

THE BAKASSI PENINSULA DISPUTE

*By Justice Muluh Mbuh**

We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no White man's foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers were.

Lord Salisbury, in "Bakassi? Whose Bakassi?" (*West Africa*, 18-24 April 1994).

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Among the many border disputes that Cameroun and Nigeria have had in the years since independence, the Bakassi peninsula stands out very clearly as the most serious dispute of all. This portion of the disputed border draws increasing attention, as it became public knowledge that the peninsula is very rich in petroleum and natural gas. The show of arms, especially in the past seventeen years, has left many dead and wounded. Fighting occurred on the lands surrounding the peninsula, (which are equally disputed), on the peninsula itself, and on the sea. The big question that faces both nations is that of sovereignty over the mineral rich peninsula—and in answering this question, both nations resorted to the use of military force to claim the territory.

The military struggle between the two nations has resulted in some form of partition of the islands. Given the disadvantage that Cameroun's population is about one-tenth that of Nigeria (roughly 12 million to 120 million), it is no surprise that Cameroun naturally resorted to accusing Nigeria for using its population advantage to populate the Bakassi

peninsula—a tactic of claiming ownership.¹ From the Nigerian end, it is common to hear accusations of Cameroun Gendarmes and their tax-drive assaults on Nigerians living in the area. Thus Cameroun initially claimed it had to exercise its sovereignty and protect its territorial integrity by taxing those who live on its soil, and Nigeria, while not relinquishing its claims of sovereignty over the peninsula had to send in troops to protect its citizens from Cameroun aggression.

Things became heated very on May 16, 1981. A Cameroun national radio news report informed the world that a Nigerian military patrol army violated Cameroun's territory by penetrating the Bakassi peninsula as far as the Rio del Rey and opening fire on the Cameroun Navy. Cameroun troops in returning fire killed five Nigerian soldiers. Cameroun alleges that this incident has provided the Nigerian authorities the pretext for exploiting the incident politically and for trying to put the blame on Cameroun.² Using diplomatic means, both nations had laid to rest the incident that resulted in the death of Nigerian soldiers but it seemed to have raised the question of sovereignty over Bakassi to the forefront of relations between both nations since then. Even with the question over the sovereignty of Bakassi hovering over the politics of both nations, Nigerians, generally hold the opinion that both nations still enjoyed, for the most part cordial relations.³ Both nations exchange delegations on a regular basis, and the Heads of States customarily send messages of congratulations to each other on festive occasions. A noted example is the visit of a Cameroun delegation to Nigeria in 1995 "in order to canvass support for Cameroun's membership in the Commonwealth."⁴

However, armed assaults continued to plague the Bakassi region over the years, and in expanded fields. For instance, in 1992-1993, faced with multiparty democratic challenges, and the growing militancy for Anglophone autonomy, the Cameroun government resorted to open oppression in which some Nigerian civilians in Cameroun were killed. Many were forced out of Cameroun during many embarrassing and harassing tax-drives. As *Africa Confidential* noted, "Nigeria's...decision to deploy a

thousand troops on the peninsula was in turn a reaction to the harassment of Nigerian fishing vessels and traders by Camerounian Gendarmes.⁵

The Bakassi border dispute escalated with two more serious incidents of incursion that provoked more shooting, recording many casualties and deaths of soldiers of both countries. The first incident was the open hostility that broke the stalemate over Bakassi on February 18-19, 1994.⁶ It was after this incident that Cameroun decided to take the border dispute to the ICJ for its adjudication. Cameroun's application was deposited on March 29, 1994, amidst accusations from Nigeria that Cameroun was not committed to bilateral negotiations to resolve the matter locally.

