Race and the Education of Desire

FOUCAULT'S *HISTORY OF SEXUALITY*

AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS

BY ANN LAURA STOLER

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Contents

PREFACE vii

I COLONIAL STUDIES AND *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY* 1

II PLACING RACE IN *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY* 19

III TOWARD A GENEALOGY OF RACISMS: THE 1976 LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 55

IV CULTIVATING BOURGEOIS BODIES AND RACIAL SELVES 95

V DOMESTIC SUBVERSIONS AND CHILDREN'S SEXUALITY 137

VI THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE AND THE REPRESSIVE HYPOTHESIS 165

EPILOGUE 196

BIBLIOGRAPHY 211

INDEX 229

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Preface

This book emerged out of a number of questions I began mulling over some fifteen years ago when I first read Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* while writing my dissertation in Paris. As my own work has focused over the last decade more squarely on the sexual politics of race, those questions have felt more pressing than ever before. At a time when Foucault's work has had such an enormous impact on anthropology and on the discursive and historic turns within it, why have contemporary scholars dealt in such an oblique way with the slimmest and, some might argue, the most accessible of his major works, volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*? More precisely, why has colonial studies, where issues of sexuality and power are now so high on the intellectual and political agenda, had so little to say about it? In a field in which reading that volume seems *de rigueur* and reference to it confers intellectual authority, what accounts for this striking absence of an engagement that is analytically critical and historically grounded at the same time?

This study begins with some obvious questions: Why, for Foucault, colonial bodies never figure as a possible site of the articulation of nineteenth-century European sexuality? And given this omission, what are the consequences for his treatment of racism in the making of the European bourgeois self? More troubling still are the implications for those of us who have sought to extend Foucault's approach to sexuality and power into imperial settings. Do we run the risk of reproducing precisely the terms of colonial discourse itself where any and everything could be attributed to and/or reduced to the dangers, contaminations, and enticements of sex?

This book is an effort to address some of these questions, to redress that

absence of reflection, and to reread volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* in what I think is an unexplored light. It questions both Foucault's account of the technologies of sexuality that pervaded Western Europe's nineteenth-century bourgeois order and his marginalization of that order's imperial coordinates and their effects. But it also sets out to do something more, to register a part of Foucault's analysis that seems to have eluded those of us in colonial studies: namely how he conceived the discourses of sexuality to articulate with the discourse of race. Empire may be absent from *The History of Sexuality*, but racism is certainly not. How do we reckon both with the book's categorical effacement of colonialism and our overwhelming silence about Foucault's at once conventional and idiosyncratic handling of racism in it?

Contrary to the evidence from most other commentators, race is not a subject marginal to Foucault's work. As I argue here, it is far more central than has been acknowledged or explored. It is certainly more integral to his thinking than I first imagined when I began this book as an essay on *The History of Sexuality* two years ago. At the time, my assessment of Foucault's interest in race was based solely on his written work. Later in Paris, I had the opportunity to listen to the French recordings and read the Italian transcripts of the lectures Foucault gave in 1976 at the Collège de France. Some have cast those lectures as an elaboration of the final chapter of *The History of Sexuality*, others as a foray into political theory. But I was startled by what else they contained, for they also represent Foucault's equivocal effort to sketch out a genealogy of the discourse of race. I draw on them here, not to provide a "clue" to what Foucault "really" thought, but rather to investigate the tensions between what he wrote and what he said. As importantly, I want to ask how these tensions might help us rethink the connection between European and colonial historiography, between a European bourgeois order and the colonial management of sexuality, as well as how those tensions might bear upon how we go about writing genealogies of race today.

This is neither the celebration of the canonical text of Foucault as culture hero. Nor is this a subtle effort to undermine his powerful conceptual claims. My task is both more humble and ambitious: namely, to read Foucault's work against issues with which he grappled for years, sometimes with prescience and great acumen, other times with what he characterized as only marginal success. I am interested in identifying the impulse of his

venture, the contingent space of ideas, the precluded venues of enquiry, the selective genealogies by which his—and our—writing of history has been constrained.

In response to the Italian journalist, Duccio Trombadori, who asked Foucault about the relationship between his earlier work and his then recently published volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault answered:

> If I had to write a book to communicate what I have already thought, I'd never have courage to begin it. I write precisely because I don't know yet what to think about a subject that attracts my interest. . . . As a consequence, each new work profoundly changes the terms of thinking which I had reached with the previous work. In this sense I consider myself more an "experimenter" than a theorist; I don't develop deductive systems to apply uniformly in different fields of research. When I write, I do it above all to change myself and not to think the same thing as before.[1]

If Foucault thought it took courage to write what he already knew, most of us might think it takes more courage to admit a lack of sure-footed intent, that in beginning few of us are sure what will come out at all. Some might argue that such an admission could only be enjoyed by someone whose innovative contribution was already secured. Others might be inclined to look more askance, to dismiss the statement as a disingenuous disclaimer, a display of false modesty by France's then leading intellectual whose master plan was evident in a patterned corpus that spanned nearly twenty-five prolific years. Either reading would do an injustice to Foucault by missing the tenor of his work, the persistent questioning that compelled his ventures. It would be to misrecognize how much his recursive style, his serial framings of what something was through concentric negations about what it was not, were part of a "thinking out loud" that not only transformed his books but has allowed his readers a unique sort of engagement with them.

Certainly any close reading of volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* would support his methodological claims. For that volume is at once a recuperation of and departure from themes addressed in his earlier work. It represents both a renewal of a concern with how discursive forma-

1. Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991) 27.

tions are shaped and a reconception of power and how power transforms those formations. It takes us from an earlier focus on the normalization of power described in *Discipline and Punish* to a broader concern with the power of normalization. It replays themes of disciplinary regimes, but distinguishes between individual disciplines and social regulation in new strategic ways. It first introduces the "cultivation of the self" as a defining feature of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. Later, as Foucault shifted course in volumes two and three, that self-cultivation is recast as part of a deeper genealogy of ethics that pushes him back to antiquity, away from nineteenth-century France which had long been his preoccupation—a move that some historians have seen as a limit to the larger applicability of his speculations. Volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* introduces the question of racism in a muted way that resurfaces at the core of his 1976 Collège de France lectures the following year.

In the Trombadori interview, Foucault describes his books as a "network of scaffolding" that carried him from one to another.[2] But that imagery is misleading. There is nothing fixed about how he saw the relationship between his projects, nor what girded the very scaffolding itself. Thus, in one place he refers to volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* as a "twin project" with *Madness and Civilization* and elsewhere as a "sequel" to *Discipline and Punish*.[3] In the first of his lectures in 1976 at the Collège de France, volume 1 is somewhat disturbingly cast as one of several "fragmentary researches," that "failed to develop into any continuous or coherent whole."[4] It is also, as Dreyfus and Rabinow note, "a broad overview of a larger project." Foucault's project changed radically in the undertaking; the six volumes initially planned were never written. The volumes he did write became a very different kind of study of "desiring man," of a very different "pseudo-object."[5] These later volumes are obviously related to the first, but it is also clear that in 1976 Foucault shifted his analytic tactics, if not his critical trajectory. By 1983, Foucault would contend, in his favored role as *provocateur*, that "sex [was] boring", that he was "much more interested in

2. Foucault 29.

3. Interview in *L'Express* 24–30, January 1977, quoted in David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 354. Foucault refers to it as a "sequel" to *Discipline and Punish* in page one of his unpublished talk on infantile sexuality available at the Saulchoir Library.

4. Reproduced in Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry Ortner, eds., *Culture/Power/History* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) 200.

5. John Rajchman, *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosphy* (New York: Columbia UP, 1985) 52.

problems about the technology of the self".[6] Thus, just as many of us were beginning to digest how we might use his insights on the relationship between the "truth" of the self and the discourse on sexuality, Foucault seemed to dismiss the value of such a project. But laying bare the scope and limits of his work is impossible if we think about it in linear terms as the abandonment of, for example, the "archaeological" method as he developed his new genealogical project.

By my reading, what is striking are his recursive folds. It may be awing, but it is no accident that Foucault, as Daniel Defert tells it, began the last chapter of volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* on the very same day that he finished *Discipline and Punish*; both are concerned in different ways with biopolitics and normalization.[7] Nor is it insignificant that that final chapter of volume 1 should reappear the following year in revised form as the last Collège de France lecture, entitled "The Birth of State Racism": both focus on the relationship between biopower and race. Foucault was the quintessential *bricoleur*.[8] While many of the components of his analysis remain, they appear with different conceptual weight in different projects and with a function that is never quite the same. As I discuss later, this tension between rupture and recuperation is more than a stylistic quirk. It is at the very basis of *how* Foucault worked and understood the nature of discursive transformations.

It should no longer be possible in the current state of colonial scholarship to imagine the research process, either the consumption or production of knowledge, as an individuated, private affair. Changes in the anthropology of colonialism over the last decade require new recognition of the collective nature of what we do. As many of us try to heed our own advice to treat metropole and colony in a single analytic field and to abandon those contained units of analysis once so cherished, we are confronted with a

6. Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1983) 229.

7. James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) 240–241.

8. The term "bricoleur" is often loosely translated as "handyman" but I have more in mind Levi-Strauss' use of the term in *The Savage Mind* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, esp. 16–36). There he uses it to describe an adeptness (of mythical as opposed to scientific reflection in his case) at manipulating and reworking a finite field of intellectual and/or material resources to carry out a varied set of tasks. To me, it aptly captures a feature of Foucault's work in that concepts from his earlier books reappear in later ones to perform new sorts of analytic tasks.

daunting task. In dismantling the careful bracketing that contained metropolitan and colonial history, research has not only become unwieldy as an individual effort, but difficult for either fledgling graduate student or seasoned scholar to sustain. As part of that new scholarship, this book reflects the collective insights and expertise of students, colleagues, and friends I have called upon with a new frequency and urgency. This is not to relinquish blame or excuse the shortcomings in my evidence or argument. It is, however, to recognize that the license I have allowed myself in posing more questions than I can answer and in glaringly omitting others, is grounded on the support of those who thought the questions themselves worth asking. My hope is that this undertaking will both clear and complicate the space in which others might draw on Foucault and move beyond him to pose questions that his insights and omissions provoke us to address.

This book was originally conceived as an essay in another book I am writing on bourgeois civilities and the cultivation of racial categories in colonial Southeast Asia. Unwittingly, and in part due to the promptings of students and colleagues, it took on a life of its own. I thank the students in my 1991 graduate seminar, "The Body Politics of Empire," in which I first taught *The History of Sexuality* and fellows with whom I contentiously hashed out questions concerning histories of sexuality in that same year at the Institute of the Humanities at the University of Michigan.

I owe special thanks to a number of people whose careful readings were both a challenge and an inspiration: Julia Adams, whose healthy scepticism about Foucault's work forced me to confront his lapses as well as his contribution; Gwen Wright, whose enthusiasm and intellectual generosity sustained me throughout, who convinced me how much Foucault might have relished this project and made me both bolder and more tempered by doing so; Nancy Lutkehaus, who listened with patience and perspicacity to the first draft as it was being written; Val Daniel, whose meticulous and discerning eye took me through its final form; Nick Dirks, who urged me to turn the original essay into a book; Jean Comaroff, Frederick Cooper, Fernando Coronil, Brinkley Messick, David Scobey, Bill Sewell, Julie Skurski, Luise White, and an anonymous, Duke University Press reviewer, whose comments on the book prompted me to do more—and less—and who kept me from major gaffes in content and form; Etienne Balibar, for his support and for wisely sending me to the Saulchoir Library;

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I thank Daniela Gobetti and Setraq Manoukian for their studied translations of the Italian and Remco van Eeuwijk for helping me with some particularly difficult Dutch passages. Samia Meziane shared with me the delights and frustrations of deciphering Foucault's lectures from scratchy cassettes. Madame Judith Revel formerly of the Saulchoir Library in Paris and the Père Albaric, its present director, graciously facilitated my task. Lisa Lindsay deftly compiled the bibliography. Carole McGranahan and Javier Morillo-Alicea labored swiftly through the index. Grants from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and generous support from the University of Michigan in the form of extended leave and a research award allowed me the luxury, unfettered by other obligations, of gratifying my obsession with Foucault's work.

I thank my daughter Tessa for rereading *The Secret Garden* with me and for persistently asking me why I have so many books on this person Foucault and why he was so important. I thank my son Bruno who pressed me to talk to him about the book and to write it in an accessible manner. I have tried to heed his sound advice in a way that will make this book useful both to those with only a healthy if skeptical curiosity about Foucault's work and for those, like myself, who have long been smitten with him. Finally, I thank Lawrence Hirschfeld, whose work on children and racism has prompted me to hurl my epithets about "psychologism" with much

more care and to see how implicitly our post-colonial and postmodern analyses are both enabled and muffled by psychological insights, as we broach the politics of sentiment and the psychology of domination.

This book is dedicated to my sister, Barbara Stoler Miller, who died with such grace sixteen months ago on a cold, sunny, snowy day. I began writing it just after she died with an intensity that could only have been born out of my grief over the loss of the person whose passion for knowledge and life has sustained and guided my own. When I was just a small girl, she taught me that it matters what one says and how one says it, that the power of words is both in their message and their form. She took pleasure in our differences and encouraged my first forays into the history and politics of knowledge. I offer her this book, on her birthday today, the only piece of work that we did not have the chance to share, with my love, respect, and admiration.

8 August 1994, Ann Arbor

Postscript: As this manuscript was going to press in December 1994, I received the long anticipated four volumes of Foucault's complete published works (excluding his books), *Dits et écrits, 1954–1988*, under the direction of Daniel Defert, François Ewald and Jacques LaGrange (Paris: Gallimard, 1994). While I had read many of these interviews and articles in their earlier published form, it was too late to consider this entire new corpus of collected materials here.

RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE

I

COLONIAL STUDIES AND *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY*

There are several possible ways to think about a colonial reading of Foucault. And at one level, anthropologists and historians have been doing such readings for some time. No single analytic framework has saturated the field of colonial studies so completely over the last decade as that of Foucault. His claims for the discursive construction of regimes of power have prompted us to explore both the production of colonial discourses and their effects;[1] inspired, in part, by Edward Said's forceful lead, students of colonialism have tracked the ties that bound the production of anthropological knowledge to colonial authority, to trace the disciplinary regimes that have produced subjugated bodies and the sorts of identities created by them. Some have sought to describe how discourses on hygiene, education, confession, architecture, and urbanism have shaped the social geography of colonies and specific strategies of rule.[2]

1. I use "us" and "we" throughout this book to identify students of colonialism, whether they be anthropologists, historians, specialists in comparative literature or none of the above. Differences in profession and geopolitical locale are less central to my analysis than the fact of an overwhelming response that Foucault has elicited from those in a wide range of political locations. Where appropriate, I identify the "we" as Euro-American scholars although some of my generalizations about the nature of colonial studies apply to a wider shared community of scholarship than those who would identify themselves with that which is Euro-American.

