Cut the paper up into 2048 evenly-sized pieces (each with 1 word on it) and put them in a hat (any container will do).

4.2.1.3 Have a Monkey Draw 23 Words Out of the Hat If you don't have a monkey, you can do it yourself. As you pull each word out, write it down on a piece of paper. In the end you will have 23 words that look like this (**do NOT use this seed phrase**):

define rifle cliff summer priority ability chimney cotton tennis crash husband try t

4.2.2 Calculate the 24th Word and Other Seed Data using SeedPicker

The 24th word cannot be calculated on paper or in your head, so you will need a secure computer for this step. This guide recommends the open source tool SeedPicker, which was designed for this purpose.

4.2.2.1 Practice First with a Dry Run Let's start with a dry run. As this is just for testing, you don't have to worry about security at all. Use the following *insecure* seed phrase (the word zoo repeated 23 times):

```
zoo zoo
```

(an unbiased monkey would not pull the same word out of a hat 23 times in a row)

4.2.2.2 Calculate the 24th Word

1. Visit seedpicker.net
2. Enter the practice phrase (zoo zoo zoo...) and hit Calculate!
3. You will see that the 24th word calculation result is buddy:

Your 24th word is **buddy** 

Full seed phrase

```
zoo zoo
```

4.2.2.3 Save the Output

1. Write down the whole 24 word phrase (zoo repeated 23 times + buddy as the 24th word) *offline* on paper only. Do not save this to any computer.
2. Scroll down to Export Public Key Info To Specter Desktop and click on the Download button. This will download a json file to your computer, containing the extended public key info.

Save the file to a DVD-R or USB drive to later share with Specter-Desktop.

Export Public Key Info To Specter Desktop

This box contains everything you need to export your extended public key to Specter Desktop.

Extended Public Key
Zpub74sb5KB3Ak1RwabGr8SHQnMTkd2mC3boVDgPf1jBFNxcXh7Nx4KV3XakPDtWLN5RpszdM7q
cBN4wm7xreh8Ys2xYUBqQ9GtkTN8h5kRVecc

Root Key Fingerprint ?
669dce62

Derivation Path ?
m/48'/0'/0'/2'

 Download

 Show QR


4.2.2.4 Do it Live **Quit all applications, remove any removable media, and turn off your internet access before continuing. Do not save the seed phrase to your hard drive (write it down on paper only), and restart your computer before restoring internet access.**

It is *highly recommended* that you wipe your hard drive before restoring internet access. See [advanced section](#) for more info.

4.2.3 Export Public Key Info to Specter-Desktop

In the previous step, you saved your extended public key information (`seedpickerxp-foo.json`) to a DVD-R or USB pen-drive.

1. On Specter-Desktop: Click + Add new device, enter a Name (like Paper Wallet), click Choose files and select your file (`seedpickerxp-foo.json`), and hit continue. Your file will be automatically parsed into something like this:



2. Your public key is now added to Specter-Desktop:

The screenshot shows the 'Paper Wallet' section of the Specter-Desktop application. At the top, it says 'Paper Wallet' and 'Device Type: Other'. Below is a table with columns: Network, Purpose, Derivation, Key, and Actions. There is one row visible: 'Main' (Network), 'Multisig (Segwit)' (Purpose), 'm/48h/0h/0h/2h' (Derivation), and a QR code followed by the key value '[083aa3db/48h/0h/0h/2h]Zpub75bfwnas1XEzkrBtQS2G1SH' (Key). A red 'Delete' button is next to the key. At the bottom are two buttons: 'Add more keys' and 'Forget the device'.

4.3 Setup Paper Wallet Advanced

4.3.1 Use a Clean Machine

If there were malware on your machine and this seed escaped, it would **significantly** degrade the security of your multisig scheme. Assuming your attacker has 1 of your 2-of-3 needed keys, then you effectively now have a 1-of-2 scheme. Introducing the possibility of a single point of failure would mean we're now suffering **the negatives of multisig**, without getting (most of) the benefits.

That is why it is essential that you **turn off (and unplug) your internet access before performing these steps.**

4.3.1.1 Option A (preferred): Tails Operating System For our one-time offline key generation, it is preferable to use a live operating system that cannot store information on the file system. [Tails](#) is a live OS that is designed to wipe itself completely on shutdown. Conveniently, Electrum also comes pre-installed with Tails.

Follow [the official Tails installation instructions](#) to install Tails. Then perform **the regular steps in the Setup Paper Wallet section** using that machine. Your computer will automatically wipe itself completely (including RAM) on shutdown.

If you are truly paranoid, remove the hard drive from the machine (before booting up Tails) so there is no possibility that any private key material can be written to disk.

4.3.1.2 Option B (less secure): Wipe Your Machine While [Tails](#) is preferred for self-destruction, you can get a similar effect by wiping the hard drive after generating your seed. If you have an Ubuntu installer DVD or pen drive (see [Computer Configuration section](#)), you can use that to perform the following steps:

1. Disconnect your computer from the internet.
2. Perform [the regular steps in the Setup Paper Wallet section](#).
3. Wipe your hard drive and re-install the operating system.
4. Reconnect the computer to the internet.

You can further enhance this with two (optional) steps:

- Before getting started, setup full disk encryption (see [Advanced Computer Configuration section](#)) with a **very** long passphrase so that any data that may have persisted on your hard drive after step 3 (above) can never be recovered.
- When wiping your hard drive, use [a secure erase program](#) to make sure that nothing survives.

Note that these do not work perfectly on Flash memory (SSD drives), so the previous technique is preferred. You can read more about this [here](#) and [here](#).

4.3.2 Verify Seed Generation

4.3.2.1 Confirm Seed Matches Zpub This is important in case SeedPicker was actually replaced by malware trying to steal your bitcoin! We will confirm that the seed is valid, matches the expected root fingerprint and Zpub (for that path).

This step is unfortunately complicated, as SeedPicker (see [basic section](#)) is the only GUI software that currently exists to make it easier. **Only advanced users who are comfortable with the command line should continue.**

4.3.2.1.1 Use HumanRNG Electrum Script <https://github.com/mflaxman/human-rng-electrum>

TODO: add instructions.

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4.3.2.1.2 Use a Pure Command Line Interface (CLI) Script Expert users only: <https://github.com/mflaxman/human-rng-golang>

4.3.2.2 Improve Airgap

4.3.2.2.1 Option A: Write Data to CD/DVD instead of USB Drive DVDs are less able to execute malware on your computer.

4.3.2.2.2 Option B: Use a QR-Code Airgap This is not currently documented. Pull requests with clarification are welcome. Specter-Desktop can receive this info via QR-code airgap.

4.3.3 Improve Seed Generation

4.3.3.1 Put Each Word Back in the Hat Between Draws BIP39 allows for a word to be repeated in your seed phrase should it happen to be randomly drawn multiple times (very unlikely).

Randomly drawing 23 words *with replacement*, when performed correctly, has 253 bits of entropy.

```
>>> from math import log2  
>>> log2(2048**23)  
253.0
```

Randomly drawing 23 words *without* replacement, when performed correctly, has “only” 252.82 bits of entropy.

```
>>> from math import factorial  
>>> def perm(n, k):
```

```
...     return factorial(n) / factorial(n - k)
...
>>> log2(perm(2048, 23))
252.8211201612868
```

With so many words to choose from (2048), the vast majority (over 88%) of possible seed phrases do not contain repeated words.

```
>>> perm(2048, 23) / 2048**23
0.8833886253765292
```

The slight reduction to such a massive keyspace is insignificant. Nonetheless, we prefer to follow standards / best practices when possible.

4.3.3.2 Use SeedPicker Cutouts Instead of having to cut out 2,048 words, you can get the same security by cutting out only 342 raffle tickets and using a 6-sided die instead. See [the SeedPicker guide for creating your own seed phrase](#) for more info. This will require 3 pages to be printed out, and it's easier if you print out another 5 (can just reference them online if you prefer). You'll also need a fair 6-sided die.