A second notable incident that escalated the dispute was recorded on February 3, 1996. As has already been noted, the strategic importance of the Bakassi peninsula and the increasing awareness of this same factor have been at the core of escalation. No other paper gave the situation a more proper picture than *Jeune Afrique*. In its November 13, 1996 edition, the editor noted that "...tous les ingrédients d'un conflit majeur sont reunis"--emphasizing the point that all the factors that lead to a major conflict are present in the Bakassi peninsula dispute. The editorial further noted "...les enjeux économiques et stratégiques sont autrement importants..." in stressing the strategic economic importance of the peninsula as a factor for escalation. The article further expressed the fact that the region harbors two very important seaports--Douala and Calabar, with a total of five million inhabitants, and for the developed countries with petroleum companies operating in the area, the risk of a major war are frightening. Noting the importance of the region to the French, the editorial did not hesitate to comment on France's "*l'alternative du diable*," which has provoked much criticism from the Nigerian side.⁷

The devil's alternative indeed! France defends its involvement in the dispute in favor of Cameroun by citing defense treaties signed at and after independence. But this does not sink well either in the Cameroons, where an angry opposition sees frustrations of the democratization process as due to French involvement, nor in Nigeria where France's investments far exceeds what they have in all French Speaking Africa, put together. France is seen therefore as fueling the escalation of the conflict for reasons best known

only to them. The pending question that confronts the French is whether their diplomatic endeavors in trying to prevent further escalation of the dispute could be taken seriously, given its position that Bakassi belongs to Cameroun. This is especially troubling to many Nigerians.

The February 1996 escalation of the border dispute has another interpretation--that of the Ambazonian (Southern Cameroons) side. Anglophone distrust of governments in Cameroun, which accordingly failed to implement the Plebiscite Treaty that was supposed to have united the Cameroons under a Federal form of government (inter-parliamentary union), feeling cheated and mistreated now demand from the United Nations its total independence. Besides, it sees Bakassi as its own. In an *interpleader* submitted by the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement⁸ to the ICJ was rejected for lack of Statehood, they laid their own case stressing treachery on the part of Cameroun. They noted that in the absence of a Cameroon Federation, and given the lack of any documentation to back the illegal transformations that the Cameroons have undergone since independence, Cameroun has no case because it has no boundary in the disputed Bakassi region with Nigeria.⁹

Following the incident of February 1996, the Southern Cameroons Information Bulletin of March 8, 1996, stated that the Bakassi war between Cameroun and Nigeria escalated when Cameroun soldiers who presently occupy Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), shot and killed a Nigerian in Victoria, Ambazonia. When the corpse of the fallen Nigerian was conveyed home, a battalion of Nigerian soldiers disguised as onion merchants took off in a boat for the Cameroons. When they were stopped at the border by a Cameroonian patrol team, they opened fire killing several soldiers from the Cameroons. The bulletin noted that the figure of two dead reported by the Cameroun government was an underestimation. The bulletin article further lamented the fact that the Cameroun government was sending only Anglophone soldiers, who were less equipped to the border region, noting that "those killed in the recent escalations are largely Southern Cameroonians."¹⁰

Still concerning the escalatory nature of the dispute, Global Threat Analysis¹¹ in an article titled “*Showdown Over Bakassi*,” Reuters News reported fresh clashes between Nigerian and Cameroun soldiers over the potentially oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Reuters noted that since mid-April Nigeria has repeatedly accused Camerounian forces of attacking its positions in the peninsula, in the Gulf of Guinea, which is also rich in fish. Cameroun denies this and insists that Nigeria is the aggressor. Lagos-based Diplomats said the recent clashes seem to stem from the mid-March interim ruling by the World Court at The Hague on the case brought before it by Cameroun to adjudicate on the dispute, Reuters News reported. According to the report, the Court had ordered the two sides to cease hostilities pending the final outcome of the case. Military sources said both sides wanted to maintain a strong foothold in the impoverished islands, hoping this would help their claim to the territory, the news report further indicated.

The biggest problem the ICJ would face in attempting to settle the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula, according to arguments advanced in this thesis, (other border portions between the two belligerents notwithstanding), emanates from the fact that the case is taking a triangular twist--not only are Nigerians claiming ownership, but Ambazonians are coming in with a much more bigger case that would not only complicate matters for both Nigeria and Cameroun, but would cause the latter to be dealt a very heavy blow, because the intrigues of the unification process would be made known to the world. It is not unlikely that in settling the Bakassi peninsula dispute, the ICJ may end up ruling on Ambazonian identity as a nation. Such a ruling may become the biggest outcome of the Bakassi peninsula dispute, especially since the case is solidly planted in historic treaties, which examination would reveal more treachery on the Cameroun side than that of Nigeria.