2. Among those studies of colonial history and historiography that draw on various Foucauldian concepts to different (and varying critical) degrees see, for example, Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and history of a South African People* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1985); Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870–1987* (New Haven, Yale UP, 1985); Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Hollow Crown* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987); Aihwa Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline* (Binghamton: SUNY Press, 1987); Vincente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988); Guari Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study*

Nor have we done so in blind faith. Our ethnographic sensibilities have pushed us to challenge the limits of Foucault's discursive emphasis and his diffuse conceptions of power, to flesh out the localized, quotidian practices of people who authorized and resisted European authority, to expose the tensions of that project and its inherent vulnerabilities.[3] These readings, for the most part, have been of a particular kind: by and large, applying the *general principles* of a Foucauldian frame to specific ethnographic time and place, drawing on the conceptual apparatus more than engaging the historical content of his analysis.[4]

This sort of passion for Foucault's general strategies is apparent in readings of his specific texts as well—particularly in treatments of volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*. His book engages a disarmingly simple thesis: if in nineteenth-century Europe sexuality was indeed something to be silenced, hidden, and repressed, why was there such a proliferating dis-

and British Rule in India (New York: Columbia UP, 1989); Lamont Lindstrom, *Knowledge and Power in a South Pacific Society* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990); Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991); Tim Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1991); Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991); David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1993); Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for the 'Indian' Pasts?" *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992): 1–26. Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994); David Scott, *Formations of Ritual: Colonial and Anthropological Discourses on the Sinhala Yaktovil* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1994).

3. See Megan Vaughan, *Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (London: Polity Press, 1991) x. Vaughan makes an explicit effort "to explore the limitations of a Foucauldian account of 'biopower' " with respect to the discourse of colonial medicine.

4. In addition to the citations above see, for example, Ranjait Guha and Gayatri Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York: Oxford UP, 1988), where the final two articles by Partha Chatterjee and David Arnold are grouped under the rubric "Developing Foucault." Chatterjee's otherwise excellent piece makes only implicit reference to Foucault, while Arnold's Foucauldian impulse is defined by his attention to bodies, discourse, and power. The engagement is conceptual, not historical, while the "development" of Foucault is unclear. Arnold's analysis of the distinctive response of the Indian middle-classes to the plague for example makes no effort to address how "cultivation" of an Indian bourgeois identity did or did not conform to Foucault's European model.

An important exception is Paul Rabinow's *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT, 1989), that "continues the exploration, in its own way, of some of the contours of modern power and knowledge Foucault had begun to map" on colonial terrain (8–9).

course about it? Foucault argues that we have gotten the story wrong: that the "image of the imperial prude . . . emblazoned on our restrained, mute and hypocritical sexuality" (HS:3) misses what that regime of sexuality was all about: not restriction of a biological instinct, a "stubborn drive" to be overcome, nor an "exterior domain to which power is applied" (HS:152). Sexuality was "a result and an instrument of power's design," a social construction of a historical moment (HS:152).

For Foucault, sexuality is not opposed to and subversive of power. On the contrary, sexuality is a "dense transfer point" of power, charged with "instrumentality" (HS:103). Thus, "far from being repressed in [nineteenth-century] society [sexuality] was constantly aroused" (HS:148). This is no dismissal of repression as a "ruse" of the nineteenth-century bourgeois order or a denial that sex was prohibited and masked, as critics and followers have sometimes claimed (HS:12). Foucault rejected, not the fact of repression, but the notion that it was the organizing principle of sexual discourse, that repression could account for its silences and prolific emanations. At the heart of his enquiry are neither sexual practices nor the moral codes that have given rise to them. Foucault's questions are of a very different order. Why has there been such a protracted search for the "truth" about sex? Why should an identification and assessment of our real and hidden selves be sought in our sexual desires, fantasies, and behavior? Not least why did that search become such a riveting obsession of the nineteenth-century bourgeois order, and why does it remain so tenacious today?

His answer is one that reconceives both the notion of power and how sexuality is tied to it. For Foucault, the history of sexuality is defined, not as a Freudian account of Victorian prudery would have it, by injunctions against talk about sex and specific sexual couplings in the bourgeois family, but by patterned discursive incitements and stimulations that facilitated the penetration of social and self-disciplinary regimes into the most intimate domains of modern life. Nor was that discourse initially designed to sublimate the sexual energy of exploited classes into productive labor, but first and foremost to set out the distinctions of bourgeois identity rooted in the sexual politics of the home. Central to Foucault's account of proliferating sexualities and discourses about them is the emergence of "biopower," a political technology that "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life" (HS:143). In its specific nineteenth-

century form, the disciplining of individual bodies and the regulations of the life processes of aggregate human populations "constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed" (HS:139). Within this schema, technologies of sex played a critical role; sex occupied the discursive interface, linking the life of the individual to the life of the species as a whole (HS:146).

While we have caught the gist of that message well—that discourses of sexuality and specific forms of power are inextricably bound, engagement with *The History of Sexuality* has been more formal than substantive, more suggestive than concrete. This is not to say that the parallels between the management of sexuality and the management of empire have been left unexplored.[5] Many students of colonialism have been quick to note that another crucial "Victorian" project—ruling colonies—entailed colonizing both bodies and minds. A number of studies, including my own, have turned on a similar premise that the discursive management of the sexual practices of colonizer and colonized was fundamental to the colonial order of things. We have been able to show how discourses of sexuality at once classified colonial subjects into distinct human kinds, while policing the domestic recesses of imperial rule.[6] But again, such readings take seriously the fact of a relationship between colonial power and the discourses of sexuality, without confirming or seriously challenging the specific chronologies Foucault offers, his critique of the repressive hypothesis, or the selective genealogical maps that his work suggests.

In taking up each of these themes, this book both draws on Foucault

5. See, for example, John Kelly, *Politics of Virtue: Hinduism, Sexuality, and Countercolonial Discourse in Fiji* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991); Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1990); Vron Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (London: Verso, 1992); Luise White, *Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1990); and my own work on the sexual politics of Europeans in colonial Southeast Asia, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race and Morality in Colonial Asia" in Micaela di Leonardo, ed., *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in a Postmodern Era* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1991): 51–101, and "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34.2 (July 1992): 514–51.

6. Also see Asuncion Lavrin, ed., *Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America* (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989); Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992) esp. chapter 5; and Vincente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988) that deals specifically with sexuality and confession in the Philippines under Spanish rule.

and extends his analysis.[7] On the one hand, I look to how his insights play out in a colonial setting; on the other, I suggest that a wider imperial context resituates the work of racial thinking in the making of European bourgeois identity in a number of specific ways. While many historians have dismissed Foucault's empirical work as hopelessly wrong, and anthropologists, as well as other social analysts, taken with his theoretical insights have tended to treat his specific historical claims as less relevant, I question whether issues of historiography and theory can be so neatly disengaged. I pursue here a critique of Foucault's chronologies, a species of the empirical, not to quibble over dates but rather to argue that the discursive and practical field in which nineteenth-century bourgeois sexuality emerged was situated on an imperial landscape where the cultural accoutrements of bourgeois distinction were partially shaped through contrasts forged in the politics and language of race. I trace how certain colonial prefigurings contest and force a reconceptualizing of Foucault's sexual history of the Occident and, more generally, a rethinking of the historiographic conventions that have bracketed histories of "the West."

Clearly the latter is not my venture alone. A collective impulse of the last decade of post-colonial scholarship has been precisely to disassemble the neat divisions that could imagine a European history and its unified collectivities apart from the externalized Others on whom it was founded and which it produced. And Foucault's metatheory has played no small part in that project, animating a critique of how specific and competing forms of knowledge have carved out the exclusionary principles of imperial power in the first place. What is striking is how consistently Foucault's own framing of the European bourgeois order has been exempt from the very sorts of criticism that his insistence on the fused regimes of knowledge/power would seem to encourage and allow.[8] Why have we been so willing to

7. While more clarity might have been achieved by separating out these efforts, I have chosen to treat them simultaneously throughout this book, signaling where appropriate my different stances vis-à-vis Foucault's analysis: where I think his analysis opens or precludes a discussion of racism, where he allows for it but does not pursue it himself, and where my analysis challenges his own.

8. Although Edward Said, for example, notes that "Foucault ignores the imperial context of his own theories," his critique of Foucault's "imagination of power" and its "minimization of resistance" takes on the theoretical imbalances of the work less than the historical skewing of his European-bound frame. See "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," *Foucault: A Critical Reader*,

accept his story of a nineteenth-century sexual order that systematically excludes and/or subsumes the fact of colonialism within it? To say that Foucault was a product of his discipline, his locale, his time may be generous, but beside the point. Colonial studies in the 1970s in England, the U.S., and France may have had little as yet to say about the relationship between colonial power and sexuality, but it had a lot to say about western imperial expansion, culture, and the production of disciplinary knowledge.[9]

Several basic questions remain. What happens to Foucault's chronologies when the technologies of sexuality are refigured in an imperial field? Was the obsessive search for the "truth about sex" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries directly culled from earlier confessional models, as Foucault claims, or was this "truth about sex" recast around the invention of other truth claims, specifically those working through the language of race? While we might comfortably concur with Foucault that a discourse of sexuality was incited and activated as an instrument of power in the nineteenth century, we might still raise a basic question: a discourse *about whom*? His answer is clear: it was a discourse that produced four "objects of knowledge that were also targets and anchorage points of the ventures of knowledge" (HS:105), with specific technologies around them: the masturbating child of the bourgeois family, the "hysterical woman," the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult. But students of empire would surely add at least one more. Did any of these figures exist as objects of knowledge and discourse in the nineteenth century without a racially erotic counterpoint, without reference to the libidinal energies of

ed. David C. Hoy (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Similarly, Robert Young's carefully argued assault on "white mythologies" of the West graciously lets Foucault off the hook by suggesting that his "position on the relations of Western humanism to colonialism would no doubt be similar to that outlined in his discussion of the relation of ethnography to colonialism in *The Order of Things*" (376–7). Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990) 195. For others who draw on Foucault's discursive analysis for treating empire and its discourses of sexuality without querying the specific historicity assumed for those discourses see Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991); Sara Mills, *Discourses of Differences: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1991); and Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexual Opportunity* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1991).

9. See, among others, Dell Hymes, ed. *Reinventing Anthropology* (New York: Random House, 1969); Talal Asad, ed. *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973); Gerard LeClerc, *Anthropologie et Colonialisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1972); and Gerald Berreman, *The Politics of Truth: Essays in Critical Anthropology* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1981), especially chapter 2, written in 1970.

the savage, the primitive, the colonized—reference points of difference, critique, and desire? At one level, these are clearly contrapuntal as well as indexical referents, serving to bolster Europe's bourgeois society and to underscore what might befall it in moral decline. But they were not that alone. The sexual discourse of empire and of the biopolitic state in Europe were mutually constitutive: their "targets" were broadly imperial, their regimes of power synthetically bound.

My rereading of *The History of Sexuality* thus rests on two basic contentions, central to much recent work in colonial studies. First, that Europe's eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discourses on sexuality, like other cultural, political, or economic assertions, cannot be charted in Europe alone. In short-circuiting empire, Foucault's history of European sexuality misses key sites in the production of that discourse, discounts the practices that racialized bodies, and thus elides a field of knowledge that provided the contrasts for what a "healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body" was all about. Europe's eighteenth-century discourses on sexuality can—indeed must—be traced along a more *circuitous imperial* route that leads to nineteenth-century technologies of sex. They were refracted through the discourses of empire and its exigencies, by men and women whose affirmations of a bourgeois self, and the racialized contexts in which those confidences were built, could not be disentangled. I thus approach *The History of Sexuality* through several venues by comparing its chronologies and strategic ruptures to those in the colonies and by looking at these inflections on a racially charged ground. But, as importantly, I argue that a "comparison" between these two seemingly dispersed technologies of sex in colony and in metropole may miss the extent to which these technologies were bound.

My second contention is that the racial obsessions and refractions of imperial discourses on sexuality have not been restricted to bourgeois culture in the colonies alone. By bringing the discursive anxieties and practical struggles over citizenship and national identities in the nineteenth century back more squarely within Foucault's frame, bourgeois identities in both metropole and colony emerge tacitly and emphatically coded by race. Discourses of sexuality do more than define the distinctions of the bourgeois self; in identifying marginal members of the body politic, they have mapped the moral parameters of European nations. These deeply sedimented discourses on sexual morality could redraw the "interior frontiers" of national communities, frontiers that were secured through—and

sometimes in collision with—the boundaries of race. These nationalist discourses were predicated on exclusionary cultural principles that did more than divide the middle class from the poor. They marked out those whose claims to property rights, citizenship, and public relief were worthy of recognition and whose were not.

Nationalist discourse drew on and gave force to a wider politics of exclusion. This version was not concerned solely with the visual markers of difference, but with the relationship between visible characteristics and invisible properties, outer form and inner essence. Assessment of these untraceable identity markers could seal economic, political, and social fates. Imperial discourses that divided colonizer from colonized, metropolitan observers from colonial agents, and bourgeois colonizers from their subaltern compatriots designated certain cultural competencies, sexual proclivities, psychological dispositions, and cultivated habits. These in turn defined the hidden fault lines—both fixed and fluid—along which gendered assessments of class and racial membership were drawn. Within the lexicon of bourgeois civility, self-control, self-discipline, and self-determination were defining features of bourgeois selves in the colonies. These features, affirmed in the ideal family milieu, were often transgressed by sexual, moral, and racial contaminations in those same European colonial homes. Repression was clearly part of this story, but as Foucault argues, it was subsumed by something more. These discourses on self-mastery were productive of racial distinctions, of clarified notions of "whiteness" and what it meant to be truly European. These discourses provided the working categories in which an imperial division of labor was clarified, legitimated, and—when under threat—restored.

If this rerouting of the history of sexuality through the history of empire makes analytic sense, then we must ask whether the racial configurations of that imperial world, rather than being peripheral to the cultivation of the nineteenth-century bourgeois self, were not constitutive of it. In this perspective, racism in the nineteenth century may not have been "anchored" in European technologies of sex as Foucault claims. If sexuality and the social taxonomies of race were mutually built out of a "more comprehensive history of exclusive biological categories,"[10] as Tom Laqueur

10. Tom Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990) 155. Also see Collette Guillaumin's "The Idea of Race and its Elevation to Autonomous Scientific and Legal Status," *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), which makes a similar point while arguing more generally that the historical rise of legal individuality gave rise to the legal notion of race. see esp. 46–49.

claims, then we should see race and sexuality as ordering mechanisms that shared their emergence with the bourgeois order of the early nineteenth century, "that beginning of the modern age."[11] Such a perspective figures race, racism, and its representations as structured entailments of post-enlightenment universals, as formative features of modernity, as deeply embedded in bourgeois liberalism, not as aberrant offshoots of them.[12] My concern here is not to isolate racism's originary moment, much less to claim that all racisms are fundamentally the same. On the contrary, I grant slippage among the projects that modernity, the enlightenment and bourgeois liberalism embraced to make another sort of point, one that appreciates both how racial thinking harnesses itself to varied progressive projects and shapes the social taxonomies defining who will be excluded from them.

