Ledger Origin

Minting a sanitary pass for fun and privacy

ETHCC 4 July 2021

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Whoami / whatisdis



Co-founder at Ledger, CTO at Ledger Origin (IoT division)

Interested in open Trusted Computing, privacy

Week end hack turned into an emergency talk

(yes, you're in the right room)

```
🛅 🖄 4G 🖊 🗎 92%
\leftarrow
                   last seen recently
Hi Hi <sub>08:25</sub>
toujours envie de parler? 08:25
                                                          hey <sub>08:25</sub> //
                                                  of course <sub>08:25</sub> //
tu as un petit titre <sub>08:25</sub>
                  faut juste que j'écrive ma prèz \o/ 08:25 //
```

The sanitary pass



QR code format defined by an European standard (Digital Green Certificate) https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/ehealth/docs/digital-green-certificates_v_1_en.pdf

Useful to get into Ethereum conferences and cafés

In France:

Incorporated into TousAntiCovid app

Verified by TousAntiCovid Verif





Security issues



Signed QR code for authentication ?!?

Everybody can copy it

Sometimes verified using naked eyes



Privacy issues



Trust the validation application not to keep your data when reading it

Which data are we talking about exactly?

The obvious: Name

The less obvious : Age, Type of vaccine, Vaccination country, Issuance and Expiration date

The correlated: List of venues, time of visit, who is attending together ...

What if ...




We could provide a proof of owning a Digital Green Certificate (locally or remotely)

We could optionally link it to our name, on demand, not by default

This wouldn't involve sending the DGC to a centralized party at any point

Trusted Computing and Ethereum to the rescue





The challenges



Can we verify the DGC on a Trusted Computing platform?

Is the Trusted Computing Platform open enough to let us check what is it doing?

Can we verify the Trusted Computing proof in a smart contract?

Reading the DGC QR code



Scanning

Decoding with base45 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-faltstrom-base45/)

Decompressing with zlib (http://www.zlib.net/)


Result is binary JSON - CBOR (https://cbor.io/)

Start reading with cbordump for example (https://github.com/intel/tinycbor)

Digging into the envelope



COSE encoded envelope: RFC 8152 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8152)



18([h'a20126044870aaa4460b56d17c', {}, h'a401624652041a611053e0061a60bfe860390103a101a46 17681aa626369781d75726e3a757663693a30313a46523a4b4b46334259494759535646235162636f6246526 2646e016264746a323032312d30332d303162697364434e414d626d616d4f52472d3130303033330323135626 d706c45552f312f32302f3135323862736402627467693834303533393030366276706a31313139333439303 03763646f626a313936322d30352d3331636e616da462666e6f7468656f756c6520737572206d657262676e6 b6a65616e2070696572726563666e746f5448454f554c453c5355523c4d455263676e746b4a45414e3c50494 55252456376657265312e302e30', h'eb4b5342a37817b5d0c6da80aaf17d364ea080ada2369658666e2cb8 c64beb6537fe9ea082daa7081f16acfce3339ccaf31cf06711fb0ac4d1811e481aabdc3f'])

Signature (r,s)

Reading the header




Validating the algorithm (signing with secp256r1 if you're not in Lithuania)

Identifying the key related to the KID

Public trust lists

https://github.com/section42/hcert-trustlist-mirror/blob/main/trustlist_fr.json

(key of each entry is the base64 encoded kid)



Interlude: reading the public key when you're in a 🗓 Ledger



"publicKevPem":

hurry

"MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQqAEImIFauqzwB5f/VyfQ3KTfTSoukwAPVSq HZWrtrc2j4FuAUpw/0bRnA9pBjN/HdUc1zcl9S0/vsCEnHkXhxjz4Q=="




base64 decoding

3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200**04** 2262056ae833c01e5ffd5c9f4372937d34a8ba4c003d54a01d95ab b6b7368f816e014a70fce6d19c0f6906337f1dd51cd73725f523bf bec0849c79178718f3e1

[:-65]


Verifying the DGC signature





Reading the payload






Ledger as a Trusted Computing platform



Open development environment (https://developers.ledger.com)


Attestation mechanism, optionally stamped by Ledger (https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/ledger/latest/ledger.pdf 9.2.2)



Digital Green Certificate receipt

Code Hash





signature by Ledger

Minting smart contract logic



Verify that the format of the receipt is correct

Verify that the device attestation public key is signed by Ledger

Verify that the receipt data is signed by the device attestation public key

Mint to the Ethereum address provided in the receipt, using the receipt tokenid

Stores the original address onchain

Hard part of the job already done by Provable some time ago (
https://github.com/provable-things/ethereum-api/blob/master/provableAPI_0.6.sol#L1

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Fun with the NFT



Single tap proof that the NFT has been issued for the correct address and key (for example ETH message signing of the current timestamp)

Pfizer Slock.it powered door only opens if you're vaccinated with the right product


[your creative idea here]

Next things to do



Support more Trusted Computing platforms (new SGX ECDSA attestation ?)

Same thing with a zero knowledge proofs and moon maths?



Wer code ser?



Soon (™) - likely next week

Will point to it on twitter (@btchip)



Thank you @btchip