THE ACTUAL DRAWING OF THE BORDER:

At ordinary glance, one can be tempted to conclude like Brownlie (1979), that the border has been completely demarcated and that there are no disputed portions. In *African Boundaries* Ian Brownlie traces the actual demarcation of the Cameroun-Nigeria border from whence the German Protectorate of Kamerun was established on July 12,

1884 to the time of the Plebiscite of February 11, 1961, when the territories of Southern and Northern Cameroons voted separately to join Cameroun and Nigeria (on different terms) respectively. Relevant treaties and agreements cited by Brownlie include:

- i) Notification to the European powers and the United States on October 15, 1884, concerning the German Protectorate of Kamerun following the July 12, 1884 treaty that established the Protectorate;
- ii) Notification to the Signatory Powers of the General Act of the Berlin Conference on June 11, 1885 and May 13, 1885, of the British Protectorate of Lagos, renamed Niger Coast Protectorate;
- iii) Exchange of notes dividing the British and German Protectorates from April 1885-July 1886 and the treaty of July 1, 1890;
- iv) Delimitation agreements from April 14, 1893-March 19, 1906 and the exchange of notes of February 22 and March 5, 1909;
- v) The Anglo-German Treaty of April 12, 1913, which presents the boundary sectors between Gamana and Cross River, and between Cross River and the Bight of Biafra;
- vi) The Milner-Simon Declaration of July 10, 1919, which partitioned German Kamerun between the British and the French;
- vii) And with respect to the British and the French Mandates established in 1922;
- viii) The trusteeship agreement approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 13, 1946;
- ix) And the 1959 and 1961 General Assembly Plebiscites held in the territories of Northern and Southern Cameroons respectively, and establishing with conformity, the boundaries between the Cameroons and Nigeria. Further, Brownlie notes that "since independence, neither of the successor states has challenged the principle of the boundary."¹²

The Nigeria-Cameroun border has four sectors. The first is the Lake Chad Tripont to the Horere Gesumi Uplands. The second is the sector of the River Gamana (boundary pillar 64) eastwards to the Kombon Mountains. From pillar 64, the third sector of the boundary runs eastwards to pillar 114 at the Cross River. The forth sector runs from

the Cross River down to the sea.¹³ The relevant portion of the border is described in the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913, as following the Thalwag of the Akpakorum (Akwayafe) River, dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang and goes as a straight line to join Bakassi Point and King Point (March 11, 1913 Anglo-German treaty, XVIII). Further, it was agreed by the two powers (Britain and Germany) that:

XIX. Should the thalweg of the lower Akwayafe, upstream from the line Bakassi Point-King Point, change its position in such a way as to affect the relative positions of the thalweg and the Mangrove Islands, a new adjustment of the boundary shall be made, on the basis of the new positions, as determined by a map to be made for the purpose.

XX. Should the lower course of the Akwayafe so change its mouth as to transfer it to the Rio del Rey, it is agreed that the area now known as the Bakassi peninsula shall still remain German Territory. The same condition applies to any portion of territory now agreed to as being British, which may be cut off in similar way.

XXI. From the center of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi point and King Point, the boundary shall follow the center of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far as the three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross- and Calabar Rivers.

XXVI. The fishing rights of the native population of the Bakassi peninsula in the Estuary of the Cross River shall remain as heretofore.

XXVII. It is agreed that within six months from the date of marking out the boundary natives living near the boundary-line may, if they so desire, cross over to live on the other side, and may take with them their portable property and harvesting crops.¹⁴

Other provisions of the treaty took care of navigation on the Cross River, which accordingly, remained open to German ships. Further evidence of the demarcation of the Cameroun-Nigeria border are contained in the Franco-British Declaration of July 10, 1919, commonly Known as the Milner-Simon Declaration (named after Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies of the British Empire, and M. Henry Simon, Minister for the Colonies of the French Republic); and the Declaration made by the Governor of

the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and the Governor of French Cameroons defining the boundary between the British and French Cameroons.