My colonial reading is of a particular kind, neither definitive nor comprehensive. It is not a reading of alternative cultural conceptions of sexuality, nor an encyclopedic account of how colonized bodies were shaped by the sexual policies of colonial states. It does not track the subversive ways in which different segments of colonized populations have appropriated the civilities imposed upon them and reread those moral injunctions against their European grain, a task that others have done so well.[13] My

11. Foucault, *The Order of Things* xxii.

12. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., introduction, "Race," *Writing, and Difference* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986) 3; Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock, 1977) esp. chapter 2, "The intellectual inheritance," 12–26; Collette Guillaumin, "Idea of Race"; George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1978); Leon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe* (London: Heineman, 1974); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989). Many of these arguments have been recently synthesized by David Goldberg in *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

13. While in this project colonialism is seen through a European optic but not determined by it, it is still a limitation imposed by the particular circuits I have set out to view. For a different treatment that more fully explores imperial taxonomies and their colonized appropriations see my introduction with Frederick Cooper, "Between metropole and colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: U of California P, forthcoming) and Ann Stoler, "In Cold Blood: Hierarchies of Credibility and the Politics of Colonial Narratives," *Representations* 37 (1992): 151–189. It is important to underscore that I am making no claim that Foucault's history of European

task is more specifically focused and constrained. It is an effort to see what Foucault's work adds to our understanding of the bourgeois casting of European colonials and their categories of rule and in turn what ways the political configurations of European colonial cultures might bring a new understanding to *The History of Sexuality*.

In exploring the making of a European colonial bourgeois order, I draw primarily on a colonial context with which I am most familiar: the Dutch East Indies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But Dutch colonial anxieties over the meanings of "Dutchness" and its bourgeois underpinnings also provide a touchstone for wider claims. Well aware of the peculiarities that distinguish Dutch, French, and British notions of what it meant to be bourgeois, I am nevertheless convinced that the construction of bourgeois sensibilities in these varied contexts are comparable in some fundamental ways. In chapter 4, I argue that each defined their unique civilities through a language of difference that drew on images of racial purity and sexual virtue. That language of difference conjured up the supposed moral bankruptcy of culturally dissonant populations, distinguishing them from the interests of those who ruled. For each, bourgeois morality was strategically allied with the moral authority of nineteenth-century liberal states. European bourgeois orders produced a multiplicity of discourses that turned on the dangers of "internal enemies," of class, sexual and racial origin, an argument that Foucault will also make as he traces the genealogy of racism in his Collège de France lectures. As Geoff Eley notes, in nineteenth-century Europe's bourgeois discourse

bourgeois sexuality nor my reworking of his genealogy of that history is generalizable to other cultural contexts, or could be mapped on to the histories of sexuality, power, and truth claims about the self among specific subjugated populations in the nineteenth-century colonized world. Those histories cannot be "read off" European ones. This does not mean, however, that consideration of these imperial articulations are irrelevant to these other cultural and political configurations. On the contrary, the particular distribution of differences that helped construct what was dominant and bourgeois for imperial Europe may be important for understanding how colonized populations claimed entitlements and strategically moved against the colonial state. It is not these imperial framings that are mirrored but the ways that concepts are organized within them that become available for oppositional political projects. Partha Chatterjee's analyses of such appropriations in *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed, 1986) and *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) are obvious and exemplary cases in point.

citizenship was "a faculty to be learned and a privilege to be earned."[14] These discourses were peopled with surreptitious invaders in the body politic, "fictive" Frenchmen, "fabricated" Dutchmen, anglicized but not "true" British citizens who threatened to traverse both the colonial and metropolitan "interior frontiers" of nation-states.[15] In short, that discourse on bourgeois selves was founded on what Foucault would call a particular "grid of intelligibility," a hierarchy of distinctions in perception and practice that conflated, substituted, and collapsed the categories of racial, class and sexual Others strategically and at different times. Nor is this attention to the working of race through the language of class as dissonant with Foucault's project as his published legacy of writings might suggest. In his Collège de France lectures discussed in chapter 3, Foucault traces the derivation of a nineteenth-century language of class from an earlier discourse of races as a key element in the changing historiography of Europe itself.

In outlining some of the genealogical shifts eclipsed in Foucault's tunnel vision of the West, I focus on certain specific domains in which a discourse of sexuality articulated with the politics of race. I use the Indies to illustrate—and really only to hint at here—how a cultivation of the European self (and specifically a Dutch bourgeois identity) was affirmed in the proliferating discourses around pedagogy, parenting, children's sexuality, servants, and tropical hygiene: micro-sites where designations of racial membership were subject to gendered appraisals and where "character," "good breeding," and proper rearing were implicitly raced. These discourses do more than prescribe suitable behavior; they locate how fundamentally bourgeois identity has been tied to notions of being "European" and being "white" and how sexual prescriptions served to secure and delineate the authentic, first-class citizens of the nation-state. Crucial to my argument, and distinct from Foucault's self-referential conception

14. See Geoff Eley's "Liberalism, Europe, and the Bourgeoisie" in David Blackburn and Richard Evans, eds., *The German Bourgeoisie* (London: Routledge, 1991) 300.

15. See Etienne Balibar, "Paradoxes of Universality" in David Goldberg, ed., *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1990), where he discusses how racism "embarks on the obsessive quest for a [national] 'core,'" based largely on "criteria of social class," 284–5. Also see Balibar, "Fichte and the Internal Border: On *Addresses to the German Nation*," in *Masses, Classes, Idea: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx* (London: Routledge, 1994) 61–86 where the political ambiguities of Fichte's notion of an "interior frontier" are spelled out.

of bourgeois identity, I stress the *relational* terms in which bourgeois selves have been conceived.

In short, I make three sorts of arguments. The first concerns chronology: why Foucault situates "the birth of racism" in the late nineteenth century and what the consequences of that placement are. Part of the answer can be found in *The History of Sexuality*, but more of it in the lectures delivered in 1976 at the Collège de France when that volume was in press. Second, I argue that an implicit racial grammar underwrote the sexual regimes of bourgeois culture in more ways than Foucault explored and at an earlier date. Here, I cast a wide net drawing on an emergent post-colonial scholarship whose forays into what were once construed as the margins of Western historiography have begun to unravel its core. I draw my argument in part from the Dutch colonial archival record. In that record, the ambiguities of racial categories and the uncertainties of Dutch identity in the nineteenth-century Indies were explicitly debated in terms setting out the racial dangers of desire, the class coordinates of "true" Europeans, and the cultural competencies which the conferral of European status required.

Third, in attending to "tensions of empire" that cut across the dichotomies of colonizer and colonized, colony and core, I reconnect a range of domains that have been treated discretely in colonial scripts, divisions that students of colonialism have often subscribed to themselves. How, for example, have Dutch historians come to think that the racial mapping of state-funded relief for poor whites in the Indies is irrelevant to liberal discourse on poor relief in nineteenth-century Holland? What allows French historians to dissect the anxieties over French national identity at the turn of the century without tackling the heated debates waged over the legal category of mixed-bloods in French Indochina in the same period? Why have both students of European and colonial histories treated bourgeois "civilizing missions" in metropole and colony as though they were independent projects for so long?

One might argue, as Robert Young does, that the collective vision in Euro-American scholarship has been blurred by "white mythologies" of history writing in the West.[16] But what would constitute a successful effort to write against those mythologies is not self-evident. It could not, for example, merely "compare" metropolitan and colonial reform to show that

16. Young, *White Mythologies*.

their political meanings are the same. It would not be to assume that the discourse on paternity suits in Haiphong and Paris and the debates over "child abandonment" in Amsterdam and Batavia have the same political valence. Rather, I think we should ask, as Foucault did in other contexts, how seemingly shared vocabularies of sexual and social reform may sometimes remain the same and sometimes diverge and/or transpose into distinct and oppositional political meanings. Foucault turns to this process in *The History of Sexuality* with respect to the discourses of sexuality and again even more boldly as he traces the strategic mobility of racial discourses in his lectures. In each of these projects, Foucault offers ways to rethink the colonial order of things, ways that challenge—and sometimes derive from—him.

Tracking Empire in The History of Sexuality

For a long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be dominated by it even today. Thus the image of the imperial prude is emblazoned on our restrained, mute, and hypocritical sexuality. (HS:3)

Students of empire have shown little interest in the historical ruptures and periodicities in which new technologies of sex develop and in Foucault's rejection of Freud's repressive hypothesis. If anything, as I show later, we have had contradictory allegiances on the one hand, to a Foucauldian perspective on power, and on the other, to implicit Freudian assumptions about the psychodynamics of empire, the sexual energies "released," and the ways such regimes extend and work. We have been profoundly silent on the "four strategic unities" that Foucault placed at the core of eighteenth-century technologies of sex: the hysterizing of women's bodies, the pedagogic expertise applied to children's sexuality, the socialization of procreative life, and the psychiatric analytics of perverse pleasure (HS: 104–105). Are these intense sites of power relevant to imperial history or beside the point? And, if they are relevant, why has so little been said about them? More strikingly, in a thematic close to the ethnological turf of kinship, Foucault identifies an eighteenth-century shift from a "deployment of alliance" to a "deployment of sexuality" that marks the modern character of power. Yet this too has fallen quietly and nearly without comment on an anthropological audience.

Some of the problems reside in Foucault's work, some are lodged in our

own. *The History of Sexuality* at one level seems to impede such a venture. Foucault explicitly traces the deployment of sexuality within an analytic field confined to the metropole—to "modern western sexuality." We are offered a distinction between "erotic art" (*ars erotica*) of the Orient, and a "science of sexuality" (*scientia sexualis*) of the West. (HS:70–71) The image of the "imperial prude" in the opening paragraph, cited earlier, of volume 1, is the first and only reference to the fact of empire. For Foucault, the image of the prude is a mainstay of our misguided reading of nineteenth-century sexuality. Empire is a backdrop of Victorian ideology, and contemporary stories about it, easily dismissed and not further discussed.[17] The "prude" is replaced; empire disappears along with its caricature. The incitement to sexual discourse in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe historicizes a European matter *tout court*. Foucault traces the biopolitics that emerged in the early 1700s and flourished in nineteenth-century Europe along axes that are sui generis to Europe, what Gayatri Spivak rightly has dismissed as a self-contained version of history, only about the West.[18] James Clifford's observation that Foucault was "scrupulously ethnocentric"[19] might give some confidence that he assiduously confined himself to the epistemic field of Europe, but when dealing with the issue of race, such careful containment should give us pause. His genealogies of nineteenth-century bourgeois identity are not only deeply rooted in a self-referential western culture but bounded by Europe's geographic parameters.[20]

Such origin myths of European culture are less credible today, as the bracketed domain of European history has been pried open, its sources reassessed, its boundaries blurred. Nearly two decades after *The History of Sexuality* first appeared, as colonial studies has moved from a delimited concern with colonialism's consequences for the colonized to tensions

17. See Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993) where he explores this presence/absence of empire in European literature.

18. Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak" in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988).

19. James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988) 265.

20. It is not only that empire is excluded, but Europe itself is defined by those powerfully situated within it, i.e. by its northern European parameters. Thus Spain and Portugal are sometimes eclipsed while Europe largely refers to England, Germany and France. See Fernando Coronil's "Beyond Occidentalism: Towards Non-Imperial Geohistorical Categories" *Cultural Anthropology* (forthcoming) where he deals with the skewed geopolitics that has constituted what we conceive of as "Europe" and the proper domain of European history. Also see Deny Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1957).

that cut across metropolitan and colonial sites of imperial rule, we are prompted to query whether the shaping of nineteenth-century bourgeois subjects can be located outside those force fields in which imperial knowledge was promoted and desiring subjects were made. It was after all Foucault who placed the connections among the production of specific knowledges, forms of power, and expressions of desire at the center of his work.[21] Armed with Foucault's impulse to write a history of Western desire that rejects desire as biological instinct or as a response to repressive prohibitions, we should be pushed to ask what other desires are excluded from his account, to question how shifts in the imperial distributions of desiring male subjects and desired female objects might reshape that story as well.[22]

As we have begun to explore the colonies as more than sites of exploitation but as "laboratories of modernity," the genealogical trajectories mapping what constitutes metropolitan versus colonial inventions have precipitously shifted course.[23] With this redirection, the hallmarks of European cultural production have been sighted in earlier ventures of empire and sometimes in the colonies first. Thus, Sidney Mintz has suggested that the disciplinary strategies of large-scale industrial production may have been worked out in the colonies before they were tried out in European contexts.[24] Timothy Mitchell has placed the panopticon, that supreme model institution of disciplinary power, as a colonial invention that first appeared in the Ottoman Empire, not Northern Europe.[25] French

21. As Arnold Davidson notes in "Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1987): 16–48.

22. Feminist critics of Foucault have posed this question more generally, but without specific reference to empire. See, for example, Teresa de Lauretis, *Technologies of Gender* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987); Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (London: Routledge, 1990); Biddy Martin, "Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault," *New German Critique* 27 (Fall 1987): 3–30; Edith Kurzweil, "Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality as Interpreted by Feminists and Marxists," *Social Research* 53.4 (Winter 1986): 647–63; Caroline Ramazanoglu, ed., *Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Lois McNay, *Foucault and Feminism* (Boston: Northeastern UP, 1992); Jana Sawicki, *Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

23. See Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991) and Paul Rabinow's *French Modern* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1989) for different elaborations of this notion.

24. Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power* (New York: Viking, 1985).

25. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1991) 35.

policies on urban planning were certainly experimented with in Paris and Toulouse, but as both Gwendolyn Wright and Paul Rabinow have each so artfully shown, probably in Rabat and Haiphong first.[26] Mary Louise Pratt stretches back further and argues that modes of social discipline taken to be quintessentially European may have been inspired by seventeenth-century imperial ventures and only then refashioned for the eighteenth-century bourgeois order.[27] Nicholas Dirks has raised the possibility that the very concept of "culture is a colonial formation."[28] These reconfigured histories have pushed us to rethink European cultural genealogies across the board and to question whether the key symbols of modern western societies—liberalism, nationalism, state welfare, citizenship, culture, and "Europeanness" itself—were not clarified among Europe's colonial exiles and by those colonized classes caught in their pedagogic net in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and only then brought "home."[29] In sorting out these colonial etiologies of Western culture and its reformist gestures, one cannot help but ask whether Foucault's genealogy of bourgeois identity and its biopolitics might also be traced through imperial maps of wider breadth that locate racial thinking and notions of "whiteness" as formative and formidable coordinates of them.

In an interview in 1976, responding to a question posed by the Italian journalist, Duccio Trombadori, as to whether he saw his books as a set of "teachings," as a "discourse that prescribes," Foucault answered:

> In my case it's another matter entirely; my books don't have this kind of value. They function as invitations, as public gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of experience.[30]

26. Wright, *The Politics of Design*; Rabinow, *French Modern*.

27. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*: 36.

28. Nicholas Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1991) 3.

29. On liberalism and British India see Uday Mehta's "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," *Politics and Society* 18.4 (Dec. 1990): 427–454; on "culture as a colonial formation" see Nicholas Dirks, "Introduction: Colonialism and Culture" in *Colonialism and Culture*; on urban planning see Rabinow, *French Modern* and Wright, *Politics of Design*; on empire, citizenship and emergent welfare politics see my "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34.2 (July 1992): 514–51 and "The Politics of Mothercare: Poor Whites and the Subversion of the Colonial State," Chapter 5 of *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Bourgeois Civilities and the Cultivation of Racial Categories in Colonial Southeast Asia* (Berkeley: U of California P, forthcoming); on nationalism see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983) and "Fax Nationalism" (manuscript); on Europeanness see Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13.1 (1989): 134–61 and Daniel Segal, "'The European': Allegories of Racial Purity," *Anthropology Today* 7.5 (Oct. 1991): 7–9. On the flattened histories that "occidentalism" has produced (with Sidney Mintz's and Eric Wolf's work offered as striking examples) see Fernando Coronil, "Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Non-Imperial Geohistorical Categories," *Cultural Anthropology*, (forthcoming).