4.3.3.3 Use Dice You can avoid all the paper cutting by [using dice and a lookup table instead](#).

4.3.3.4 Add a Strong Passphrase to Your Seed Caution: you now have to come up with a way to backup/protect this passphrase, and if you lose it your seed is worthless. Because this step is only for **expert** users, we're going to ignore it for now. Be sure to use a hardware wallet where you can enter the passphrase directly on the device to avoid [potential issues](#).

4.3.4 Not Perfect

No setup is perfect and this one is no exception. Read more about known issues with SeedPicker [here](#).

4.4 Setup Cobo Vault

4.4.1 Upgrade Firmware

Follow the instructions [here](#) to update your firmware:

1. Download the latest BTC-Only firmware from Cobo:

<https://cobo.com/hardware-wallet/downloads>

The screenshot shows the Cobo website's 'Downloads' section. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for 'Cobo Wallet', 'Cobo Custody', 'Cobo Vault', 'Company', 'Support', and language selection ('EN'). A 'Shop Now' button is also present. Below the navigation, there are links for 'view', 'Coin Support', 'Downloads' (which is highlighted in blue), 'Blog', 'Web Authentication', and 'User Guide'. On the right side of the main content area, there is a 'Cobo Tablet' link and a 'Shop Now' button. The main content features a large graphic of a shield with a Bitcoin symbol inside. The title 'Bitcoin-only Firmware Download' is prominently displayed. Below the title, there is an important notice about upgrading the Cobo Vault from multi-coin to Bitcoin-only firmware. It includes a warning icon, the text, and a link to download the package. Further down, there is a note about the permanence of the upgrade and two download buttons: 'BTC-Only Firmware' (highlighted with a red box) and 'Checksum'.

2. Copy the downloaded .zip file to your microSD card and insert it into your Cobo Vault.




3. Turn on your Cobo Vault. You will be prompted to update the firmware, click the button to accept the upgrade. If not, you can click on Menu > Settings > Version > Update Now.
4. Enter your password when prompted. The update may take several minutes to complete.

4.4.2 Setup Wallet


Follow [the instructions on Cobo's website](#) to verify your device, setup a PIN, and generate your seed.

4.4.3 Export Public Key Info to Computer via QR Code / Webcam

1. On Cobo: Menu > Multisig Wallet > ••• button in the top right > Show/Export XPUB.




2. On Specter-Desktop: Click + Add new device > Scan



3. Hold the QR code on your Cobo vault up to your webcam so your computer can scan it.

4. Give your device a name (i.e. Cobo) and hit Continue.

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You can perform these steps via SD card, but since it is harder to do and less secure you really shouldn't!

4.4.3.1 Verify Your Firmware Before Installing Confirm that the sha256 hash digest of the file you downloaded matches what is expected:

```
$ shasum -a 256 V1.4.0-BTC_Only.zip  
6956715f43893da00f41ff6e3da5403c908e853f35ad85b80ab75af59b3f1faf V1.4.0-BTC_Only.zip
```

(This is accurate for v.1.4.0 but will become stale for future releases. Calculate the hash digest of the new file and confirm that it matches what's published by the company.)

4.4.4 Not Perfect

No device is perfect and this one is no exception. Read more about known issues with Cobo Vault [here](#).

4.5 Setup Coldcard

4.5.1 Update Your Firmware

Follow the steps on Coldcard's website:

<https://coldcardwallet.com/docs/upgrade>

4.5.2 Setup Wallet

Follow the steps on Coldcard's website:

<https://coldcardwallet.com/docs/quick>

TODO: add more instructions for generating seed, setting PIN, etc


4.5.3 Export Public Key Info to Computer via MicroSD

1. Insert a microSD into Coldcard and then select: Settings > Multisig Wallets > Export XPUB.




2. Remove the microSD card from your Coldcard and put it in your computer's card reader.
3. On Specter-Desktop: Click + Add new device > Choose files:

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4. Give your device a name (i.e. Coldcard) and hit Continue.

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4.5.4 Verify Coldcard Authenticity

The Coldcard will come in a bag with a letter or barcode under the number (e.g. C0008091) - when you first start up the device, confirm that it displays this number. See Matt Odell's Coldcard video from approx 3 mins in [here](#).

4.5.5 Improve Coldcard Airgap

4.5.5.1 Power Source Instead of connecting the Coldcard to your laptop for power:

- Use a portable battery pack (best)
- Use a wall outlet
- Use a [charge-only \(no-data\) USB cable](#) or a [USB condom](#) on an existing cable on a regular micro-USB cable.

4.5.5.2 Use A Dedicated Device for Address Exploration [Coldcard doesn't currently support address exploration with an airgap.](#) In order to verify a receive address on a coldcard you must significantly weaken your airgap and plug the Coldcard into your laptop via USB port.

For more mitigations see [Coldcard Advanced Address Verification](#).

4.5.5.3 SD Card Interactivity Each time your SD card travels back and forth between your computer and coldcard introduces the possibility of malware jumping your “airgap.” Expert users can figure out how to create a multisig wallet on their coldcard with only 1 file from their hot machine (no need to first export the public key information from the coldcard). TODO: file github issue on Specter-Desktop to build this into the UI and link to it here.

4.5.6 Additional Entropy

Add additional entropy during new wallet creation using a casino die by pressing ‘4’ as demonstrated [here](#) by Matt Odell.

4.5.7 Not Perfect


No device is perfect and this one is no exception. Read more about known issues with Coldcard [here](#).

4.6 Coordinate Multisig


Now that we have all your public key information in Specter-Desktop, we need to create your 2–of–3 multisig wallet. We tell Specter-Desktop and each hardware wallet that these are your 3 public keys and that any 2 of them is sufficient to sign a transaction. This is a one-time setup that you’ll never need to repeat.

4.6.1 Setup Specter Desktop

1. On Specter Desktop, select + Add new wallet > Multisignature wallet




2. Give a name to your wallet (i.e. Redundant Multisig), choose Segwit (default), 2-of-3 (default) and select your 3 cosigners: Cobo, Coldcard and Paper Wallet




3. Select your public keys. If you've followed the default steps, you'll just select all 3 of them.

10x Security Bitcoin Guide



4. See your first bitcoin address!:




(we'll learn how to trust-

lessly verify addresses in the **Verify Receive Address section**)


4.6.2 Setup Cobo Vault

1. On Specter Desktop, select your wallet (Redundant Multisig) > Settings > Show Cobo QR Code:




Which will generate a


popup like this:



2. Scan the QR code on your Cobo Vault:





3. View wallet information and confirm:



4.6.3 Setup Coldcard

1. On Specter Desktop, select your wallet (Redundant Multisig) > Settings > Download Coldcard File:




2. Save this file to your microSD card and put the microSD card in your Coldcard.
3. On your Coldcard, enter: **Settings > Multisig Wallets > Import from SD**

 (select the file and press √)


4.6.4 Verify M, N, and Pubkeys

Even if you have the correct m-of-n (2-of-3), you need to be sure that the public keys used correspond to the private keys you actually control!

4.6.4.1 Cobo You can verify this when [setting up your Cobo](#), or go to **Multisig Wallet > Wallet Name > Wallet Info** anytime:



4.6.4.2 Coldcard On your Coldcard, enter: Settings > Multisig Wallets > Your Wallet Name > View Details:




Because Coldcard uses xpub... while Specter/Cobo use the newer Zpub... standard, the easiest way to do this in practice is to **verify a single receive address on the coldcard**.

Expert users may be able to convert between xpub and Zpub with a tool like [Jameson Lopp's XPub Converter](#) to verify extended public keys. RTFM for more info: <https://coldcardwallet.com/docs/multisig>

4.6.4.3 Paper We want to verify that the pubkey from this piece of paper has been included in our quorum. Confirm that your Zpub... from the **Setup Paper Wallet Step** is included on your Cobo Vault (above).