Amidst the many adjustments that were made by the British and German boundary negotiators, regardless of claims that the boundary divided many tribes,¹⁵ the Anglo-German Treaty of April 12, 1913 is the only and most important ground from which reference concerning any territorial dispute along the border between the two countries could be made. Equally of importance are the international boundaries between the Cameroons [Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) and *Cameroun*) before independence. The map of Ambazonia when the British jointly administered it as a UN Trust Territory with Nigeria is central to understanding the positions of the claimants. This position is supported by Olayinka Y. Balogunin in his study of "*The Process of Cartographic Definition of Nigerian Boundaries*," when he insinuates that "The original boundary between Nigeria and German Kamerun had been demarcated with pillars by 1913, but with the post-World War One developments, the only internationally valid sections of the demarcated boundary are a part of the Yola Arc and the section from the Rio del Rey Creek to a point where the Gamana River crosses the old boundary." According to Olayinka, "this boundary would be valid only if Cameroun respects the protocol signed by Britain and Germany regarding this mutual boundary...From Gamana River eastward to Kombon and northward to the tripoint with Chad, the Cameroun-Nigeria boundary is yet to be demarcated."¹⁶

The weakness of Olayinka's argument does not concern the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913, but rather the fact that he regards the boundary between Ambazonia (then Southern Cameroons), which was jointly administered with Nigeria by Britain as not being an international boundary. The correct notion is that as long as all the treaties were binding on the signatories, their international nature will continue regardless of whether or not Ambazonia is seen only as provinces in present day Cameroun or back then in British ruled Nigeria. What Treaties has Cameroun with Ambazonia that effectively dissolved the international boundaries of the latter?

On the contrary, both Nigeria and Cameroun are not respecting the boundaries and the agreements that created them. This may be partly because Nigeria wonders what has become of Ambazonia, which by the terms of the Plebiscite Treaty was not supposed to cease existing as a State, and in part, because it has instead been absorbed illegally by *La Republic du Cameroun*. Nigeria now wrestles with Cameroun in order to get a chunk of the now entrapped Ambazonia—which probably to them is a "no man's land." There doesn't seem to be any other logical explanation why both nations, in violation of international law, are bent on fighting each other—or as *Africa Confidential* put it—"blundering into battle"—over Bakassi.

III CONTEMPORARY CLAIMS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

Dispute along the Cameroun-Nigeria border has been a matter of historic proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section where in lies the Bakassi peninsula. As we have already noted, the most important document that concerns the demarcation of the border between the Cameroons (then Southern Cameroons and *Cameroun*) and Nigeria is the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Confidential documents made public in London now shed light on how important an instrument the treaty was. Not only are the pillars of the treaty the only pillars that completely marked the entire border, but also, the entire confidential documents reveal a high degree of reliability--so much that not even Her Majesty's government dared to temper with the treaties that fixed the pillars.

The first noted conflict over the Cameroons and Nigeria coastal area could be traced to the dispute between the Germans and the British over German success in signing treaties with the Cameroon Kings of Akwa and Bell Town in Douala on July 14th 1884. The treaties in effect, proclaimed the German Protectorate extending from the Rio Del Rey area to Gabon. This angered the British Consul, Hewett whose treaties were signed late¹⁷ (we recall here the popular saying in Cameroon history of "Too late Hewett!" The British, perhaps to save face, or perhaps genuinely, criticized the German move but went ahead to downplay the loss of the territory terming it "the flat, swampy, and unhealthy Cameroons—especially as we retain, in the coast of Ambas Bay and the

neighboring mountains, almost the only part of that region that can be inhabited by Europeans.¹⁸ Moreover, a dispute over the disrespect of German flag, inciting the natives to rebel against German rule, and the fact that British explorer Hewett would preside over court cases in Douala as if Germans did not exist equally fueled tensions between the two European powers. A rebellion of the natives led to the death of one German. Even though it was crushed, it provoked bitter reaction from Germany, which led Bismarck, in his traditional way, to demand compensation with land west of Ambas Bay to the Rio del Rey. After some hesitation Britain complied and a new boundary line was made along the Right Bank of the Rio del Rey to its source and to extend from there to the Cross River Rapids. Later the British bargained that Germany surrender claim at St. Lucia in South Africa in exchange for Victoria in the Cameroons. These agreements were contained in exchange of letters dated April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885.¹⁹