30. Foucault, *Remarks on Marx* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991) 40.

31. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xii.

32. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

33. Foucault uses the term "bourgeoisie," "bourgeois class," and "bourgeois affirmation of self"

The History of Sexuality is a schematic blueprint for what Foucault had intended to write but chose not to complete. Thus even more than *The Order of Things* which Foucault hoped would be read as an "open site," in volume 1 he extends that invitation for openness more explicitly than in many of his other works.[31] However prescriptive that may be, it leaves us with more provocations than closely crafted arguments and a surprising number of conventions to wade through should we accept his invitation. My own response to Foucault's "public gesture" has been to do "something like it," something which, as he might have anticipated, would not come out at all the same. In rereading *The History of Sexuality* in an unexplored colonial light, "off center court" as Ben Anderson once put it, I suppose there is some implicit desire to cast this book as an opening, as a provocation, as an invitation of my own.[32]

In that spirit, I turn in the beginning of chapter 2, to the proliferation of sexualities and racisms that underwrote Europe's nineteenth-century bourgeois orders in an effort to address a basic question: how Foucault could write an effective history of sexuality, one that earmarks racism as one of its crucial products, but that has had so little resonance for theorizing racial formations today. The bulk of that chapter attends to the place of racism in volume 1 and offers a colonial mapping of it. Chapter 3 focuses almost exclusively on his 1976 lectures on race at the Collège de France. I look at how the lectures inform his treatment of racism in *The History of Sexuality* and in what unexpected ways they allow a rethinking of his broader analytic project. Chapter 4 takes up one of Foucault's central concerns in *The History of Sexuality*; namely, his claim that technologies of sexuality were a core component in the making and cultivation of the bourgeois self. I question less that assumption than the racialized making of it.[33] Chap-

ter 5 expands on a theme to which Foucault had planned to devote an entire volume; namely, the discourse on masturbating children and why it so concerned the bourgeoisie. I take up the discourse on masturbation with a different emphasis than Foucault's that in turn leads my discussion toward another end. The colonial variant of that discourse on children and their sexual desires was more about the cultural transgressions of women servants and native mothers than about children themselves, less about the pedagogy surrounding children's sexuality than the racialization of it. Chapter 6 engages Foucault and colonial studies on a subject which at once underwrites *The History of Sexuality* and is absent from it: namely, the production of desire. My interest is in the distributions of desire, an issue which Foucault's apparent dismissal of Freud's focus on sexual desire would seem to preclude. In the concluding chapter, I pose two sorts of questions: first, how *The History of Sexuality* and the lectures on race might be differently located within Foucault's broader projects, and second, how such locations inform new ways we might write "effective histories of the present" in colonial studies today.

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throughout volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* without ever defining what he means by those terms. I use these terms as well but resist the impulse to fill in for Foucault or provide a fixed alternative definition on the argument that what constituted the "bourgeois self" and its "self affirmation" was relational and tied to historically specific notions of gender, nation, and race, not class alone. This book may be seen as an effort to identify the changing parameters of a bourgeois self that were contingent on a racially, sexually, and morally distinct range of other human kinds. While this may be frustrating to the reader, it serves to underscore the mobile discourses of dominance in which bourgeois priorities were defined and defended and in which cultural and economic vulnerabilities were perceived.

II

PLACING RACE IN *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY*

An inducement for students of colonialism to work out Foucault's genealogies on a broader imperial map should be spurred simply by their glaring absence. It is even more disturbing that such a crucial element of *The History of Sexuality* that does speak directly to the nineteenth-century imperial world has been so conspicuously ignored. This is Foucault's strategic linking of the history of sexuality to the construction of race. The omission is not that by students of colonialism alone. While references to racism appear in virtually every chapter, few of Foucault's interlocutors have considered them for comment or review.[1] None of the three recent

1. Among the many well-argued reviews and articles that deal critically with volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* but with no reference to its treatment of race see, for example, Eloise Buker, "Hidden Desires and Missing Persons: A Feminist Deconstruction of Sexuality," *Western Political Quarterly* 43 (1990): 811–32; Manthia Diawara, "Reading Africa through Foucault: Mudimbe's Reaffirmation of the Subject," *October* 55 (1990): 79–92; Lucette Finas, "Michel Foucault: Les Rapport de pouvoir passent à l'intérieur des corps," *La Quinzaine Littérature* 247 (1977): 4–6; Althar Hussain, "Foucault's History of Sexuality," M/F 5 (1981): 169–91; Edith Kurzweil, "Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality as Interpreted by Feminists and Marxists," *Social Research* 53.4 (Winter 1986): 647–63; Bernard-Henry Levy, "Non au sexe roi," interview with Foucault, *Nouvel Observateur* 644 (1977); Biddy Martin, "Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault," *New German Critique* 27 (Fall 1987): 3–30; Alec McHoul, "The Getting of Sexuality: Foucault, Garfinkel and the Analysis of Sexual Discourse," *Theory, Culture and Society* 3.2 (1986): 65–79; Allan Megill, *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1987); Claire O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philospher* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Robert Padgug, "Sexual Matters: On Conceptualizing Sexuality in History," *Passion and Power: Sexuality in History*, eds. Kathy Peiss and Christina Simmons with Robert Padgug (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989); Carol A. Pollis, "The Apparatus of Sexuality: Reflections on Foucault's Contributions to the Study of Sex in History," *Adversaria* 23.3 (1987): 401–14; Roy Porter, "Is Foucault Useful for Understanding Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Sexuality?" *Contention* 1 (1991): 61–82; Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of*

biographies of Foucault even index the subject of "racism."[2] From a wide range of interviews, book reviews and *explications du texte*, by philosophers, anthropologists, historians, journalists, and literary critics of varied critical persuasions, few address Foucault's attention to the "instrumentality" of sexuality in the making of race.[3] Even David Goldberg's recent study, *Racist Culture*, explicitly inspired by Foucault's analysis of discursive formations, never mentions Foucault's treatment of that subject.[4] Given this resounding silence, one might rightfully be more suspect of my peculiar reading of Foucault than of these prevailing omissions. There are, however, I think some good reasons to pursue the question further.

The silence seems unwarranted on several counts; most strikingly because the final two sections of *The History of Sexuality* deal directly with the intersection of sexuality, degeneracy, and racism within the emergence of the "biopolitical" state. In a 1977 interview, a rare instance when Foucault was asked to address the issue of racism directly, he somewhat cynically responded:

Production vs. Mode of Information (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Uta Liebmann Schaub, "Foucault's Oriental Subtext," *PMLA* 104 (1989): 306–16; Victor Seidler, "Reason, Desire and Male Sexuality," *The Cultural Construction of Sexuality*, ed. Pat Caplan (London: Tavistock, 1987); Elinor Shaffer, "Book Review of *The History of Sexuality, Vol.I*," *Signs* (Summer 1980): 812–20; Pierre Sullivan, "Historie et sexualité: à propos de l'oeuvre de Michel Foucault," *Revue Française de Psychoanalyse* 5 (1984): 1441–1453; Jeffrey Weeks, *Sex, Politics, and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 1800* (London: Longman, 1981). Also see the interviews collected in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. This list does not include those works I cite elsewhere. Alan Sheridan, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth* (London: Tavistock, 1980) 191–93, David R. Shumway, *Michel Foucault* (Boston: Twayne, 1989) 151, and Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1983) 141 mention Foucault's discussion of racism in passing.

2. See Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991); James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993); David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon, 1993).

3. Etienne Balibar, "Foucault and Marx," delivered in 1988 at a Conference on Foucault in Paris. As Balibar notes "the place occupied by the problem of racism [in Foucault's work] . . . was considerable" (58).

4. David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (London: Blackwell, 1993). Also see Frank Dikötter's *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992) which, albeit far more influenced by Michael Banton's treatment of racial thinking, makes no reference to Foucault on race.

> Yes, no one wants to talk about that last part. Even though the book is a short one, but I suspect people never got as far as this last chapter. All the same, it's the fundamental part of the book.[5]

Secondly, references to racism in *The History of Sexuality* are neither incidental nor perfunctory. They are carefully positioned, signposted if not elaborated, in parts 2, 3, 4, and 5. Nor should this be surprising. Volume 1 was, in its inception, a schematic overview of the six volumes Foucault had intended to write, with volume 6 (as advertised on the back cover of the first French edition) to be devoted to "Populations and Races."[6] That project was put aside by 1977 when Foucault turned back to Hellenic conceptions of sexuality and cultivations of the self that contrast modern forms. Even as a *plan de recherche*, volume 1 offers compelling insights into how Foucault conjoined the rise of racism and technologies of sex. But there is stronger evidence still that the subject of racism was of more than passing concern to Foucault's larger project. The lectures he gave at the Collège de France in 1976, when that first volume was just completed, were explicitly devoted to the nature of racial discourses and their shifting political semantics.

Thus from either the vantage point of Foucault's project or contemporary studies of racism, the silence of his interlocutors is strange. Etienne Balibar is one of the few to note Foucault's central concern with racism as "the most revealing concrete effect" of a biopolitics that bore on the species and its reproduction. In Balibar's reading, racism was the "crucial phenomenon" that biopolitics set out to explain.[7] John Rajchman similarly has remarked on Foucault's focus on the "scientific" notion of "degeneracy" as a category racially inflected through the technologies of sex.[8] Others, however, such as Abdul JanMohamed, have invoked Foucault's

5. Quoted in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1977) 222.

6. The six volumes were to be titled: 1. *La volonté du savoir* (The will to knowledge) 2. *La chair et le corps* (The flesh and the body) 3. *La croisade des enfants* (The children's crusade), 4. *La femme, la mère et l'hystérique* (The woman, the mother and the hysteric) 5. *Les pervers* (perverts) 6. *Populations et races* (populations and races).

7. Etienne Balibar, "Foucault et Marx: L'enjeu du nominalisme," *Michel Foucault: Philosophe* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), see esp. 58;66.

8. John Rajchman, *Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1991) 106–7.

analysis of bourgeois sexuality only to quickly dismiss it out of hand. JanMohamed's contention that Foucault's exclusive focus on the bourgeois forms of sexuality precludes an understanding of racialized sexuality seems to miss the very force of Foucault's argument. If the technologies of sexuality that shape bourgeois identity account for the rise of racism in its statist form, then it would seem that racialized sexuality is not outside this "class body" in the making, but, on the contrary, part and parcel of it.[9]

Without digressing at length into a social history of French intellectual pursuits of the 1970s, it still seems worth noting some of the contours of the political field in which Foucault's reflections could be heard at the time.[10] First of all, *The History of Sexuality* is not, of course, a book about racism. Its critique is directed against Marxist and Freudian analyses of society and its discontents and particularly against the repressive notion of power that he saw embraced in those accounts. More pointedly, it targeted Wilhelm Reich's and Herbert Marcuse's Freudian-Marxist celebration of sex as liberation from the repressive power of capitalism and its restrictive institutions. Foucault contested both of these interpretations. For him, on the contrary, power must be seen in its affirmative, knowledge-producing form, prompting a proliferation of discourses on sexuality and their effects, not their attenuation. It is the form of power generated by these discourses that shape his project; racism here is a consequence of them. In short, racism is not the *subject* of *The History of Sexuality*. Instead, it analyzes how a discourse of sexuality articulates and eventually incorporates a racist logic. This is the book's end-product. Racisms are not what Foucault analyzed; he looked rather to the ways in which a prior technology of sexuality provided a cultural susceptibility and discursive field for them.

Foucault's somewhat oblique treatment of the issue of racism may account for its lack of resonance. But then he was not the only one who failed to enlist the French intellectual left to take on these issues—nor is

9. Abdul R. JanMohamed, "Sexuality on/of the Racial Border, Foucault, Wright and the Articulation of 'Racialized Sexuality,'" *Discourses of Sexuality*, ed. Domna Stanton (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1992) 94–116.

10. For the most recent effort to map out the intellectual and political field in which Foucault's work was situated see Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault et ses contemporains* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994). While Eribon marks 1970 and 1976 as two key moments when Foucault's project changed course, he makes no reference to the 1976 Collège de France lectures on race and Foucault's turn away from that subject in subsequent years.

it clear that such a task would have been his intent.[11] Although opposed to the wars in Indochina and Algeria, there is no indication that Foucault sought to situate his analysis of racism with respect to these political interventions.[12] He belonged to a generation whose political energies had been massively mobilized against the French government's efforts to keep Algeria under its tutelage. Many loudly supported France's colonized populations in the Algerian war.[13] While Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre were among those who explicitly addressed colonial racism, they did not prompt a general theoretical engagement with racism nor a confrontation with the racial underpinnings of French society itself.[14] The concept of class and the sorts of social transformations to which capitalism gave rise remained foundational in critical social and political theory; race and racial theory was not.

But one could easily argue that such an effort to situate Foucault's knowledge and his reception are at best speculative, perhaps irrelevant. We might do better to look, not at the politics of intellectuals, but at the muted presence—some might argue, the absence—of a politics of race in Europe in the 1970s. Could Foucault have written an effective history of racism (as he had done for prisons, madness, and sexuality) in a political environment in which racial identity was accorded no positive force nor race a strategic space? In contrast to the United States, where the civil rights movement

11. Mark Lilla, in a review of Eribon's and Miller's biographies of Foucault, criticizes both for missing the crucial point that "Foucault was never a political leader: he was what the French call a suiviste." See "A Taste for Pain: Michel Foucault and the Outer Reaches of Human Experience," *Times Literary Supplement* 26 March 1993: 3–4.

12. On Foucault's opposition to French interventions in Indochina and the Algerian war, Miller makes passing reference. James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) 57, 136.

13. Clearly the French left was not unambiguously anticolonial during the Algerian war—the left version of the civilizing mission was hard to overcome. On the different sorts of political engagements and positions taken on by French intellectuals during the Indochinese and Algerian wars see Paul Clay Sorum, *Intellectuals and Decolonization in France* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1977) and J.-P. Rioux and J.-F. Sirinelli, eds., *La Guerre d'Algerie et les intellectuels français* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1991). Note that while intellectuals of the right who fought for a "French Algeria" identified their position with 19th century racist thinkers such as Renan and Vacher LaPouge, the left's defense of an independent Algeria was framed as an assault on imperialism more than on racism per se.

14. Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé* (Paris: Payot, 1957); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 1963); Jean-Paul Sartre, *La Critique de la Raison Dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960).

prompted a generation of scholars to resituate racism as inherent to the inclusionary myths and exclusionary practices of democracy and freedom,[15] histories of European racism took a very different course. Such histories remained bracketed in specific stories: as a subtheme in the history of totalitarianism as in the influential work of Hannah Arendt, as a politically anesthetized, ahistorical field of "race relations" as in Britain, and perhaps most notably as a history of the horror of recent Nazi memory (as in Leon Poliakov's *The Aryan Myth*)—a cordoned off history of archaic origins, a history to dispose of, a narrative of the past.[16]

A radical rethinking of racism as inherent in the deep structure of Europe's *contemporary* social order has only emerged with the political force of "new racism" in the 1980s and in dialogue with the multiple constituencies voicing opposition. The "immigration problem" of England, Germany, Holland, and France, most vicious in the LePenist fears about its defiling of French cultural identity, has brought racist violence and a virulent discourse on racial contamination, "rootless" foreigners, and internal aliens back home.[17] But in this analysis too, Foucault is granted no part. Even the more recent wave of German scholarship that resituates Nazism as part of the " 'normal' achievement of respectable science" accords him no place. As Geoff Eley notes, Foucault could easily have been its "patron saint," but he is not.[18]

Leaving the psychodynamics of Foucault's choice of subject to his biographers, one might still argue that the absence of any reference to his work on race may in part derive from his own abrupt shifts in trajectory. While his forays in his 1976 lectures into "the origins of state racism" were both bold and counter-intuitive, they were shortlived. After a sabbatical

15. For the best example of an effort to tie the history of racism to the rise of democracy in the U.S. see Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975).

16. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948). On the depoliticization of the "race relations" literature in Britain see Robert Miles, "Marxism Versus the 'Sociology of Race Relations'?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7.2 (1984): 217–37. For the originary approach of Leon Poliakov see *The Aryan Myth* (London: Heineman, 1974).

17. See, most notably, Pierre-André Taguieff, *La force du préjugé: essai sur le racisme et ses doubles* (Paris: La Découverte, 1988); and "The National Front in France," *New Political Science* 16–17 (Fall/Winter 1989): 29–70. Also see Tore Björgo and Rob Witte, eds., *Racist Violence in Europe* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

18. Geoff Eley, "Scholarship Serving the Nazi State I; Studying the East," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 12.4 (1989): 576.

in 1977, his 1977–78 course at the Collège de France surprised associates, students, and friends.[19] The transformation he had explored in 1976 from a "discourse on the war of races" to "state racism" never appears again, and the genealogy of racism was not pursued further. By 1978, "governmentality" took its place entirely, leading Foucault back to sex in the governing and care of the self. As one of Foucault's associates told James Miller, "the [1978] course did not go as planned."[20] This may have been a period of "crisis" for Foucault, as some have claimed, following the "quiet" reception of volume 1 by some, and its more scathing dismissal by others, the latter reflected in *extremis* by Baudrillard's 1977 piece, *Forget Foucault*.[21] What we do know is that there was a radical shift in the historical period on which he worked, a different weighting of his analytic focus, marked by a clean erasure of the question of racism from his project.

The suggestion of one of Foucault's close associates that he was possibly "deadlocked" on thinking about race may be on the mark.[22] The discrepancy between *The History of Sexuality* and the lectures on racism is striking. While the former alludes to linkages between racism and technologies of sexuality (that were to be pursued in later volumes), in the lectures biopower, not sexuality, frames his argument. The explicit link between racism and the bourgeois order is no longer there. The lectures take off from another vantage point entirely. They trace the "polyvalent mobility" of a discourse of races through a number of minor and major figures in European historiography. On the other hand, Foucault centrally positions the discourses of race in a way he had never done so before. The specificity of the late nineteenth-century racism alluded to in *The History of Sexuality* is no longer assumed but engaged directly.

Even if we could account for the reception of this part of his work two decades ago, it does not explain the silence now. Today, when critiques of the essentialist underpinnings of racial and sexual identities are so well incorporated into intellectual and political agendas, few have drawn directly from him. I return to the lectures in the following chapter. Here I invoke them to make a specific point; namely, that the attribution to Foucault of a concern with racism is not merely a presentist reading of his work.

19. Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* 299.

20. Miller 299.

21. See Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 358 on the "quiet welcome," and Jean Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault* (New York: Semiotext, 1977).

22. Personal communication, January 1994.

Racism is a complex, if elusive subtext of it. Before turning to the lectures in chapter 3, I outline how Foucault saw the relationship between racism and discourses of sexuality in *The History of Sexuality* and suggest some of the dissonances that emerge when the economics of colonial racism is joined with his account.

Discourses of Sexuality and Racism in The History of Sexuality

Foucault's engagement with issues of racism is not easy to untangle. While references to racism appear sparingly throughout volume 1, the fact of modern racism is fundamental to its project. Racism is first mentioned in a discussion of the earliest technologies of sex that arose in the eighteenth century around the political economy of population, regulating the modes of sexual conduct by which populations could be expanded and controlled. It was, "these new measures that would become the anchorage points for the different varieties of racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (HS:26). In describing the rupture between a medicine of sex and the biology of reproduction in the nineteenth century, Foucault describes how the scientific arbitrators of sex authorized the "hygienic necessity" of cleansing and invigorating the social body in forms that "justified the racisms of the state, which at the time were on the horizon" (HS:54). Note that here racism is a potential waiting to be born, not yet on the terra firma that produced the rigid racial taxonomies of the late nineteenth century.

In colonial perspective, we could easily offer a different chronology with other prefigurings, of which Foucault was clearly aware. Colonial technologies of rule bear witness to earlier, explicit racially-based policies once in widespread use. Discriminations based on color divided black slaves from indentured poor whites in the American south in the early 1600s just as religion and color served to delineate status in the Dutch East Indies a half century later.[23] By 1680, those of "mixed-blood" were systematically

23. Ernest van den Boogaart, "Colour Prejudice and the Yardstick of Civility: the Initial Dutch Confrontation with Black Africans, 1590–1635," *Racism and Colonialism*, ed. Robert Ross (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Boogaart's effort to distinguish "color prejudice" of the early seventeenth century from the racism of a later period belies how early both color and religion were the joint criteria on which access to office and residence was based. For the Dutch East Indies see Willem Mastenbroek, *De Historische Ontwikkeling van de Staatsrechtelijke Indeeling der Bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indie* (Wageningen: Veenman, 1934) 35. On the force of racism in eighteenth-century France and its colonies see Pierre Pluchon (*Nègres et Juifs au XVIIIe siècle: Le racisme au siècle des Lumières* [Paris: Tallandier, 1984]).

denied entry to the upper echelons of the Indies bureaucratic service.[24] When Spain is brought back within the "European" picture, the "undisguised contempt" for *criollos* and "half-breeds" that peninsular Spaniards and metropolitan authorities displayed is evident even earlier.[25]

Students of U.S., French, British, and Dutch colonial history have debated whether these were emergent racisms of a different order, not yet as firmly biologized as in the nineteenth century. Some argue that racism was systematically embraced by the seventeenth century, others hold that it had not yet emerged in its consolidated, pure somatic form.[26] In either case, there is good evidence that discourses of race did not have to await mid-nineteenth-century science for their verification. Distinctions of color joined with those of religion and culture to distinguish the rulers from the ruled, invoked in varied measures in the governing strategies of colonial states. In the nineteenth century, on the other hand, race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the "measure of man" were framed. And with it, "culture" was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule.

24. C. Fasseur, *De Indologen: Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825–1950* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1993) 119.

25. See Anthony Pagden's "Identity Formation in Spanish America" (*Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World* Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), where he argues that, "within a few years of the conquest the mestizos, far from being the bearers of a new mixed culture, had become a despised breed, contemptuous of their own Indian origins and rejected by a white elite that had come to fear racial contamination too much to wish to acknowledge direct association with them" (71).

26. This debate has been most sharply defined in the U.S. over the relationship between racism and slavery in the seventeenth century. It has been treated in depth in other contexts and I will not review them here. See Winthrop Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1968); George Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Alden Vaugh, "The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in 17th Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 97 (July 1989): 347–49; and David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1991) esp. 23–36. For a sample of the wide range of contributors to this debate from philosophy, history and comparative literature see Harold Pagliaro, ed., *Racism in the Eighteenth Century* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve UP, 1973).

But even among historians who place the emergence of modern racism in the nineteenth century, this emergence is often dated earlier than does Foucault, around 1800—coterminous with an anxious and uncertain bourgeois order—not subsequent to it.[27] Why, then, does Foucault embrace this particular version of the nineteenth-century history of race but categorically reject the standard story of nineteenth-century sexuality? *The History of Sexuality* hints at some reasons, but the lectures offer more guidance. Colonialism was clearly outside Foucault's analytic concern, to him a byproduct of Europe's internal and permanent state of war with itself, not formative of those conflicts. In lectures, he would state only that racism was elaborated with colonization, to allow and account for "la genocide colonisateur." Colonial genocide is then one manifestation of a much more protracted discourse on the war of races, an elaborative moment of it.

Foucault's focus on the second half of the nineteenth century has other motivations as well. His concern was with state racism, not its popular forms. Racism is a state affair, confirmed by a set of scientific discourses that bear witness to it (HS:147). This latter may seem like a curious formulation, given the common rendering of Foucault's position that the state is not a privileged site for the discursive construction of power. But reading the lectures against *The History of Sexuality* provides a more subtle insight. The state is not written off as a locus of power. Rather, Foucault locates how state institutions foster and draw on new independent disciplines of knowledge and in turn harness these micro-fields of power as they permeate the body politic at large.

Another issue informs his chronology, a point we can only vaguely discern from *The History of Sexuality*: the principal form of state racism which concerned Foucault was that of the Nazi state and its "Final Solution." As such, there is an implicit teleology to how he treats what racist discourse "does." It must account for a set of practices that allow a state to identify not primarily its external foes, but its enemies within. In both the lectures and volume one, the focus is on the internal dynamics of European states

27. See George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1978); Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock, 1977); Collette Guillaumin, "Idea of Race"; Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, 23. Tom Holt places racism as a "creature of the ostensibly nonracist ideology that had undermined and destroyed slavery." Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992) xx.

and their disciplinary biopolitical strategies. Contiguous empires figure in Foucault's genealogy of racism in his lectures, but imperial expansion outside Europe does not. In short, the genealogy of racist discourse is sui generis to Europe: colonial genocide is subsumed, dependent, accounted for, and explained *in absentia*.

For Foucault, racism is embedded in early discourses on sexuality, but not yet in explicit form. In the making of a bourgeois "class" body in the eighteenth century, a new field of discourse emerged concerned with "body hygiene, the art of longevity, ways of having healthy children and of keeping them alive as long as possible" that "attest to the correlation of this concern with the body and sex to a type of 'racism'" (HS:125). But "racism" is still bracketed here with inverted commas. This was not, he warns us, the familiar racism of the blue-blood aristocracy, invested in a conservative status quo. On the contrary it was a "dynamic racism, a racism of expansion, even if it was still in a budding state, awaiting the second half of the nineteenth century to bear the fruits that we have tasted" (HS:125). Two important issues emerge here. First, this is the only place in *The History of Sexuality* where Foucault alludes both to different historical moments of racism and to its different varieties. Up to this point, racism has been presented as a nineteenth-century invention. Here, however, he specifies an earlier racism that preceded its bourgeois form, one "manifested by the nobility" and organized for different ends. But note again, racism remains both internal to northern Europe and of elite derivation.[28]

This is not a unique story of racism's origin.[29] Benedict Anderson offers an account that, at first glance, would seem very much the same. In *Imagined Communities*, he writes:

28. Foucault's only mention of "inquisitions" is in the context of the spread of the confessional in the Middle Ages (HS:58). The sort of "state racism" that one might argue was entailed in the Spanish Inquisition and the policies of mass expulsion and extermination based on "purity of blood" is perhaps assumed, but unaddressed. On the Inquisition's part in accenting issues of race and a discourse on the "purity of blood" see Henry Kamen, *Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985) esp. 101–133. For support of the argument that the early Spanish history of racism was salient to the making of national identities in nineteenth-century northern Europe, see Michael Ragussis, "The Birth of a Nation in Victorian Culture: The Spanish Inquisition, the Converted Daughter, and the 'Secret Race'" *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Spring 1994): 477–508.

29. Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Class* (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1951) for example, argued that imperialist policy was not at odds with the interests of the aristocracy, but "rested on it" (35).

> dreams of racism have their origin in ideologies of *class*, rather than in those of nation; above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristocracies. No surprise . . . that on the whole, racism and anti-semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries, but within them. In other words, they justify not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination.[30]

While Anderson and Foucault concur on racism's aristocratic etymology, they differ on two fundamental counts. For Anderson, racism derives from class. For Foucault, as we shall see in chapter 3, it is the other way around: a discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races. Also, for Foucault, these racisms of the nobility and the bourgeoisie are distinct, discontinuous, and qualitatively different in kind. For Anderson, on the contrary, racism is not only continuous but serves the hybrid "upper class" political project of "official nationalism." These two racisms become one and the same, welded by a nineteenth-century "conception of empire" in which "colonial racism was a major element."[31] By his account "late colonial empires even served to *shore up* domestic aristocratic bastions, since they appeared to confirm on a global, modern stage antique conceptions of power and privilege."[32] In short, colonial racism was of "aristocratic or pseudo-aristocratic derivation," but not confined to those class interests. Colonial empires "permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to *play* aristocrat off center court: i.e. anywhere in the empire except at home"[33] (my emphasis). We will have occasion to question Anderson's portrayal of European colonial communities as comprised of a "bourgeois aristocracy" in chapter 4. Here, I invoke him to underscore the basic point that notions of "a purity of blood" and the racisms that they expressed circulated through empire and back through Europe. They were never contained in Europe alone.

While Foucault's description of this "familiar" earlier aristocratic racism is at best vague, his account of its later "dynamic" variant has more specific referents. It is in the late nineteenth century that technologies of sex

30. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* 136.

31. Anderson 137.

32. Anderson 137.

33. Anderson 137.

are most fully mobilized around issues of race with the pseudo-scientific theory of degeneration at their core. He writes:

> The series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex. . . . Its application was widespread and its implantation went deep. Psychiatry, to be sure, but also jurisprudence, legal medicine, agencies of social control, the surveillance of dangerous or endangered children, all functioned for a long time on the basis of 'degenerescence' and the heredity-perversion system. An entire social practice, which took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, furnished this technology of sex with a formidable power and far-reaching consequences. (HS:118-119)

That "vast theoretical and legislative edifice" that was the theory of degeneracy secured the relationship between racism and sexuality. It conferred abnormality on individual bodies, casting certain deviations as both internal dangers to the body politic and as inheritable legacies that threatened the well-being of a race (PK:204).

There is nothing particularly innovative in this formulation. Sander Gilman, Daniel Pick, and Anna Davin, among others, have treated the discourse of degeneracy with more nuance and far more historical depth than Foucault.[34] Pick argues that degeneracy was a "European disorder" that "above all [evoked] danger from internal transgressions rather than inter-racial 'pollution'."[35] Crystallizing in eugenics, nineteenth-century degeneracy theory developed as a national and a class-specific project that converged with wider purity campaigns for improved natality and selective sterilization. While Pick rejects what he calls the more conventional portrayal of degeneracy as part of the racist construction of empire, for Foucault, empire never comes up. Only Nazism is mentioned as, "doubtless the most cunning and the most naive combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of disciplinary power" (HS:149).