4.6.4.4 Specter-Desktop: We can't trust this device (we have to assume it's malware), but it's still a useful sanity-check:



5 Verify Receive Address

It is **essential** to be sure you control a bitcoin address before you use it to receive funds and **verifying multisig receive addresses is slightly more complicated than single-key setups.**

In order to securely receive funds, you must verify a given receive address on at least a quorum (m in m-of-n) of your trusted displays. In the default case, this means you would check on **both** your Cobo Vault and your Coldcard. This is both annoying – the two devices should be kept in different physical locations – and in the case of Coldcard mildly frustrating as **they don't currently support address exploration with an airgap.**

Once you have verified your address on a quorum of devices, it is safe to give that address out to a payee. Advanced users can mitigate some of these issues by following **these steps.**

1. [Specter Instructions](#)
2. [Cobo Vault Instructions](#)
3. [Coldcard Instructions](#)

5.1 Verify Receive Address Advanced

It is essential to be sure you control a bitcoin address before you receive funds on it, as this is a common attack that leads to losses. You can read more about this issue [here](#).

5.1.0.1 When to Choose A Less Secure Approach Having to travel to multiple geographies just to verify a single receive address (not even to spend bitcoin) can be undesirable for practical reasons.

One way around this is to (partially) trust the addresses your host computer displays. If your host computer says address X follows the rules of your quorum (m signatures required from these n seeds your hardware wallets control), **and** your Cobo vault agrees, you might decide it's worth the risk to consider that receive address valid. **If your host computer (which may be infected with malware) and your Cobo Vault were compromised, this could result in immediate loss of funds sent to this address.**

Factors that make it less risky to consider this approach:

1. **When the amount you're receiving is low.** Bitcoin price appreciation could increase the \$ value of the bitcoin in this address.
2. **When the computer you're using to verify this address is a dedicated machine** - an eternally quarantined machine is *much* better.
3. **When you previously saved (preferably printed) a file of addresses that you verified on a quorum of trusted devices**, this address matches that file, and you are confident that nobody tampered with the file.
4. **When performing a 3-of-5 multisig transaction where you verified the address on 2 trusted devices in the quorum** but not the full 3 required.
5. **When your hardware wallets you use to verify the address previously saved/registered the public keys info from the rest of your seeds**, so that tampering with any seed would be caught by this wallet. TODO: add more on this.

You might consider it safe to send to an address that you've previously received funds on and been able to spend, but this has two serious issues:

1. This is known as address reuse, and it's a bad for both privacy as well security (in the event of a quantum computer). TODO: add link/explanation.
2. The fact that you were previously able to spend does indicate you have control but doesn't guarantee it. In an extreme case, your host computer may be malware-infected yet still relaying/signing your small transactions in hopes of tricking you into making a large deposit (you can think of this as a long-con).

5.1.1 Offline Address Verification

Your Specter-Desktop software is connected to the internet, or at least connected to your bitcoin node which is connected to the internet. We can improve this by using an offline/dedicated machine, where we install only the most minimal software.

While this will help protect you against malware on your computer, you are still at risk from an [Evil maid attack](#) with physical access to your computer (or paper printout). They could tamper with this software/printout to instead show bitcoin addresses that they control, and trick you into receiving a deposit on their address.

5.1.1.1 Option A: Dedicated Machine TODO: add instructions for inputting extended public keys & paths (no private keys/seeds) running Electrum, Sparrow, Caravan, or some CLI script.

It is recommended to use an eternally quarantined machine, meaning that it is never again connected to the internet and not used for any other purpose. That way, the attack surface is reduced and you are not at risk of malware on an ongoing basis.

5.1.1.2 Option B: Print the Addresses to Paper One benefit of this is that you could get by without a dedicated machine, and the other is that paper is easier for most people to secure vs a computer.

The main downside is that if you have a ton of bitcoin addresses (perhaps for a bitcoin business that receives many payments daily), paper can be a little harder to keep track of.

Steps:


1. Follow the instructions in the previous step and setup a clean (freshly wiped) machine to verify receive addresses.
2. Export a very large amount of receive addresses to a file. You never want to have to repeat this setup and paper is cheap, so consider a very large number (say 10,000 addresses).
3. Print this file, and consider making multiple copies.

Now that you never need to check this computer again, you can go about using it for whatever you like and not have to worry about keeping it secure. Ideally, you would wipe the computer, but since it is only touching *public* key information the only risk is a privacy leak.

5.2 Verify Receive Address on Specter

Verification is easy!

Your Multisig Wallet (i.e. Redundant Multisig) > Receive and then see Address #X:




Your computer may be compromised with malware!

If you're paranoid, you can [also verify this address using an eternally quarantined machine \(or file\)](#).

5.3 Verify Receive Address on Cobo Vault


Verifying receive addresses is one area where Cobo excels! The large screen and true airgap improve both security and usability.

On Cobo Vault, click Multisig Wallet > Receiving tab (default selected) and click on the address:



While verifying the address is a good start, ideally you also want to reconfirm the m-of-n quorum info each time you transact.

Go to Multisig Wallet > Your Wallet Name > Wallet Info:




5.4 Verify Receive Address on Coldcard

5.4.1 Warning


Coldcard doesn't currently support address exploration with an airgap. In order to verify a receive address on a coldcard you must significantly weaken your airgap and plug the Coldcard into your laptop via USB port. We hope that Coldcard will add functionality similar to Cobo vault soon. See [advanced section](#) for mitigations.

5.4.2 Verify via USB

1. On Specter-Desktop: Your Wallet > Receive > Display address on device:



2. Verify address on your Coldcard:



5.4.3 Warning

Coldcard doesn't currently support address exploration with an airgap. In order to verify a receive address on a coldcard you must significantly weaken your airgap and plug the Coldcard into your laptop via USB port.

5.4.3.1 Option A: Offline Address Verification See [receive address verification advanced section](#). This step doesn't actually use your coldcard to derive the address, it just uses the extended public key information from your coldcard.

5.4.3.2 Option B: Eternally Quarantine A Dedicated Computer Similar to the previous step, you can setup an eternally-quarantined watch-only machine, but use it to connect to your coldcard to verify the receive addresses on your coldcard's display. Eternally quarantining the machine reduces the risk that it becomes malware infected, to reduce the risk of plugging it into your coldcard.

6 Backup Wallet

Now that we've confirmed everything is working as expected, let's back it all up *before* receiving any bitcoin.

6.1 Seeds and Public Keys

There are two components to your wallet that you need to backup to guarantee recovery: **seed phrases** and **public keys**.

6.1.0.1 Seed Phrases [BIP39](#) seeds are 24* word phrases that represent your bitcoin private keys. With multisig, you only need to have m (of your total n) seed phrases to sign a transaction. Seed phrases should be guarded very carefully as anyone who gets access to m of your n seed phrases could steal your bitcoin!

*Expert users may choose to have a shorter seed-phrase, though we do not normally recommend this.

6.1.0.2 Public Keys One confusing thing about multisig is that you need *all* of your public keys ([including associated metadata](#)) in order to be able to spend *any* of your bitcoin. Public keys do not

need to be guarded nearly as carefully as seeds; anyone who gets access to ‘public key information’ can only see which bitcoin addresses belong to you but cannot spend from them.

For non-expert users, we recommend storing a copy of *all* extended public keys with *each* individual seed as well as redundant backups in many other places that may include:

- Unsecured in a filing cabinet at home and/or work
 - With your heirs, who may one day have to figure this out without your help
 - In a safe-deposit box
 - With your accountant, lawyer, or financial advisor
 - With an insecure cloud provider (advanced users may want to encrypt this first)
1. [Backup Seeds Instructions](#)
 2. [Backup Public Keys](#)

6.1.0.3 Protect Your Privacy Expert users may notice a potential privacy issue with having many copies of your extended public keys floating around. You can read more about it [here](#).