All along both the British and the Germans had mistakenly believed that the Rio del Rey was a river. When mapping the Old Calabar (Cross) River in 1889, Captain Graf Bernstorff discovered with much amazement that:

- 1) The Akwayaffe River did not end in the Old Calabar River as the English maps had shown, but rather entered directly into the sea;
- 2) That the Rio del Rey was not a River, but a seaway, and that the Akwayaffe was connected to the Rio del Rey by channels to the east;
- 3) That the Ndian River on the map prepared by the English Consul Johnson is, according to Weladji, "unknown to the natives of the Rio del Rey who instead call it the Ofa."²⁰ Commandant Pullen for Her Majesty's Government confirmed these German findings. These findings provoked maneuvers from both sides in an effort to secure Ndian River on the part of the British, and to secure the acceptance of the Akwayaffe as a substitute for the nonexistent Rio del Rey, on the part of the Germans. Accordingly, Article 4 of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 firmly secured the findings.²¹

The importance of these findings lie in the fact that the Germans insisted that from 1885, the waterway, whether river or creek, belonged to her and that the 1890 Agreement had changed nothing in this regard. And to this, the British agreed, noting:

There is no doubt that under the agreement of 1885-86 both banks of the river were given to Germany, and that from that time to 1890 she held this waterway...the resulting Agreement signed on 14th April, 1893 defined the Rio del Rey boundary with greater clarity and a pointer to things to come--neutralized the [Bakassi peninsula dispute].²²

In 1901, an agreement was reached as to the proposed boundary between the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Colony of Kamerun, between the British and the Germans. This agreement reconfirmed the April 29-June 10, 1885; July 27-August 2, 1886; July 1, 1890; April 14, 1893; and November 15, 1893 Agreements on the boundary lines between the Rio del Rey and the rapids of the Cross River. This Agreement was done in a meeting in Buea, Kamerun on April 1901, and is the basis of all subsequent boundary Agreements—1906, 1909, and 1913—with minor amendments.²³

Articles 3 of the Buea Agreement stands out clean and clear on Bakassi. It states:

In lieu of the boundary line commencing in the Rio del Rey at the point given in the maps 'West Pt.' and 'West Huk' respectively, it should commence at the South West Point of *Bakasi* Peninsula marked '*Bakasi Head*' and follow the West Coast Line until *Bakasi* Point at the mouth of the Akpa Iyefe (Akwafe) River is reached, thence it shall follow the center of the river as far as the Urifian Creek on the left bank of the said river, in such manner as to through the *Bakasi* Peninsula and the area between the Peninsula and the Creek, formerly in British territory, into the German colony of Kamerun, provided that the engagements in Article 3 of the Agreement of 14th April 1893 (mentioned in Article 3 herein), shall be observed, and no trade settlements be allowed to exist or be erected (see Appendix VI & IV for the new position establishing *Bakasi* Point).

This Agreement has stood the test of time, surviving through the World Wars and the settlements thereafter, through the period of decolonization of the fifties and sixties.

Recently declassified documents of the British Archives shed more light on the nature of some other dispute in the Bakassi area of the Cameroun-Nigeria case. Summarily, the

documents reveal that all through British rule of the Cameroons and Nigeria, the boundary pillars laid by the Germans were untouched and that any attempt at redressing the border were resisted. A clear case in point is the dispute over the Obudu Cattle ranch. The question is whether it was on Nigerian soil, or in the Cameroons, or whether it overlapped the border. This dispute was dealt with through the exchange of note in which the British expressed fear of being entangled in a border dispute of the nature of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.²⁴

The Obudu Cattle Ranch dispute arose from a Shell Company aerial survey map, which showed that part of the Obudu Cattle Ranch was in fact, on the Cameroonian side of the border. Because a team of surveyors from Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) was embarked on tracing the borderline of the State, the British feared that if the surveyors saw the Shell map, they might use it to confirm the boundaries of Southern Cameroons. To the British, this would greatly hurt Nigerian feelings, a thing they would like to avoid. In an inward telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, the correspondent advised that the Colonial Office should "instruct Southern Cameroons Government to desist forthwith from any attempt to demarcate this boundary."²⁵ This telegram provoked a series of correspondence aimed at resolving the matter.