34. Sander Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1985) 191–216; Anna Davin, "Motherhood and Imperialism," *History Workshop* 8 (1978); Daniel Pick, *The Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918* (New York: Cambridge, 1989). Cf. Dain Borges, " 'Puffy, Ugly, Slothful and Inert': Degeneration in Brazilian Social Thought, 1880–1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25 (1993): 235–256 who looks at the discourse on degeneration as a "major vehicle of social criticism . . . for Brazilian intellectuals" in this period

35. Pick, *Faces of Degeneration* 39.

Pick differs with Foucault on a crucial point. The discourse of degeneracy was not an instrumental vehicle of bourgeois empowerment as for Foucault, but quite the opposite, an expression of "social anxiety," "internal disorder," and political fear; in short, a representation of "powerlessness" within a "seemingly self-possessed imperious discourse."[36] From a colonial perspective, this makes much more sense. As we will see in chapter 4, notions of degeneracy were directed at multiple targets and had wide applications.[37] They not only targeted colonized populations as Pick assumes, but also the indigent, supposedly *décivilisé*, racially-hybrid members within the European community. Degeneracy characterized those who were seen to veer off bourgeois course in their choice of language, domestic arrangement, and cultural affiliation. Notions of degeneracy registered dissension among Europeans and basic uncertainties about who would be granted that privileged status.[38] Thus, in the Dutch Indies, "degenerate" was an adjective that invariably preceded those labelled as poor and white. It could be invoked to protect the schools of "full-blooded" Dutch children from their poor Indo-European compatriots, as well as from those children who were "purely" Javanese. Similarly, the notion of degeneracy appears repeatedly in the 1898 Indies legal code on mixed-marriages to justify why European women who choose native men as their husbands should not be entitled to Dutch citizenship. The point is this was not a "European" disorder or a specifically colonial one, but a "mobile" discourse of empire that designated eligibility for citizenship, class membership, and gendered assignments to race.

Biopower, Sexuality and Race

While the references cited above suggest a progressive story of racism emerging out of earlier technologies of sex, Foucault's story, not surprisingly, is far more complicated. It is in the book's final chapter where the welding of racism to "biopower" confers on racism its most virulent form. It is not biopower per se that produces racism, but rather the "calculated management of life" consolidated in the nineteenth century bringing together the two "poles" of biopower that emerged separately two centuries earlier (HS:140). One pole centers on the disciplining of the individual, on the "anatomo-politics of the human body"; the second centers on a set of "regulatory controls" over the life of the species in a "biopolitics of the population" (HS: 139).[39]

36. Pick 237.

37. This was, of course, true in Europe and the U.S. as well, where a discourse of degeneracy was used by feminist and left wing birth control advocates such as Emma Goldman as well as those adamantly against them. See Daniel Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1985) 90 and Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York: Grossman, 1976).

38. Pick, *Faces of Degeneration* 39.

What marks nineteenth-century biopower as unique then is not its focus on the individual body and the species alone, although this is the feature that most commentators have rightly pointed out.[40] It also joins two distinct technologies of power operating at different levels; one addresses the *disciplining* of individual bodies, the other addresses the "global" *regulation* of the biological processes of human beings.[41] It is this "technology of power centered on life" that produces a normalizing society and a new form of racism inscribed within it. Foucault would explore these connections in more detail in his 1976 lectures, but this concern with normality is already prefigured in volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*, in *Discipline and Punish*, earlier still in *Madness and Civilization*, and *The Birth of the Clinic*, as well.[42]

39. In *Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (London: Polity Press, 1991), Megan Vaughan explores "the limitations of a Foucauldian account of biopower," arguing that colonial medical discourse and practice differed substantially from that described by Foucault because it conceptualized Africans "first and foremost, as members of groups and it was these groups, rather than individuals who were said to possess distinctive psychologies and bodies. In contrast to the developments described by Foucault, in colonial Africa group classification was a far more important construction than individualization" (11). In this otherwise rich study on colonial power, medicine and African subjectivity, Vaughan misses just this point that nineteenth-century biopower represented a shift toward the regulation of the social body, toward the normalization of collective identities, and away from individualizing disciplinary regimes. Vaughan dismisses Foucault's account precisely because she understands biopower to be a form of individualization rather than collective regulation.

40. See, for example, Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault* 140.

41. Michel Foucault, *Temps Modernes* 45.

42. Colin Gordon makes a similar observation:

> Whether out of a polemical appetite for indications of unstable oscillation and damaging retreat, or through an inclination to apply the (often misunderstood) Foucauldian thematic of discontinuity to Foucault's own thought, or simply out of the need for a striking story-line, the evidences of a strong continuity from *Histoire de la folie* through to the end of Foucault's output have generally been paid too little critical attention."

See Colin Gordon, "*Histoire de la folie*: an unknown book of Michel Foucault," *History of the Social Sciences* 3.1 (1990): 5.

In *Discipline and Punish*, he identifies 1840, when the children's rural reformatory was established at Mettray, as the start of a "new era" in the "normalization of power." It was a key moment when what he calls the "carceral archipelago" of the nineteenth century produced a "slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation" that allowed the "social enemy" to be defined at once by irregularities, departures from the norm, anomaly and criminal deviations (DP:298–9). In the French language edition of *Madness and Civilization*, he already has set out "to write a history of boundaries . . . by which a culture rejects something that it will designate for itself as Exterior."[43] In each of these projects, Foucault first explores the "normalization of power." By the time he writes *The History of Sexuality* and the lectures on racism, his focus has shifted to a wider concern with the power of normalization.[44] And with this shift, the underpinnings of his approach to modern racism are close at hand. This creation of the "internal enemy" and of "the dangerous individual," both framed within a "theory of social defense," will be fundamental, as we shall see in the following chapter, to how Foucault will explain the racisms of modern states.[45] As George Mosse, among others, has noted, the distinction between normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and sexual deviance, and between moral degeneracy and eugenic cleansing were the elements of a discourse that made unconventional sex a national threat and thus put a premium on managed sexuality for the health of a state.[46] Foucault writes, "Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis of regulation (HS:146)." Through this new biopolitic "management of life,"

43. *Folie et Déraison: Historie de la Folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Plon, 1961). The French quote reads: "On pourrait faire une histoire des *limites*,—de ces gestes obscurs, nécessairement oubliés dès qu'accomplis, par lesquels une culture rejette quelque chose qui sera pour elle l'Exterieur," III.

44. In agreement with Miller's biography of Foucault, Mark Lilla notes: ". . . it was the idea of social boundaries and their trangression, not homoeroticism as such, that dominated [Foucault's] mature outlook." "A Taste of Pain," *Times Literary Supplement* 26 March 1993: 3. Also see John Rajchman's discussion (*Truth and Eros*, 105–106) of Foucault's reflections on the "technology of exclusion."

45. On this creation of "the dangerous individual" as an enemy of society within a "theory of social defense" see his seldom referenced but fascinating piece, "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual' in 19th century Legal Psychiatry," *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* 1 (1978): 1–18.

46. George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1985) esp. 10–22.

sex not only stamped individuality; it emerged as "the theme of political operations" and as an "index of a society's strength, revealing of both its political energy and biological vigor" (HS:146).

Thus surveillance of sexuality and insistence on racial supremacy are played out at several levels that, in the wake of feminist history, are now familiar. The sexualization of children "was accomplished in the form of a campaign for the health of the race" (HS:146), while the medicalization of women's bodies was carried out "in the name of the responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution and the safeguarding of society" (HS:147). In Foucault's abridged rendering of these processes in volume 1, the two crucial elements of gender and empire are missing from his account. But it is imperial-wide discourses that linked children's health programs to racial survival, tied increased campaigns for domestic hygiene to colonial expansion, made child-rearing an imperial and class duty, and cast white women as the bearers of a more racist imperial order and the custodians of their desire-driven, immoral men.[47]

If the connections among sexuality, race, and biopower outlined above seem only loosely articulated it is because in Foucault's story they remain so. He links racism and the technologies of sexuality directly to biopower, without linking racism and sexuality explicitly to each other. Their relationship is mediated through what he would later call, "a sort of statisation of the biological," a biopolitical state in which sex was an instrumental "target" and racism an effect. What is implicit, however, is important. If "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life" (HS:144), then, as we shall see from his lectures, modern racism is the historical outcome of a normalizing society. It is no coincidence that his Collège de France lectures given in 1974–75 were devoted to *les anormaux* (abnormals) and to racism and the biopolitical state the following year. Both dealt with the burden of normality and its biological technologies and with how these "relations of subjugation can produce

47. See Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood" for one of the earliest and still best, accounts of an imperial "biohistory" that does not use the term. Also see Nancy Hunt, "Le bébé en brousse': European Women, African Birth Spacing and Colonial Intervention in Breastfeeding in the Belgian Congo," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21.3 (1988): 401–432; my "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power"; and Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: the Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907–1925," *Signs* 16.4 (1991): 787–807.

subjects," defined by their varied transgressions as "internal enemies" of society and state.[48]

Deployments of Alliance, Deployments of Sexuality and Race

Distinctions between the technologies of bodily discipline and mass regulation are not the only distinctions Foucault explores. Two other fundamental oppositions mark the rise of biopower in modern European history. One is the distinction between a deployment or device ("dispositif") of alliance and a deployment of sexuality.[49] The other is the distinction between a "symbolics of blood" and an "analytics of sexuality," each initially grounded in distinct regimes of power. How do these contrasting terms relate? What do they have to do with racism, and what kind of colonial sense can we make of them?

In skeletal form, his argument runs something like this. Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the regulation of social life was mediated through a "deployment of alliance," in which control over sexual practices centered on matrimonial relations (HS:37) and on legal and religious codes of conduct that distinguished between the lawful and illicit sexual practices. This system, centered on "legitimate alliance" (HS:38), was "attuned to a homeostasis of the social body" (HS:107), to the sexual behavior of the conjugal couple, and to "maintain[ing] the laws that govern" those relations (HS:106). Foucault writes, "This deployment of alliance, with the mechanisms of constraint that ensured its existence and the complex knowledge it often required, lost some of its importance as economic processes and political structures could no longer rely on it as an adequate instrument or sufficient support" (HS:106). This failure to maintain elite control within an alliance-based system of power is not fleshed out, nor does Foucault seem to consider that such an explication is required. He only hints at those "economic processes and political structures" in which the decline of absolutism and monarchy and the rise of liberalism

48. Michel Foucault, *Resumé des cours: 1970–1982* (Paris: Julliard, 1984): 85.

49. "Dispositif" is a loaded theoretical concept for Foucault that is notoriously difficult to translate. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow prefer to translate it as "deployment," Gilles Deleuze as "[social] apparatus," Alan Sheridan chooses "machinery." I prefer "deployment," "device," and "apparatus" and use them interchangeably. See Gilles Deleuze's "What is a dispositif?" (in *Michel Foucault: Philospher*, Timothy Armstrong, ed. [New York: Routledge, 1992] 159–168), the most lucid explanation I know of that captures the complexity of meaning and movement in the term.

undermined the social hierarchies based on lines of descent and called for new ways of naturalizing the inequities on which an emergent bourgeois order was based. Whereas for Foucault, racism has not yet appeared in its modern form, this is precisely that moment when others have sought its emergence. Collette Guillaumin, for example, argues that the rise of individualism and the decline of monarchy prompted new theories about how "individuals might be linked together by their natural character."[50] In replacing alliance as an organizing principle of society, these theories of new naturalized collectivities would prompt the production of new disciplines giving truth-value to the belief that these were organic collectivities with distinct somatic and psychological traits. John Rex, Edmund Morgan, and, more recently, David Goldberg have made similar arguments that economic liberalism, commitments to "freedom," and modernity have produced structured inequities and distinctions of difference on which nineteenth-century racism was based.[51]

Foucault neither explores these issues, nor really accounts for them. Instead, he pursues another sort of argument. With the "discursive explosion" around sexuality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he identifies a split between the laws of matrimony and the rules of sexuality when each began "to be recorded on two separate registers" (HS:40). The social apparatus of alliance and that of sexuality are contrasted term by term; the former being a maintenance system, the latter "engender[ing] continual extension of areas and forms of control"; the former concerned with reproduction, the latter with penetrating and annexing individual bodies in ever more comprehensive and intrusive ways (HS:106).

50. Guillaumin, "Idea of Race" 30.

51. Rex argues that with the decline of a legal system that upheld inequalities and specific sanctions to back it, racist beliefs took hold . . . "that the doctrine of equality of economic opportunity [of economic liberalism] and that of racial superiority and inferiority are complements of one another." "The Theory of Race Relations—a Weberian Approach," *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980) 131. David Goldberg skillfully draws on the earlier insights of Zgyman Bauman, Etienne Balibar and others to analyze race as "one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity." As he states it, the "liberal paradox" is that as "modernity commits itself progressively to idealized principles of liberty, equality and fraternity . . . there is a multiplication of racial identities and the sets of exclusions they prompt and rationalize, enable and sustain." Also see Harry Bracken ("Essence, accident and race" *Hermathena* 116 [Winter 1973] 81–96) who argues that empiricism and "the rise of manipulative models of man" emerging with Locke in the late seventeenth century made it more possible to think about different species of humans and to conceive of them in racist terms.

The model here seems disturbingly conventional. Is Foucault a modernization theorist in disguise? Has he constructed a model of modernity that is all too familiar: a premodern system of power predicated on legal codes, "on a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of names and possessions" (HS:106)? In it, the privileges and "symbolics of blood" are replaced by a system of power that regulates through normalization rather than legal codes, that enlists the individual to monitor itself, that turns away from the sexuality of the conjugal couple to those peripheral sexualities where "abnormality" can be scrutinized, pluralized, and controlled. But such a developmentalist reading misses his point. The deployment of sexuality is "superimposed," it does not "supplant" the deployment of alliance, but is constructed out of the latter, imbuing it with a new tactic of power. The family is the site of this convergence, not a structure of alliance that restrains sexuality, as the conventional account would have it, but that which provides its most crucial support (HS:108).

One could read Foucault as a master at the art of crafting bold dichotomies that he recants as quickly as he sets them up. He notes a "shift" or "transition" from a deployment of alliance to one of sexuality and then quickly debunks the assumption that there were ever any such clear breaks. He writes that the "symbolics of blood" and the "analytics of sexuality" developed out of "two distinct regimes of power" (HS: 149), though he earlier disclaims the notion that these were "the organizing principle[s] of two cultural forms" (HS:148). These read as contradictions, however, only if we assume that Foucault construed history in terms of such clean breaks. While a notion of epistemic rupture does frame the *Order of Things*, *The History of Sexuality* seems to operate under different analytic emphasis.[52] At issue here is not rupture, but the tension between rupture and *recuperation*.[53] Thus, just as a reader may think that the thematics of blood disappears with the analytics of sexuality, Foucault reveals the symbolics

52. There seems more affinity with *The Archaeology of Knowledge* where he states his willingness to "accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed" (AK:26). There he explores how existing themes are reanimated, asking whether it is "possible, with a particular set of concepts, to play different games?" (AK:37–38).

53. See Jonathan Goldberg, who notes that the apparatus of sexuality contains within it a "strange continuity with the old supposedly outmoded regimes of alliance." *Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992) 16.

of blood as a living discourse that "lent its weight" to a power exercised through the deployment of sexuality (HS:149). Foucault did not reject the identification of continuities, but only those "false" ones, as one of his less sympathetic readers, Jurgen Habermas, has rightly noted.[54] Appreciating Foucault's sustained concern with this tension will be critical when we turn to his treatment of racism in the lectures.

Foucault traces a distinct discourse of sexuality appearing in the early eighteenth century and a "completely new technology of sex" by its end (HS: 116). This new technology expanded along the three axes of pedagogy, medicine, and demography that "made sex not only a secular concern but a concern of the state as well. . . . sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals to place themselves under surveillance." When "sex became a police matter" (HS:24), the administrative concerns of the state became riveted not on a "people, but on a 'population' as an economic and political problem." It is that moment when governments began to enumerate "legitimate and illegitimate births," frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation . . . the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions" (HS:25). This "policing of sex" was not a matter of enforcing a "taboo" so much as it was an apparatus for the "ordered maximization of collective and individual forces" (HS:24–25).