6.2 Backup Seeds

Remember that anyone who gets access to a quorum of your seeds (m in m -of- n) as well as your much less secure [public key information](#) can steal *all* of your bitcoin, so **do not store store a quorum of your seeds in one place!**

6.2.0.1 Redundancy You want to backup each of your 24 word bip39 seed phrases on a piece of paper, so that you can recover if your hardware wallet is lost, defective, or destroyed. That means at a minimum you’ll have 3 pieces of paper, each with 1 seed phrase. Then, m of your seeds along with **all** n of your extended public key info (see [Backup Public Keys](#)) will allow you to recover your funds.

6.2.0.2 Security Some good places to store a seed:

- **Vaults at banks** - safe-deposit boxes have the added benefit that in the event of your death they should naturally transfer over to your heirs.
- **Safes at home/work** - you may not have the security systems/monitoring of a bank, but you also don’t have to trust a third party to let you in (nor peak).
- **Buried in a mountain** - X marks the spot!
- **With a trusted family member** (or very close friend) - remember that if you give away m seeds, this person could spend your bitcoin.

6.3 Think Hard About Your Risks

It is a natural human bias to be more concerned with theft vs loss. An easy window into our psychology is that we are all terrified of homicide but in fact suicide is more common. Non-expert users should question themselves when taking extreme steps to protect against theft over loss.

There are many tradeoffs between security/redundancy below and only you can decide what the appropriate balance is for your needs.

6.4 Multiple Locations

6.4.0.1 Physical Security Not only does storing all of your bitcoin information in one place make it less secure, it also makes you a target! You don't want a home-invader to be able to hold you at gunpoint for your life-savings. The downside here is that funds kept this way may be a little harder to spend as you now have to visit multiple secure locations. *For day-to-day funds, you might choose a simpler single-key signature wallet setup that is easy to spend (but not as secure).*

6.4.0.2 Natural Disasters If you keep all m seeds in one location and there is a fire (or flood) you could lose everything, perhaps when you need it most. In the unlikely event you need to evacuate, you don't also want to be carrying your life-savings on you (see previous section on physical security).

Imagine you have a 2-of-3 scheme with 1 seed in each of 3 cities (A, B, and C). Should you need to evacuate city A, you can take seed A with you to city B or to city C. As you are only carrying 1 (of a needed 2) seeds, should you be robbed during this time your attacker will not be able to spend your bitcoin. Important note: in the event a seed is compromised you need to retrieve m seeds ASAP to "rotate" out the seed that was stolen (this is accomplished by moving your funds to a new multisig scheme where you control *all* 3 seeds again).

6.5 Estate Planning

The hardest bitcoin security question for most bitcoiners to answer is "what happens to your bitcoin if you get hit by a bus?" Unfortunately, ensuring your bitcoin is recoverable by your loved ones **and nobody else** is a very challenging task. Multisig is the best tool we have to aid in this process.

6.5.0.1 Give One (or More) Seeds to Someone You Trust If someone has a quorum of seeds, they can potentially steal your bitcoins! Depending on your personal situation, this may be a good thing (perhaps a spouse who you want to have complete access) or a bad thing (perhaps a financial manager who might be tempted to steal).

Imagine you have a 2-of-3 scheme with seeds A, B, and C, all of which you initially control. You and your spouse want to always have access to your bitcoins, and you want your children to only get access in the event both you and your spouse are dead.

You might do the following:

- Give your family (you, your spouse, and your children) a copy of seed A. You/spouse store seed A at home or work and your children also store seed A somewhere that only they have access to (perhaps their home, work or a safe deposit box).
- Put seed B in a safe-deposit box that only you and your spouse have access to.
- Give seed C to your lawyer or other trusted-friend, to share with your children in the event of your death only. They will also share it with you if needed as part of an emergency recovery.

As a result of this scheme:

- You and your spouse always have regular access via seeds A & B, provided that you didn't lose your copy of seed A and that you can get into your safe deposit box for seed B. If you lose seed A, you can ask your spouse or children for their copy as a backup. In the event of a problem retrieving seed B from the bank, you can ask your lawyer for assistance in recovery (as they have seed C). Keep in mind that if you lose *both* seeds A and B, your bitcoins are permanently lost.
- In the event both you and your spouse die, your children can recover. They already have seed A, they just need seed B (from the bank) or seed C (from the lawyer). They can get access to seed B by contacting the bank (assuming you designated your children as the next-of-kin for your safe deposit box) or seed C by contacting the lawyer.

Of course, there are all kinds of tradeoffs/choices to be made:

- If *both* your lawyer and the bank are dishonest (or compelled by a government order), they can collude to steal your bitcoin (they have access to seeds B and C)!
- If *both* your lawyer and the bank are unlucky/negligent (perhaps they both suffer catastrophic fires in the same day!), you can be locked out of your bitcoin forever (seeds B and C are lost, as seed A alone is not enough to meet the 2-of-3 threshold).
- If your children want to steal their inheritance before you die and are able to collude with (or trick) either the bank or the lawyer, they can get seed B or C and combine it with seed A (which they already have).
- Your lawyer and your children may have some insight into your bitcoin transaction history, which could implicate how much bitcoin you have.

Read more [here](#).

While not perfect, this is **far superior to single-key signature schemes**.

Each of these situations can be addressed with a different quorum, giving different people different access, making more backups, etc. However, each of those choices will introduce new risks.

You can quickly see that this scheme lends itself better to something like 3-of-5, so you can have more entities/redundancy, and clearer organizational lines (less copies of keys floating around, so you can know for sure *who* signed each transaction).

6.6 Protect Your Backups

6.6.0.1 Metal [Metal bitcoin seed storage](#) is the most durable, as paper can fade, burn or smudge if wet. Use metal instead of paper to backup your seed phrases.

6.6.0.2 Archival Paper & Ink [Archival paper](#) is obviously not as durable as metal, but better than regular paper. Place your paper into a plastic bag with a good seal (vacuum sealed even better) so that it doesn't get destroyed in the event of water damage.

6.6.0.3 Fireproof Document Bag You can use these to protect seed backups, and also to protect your physical hardware wallets.

6.7 Backup Public Keys

While you can spend bitcoin with only m seeds, you must also have all n public keys to be able to spend any bitcoin. For this reason, we recommend saving **many** copies (each one having *all* public keys).

6.7.0.1 Save to USB Pen Drive or DVD Drive Make many copies and store in many locations. We recommend you keep a copy of *all* public keys (and related metadata) with *each* seed.

6.7.0.2 Save on Your Computer TODO: add instructions on how to save this with Specter.

6.7.0.3 Save Online Save this data to various cloud providers (Dropbox, Google Drive, iCloud) or backup services (Mozy, Carbonite, Backblaze, etc) that you may already use. Keep in mind this now means they have the ability to see all your bitcoin transactions and balance information (if they decide to peek).

6.7.0.4 Protect Your Public Keys Put your public key data (DVD or USB pendrive) in a plastic Ziploc-style bag to protect it from water damage. A vacuum-sealed bag is even better. For fire protection, place that inside a fireproof document bag.

6.7.0.5 Secure Your Public Keys Anyone who gets access to public key information can see which bitcoin addresses belong to you but cannot spend from them. While cloud backups may be good from an availability perspective, it also means that a third party could potentially see your bitcoin addresses and transaction history. To protect against this, encrypt the data with a **strong** passphrase before sending it to the cloud. The problem of course is that you need a system in place to protect you if you lose that passphrase (or get hit by a bus). This is one reason why keeping an unencrypted copy of all public keys with each of your bitcoin seeds (that should already be stored in secure locations) is often an ideal tradeoff.

6.7.0.6 Extended Public Key Info The info needed to backup your extended public keys also includes related configuration settings/metadata:

- **The Extended Public Key:** this will either start with Zpub for mainnet / Vpub for testnet if using [SLIP132 encoding](#) or xpub for mainnet / tpub for testnet.
- **BIP32 Paths:** Instructions for your hardware wallet to derive the specific key used for signing from the seed.

This can be represented in many ways but might look like `m/48'/0'/0'/2'`.