Sensitivity over the Southern Cameroons-Nigerian border arose from the fact that in 1954 the Nigerian government single-handedly, but also to its disadvantage, inaccurately redefined the border, leaving out the Obudu cattle ranch, which lies inland, north of Bakassi.²⁶ In attempting to instruct Southern Cameroons to desist from carrying out the survey, the British government showed preferential treatment when it failed to question why and how the Nigerian government could have made such a mistake. As later correspondence would show, irresponsibility on the part of the Nigerian government was equally responsible for triggering the squabble over the Obudu Cattle ranch.

In a correspondence to the Commonwealth Office, E. C. Burr²⁷ noted that: "2. Party are not specifically surveying Southern Cameroons/Nigeria border but will naturally record

border points to enable boundary to be shown on maps." Three days latter, E.C. Burr²⁸ again communicated Commonwealth Relations Office stating, "...we see nothing sinister in all this; it is in fact no more than the usual work of the Directorate of Oversea Surveys and is on a joint Eastern Nigeria/Southern Cameroons scheme. The Nigerian bit is one of your technical assistance schemes." Burr then cautioned that any attempt to curtail activities of field party would of course make preparation of maps impossible, and demanded that the Nigerian government be so informed.

The most intriguing observation from the declassified documents is found in the document marked WAF 441/110/01, which states, "The actual boundary will not be shown on the first editions of the new maps if there is any objection from either side in doing so." In another document²⁹ Greenhill stated that although the British could undertake not to show the boundary, or for that matter the position of the existing boundary pillars, on the first edition of the new maps, they "find it very hard to resist pressure from the Southern Cameroons Government to stop omitting such essential information from maps of the Southern Cameroons." In addition, he said "the Southern Cameroons Government have asked for mapping of Southern Cameroons to be continued by us after the transfer of power of some form of U.K. Technical Assistance." Although it was latter on determined that the Obudu Cattle ranch lay on the Nigerian side, it is not clear how this conclusion was arrived at.

Even though Greenhill observed that the foregoing dispute was due to "lack of liaison between the various departments of the Nigerian Federal Government concerned," one would not help but have the feeling that the colonial masters were tolerant to Nigeria, and would let them do as they pleased. Specifically, D. W. S. Hunt had written to the Colonial Office, asking Geofrey Lamarque, (to whom he equally sent copies of the correspondence), to

...see that Southern Cameroons direct their attention elsewhere. If this particular area is to be mapped let it be done from the Nigerian side. Above all, before any boundary line

is printed on the maps, the Nigerian authorities must be fully consulted and given the opportunity of working out their own ideas of where the line should run.³⁰

Hunt's position was however downplayed by J. Chadwick, who on June 6, 1961, wrote the Commonwealth Office stating,

After all the Nigerians have given tacit approval to the existing boundary between them and the *Ambazonia* by failing to protest at the time of the Plebiscite, when the boundary must have been defined as between those who voted and those who did not...But obviously we do not wish to offend Nigerians. If they wish to protest ...it would be better if we were in no way involved in the issue. If the matter does come to a head and resolve itself into a possible boundary adjustment dispute, the protagonists after October 1st would be the Nigerians and, presumably, the United Federal Cameroon Republic. Must we make our selves a third party by laying down the boundary at this stage?³¹

Still in another correspondence dated May 30, 1961, M. L. Woods blamed the Nigerian government for making unduly heavy weather over the border issue.³² Perhaps this may be true too of the Bakassi peninsula dispute today, for as one can clearly observe, if the Obudu Cattle ranch case was settled using the Anglo-German treaty of 1913, why then can the present border dispute not be resolved in like manner?