In colonial perspective, we can recognize some of this pattern, but some parts of the formulation are questionable, and the eighteenth century dating seems in some places too early, in others too late. For one thing, it is not clear that this shift from a "people" to a "population" makes metahistorical sense. What is striking about colonial projects is that both the notions of a "population" and a "people" often were being crafted by administrators cum ethnographers at the same time.[55] As populations were being enumerated, classified, and fixed, "peoples" were being regrouped and reconfigured according to somatic, cultural, and psychological criteria that would make such administrative interventions necessary and credible. The heightened British interest in cataloguing the "peoples of India" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was part of what Bernard Cohn has described as, a "vast documentation project" that created forms of

54. Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) 251.

55. I thank Val Daniel for pushing me to clarify this connection.

ethnological knowledge in the service of colonial control.[56] The concept of a "population" did not substitute for a "people": both conceptions represent state-building and nation-building projects in which a racial grammar tying certain physical attributes to specific hidden dispositions played a crucial role.

Secondly, sex becomes an "issue" between the administrative apparatus and European colonists nearly one hundred years earlier. Granted these are not discourses of sexuality with comparable breadth and intensity to those in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, they were repeatedly linked to the potentialities of colonial settlement and to the production of populations that would be made loyal to emerging colonial states. But it was not "sex" that "required the social body as a whole and virtually all of its individuals to place themselves under surveillance" (HS:116); it was specific individuals and those in authority who identified sex as a domain of control.

In the case of the Indies, the Dutch East India Company's management of sexual arrangements condoned certain kinds of liaisons and not others. The Indies' early Dutch rulers debated long and hard over the best means to cultivate a Dutch settler population on Java, and issues of sexual management were high on their agenda. As early as 1612, the East Indies' first governor general refused to allow Dutch women to emigrate because of their scandalous sexual promiscuity "to the shame of our nation."[57] By 1642, there was already a women's prison in Batavia to confine those married and unmarried European women "whose scandalous lives were debauching the [European] young men and children of honorable homes."[58] Managed sex was on the state agenda, but it would be disingenuous to assume this to be the sort of surveillance Foucault had in mind. Still, the management of non-conjugal sex was implicated in a discourse on "the defense of society" much earlier than he suggests, not as a coherent and comprehensive regime of biopower, but with many of its incipient elements. Sexual arrangements of company officials, subaltern military, and free burghers was monitored, if not successfully regulated early on.

56. See Bernard Cohn, "Past in the Present: As Museum of Mankind," *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi: Oxford, 1987), "The Peoples of India: From the Picturesque to the Museum of Mankind," n.d., and "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia," in *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*.

57. See C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600–1800* (London: Hutchinson, 1965) and Jean Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1983).

58. Mr. J. A. van der Chijs, Nederlandsche-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602–1811, Part I, 1602–1642 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1885) 461–65.

Dutch anxieties over the sexual proclivities of European subjects were paralleled in North America as well. What George Fredrickson has called the "first clear-cut example of statutory racial discrimination" in the Virginia law of 1662 fined "interracial fornicators," followed by a ban on all forms of interracial marriage in 1691.[59] While these injunctions were clearly legal and concerned with the conjugal couple—features that Foucault attributes to the apparatus of alliance—they also linked individual desires to social reproduction in ways that he dates for Europe a century later.

Rabinow and Dreyfus note that Foucault linked individual sexualities and the security of the social body as nineteenth-century inventions when "appeals to the very fate of the race and the nation seemed to turn in large part on its sexual practices."[60] But the "fate of the race and the nation" were also tied in colonial discourses to individual sexual practices in Africa, Asia, and the Americas at an earlier date. Maryland legislators had already made such connections in 1664 when they focused on the sexual inclinations of white women who bedded with "non-white" men as targets of concern, accusing them, as in the Indies, of causing a "disgrace not only to the English but also of many other Christian nations."[61] Male sexual anxiety focused on more than suitable Christian marriage partners for European women and on the transmission of property, but on the unmanaged desires of women themselves. Thus, the Maryland law of 1681 regulating interracial unions justified its injunctions by the fact that white women were giving in to their "lascivious and lustful desires" with "negroes and slaves."[62] In both the Dutch and British accounts, the sexual choices of white women were at issue; they are desired objects, but unruly desiring subjects as well. While the notion of a "Christian nation" in the

59. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy* 101.

60. Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault* 141.

61. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy* 101, 103.

62. Fredrickson 104. Clearly the notion of race in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonies did not bear the same explanatory weight as it does in the nineteenth century. In the former, race is folded into Christian hierarchies of civility, a piece of a larger narrative in which the economics of slavery played a crucial role. By the nineteenth century, race organizes the grammar of difference. Christianity is no longer a defining feature, but subsumed as a one form of distinction that varied with specific strategies of imperial control.

seventeenth century and the bourgeois nation of the nineteenth century were clearly not the same, in both contexts unmanaged sexuality was considered a threat to these different social bodies. The pointed control over women's sexuality, as well as over the "natural inclinations" of men, was a shared effect.[63]

Foucault's story may eclipse the extent to which colonial regimes anticipated the policing of sexuality in modern Europe. Nevertheless, the distinctions he draws between deployments of alliance and sexuality make some sense when applied to the colonial society of the Dutch East Indies. Jean Taylor's fine-grained study of the changes in the colonial culture of the Indies between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries makes a similar argument, if to a different end.[64] She describes how colonial authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was secured through a pervasive system of political and familial alliance.[65] This "deployment of alliance," to use Foucault's terms, allowed Dutch men access to privilege and profits through a calculated series of marriage links to Asian and creole women. She writes:

> The glue that held this society together was the family system. Under the VOC [Dutch East Indies company] political and economic structure, promotions were largely controlled by patronage in which family relationship played a key part . . . At the heart of the Indies clan were women, locally born and raised, who brought men into relationships of patron and protégé as father-in-law, son-in-law, and brothers-in-law. Such alliances could be far-reaching when high death rates and remarriage meant that spouses circulated. And since, under Dutch law, women could be named sole inheritor of a man's property, widows were sought after for the fortune they brought to a marriage . . . The VOC's Asian empire . . . used marriage to cement alliances.[66]

63. Again, this is not to suggest that they were the same. In the latter, the bourgeoisie's engagement with a discourse of universality and progress opened up possibilities that social boundaries might be loosened in ways that heightened anxiety about that very question.

64. Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia.*

65. Also see Julia Adams, "The Familial State: Elite Family Practices and State-Making in the Early Modern Netherlands," *Theory and Society* (Summer 1994): 505–539; and F. S. Gaastra, "The Independent Fiscaals of the VOC, 1689–1719," *All of One Company: the VOC in Biographical Perspective* (Utrecht: Hes, 1986) 92–107 who argues that by the end of the seventeenth century family ties among the VOC's higher servants were "growing closer and closer" (96).

66. Taylor, *Social World of Batavia* 71–72.

This legally secured system of alliance was a power structure of limited reign. Dutch metropolitan authorities saw these strong mestizo and creole connections, produced out of interracial unions, threatening the metropolitan hold on colonial authority and sought specific cultural measures to remedy the situation. By the mid-nineteenth century, "assaults on mestizo culture" were expressed in concerted efforts to make the colony more clearly of a "Dutch character" in a number of domains.[67] Most notable were attempts to enforce spoken Dutch in newly established private schools for European children. But these met with little success. With even the strongest advocates of enlightenment ideals still securing their connections and wealth through mestiza marriages, the elite in the Dutch stronghold of Batavia remained as removed from the *burgerlijk* order of the Netherlands as ever.[68]

This was to change radically in the early nineteenth century when a streamlined Dutch administration took over from the collapsed VOC after a brief British interregnum.[69] The bureaucratic engine of the colony was set on a new course with much more stringent guidelines established for entry into the colonial service. "Foreigners" as well as "undesirable persons drawn from impoverished families" no longer had a place.[70] A "sound" education in the Netherlands was required. This implied not only a fluency in Dutch, but the elimination of those who might form a " 'pernicious middle-race' between Europeans and natives," lacking the morality of cultivated Europeans.[71] If "inappropriate" Europeans were mildly suspect, the large population of "creoles," "colored," and the mixed population of so-called "*inlandsche kinderen*" were placed under administrative spotlight as never before.[72] By 1838 all *inlandsche kinderen* were banned from posts that might bring them in direct contact with Javanese.[73] Although explicit discrimination against Indo-Europeans was to be abolished from the Indies civil service requirements in the following decades,

67. Taylor 78–113.

68. Taylor 90, 93. On the term *burgerlijk* see fn. 50, chp. 4.

69. See C. Fasseur, *De Indologen: Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825–1950* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1993).

70. Fasseur 41.

71. Fasseur 43–44.

72. See also C. Fasseur, "De 'adeldom' van de huid: De role van de Indische Nederlander in het Nederlands-Indisch bestuur," *Sporen van een Indische Verleden* (1600-1942), ed. Wim Willem (Leiden: Rijkuniverseiteit, 1992) 14.

73. Fasseur, *De Indologen* 17.

it did not disappear.[74] It was merely substituted with a criteria of "quality" that explicitly sought recruits from the Dutch "*beschaafde stand*" (the "cultivated classes") which served the same purpose: Indo-Europeans were effectively barred.[75] With this mandate, a more visible European-oriented, Dutch middle class was recruited and encouraged to make its presence felt. Revised managements of sexuality thus followed from efforts to secure a Dutch national identity and creole compliance with a metropolitan-controlled colonial project.

As the Dutch colonial bureaucracy grew, an expanding class of civil servants, born and educated in Holland, took over as the new scientific, administrative, and cultural arbitrators on hygiene, education, morality, and sex. This transformation not only instilled a more explicitly bourgeois morality. It also made the formalization of racial categories contingent on the management of sex, but more directly on a legal system that was sharply attuned to the conditions in which "mixed-blood" children were born: out of prostitution, concubinage, and marriage. It refused children born in concubinary relations between European men and native women rights to European status without acknowledgment by their fathers, thereby allowing or compelling men to relinquish responsibility for them. The "social apparatus of alliance" did not disappear as issues of sexual morality and bourgeois convention came to define who was eligible for European status and who was not. It rather resurfaced in a new form as European-born wives, and white endogamy came to define the new style of a modern colony that would efface its mestizo connections and culturally hybrid roots.

From a Foucauldian perspective, there are three striking features of this shift. The first is how quickly the power structure based on mestizo alliance broke down, as prestige and coveted administrative posts were increasingly accessible only to the European educated and the European-born.[76] The second is that the emergence in the nineteenth-century Indies

74. Fasseur, "De 'adeldom' van de huid," 19.

75. Fasseur, "De 'adeldom' van de huid": 21, Fasseur, De Indologen: 76.

76. This is not to suggest that kinship alliances did not continue to play an important part in how offices were procured and assigned, only that other powerful criteria of selection, namely wealth, education and standardized exams now intervened. If we trace the family ties in the Indies nineteenth-century civil service, it is clear that nepotism continued to play a crucial role in the distribution of office. Robert van Niel argues that alliances among Indies families in the 1830s and 1840s actually "became more extensive and more intimately tied to various aspects of government or private cultivations and assorted exporting arrangements." *Java under the Cultivation System* (Leiden: KITLV, 1992) 101.

of an intensified discourse on bourgeois respectability and sexual morality carried with it a new interest in the domestic milieu and scrutiny of the privatized habitus in which European bourgeois values could be cultivated and children raised. The third is that this assertion of European, rather than mestizo, supremacy was underscored by a more explicit discourse and set of policies that tied the self-disciplining of individual colonial Europeans to the survival of *all* Europeans in the tropics and thus to the biopolitics of racial rule. In short, the assertion of a bourgeois order and the membership criteria for which "full-blooded" Netherlanders pressed was never distinct from the changing definition of who was European. Cultural competencies and sexual practices signaled the lines of descent that secured racial identities and partitioned individuals among them.

While this truncated account appears to be consonant with Foucault's general argument, it is dissonant in other ways. Colonial regimes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were never based on systems of alliance alone. Concubinary relations were a mainstay of colonizing settlement policy in sixteenth-century Mexico and as early as the seventeenth century elsewhere.[77] In the Indies, these relationships between subaltern European men and Asian women were not only sanctioned by the state, but encouraged by it. Local women were enlisted to provide the services that allowed civil servants and planters to maintain a European standard of living and "acclimatized" to the tropics at little cost. In Malaysia, Indochina, and parts of French- and British-ruled Africa, concubinage was the dominant domestic arrangement through the early twentieth century among subaltern Europeans, as well as many of the elite.[78]

Students of colonial history might think to interpret these illicit sexual practices as evidence of a regulative system that went awry, but this may be missing the point. This administrative economy of sex condoned arrangements that were neither conjugal, legal, nor necessarily reproductive of a ruling class. While well-placed families may have been solidifying their

77. See Asuncion Lavin "Sexuality in Colonial Mexico," *Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America* (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989) 57.

78. See John Butcher, *The British in Malaya, 1880–1914* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1979); Taylor, *Social World of Batavia*; George Fredrickson, *White Supremacy* 114, and my "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power."

prestige and power through marriage alliances, other forms of managed sexuality were proliferating. The sexual "disorders" of colonial society—venereal disease, prostitution, concubinage, illegitimate children, and a "wandering population of mixed-blood bastards" to which these illicit arrangements had allegedly given rise were sometimes subversions of the prevailing order of society—but as often expressions of it.[79] These were target problems, productive of a discourse that justified more invasive institutional control both of natives and of certain classes of Europeans. The point is that these deployments of alliance and sexuality were both part of the colonial order of things; at one moment competing, at other moments convergent venues through which distinctly gendered forms of racial and class power were ordered and displayed.

By the mid-nineteenth century, *metissage* ("racial mixing")—construed as the consequence of extra-marital alliances—was a focal point of political, legal, and social debate, conceived as a dangerous source of subversion, a threat to white prestige, the result of European degeneration and moral decay. Children—abandoned, illegitimate and of mixed-blood—had become the sign and embodiment of what needed fixing in this colonial society, giving force to the urgency for a more clearly defined bourgeois order based on white endogamy, attentive parenting, Dutch-language training, and surveillance of servants that might shore it up. These discourses on sexuality, as Foucault might have argued, were charged with instrumentality. They racialized the dangers of sex, by underscoring that illicit sex gave rise to bastard children, sexually precocious Indies youths, to daughters and sons of mixed unions predisposed to becoming prostitutes and patricides when they grew up. They needed to be watched with vigilant attention and to be subjected to state controls. Proposals to extend school hours in the Indies for the daughters of the Indo-European ("mixed-blood") poor were explicitly instituted not to improve their education, but to remove them from the immoral influence of their native kin and their mothers' native lovers.

These were not discourses designed to find a solution, as participants in these debates repeatedly professed. Instead, these concerns over racial and cultural hybridity fueled the administrative and practical fears of a heterogeneous European community that its boundaries needed policing in ever more intimate ways. Who was "dangerous" was as much those

79. See my "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power."

legally defined as European—that noxious "middle-race" inside the borders of this amorphous European community—as those clearly external to it.[80] These discourses provided liberal reformers with a constant reminder that colonialism was about not only incorporation, but also distinctions between the *echte* Dutch and those assimilated natives of "fabricated" European status, between citizens and subjects, between colonized and colonizer, and not least between different classes of Europeans.