- **Quorum Information:** Your `m` and `n` in `m-of-n`.
- **Root Fingerprint:** An ID for your master public key. This is 4 bytes of data, stored in hexadecimal format (i.e. `5e66c49b`)

You don't need to know what these are, your software will handle it automatically. The main thing is that you have to keep a copy of all this public key info for all of your seeds, and unlike your 24 word seed phrase it's too long/unwieldy to write down by hand.


This is why we use USB pen-drives, DVD drives, store it on our computer, in the cloud, etc.

7 Send Bitcoin


In order to send bitcoin, you will need to sign on 2-of-3 of your hardware wallets.

At this point, you should've completed all the previous sections. Once you've [verified your receive addresses](#) and [backed up your wallet](#), it's safe to receive bitcoin. Now we'll go over how to spend some of them.


1. On Specter-Desktop: Your Multisig Wallet (i.e. Redundant Multisig) > Send > New. Fill out the transaction info and hit Create unsigned transaction:



2. The transaction will now exist in an unsigned state. Click Open so you can sign it with your hardware wallets (Cobo and Coldcard):



3. Select Cobo to sign with first (order doesn't strictly matter):



4. Sign via QR code (best airgap & UX):




5. On Cobo Vault: Menu > Multisig Wallet > scanner icon (in the top right) and scan the QR code that Specter-Desktop is displaying.




6. On Cobo: sign the transaction.

TODO: add photo


7. On Specter-Desktop: Scan signed transaction and hold up Cobo Vault to your computer's QR code scanner:



8. Select Coldcard to sign with second (order doesn't strictly matter):



9. Select USB and pick which USB device to do the signing:




10. On Coldcard: confirm transaction:



(this warning has to do with the high transaction fee for this test transaction and is safe to ignore)

11. Broadcast the signed transaction:



TODO: fix outdated pictures.

7.1 Complexity of Multisig Here

Besides needing multiple signature, multisig also involves complexity in that your change addresses are m-of-n as well.

Fortunately, your wallet software will abstract this away for you.

TODO: add link with more details explaining this.

7.2 Sign on Coldcard via SD Card

SD Card is a better airgap.

TODO: add instructions

7.3 Inspect Signed Transactions Before Broadcasting

TODO: add instructions

8 Emergency Recovery

By default, you sign your 2-of-3 transactions on your 2 hardware wallets (Cobo Vault and Coldcard) that **you previously configured**. If either device is damaged/destroyed, you should replace it with a new one and load the same seed phrase that **you previously backed up** onto the replacement device. This means that if seed phrase A was on your Cobo Vault and your Cobo Vault was destroyed in a fire, you would do the following:

1. Buy a new Cobo Vault.
2. Find the backup of seed phrase A that **you previously made**.
3. Load seed phrase A onto your new (replacement) Cobo Vault.
4. Follow **the previous hardware wallet setup steps** to add the new device into your multisig.

However, if for any reason that doesn't work (perhaps devices are sold out or the company has gone out of business), you can load that BIP39 seed onto another device.

For this, we have two recommendations: Trezor (hardware wallet) and Electrum (software wallet). Both have tradeoffs, and we hope that there will be better options in the future. BIP39 is the gold

standard supported by all major hardware wallets, so we expect it will continue to be compatible with new hardware wallets as they come online in the future.

As there are gotchas in both of these setups, we recommend you read [the advanced section](#) for tips to improve your setup.

8.0.0.1 Option A - Trezor You should be aware that this is a little more complicated than hardware wallets you setup previously, and there are some pitfalls to avoid (see [known issues](#)).

TODO: add explanation/screenshots.

8.0.0.2 Option B - Electrum Electrum is an open-source software wallet that is free and readily available, but difficult to use with multisig. **As it will be touching private key material, we strongly recommend you run this on an airgapped machine** (see [advanced section](#)).

TODO: add screenshots.

1. Download and install Electrum from electrum.org/.
2. Create a new multisignature wallet using the wizard, and select 2 of 3 as your quorum.
3. Using your Specter wallet backup file, identify your zpubs from the JSON file
4. For the first two keys (Coldcard and Cobo), import the zpub master public keys into the Electrum multi signature wizard as keys in the multi signature quorum, ensuring the pathway matches the one Specter wallet used e.g. $m/48'/0'/0'/2'$. Electrum will display these as xpub master keys.
5. For the seedpicker paper wallet, select private keys, and Electrum will present a box to type in your seedpicker seed. Ensure you use the drop-down menu to select that this is a BIP39 seed or otherwise Electrum will not correctly recognise and recover this seed. Notice from this point, you should now consider this private key as ‘hot’ assuming your Electrum machine is online.
6. You can generate a PSBT partially signed bitcoin transaction from Specter, sign it with one of your keys (e.g. the Coldcard or Cobo), and then load that PSBT into your Electrum under the Tools > Load from file function. If correctly imported, Electrum will then detect that this transaction has been signed by 1 of 2 required signatures, and present you the opportunity to sign it with the seedpicker paper wallet key.
7. You can then Save this PSBT file and broadcast it from your Specter Wallet to broadcast the transaction.

8.1 Option A - Trezor Hardware Wallet

8.1.0.1 Update Your Firmware TODO: add content

8.1.0.2 Do Not Disclose Your Addresses TODO: add content

8.2 Option B - Electrum Software Wallet

8.2.0.1 Use an Airgap Machine Tails strongly recommended.

8.2.0.2 Verify Validity of Electrum Software You can read instructions on how to do this [here](#).

9 Known Issues & Benefits

9.1 10x Security Guide

9.1.1 Specter DIY

TODO: add content

9.1.2 Coldcard

9.1.2.1 Verifying a Receiving Address Breaks Airgap [Coldcard doesn't currently support address exploration with an airgap](#). In order to verify a receive address on a coldcard you must significantly weaken your airgap and plug the Coldcard into your laptop via USB port!

We expect they'll release this feature in the future, but the recommendation for now is to use Cobo Vault as the primary device when it comes to [verifying receive addresses](#). Advanced users can pursue [various mitigation strategies](#).

9.1.2.2 SD Card “Airgap” While better than a USB port, SD cards are not a perfect airgap. [Stuxnet](#) proved that the NSA was capable of jumping a USB-drive airgap to harm the Iranian nuclear reactor program.

9.1.2.3 Wired “Airgap” This device must be connected to your computer in order to function. Wired connections are bad because the USB stack presents massive attack vectors; the whole point of hardware wallets is to keep your keys offline. Coldcard requires a USB connection only to perform address verification (see above for related issues).

9.1.2.4 Small Screen This makes it hard to manually verify addresses / public key info, and impossible to display QR codes (to minimize using the SD card).

9.1.2.5 UX Feels More Hacker/Prosumer than Enterprise Grade The Coldcard Mark3 has come a long way and now features clicky-buttons, a faster processor, and a more RAM (for signing transactions with many inputs).

However, normal users may be skeptical to trust a device to millions of dollars that looks like a child's calculator. Looks can be deceiving, as this is a very powerful and purpose-built device.

9.1.2.6 Non-Reproducible Builds While Coldcard builds are signed by Coldcard, they are not built in a way that is reproducible so they cannot be independently verified. That said, Coldcard firmware is fully open so users can compile it themselves if they want this guarantee.

9.1.2.7 Fork of Trezor This hardware wallet was launched by forking some of Trezor's open-source code. That said, it is very actively maintained and has many new features since then (some that Trezor has not been updated to support).

9.1.3 Cobo Vault

9.1.3.1 Not Fully Open-Source The device has been audited, but is not fully open-source for various reason. See more details on [their blog](#).

If firmware cannot be built from source reproducibly, then users are merely trusting that the binaries the software developers sign are actually derived from the correct source. Unless users build the firmware themselves, this is essentially the same tradeoff as just using closed source code. Note that developers working on the project needn't be malicious for issues to occur as their computers could be hacked.

9.1.3.2 Built on General Purpose OS (Android) Most hardware wallets use special purpose operating systems to reduce their attack surface (and improve performance). Cobo did harden their Android installation, but the attack surface is still much larger.