Akinjide R. expresses one such opinion that drums up the premise that the 1913 Anglo-German treaty is not binding on Nigeria. In an article published by West Africa magazine, in April 1994, Akinjide enumerates many treaties that were signed by the Chiefs and Kings of the Old and New Calabar area demanding British protection (The Oil River Protectorate). Akinjide further insinuates that because the Order-in-Council of November 22, 1913, which came into force on January 1, 1914, bringing together the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria in to a single Protectorate of Nigeria, though still separate from the colony of Lagos, and that because the Anglo-German treaty was signed before this act, that the treaty is not binding on the new Nigeria. Akinjide further states that the British government within months of it denounced the treaty birth. Thus the treaty is not a treaty in force. Besides believing that

the treaty between Britain and Germany was not binding, Akinjide continues to hold yet another wrong notion of the area.

For instance, he continues to make reference to the *Rio del Rey* as a river (he does so seven times and once as a port), even though it was long proven that it is not. All this is done to uphold the premise that the Bakassi peninsula, which is in the area of the *Rio del Rey* belongs to Nigeria. Specifically, he says the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 is not a treaty in force because " since something cannot emanate from nothing, the 1913 Treaty cannot therefore be the judicial basis for a claim to the Bakassi Peninsula by Cameroon."³³

What Akinjide fails to question is why all along, international agreements thereafter continue to respect the said Treaty, why the Nigerian government and the British government accepted maps of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) that showed Bakassi as its territory and not Nigeria's—even when the said territory was jointly administered by Britain together with Nigeria, and specifically the stipulations of the Franco-British Declarations of July 10, 1919, which also, for the most part, honored the 1913 Treaty. Note should be taken of the fact that the boundaries of Southern Cameroons, have since the days of the 1913 treaty, remained the same—only to be contested by Nigeria when it is known that the Southern Cameroons nation has become nothing but a mere colony in *Cameroun*—the answer can not be far fetched.

The answer as to why Nigeria and Cameroun suddenly find themselves fighting over Bakassi seems for the most part to hover over the identity crises surrounding the State of Southern Cameroons. The position of the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM) and the Ambazonian Republic leaders has been made clear on numerous occasions, including their 1995 visit to the UN in demanding adult membership of that World Body. Concerning Bakassi, the position of the leaders has equally been clear--that from 1919-1958 when Southern Cameroons was jointly administered with Nigeria, maps prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands and Surveys in Lagos recognized the Bakassi peninsula as being part of Ambazonian territory. They also hold the belief that for the

short duration of the Federal structure that the Cameroons adopted after the Plebiscite, the Federal Cameroon Republic had Bakassi as part of its Federal Territory.³⁴

In commenting on declassified documents from the Public Records Office of the UK, N. N. Susungi notes that in trying to forge a unification process where the Ambazonians would be integrated into an independent Republic of Cameroun, President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun, committed fatal errors that have placed the unification process in jeopardy. This has led to a situation where both Cameroun and Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) would be better off if legally separated by the UN. Notably, Ahidjo failed to prepare a draft constitutional document to be signed between him and John Ngu Foncha during and after the Foumban Conference, and so there is no document to show that the unification process ever took place. Thus UN Resolution 1608 was never implemented in constitutional terms since there was no constitution signed by the leaders of the two states. Finally, internationally recognized territorial boundaries are in doubt. Citing the Bakassi border dispute, Susungi demands to know if under such circumstances the Cameroun government can lay claim to sovereignty over Bakassi.³⁵

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF CLAIMS OF DISPUTING PARTIES:

Another explanation as to why Cameroun and Nigeria were gradually drifting to war is that both governments are using the border dispute as a means of diverting attention away from their poor human rights records. In both countries, it is common to easily enumerate instances of gross human rights violation, resulting from the dire desire of the masses for genuine democracy and good neighborliness. This position is backed by the works of Albert Mukong (1985), and as Executive Director of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG) in Cameroun; Joseph Richards (1978) and *Africa Confidential*—all shade light on the human records of both nations—Cameroun and Nigeria.