Colonial law was no marginal player in these constructions of difference, as Foucault's account would suggest.[81] What Verena Martinez-Alier has noted for nineteenth-century Cuba holds for the Indies: legal codes and not norms alone determined a person's racial status "when his physical appearance was not an unambiguous guide."[82] Paradoxically, racial taxonomies in the Dutch East Indies were predicated on notions of fixity that were legally enforced, but these legal codes in turn depended on the identification of sexual and psychological essences that were ill-fixed and ill-defined. Similar to Spanish law, "the difference between being 'held to be white' and being 'truly white' was not one of physical colour."[83] In the Indies, the legal regulation of interracial marriage and the discourse that conferred specific sexual characteristics to social categories of persons did similar work. Together they structured and shaped inclusions in the category of European and its changing criteria of exclusions.

The Dutch case does not discredit Foucault's claims as much as it transforms them. It does suggest several issues to consider further. First, the tension between deployments of alliance and sexuality as distinct organizing principles of power may configure differently when the issue of racism is centrally posed. JanMohamed has rightly noted that racialized sexuality in U.S. slavery was not beyond the law, but constituted by it; by the legal designation of slaves as property and their children as the property of others.[84]

80. Fasseur, *De Indologen* 43.

81. In a carefully argued "counterexample" to Foucault's analysis of the relationship between discipline and law, see Laura Engelstein's "Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline and the Law in Imperial and Soviet Russia," *American Historical Review* 98.2 (April 1993): 338–363.

82. Verena Martinez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba: A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society* (London. Cambridge UP, 1974) 73.

83. Martinez-Alier 71.

84. Abdul JanMohamed specifically argues that "racialized sexuality replicates more features of the deployment of alliance than of bourgeois sexuality" . . . in that it is "tied not only to the

Second, in such colonial contexts as the Indies, discourses on libidinal desires were invariably shaped by how those desires were seen in relationship to their reproductive consequences. The truth claims about "peoples" were jointly contingent on the quantity and quality of their sexual energy *and* on how much, how rapidly, with whom, and under what conditions they could successfully reproduce. It was not just sexuality in which the truth was lodged, but in how productive that sexuality was.[85] Part of the problem is one that Doris Sommer notes—Foucault's virtual neglect of the "most obvious deployment of bourgeois sexuality, the legitimate conjugal variety without which there could be no perverse difference."[86] As we shall see in chapters 5 and 6, certain forms of racialized desire were animated in ways that buttressed bourgeois marriages, sanctioning the colonial state's intervention in the sexual and marital arrangements among different classes of "Europeans."

In addition, Foucault's equation of social "homeostasis" with deployments of alliance and kinship makes little ethnographic or historical sense. Jean Taylor's account evinces dynamic local interpretations of kin ties that were far from homeostatic. What is striking when we review the colonial policies of the Netherlands Indies, French Indochina, and parts of Latin America is how much *selective* affirmations of kinship could cut through the boundaries of privilege and race.

One of the more compelling examples of this sort of creative manipulation of kinship that scrambled racial categories was a phenomenon that both French and Dutch colonial authorities identified as "fraudulent recognitions." These were cases in which children of "mixed-blood" or even of "purely native origin" were acknowledged by European men who were supposedly not their natural fathers. These claims to paternity, in which a European man of modest or impoverished means would allegedly be paid a fee by a native woman to recognize her child, could redefine who "by descent" was European and who was not.[87] European status was a valuable

transmission and circulation of material wealth but to its very production" ("Sexuality on/of the Racial Border" 113).

85. See Doris Sommer, *Foundational Fictions* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1991), 24, who makes this point so well.

86. Sommer 33–34.

87. See J. F. Kohlbrugge, "Prostitutie in Nederlandsche-Indie," *Indisch Genootschap*, 19 February 1901: 26–28; (n.a.); "Ons Pauperisme," *Mededeelingen der Vereeniging "Soeria Soemirat"* 2 (1892). For a more detailed discussion of this "fraudulent recognitions" see my "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers. . . ."

commodity. Moreover, these were racial reorderings outside the state's control. In French Indochina, Madagascar, and the Indies in the late nineteenth century, the perceived danger of such false paternity claims was that they "both exposed the [European] element to being submerged by a flood of naturalized natives and introduced into their midst a questionable population."[88] The prevailing fear among colonial officials that fictive paternity could produce fictive Europeans suggests that some claims to alliance and descent subverted rather than substantiated racial taxonomies.

Race, Sexuality, and the Blood of the Bourgeoisie

It seems quite clear that the intimate hierarchies of colonialism prevailing in the slave, indentured, and wage labor regimes of Europe's "age of empire" would have produced a very different dynamic between alliance and sexuality than Foucault outlined for Europe. Nor undoubtedly would he have disagreed. His treatment of racism is focused on other issues and other sites; namely, on the shift in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from a "symbolics of blood" to an "analytics of sexuality." In societies in which systems of alliance, descent, and death were dominant, blood was a "*reality with a symbolic function*" (HS:147). In modern society on the other hand, the mechanisms of power are located elsewhere, "addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity to be used" (HS:147). It is not the symbols of death that are charged, but sexuality as an "object and target" (HS:147). Lest we assume that a "substitution of sex for blood was by itself responsible for the transformation that marked the threshold of our modernity" Foucault refuses any such claim (HS:148). The new procedures of power "caused" our societies to shift from one to the other, but not without "overlappings, interactions, and echoes" (HS:148). A preoccupation with blood for nearly two centuries "haunted the administration of sexuality," and nowhere more clearly than with the rise of racism (HS:149). In one particularly clear passage, Foucault writes:

88. Raoul Abor, *Des Reconnaissance Frauduleuses d'Enfants Naturels en Indochine* (Hanoi: Imprimerie Tonkinoise, 1917) 41.

> Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, "biologizing" statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (peuplement), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. (HS:149)

Indisputably, this was the case. Late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century discourses on miscegenation combined notions of tainted, flawed, and pure blood with those of degeneration and racial purity in countless ways.[89] Although French and Dutch liberal reformers often insisted that cultural "suitability" and not race was the basis on which access to colonial educational opportunities and welfare entitlements rest, designation of those Europeans who were "full-blooded" and "*pur sang*" was repeatedly invoked to identify how the lines between the deserving and undeserving poor were to be drawn. Thus Dutch and French colonial commentators shared the notion that mixed-blood children, no matter what their educational achievements, might always revert to their native affiliations because of the "blood that flowed in their veins." A study on child delinquency (published in the same year that removal of "the racial criteria" from the Dutch East Indies constitution was being hotly debated) notes that "by far the greatest percentage of European children who perpetrated crimes were born in the Indies, children therefore with more or less native blood," thereby absolving "pure-blooded" Europeans from any association with crime.[90] Similarly, Virginia Dominguez's study of racial classification in creole Louisiana powerfully illustrates how assumptions about the "properties of blood" determined racial identity and class

89. See, for example, J. M.Coetzee, "Blood, Flaw, Taint, Degeneration: The Case of Sarah Gertrude Millin," *English Studies in Africa* 23.1 (1980): 41–58; Michael D. Biddis, *The Age of the Masses* (London: Penguin, 1977).

90. A. de Braconier, *Kindercriminaliteit en de verzorging van misdadig aangelegde en verwaarloosde minderjarigen in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Baarn: Hollandia, 1918) 11.

membership from the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century.[91] The U.S. legal system of racial classification is still derived from the "one-drop" theory, a stipulation that a child with a single great-grandparent of African-American descent, is black.[92]

What is problematic in Foucault's argument is not his description of the reappearance of a "symbolics of blood" in the nineteenth century and its continued salience today, but rather the selective (northern) Europe-bound genealogy he draws for it. The myth of blood that pervades nineteenth-century racism may be traced, as Foucault does, from an aristocratic preoccupation with legitimacy, pure blood, and descent, but not through it alone. It was equally dependent on an imperial politics of exclusion that was worked out earlier and reworked later on colonial ground.[93] Boxer holds that the sixteenth-century Portuguese notion of "contaminated races" that pervaded colonial policy did more than distinquish the aristocracy from the poor and Christians from heathens; it was a color prejudice that underwrote the social hierarchies of Portuguese rule.[94] Deborah Root contends that the sixteenth-century Spanish state concern with "purity of blood" and the association of Moriscos with infection, vermin, and disease, were already part of the forging of a "cleansed" Spanish identity "that referred both to national unity and to the overseas empire."[95] Verena Stolcke argues that in colonial Latin America the notion of "purity of blood acquired new force as it lost any religious connotation, becoming

91. Virginia Dominquez, *White by Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers UP, 1986) 89.

92. See James David on the "one-drop rule" in *Who is Black? One Nation's Definition* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1991) 4–6 and an excellent piece on the persistence of that rule in debates over revisions being prepared for the 2000 U.S. census (Lawrence Wright, "One Drop of Blood" *The New Yorker* (July 25, 1994): 46–55.)

93. Verena Martinez-Alier in *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth Century Cuba* notes that "the concept of purity of blood, which had become largely discredited in Spain by the end of the eighteenth century . . . experienced a revival in Cuba" (1974: 75). Others have argued that official investigations of purity of blood in Spain itself lasted through the middle of the nineteenth century. See Charles Amiel's "La 'Pureté de sang' en Espagne" *Etudes inter-ethniques* 6 (1983): 27–45 on this point and on "the conjunction of religious, biological and classist racisms" that the Spanish state embraced (41).

94. C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969) 215–41.

95. See Deborah Root, "Speaking Christian: Orthodoxy and Difference in Sixteenth-Century Spain," *Representations* 23 (1988): 118–134.

a clearly racial notion" by the beginning of the eighteenth century.[96] I draw attention to these colonial contexts not to suggest that these racisms are the same, but to underscore the fact the racial lexicons of the nineteenth century have complex colonial etymologies through which these aristocratic discourses on "purity of blood" were replayed and transformed.

When we turn to the nineteenth century anxieties around Eurasians, Indos, and mestizos, the colonial entailments of these discourses become clear. These were not only groups seen as "mixed" by blood. They were the "enemy within," those who might transgress the "interior frontiers" of the nation-state, who were the same but not quite, potentially more brazen in making their claims to an equality of rights with "true" Europeans, but always suspect patriots of colonial rule. Science and medicine may have fueled the re-emergence of the beliefs in blood, but so did nationalist discourse in which a folk theory of contamination based on cultural contagions, not biological taintings, distinguished true members of the body politic from those who were not. These folk theories of race were derived from how empire was experienced in Europe. They were disseminated through an imperial logic in which cultural hybridities were seen as subversive and subversion was contagious. In that imperial frame, native sensibilities and affiliations were the invisible bonds that could position those of "mixed-blood" as "world citizens" at the vanguard of revolt against those "full-blooded" Europeans who claimed the right to rule.[97]

Foucault's account may allow for such an understanding, but it does not provide one. He looked at "blood" as a body fluid, expressive of vitality, kinship and contamination, not at its part in defining the imperial body and its interior borders. For him, nineteenth-century racism was not about the symbolics of blood per se, but about how the meanings of blood worked through the technologies of sex in a power "organized around the management of life" (HS:147). Race is a theme of the text, but not the subject of analysis: "Through health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target." His

96. Verena Stolcke, "Conquered Women," *Report on the Americas* XXIV.5 (1991): 25. Also see Magnus Morner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), who notes that a "royal decree of 1805 declared that persons of "pure blood" had to ask permission of the viceroy or the audiencia in order to marry 'elements of Negro and Mulatto origin' " (39).
97. W. Horst, "Opvoeding en onderwijs van kinderen van Europeanen en Indo-Europeanen in Indie," *De Indische Gids* II (1900): 989.

focus is on the bourgeois body, an individual body menaced by heredity, a social body bent on affirming itself. As he tells us, it is more than a clever play of words to say that "the bourgeoisie's 'blood' was its sex" (HS:124). Within this equation, "sex" would come to define the distinction of the bourgeoisie, as blood had for the nobility; it would legitimate its moral highground, its claims to supremacy, and the healthy vigor of bourgeois rule. If the "special character" of the aristocratic body was hidden in the truth of its blood and not its wealth, then the uniqueness of the bourgeois body was to be lodged in the "truth" of its sex. Foucault writes: "This class must be seen . . . as being occupied, from the mid-eighteenth century on, with creating its own sexuality and forming a specific body based on it, a 'class' body with its health, hygiene, descent, and race . . ." (HS:124).

How does race figure in this equation, in this "transition from sanguinity to sexuality"? Foucault suggests that "the new concept of race tended to obliterate the aristocratic particularities of blood, retaining only the controllable effects of sex . . . (148). Within this new biopolitical regime, modern racism emerges out of the technologies of sex. For Foucault, race is a theme through which sexuality is discussed, modern racism follows from it. In his Europe-bound account, racism is a consequence of that "class body" in the making, but viewed in colonial perspective bourgeois bodies were constituted as racially and relationally coded from the outset. If race already makes up a part of that "grid of intelligibility" through which the bourgeoisie came to define themselves, then we need to locate its coordinates in a grid carved through the geographic distributions of 'unfreedoms' that imperial labor systems enforced. These were colonial regimes prior to and coterminous with Europe's liberal bourgeois order. As many have argued, the colonies have provided the allegorical and practical terrain against which European notions of liberty and its conceits about equality were forged.

Thus, from the vantage point of the 1990s, colonial historians may be drawn to Foucault's insights, but perplexed by the omissions and ultimately left cold. Can we understand these discourses of sexuality and race that fold into one another in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe outside the wide sweep of empire in which biopolitics was registered and racial taxonomies were based? Is empire precluded by *The History of Sexuality* or subsumed by it? More pointedly, how central was race to this "class body" in the making? Was racism part of the formation of a modern, sexualized, bourgeois subject or a later elaboration of it? I take up these issues

in chapter 4. Before doing so, I want to look closely at Foucault's 1976 Collège de France lectures. There, certain elements of *The History of Sexuality* come into sharper focus, while other silences remain pronounced. Foucault anticipated many of the challenges I have raised here in ways that render our queries more pressing and more relevant both to his project and to our pursuit of the colonial genealogies of racism more generally.

III

TOWARD A GENEALOGY OF RACISMS:

THE 1976 LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE

The reading I offered of Foucault's thinking on racism in the preceding chapter could be construed as a reasonable one, based on his schematic treatment of the subject in *The History of Sexuality*. But Foucault's effort to account for the fact of racism was not, as we know, confined to that volume alone. The Collège de France lectures, given in the winter of 1976 when volume 1 was in press, evince a more direct engagement, an effort to situate the discourse of race within a deeper genealogy, with attention to its changing form. What is significant for us, and what ties the lectures closely to *The History of Sexuality*, is Foucault's concluding argument that the emergence of biopower inscribed modern racism in the mechanisms of the normalizing state. If that was the central argument of the lectures, the task here would be relatively straightforward. But it is not.

Despite the fact that five of the eleven lectures center on the changing discourse of race from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, Foucault is emphatic that racism is neither his subject nor his primary concern. As he put it in the lecture of February 2nd

> For me, at this moment, it is not a question of writing a history of racism in the general or traditional sense of the term. I do not want to write a history of what in the Occident could be the consciousness of the appearance of a race, nor the history of the rituals and mechanisms by which one could exclude, disqualify, and physically destroy a race. The problem that I want to pose is another and does not concern either racism nor in the first instance the problem of races. It was, and for me still is, a matter of showing how in the West, a certain