9.1.3.3 Altcoin-Focused In theory, supporting altcoins does not fundamentally weaken bitcoin security. In practice, the more complex a codebase is the more likely a security bug will be introduced (or go undetected). These wallets are liable to be slow to upgrade their security, and [bit rot](#) is more likely to set in.

Cobo does have [a bitcoin-only firmware](#), though this is not a perfect solution (TODO: add link).

9.1.3.4 Mild Annoyances These are all things that are annoying but not show-stoppers:

- **Slow boot time.** The fingerprint reader does help makeup for this!
- **Long PIN can be annoying to enter on keyboard.** However, this only matters when the finger-print reader fails.
- **The microSD card is hard to remove.** A simple pair of tweezers solves the problem. More importantly, the strong QR-code airgap means you only have to use SD card to update the firmware.

9.1.4 SeedPicker

9.1.4.1 Software Wallets Are Dangerous It's harder to secure a general purpose operating system than to secure a purpose-built hardware product. SeedPicker pushes more security responsibility onto end users.

Advanced users (those comfortable setting up an airgap machine and verifying SeedPicker's results) love how SeedPicker can trustlessly eliminate [RNG attacks](#) on your seed phrase. Regular users are more likely to shoot themselves in the foot and are probably better off trusting their hardware wallets to generate the seed phrases correctly.

9.2 Don't Be Discouraged

Security is not a binary, and no device is 100% secure. Remember that [multisig security is additive](#), and using this device as part of a proper multisig setup can *substantially* improve your bitcoin security.

9.2.1 Multisig

While multisig offers [unparalleled security](#) (see more in the [Why Multisig](#) section), the benefits do not come for free.

Here are some of the current negatives of using any multisig scheme:

- [Added Complexity](#)
- [Limited Hardware Wallet Support](#)

- [Verifying Receive Addresses](#)
- [Extra Cost](#)
- [Seeds and Privacy Leaks](#)

9.2.2 Complexity

9.2.2.1 Complexity is the Enemy of Security This is a common adage when it comes to information security, and multisig is no exception. There are two very important mitigating factors.

9.2.2.2 Multisig is Not that Complex It may seem that multisig is quite complex, but much of the complexity is just forcing the important security steps to be done upfront before funds are deposited, which is a *much* more secure than doing it after funds are at risk. In single-key setups, the typical workflow is for a user to setup an insecure wallet (with several single-points-of failure) and then later attempt to secure it (perhaps as the value of the funds grow). Some users discover to their horror that it is already too late.

A common example of this workflow might be to use a paper wallet (or paper seed) to receive funds, which has two major issues that a proper multisig scheme is designed to mitigate:

1. **It is typically not possible to independently verify the source of randomness** used to generate private key material. This leaves all funds subject to theft, even if the funds were generated on an airgapped/eternally quarantined machine.
2. **Verifying the backed-up seed matches the addresses generated requires testing this on a secondary device.** If you're going to do this, you should just use multisig so you can get the benefits of real fault tolerance! See [Verifying Your Receive Addresses](#).

9.2.2.3 Multisig Recognizes Humans Are Imperfect It turns out that cryptography in meatspace is very challenging. It is far harder to execute a single-key signature scheme *perfectly* vs executing a multi-sig scheme *decently*, and the latter is far more secure than the former (see [here](#) for more details).

9.2.2.4 Limited Airdrop/Fork Support Because multisig transactions are more complicated, some altcoin airdrops that gave people coins for having bitcoin only did so when those bitcoins were secured by a single-key address. Even if those chains did give coins to bitcoin multisig holders, the new coins sometimes had very weak multisig support (effectively trapping those airdropped coins for all but expert users).

Airdrops have become quite rare since 2018 and seem unlikely to make a resurgence, so this issue may have resolved itself.

9.2.2.5 Limited Message Signing Support Messages are signed with a private key, and that signature reveals the public key. There's no protocol/standard for signing with m-of-n bitcoin pubkeys (which are represented in address format as a script hash of those pubkeys). You can read more [here](#).

However, this feature is rarely used in single-key setups, and if it were important a workaround could easily be implemented.

9.2.3 Hardware Wallet Vendors

Unfortunately, there are few hardware wallets with good multisig capabilities.

Currently, only 2 hardware wallets (Coldcard & Cobo Vault) even offer BIP174 support. Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBT or [BIP174](#)) was proposed in July 2017 and merged into Bitcoin Core [in October 2018](#). Wallets that don't update their software could easily become abandonware.

Large transactions can also be [slower to sign](#).

TODO: add content

9.2.4 Verifying a Receive Address

9.2.5 Confirm You Control the Wallet

Because multisig schemes require m-of-n signatures, you must verify a new receive address on m-of-n trusted devices before receiving funds. Otherwise, you could fall prey to a clever attack.

9.2.5.1 Example Attack Let's say you have a 2-of-3 multisig (with seeds A, B, and C), and your host computer is infected with malware (we always assume this to be true and it's the reason for using hardware wallets in the first place). Unfortunately for you, one of your hardware wallets is compromised/fake. Here is how you could be tricked into using an address you don't actually control to receive funds:

1. Specter on your host computer (malware) displays a 2-of-3 receiving address, where *none* of your hardware wallets are actually part of the multisig scheme.
2. You pull out hardware wallet A (also malware!) and it (falsely) confirms the same receive address on its trusted display.
3. You then deposit funds to this address, and are confused when they magically vanish :(

A similar attack is possible where $< m$ of our keys are part of the multisig, but your attacker still controls at least m keys and can steal your funds as soon as they arrive. For example, you might verify a 3-of-5 address on the trusted display of 2 hardware wallets, but your attacker could still control the other 3 keys and rob you remotely.

Smart hardware wallets implement a defense against this where they register all extended public key information when the wallet is setup, which can make this attack **much** harder to pull off.

9.2.5.2 How Bad Is This The bullet-proof solution is to verify your receive addresses on a quorum of trusted displays. Not only does this eliminate the risk, but it serves as a redundant check when making a deposit.

While perhaps a little counter-intuitive, this is an excellent safety feature as redundant verification applies to single-key signature users as well. Verification in single-key schemes adds new issues due to the inherent single point of failure in single-key signature schemes; you now have your seed floating around in multiple places for verification, and suffering a breach in any one of these is enough to lose all your funds!

9.2.5.3 Potential Mitigation This guide spells out a [less secure approach](#) that is available for users who choose to sacrifice some convenience for security.

9.2.6 Confirm You Can Retrieve the Key

TODO: add content about bip32 paths.

9.2.7 Cost

While multisig is slightly more expensive, for securing large amounts of bitcoin it's well worth it. You can see more about recent multisig improvements [here](#).

9.2.7.1 More Hardware Buying multiple hardware wallets is more expensive than buying one.

Fortunately, open-source paper wallet software [like SeedPicker](#) has been released that lets you add seed(s) to your multisig quorum for recovery without having to purchase additional hardware wallets to get started (until/unless you need to perform emergency recovery).

9.2.7.2 Higher Transaction Fees The more signatures in your transaction, the higher your transaction fees.

The good news is that segwit gives a witness discount for p2wsh transactions, which has led to them being labelled “[Unfairly Cheap](#)”!

9.2.8 Seeds and Privacy

In the event that an unauthorized third party gains access to a single seed and knows the corresponding bip32 path used, they will be able to calculate the child public keys that it would (likely) contribute to a multisig scheme. This means that if this third party is savvy, they can scan the bitcoin blockchain to see all the transactions that these address *previously* controlled (meaning that their public key was part of the quorum of addresses that could spend those bitcoin). We say “previously” because this third party cannot know which multisig addresses (if any) that key currently participates in.

Keep in mind that this issue already exists with single-key signatures and is much worse: an unauthorized third party who gains access to your seed can not only see your previously used addresses, they can also see your current ones and more importantly *steal* all your funds. So, while this is a negative of bitcoin multisig it is still strictly superior to single-key signatures.

9.2.8.1 Option A: Nonstandard BIP32 Path One solution to this is to use a non-standard bip32 path as a way to hide your activity on the blockchain from anyone who gains unauthorized access to a seed. That way if a 3rd party gains unauthorized access to a seed, they can't see how much it was ever protecting (to spend bitcoin they need access to m seeds).

This has the added benefit that it could be combined with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme to make it so that someone would have to break into multiple secure locations in order to get access to private information. This standard is still being developed, especially since many hardware wallets currently do not support non-standard paths (see [Verifying a Receive Address](#)).

9.2.8.2 Option B: Store Passphrases Separate from Seeds This solves one problem and creates another: now you have to store those passphrases securely. This creates a whole other set of security tradeoffs. We recommend this **for experts only** and is outside the scope of this guide.

9.3 Hosted Services

9.3.1 Casa

9.3.1.1 Coldcard Implementation Doesn't Verify Cosigner Wallets Casa recommends you trust PSBTs of your cosigner wallets (meaning don't verify them). In the event Casa were compromised, this leaves you at risk of loss when transacting.

9.3.1.2 1 Key Kept on Phone Hot Wallet Software hot wallets are inherently less secure but they have a better UX and offer one less device to buy/configure/update. You can export your mobile key from the app for sovereign recovery purposes (instructions [here](#)).

9.3.1.3 Outdated Firmware Casa recommends users don't update their firmware. This is likely to prevent hardware wallet vendors from being able to make breaking changes like [this one](#). This will hopefully be resolved naturally in the future as hardware wallet vendors have strong incentives not to jeopardize access to user funds.

9.3.1.4 Sovereign Recovery Is Very Hard While you can leave their service (or recover your coins if they go out of business), [the process](#) is likely only possible for advanced users.

9.3.1.5 Privacy Alert Any third party service that can participate/coordinate multisig transactions will have access to your balance and transaction history. They may be forced to share your records with multiple government agencies, and often be legally unable to disclose their compliance with requests. Of course most bitcoiners buy their coins on exchanges that follow KYC/AML procedures, so this may or may not be a factor for your use-case.

Casa is unique in that they do not perform traditional KYC, and it is even possible to signup without sharing your name. Customers can pay anonymous with bitcoin or prepaid cards. [Their privacy policy](#) is intentionally very customer-friendly.

9.3.1.6 Seedless Casa is [Seedless](#), meaning that by default there are no seed backups from your hardware wallets (the mobile and Casa keys are backed up automatically). This has some UX benefits that may improve security, but can also increases the risk of loss.

- Casa offers [Casa Covenant](#) for inheritance, though the public details are sparse. Opting into this would likely be incompatible with using their service anonymously.
- Their [health check](#) feature is useful for promoting best practices.

- They support 3-of-5 which is an excellent setup, and make it easy by providing 2 of the keys.

This is an especially good fit when using a hosted service that abstracts away a lot of multisig's complexity. Casa users should *strongly* consider this option as Casa is seedless and uses 1 software wallet (see above).

9.3.2 Unchained Capital

9.3.2.1 Privacy Alert Any third party service that can participate/coordinate multisig transactions will have access to your balance and transaction history. They may be forced to share your records with multiple government agencies, and often be legally unable to disclose their compliance with requests. Of course most bitcoiners buy their coins on exchanges that follow KYC/AML procedures, so this may or may not be a factor for your use-case.

9.3.2.2 Only Option is 2-of-3 3-of-5 would be better, especially when using a hosted service that already:

- Abstracts away a lot of multisig's complexity
- Holds 1 (or more) of your seeds
- Unchained has gone to great lengths to [streamline their sovereign recovery process](#) by releasing an open-source product called [Caravan](#) that abstracts all the steps away from end-users.
- Their [key checks](#) feature is useful for promoting best practices.
- Current estate-planning offerings are [barely disclosed](#), but they are in a position to be extremely helpful to your heirs/estate should something happen to you.

9.4 Other Coordination Software

9.4.1 Electrum

In theory, it would be possible to do everything described in this guide using [Electrum](#) instead of [Specter Desktop](#). However, there are a number of reasons we're using [Specter Desktop](#) instead.

TODO: add more links to this section

9.4.1.1 Electrum Has a Very Slow Release Schedule This may be due to the fact that it's a large project used for many different things (lightning network, coin selection, hardware wallet integration, multisig, validating block headers, etc), or its nonstandard use of git (it operates with a "dirty" master

branch). For example, a new release from version 3.3.8 to 4.0.0b0 took nearly a year to release! For mission-critical security software, we require a regular release schedule.

9.4.1.2 Limited BIP39 Support Electrum has limited support for BIP39 and is openly considering dropping it altogether. Users cannot create BIP39 seeds, and importing them is difficult; it requires knowing to toggle hidden checkboxes and ignoring scary user prompts with inaccurate security warnings. This is confusing for hardware wallet users, as BIP39 is the universal standard that almost all hardware wallets use.

9.4.1.3 Default Government Spying Using Electrum in the standard way is convenient, but risks revealing which addresses are yours to anonymous/volunteer SPV servers on the internet. These volunteer servers are likely to be run by blockchain surveillance companies like [Chainalysis](#). Dishonest SPV servers can also attempt to trick SPV clients into following a version of the blockchain that is invalid if it has more Proof of Work. While it is possible to run your own Electrum Server (on top of your own Bitcoin Core node), it is easier to just run your own Bitcoin Node only.

9.4.1.4 Confusing UX Electrum's UX has full of pitfalls that will technically not cause loss of funds but can easily confuse non-expert users who may then make mistakes leading to loss of funds. Specter-Desktop's UX is already much better than Electrum and is improving rapidly.

9.4.2 Caravan

TODO: add content

9.4.3 Sparrow

TODO: add content

9.5 Hardware Wallets

9.5.1 Specter DIY

TODO: add more content

9.5.1.1 Cannot Buy Assembled Version While the DIY version is great for expert users (and no longer requires soldering!), the overwhelming majority of users prefer a product they can purchase. The fewer people that use a product, the less thoroughly it is scrutinized/tested and higher risk it has for becoming abandonware.

Small nitpick: there is no currently available case, it's just raw electronics.

We expect both these issues to be resolved in the future, which will make this device a recommendable addition to your multisig setup.

9.5.1.2 No Physical Security Not having a secure element means that if someone gets physical access to your Specter DIY device they can extract your seed.

There are two mitigations that make this an acceptable tradeoff:

1. Many use-cases are already built around the idea of giving complete access to anyone who gets physical access to a device. For example, if you're storing seed phrases on metal plates (with no passphrase) then an attacker who gets access to that plate has all the private keys associated with it. To get the benefits of a secure element (enforcing PIN access to a secure element with both a limit on the number of attempts an exponentially-increasing time-delay for guesses) means that you also need to remember a PIN.
2. A long passphrase can strongly mitigate this issue, and the iPhone-style keyboard is very good for entering passphrases.

9.5.1.3 Written in Python This is not inherently a problem (python is a good general-purpose programming language!), but several hardware wallets with varying level of multisig support are also written in python, including: Trezor, Coldcard, KeepKey, Specter-DIY, and Passport. These hardware wallets share *a lot* of upstream code, and it's possible that if a vulnerability were discovered in one it would be present in the others.

9.5.2 Trezor

9.5.2.1 Trezor Bridge Warning Default usage leaks your xpub to Trezor's servers (and whoever they share records with). This is [estimated at 99% of their users](#). This has severe privacy implications and some [potential security implications](#).

9.5.2.2 Limited BIP174 Support Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBT or [BIP174](#)) was proposed in July 2017 and merged into Bitcoin Core [in October 2018](#). Wallets that don't update their software could easily become abandonware.

You can track Trezor's progress on this issue [here](#).

9.5.2.3 No Keyboard With only 2 buttons, it's very hard to enter a 24-word seed or strong passphrase. You can read about advanced recovery steps on the screen for both Trezor One [here](#) and for the Model T [here](#).

To mitigate this, Trezor can plug into your computer and use clever tricks to "securely" enter text on your computer, but is not ideal from a security/UX perspective.

9.5.2.4 No Physical Security If a clever attacker with ~\$100 USD of equipment gains *physical* access to your Trezor (model T or Trezor One) they can extract your seed. You can read more about this [here](#) and [here](#) (Trezor's response [here](#)).

These attacks can be mitigated with a strong passphrase, and cannot be exploited remotely (must have physical access to your Trezor).

9.5.2.5 Slow To Sign Multisig Transactions It is unclear why this is the case:

<https://twitter.com/lopp/status/1308082310038732801>

9.5.2.6 Have Made Breaking Changes in the Past In June 2020, [BTCPay users found they were no longer able to access their funds](#). Recovery is possible; savvy users can refuse to upgrade their firmware (and forego potentially valuable security updates) in the first place and expert users can load in their own firmware. You can read more about this [here](#).

9.5.3 Ledger

9.5.3.1 Terrible Multisig Support Ledger [cannot verify a receive address nor verify change addresses](#), making it unsuitable for both sending and receiving bitcoin in a multisig transaction. Chief Security Officer of Ledger Charles Guillemet has defended their decision to not support multisig by saying ([link](#)):

"a tiny mistake that can lead to massive loss and at scale, and this is very concerning to me"

Note that the whole point of multisig is to provide fault-tolerance so that **you can make mistakes and still avoid losses!** This is a very bizarre stance for a security company to publicly take, which he has defended [here](#). Hopefully, Ledger will join the multisig party in the future so their devices can be used securely as part of your quorum.

9.5.3.2 No BIP174 Support Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBT or [BIP174](#)) was proposed in July 2017 and merged into Bitcoin Core [in October 2018](#). Wallets that don't update their software could easily become abandonware.

9.5.3.3 Hard-To-Use Buttons While the physical input on most hardware devices is not perfect, Ledger's make it difficult to enter even a short 4-digit PIN. This leads to shorter PINs and problems entering seeds/passphrases.

9.5.4 KeepKey

9.5.4.1 Fork of Trezor This hardware wallet was launched by forking Trezor's open-source code. While forking open-source projects is normal in software development, if the forked project is not more actively maintained than the original it is *less* likely to catch bugs and upgrade to support new features. For this reason, we consider the Trezor superior to KeepKey in most ways, but do be mindful that [Trezor's Known Issues](#) likely apply to this device as well.

9.5.4.2 Only 1 Button Only 1 button. This makes it impossible to enter a recovery seed / passphrase on the device. They do have some clever UX options for you to do this on your host computer [using a substitution cipher](#) but it is difficult/confusing and discourages use.

9.5.4.3 Wired “Airgap” This device must be connected to your computer in order to function. Wired connections are bad because the USB stack presents massive attack vectors; the whole point of hardware wallets is to keep your keys offline.

9.5.5 BitBox02

9.5.5.1 Not Currently Supported by Specter-Desktop TODO: add link

TODO: add rest of content

9.6 Other Protocols

9.6.1 Advanced Single Sig

A common response to multisig is: “*but what if I do single-sig with a passphrase, is that secure?*”

Well, it depends. Remember that when single-key signature schemes are performed perfectly, the math behind them *is bulletproof*. Being that mere mortals are in control of the keys and the software

that interacts with them, the reality is often quite different. With single sig, an attacker needs to find just 1 vulnerability to separate you from your bitcoin.

Let's use some examples to demonstrate how this scheme (which was a good choice in ~2015) is strictly inferior to multisig.

9.6.1.1 Interacting with Blockchain Data How does your wallet interact with blockchain data? Do you maintain a perfect airgap? If your hardware wallet is plugged into your computer (meaning no airgap), then you are 1 vulnerability (out of **many**) from losing your bitcoin.

This immediately eliminates Trezor, Ledger, and Keepkey. You must now be using either:

- Your own software wallet (like Electrum) which is quite dangerous for non-expert users.
- A hardware wallet like Coldcard or Cobo Vault that has an airgap. Note that these devices are not perfect, see known issues [for Coldcard](#) and [for Cobo](#).

For the rest of this page we'll assume you're using a hardware wallet, as few non-experts run software wallets these days.

9.6.1.2 Load Your Own Firmware In order to be able to trust what your device is telling you (basic things like a deposit address on receiving funds or advanced things like change detection when spending) you must be sure it's running the correct software. In practice, the best way to do this is to load the firmware onto the device yourself (note that this is not perfect, as a truly clever purchased device could fake receipt of the firmware and still lie to you). Since it only takes one mistake to lose bitcoin, closed-source software is reckless for storing bitcoin (note that this is not true for multisig where the security model is additive). This leaves only the Coldcard.

If you really want to be safe, you should order the hardware yourself and build the device on your own.

9.6.1.3 Bad Random Number Generator Users are [notoriously bad at generating strong passwords](#), but let's assume your passphrase has enough entropy that it is truly impossible to crack, even for an attacker with access to your seed phrase. You no longer need to worry about a compromised random number generator on address generation, nor rolling dice for entropy (and verifying this output is being used correctly). As this long passphrase is by definition challenging to remember, you're going to need to back this up.

Again, with multisig you don't need fancy passphrases (by default) as breaking a multisig scheme would require a quorum of devices' seed phrases to be compromised (in a way that your attacker could exploit).

9.6.1.4 Verification In order to achieve perfect execution (so that attacks cannot be exploited) you need to know what your device is doing. As the saying in bitcoin goes: “don’t trust, verify.” You should have a second device (preferably made by a second manufacturer) to confirm everything your first device tells you (receive address verification, spend transactions send the amounts you expect, proper change detection, etc).

If this sounds a lot like a convoluted version of multisig, it’s because it is. Single-sig products typically don’t build that much verification into their workflows. You also now need to be worried that all the information needed to steal your bitcoin now exists in multiple places.

9.6.1.5 Chosen Nonce Attacks If your nonce is not truly random, the private key used can be [easily calculated](#). If your extended public key is known to your attackers, they can trivially derive the rest of your child private keys!

Advanced users can sign the same transaction multiple times and prove that their k-value is deterministic, but this is still no guarantee of randomness (expert users can write their own code to verify [RFC6979](#) implementation).

Note multisig *massively* reduces the risk of chosen nonce attacks, as your attacker would need to be able to extract the nonce from a quorum of your signatures.

9.6.1.6 Multiple Pieces You now have a scheme with multiple parts (seed words and passphrase) which both need to be combined in order to recover your bitcoin. We can think of this like a 2-of-2 scheme, because if you lose either part you lose *all* of your bitcoin. A better scheme would be something like a 2-of-3 multisig, where you can lose a part and not lose all of your bitcoin.

And if you’re saying you’ll use Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme, read [this note](#) first.

9.6.1.7 Inheritance What happens if you get hit by a bus? Multisig handles this situation reasonably well, as you can give 1+ seeds to your heirs while you’re alive, and/or arrange for the transfer of any remaining seeds if you die (by using a safe deposit box or a hosted service like [Casa](#) or [Unchained](#)). The boundaries are well-defined and the recovery process uses common standards.

9.6.1.8 But I’m Perfect Let’s assume you are the rare expert who can take all of these precautions and execute this setup flawlessly. You’re now guarding multiple pieces of information, and verifying each step on multiple devices. Wouldn’t you be better off to combine that with a standard that enforces multiple signatures and explicitly allows for 1 or more mistakes? See [Why Multisig](#) section for more details.

9.6.2 Glacier

TODO: add content

<https://glacierprotocol.org/docs/extend/improvements/>

9.6.2.1 Address Reuse Multisig (using trusted stateful displays) largely solves this problem.

9.6.2.2 Uses P2SH Should be upgraded to segwit.

9.6.2.3 Doesn't Support BIP39 This is the standard for backups.

9.6.3 Yeti

TODO: add content

Requires ability to use command line