For almost four decades of independence, Cameroun can boast of having only two presidents. Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroun ruled almost single-handedly, for twenty-five years. During his terms of office detention for no crimes other than that one made a negative political comment were very common. Thus Ahidjo operated many

maximum-security prisons in which political detainees were kept. No other works have told his story better than Joseph Richard's (1978) *Gaulist Africa: Cameroun Under Ahmadou Ahidjo*, and Albert Mukong's (1985) *Prisoner Without A Crime*. Both authors believe that as many as 25000 people died as a result of the *Union de Populations Camerounaise* (UPC) insurrection, another 5000 by tortures in the *Brigade Mixte Mobile* (BMM) while an estimated 20000 shed their blood in passing through the detention camps.³⁶ But regardless of these crimes Ahidjo managed to stay in power for so long, that Mungo Beti commented that "Ahidjo appears condemned to commit fratricide...all Cameroonians of any talent are either in exile or prison; all progressives, or even oppositional tendencies have been destroyed with ferocity."³⁷

It is however surprising that after Paul Biya took over power from Ahidjo, that things got worse--both in terms of fundamental human rights and the national economy. If there was one thing that Cameroonians of all domains did not complain about, it was the economy. Under Paul Biya the economy has recorded its worst setbacks since independence, and workers have been reduced to nothingness, having had their salaries cut by as much as 70%. But this is not the case with the earnings of those in the armed forces. The salaries of Gendarmes, and the Army have almost doubled since Biya became President due to almost annual salary increments. Such behavior translates directly in to that of the repressive nature of the polity in that government has clearly bought the loyalty of the forces in its bid to rig elections and crush mass resistance just to maintain power.

Thus the struggle to democratize Cameroun, especially since the "wind of change" of the 1990s, has been a dismal failure. Democracy, at least of the type once practiced in Ambazonia became a far-fetched dream. Hundreds of casualties were recorded in trying to earn it. And as for human rights, thousands are presently in jail for one political offense or the other, just because freedom of speech was policy only on paper. A case in point concerns letters written from one of Cameroun's maximum-security prison (BMM) in Yaounde, to the Director of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG), Albert Mukong.

The political detainees were all from Ambazonia, and their crime--that they participated in a signature referendum that demanded the total independence of Ambazonia. In these letters, the detainees lamented about the conditions under which they were being held and prayed that Albert Mukong, who was very familiar with these conditions, should not give up efforts in trying to free them. Some of the victims they noted had already lost their eyesight, and some had contracted tuberculosis. They were not being given any medical attention. The detainees begged Mukong to " Sir...use your high office to see about our problems and if government does not want to judge us, let *them* transfer us to our areas of jurisdiction"³⁸

Our area of Jurisdiction?—Even these detainees know that they have been abducted and are pending trial in an alien land, under laws that do not only contradict those they grew up in, but are a serious violation of their fundamental human rights. The Common Law practiced in Ambazonia is totally different from the Napoleonic Codes that serve as the law in Cameroun.

Still in another letter signed by one of the leaders in detention, a list of 61 Anglophone political detainees from Ambazonia, held at the Kondengui Central Prison, sincerely appreciated the efforts being made to liberate them. The leader noted that they were being starved to death, and lamented about the plight of their children who were now out of school. Specific reference was made of the children of Ngek Simon from Oku, whose children were reported to be street beggars. The leader of the group noted that these children have now become

Orphans in their own country without shelter. As you know, Yaga Grace, the mother (of the children, I suppose), Ngek Simon the father and the eldest son Ngek Adalbert are all here under detention in Kondengui and Mfou prisons...though we are dying, we believe that one or some will survive this persecution to relate the history.³⁹

It is important to note that a list of detainees drawn up on September 3, 1998, contained the names and place of birth, the date of death and place of burial of seven detainees who were victims of the Cameroun government's cruelty. The overall human rights situation in Cameroun at the time of depositing the Application against Nigeria was so bad that in

writing about it, *West Africa* magazine⁴⁰ (in commenting about the report of the United States Department of State concerning its world wide survey of human rights for 1993) captioned the story a "damning report." The report had criticized the Cameroun government for "abusive practices that often target political dissidents and community leaders opposed to President Paul Biya's regime." These abuses included routine beatings, torture and illegal detention.

However, recent reports from Cameroun indicate that thirteen of the freed detainees from the Kondegui and Mfou Central Prisons have disclosed that they were subjected to all forms of inhumane treatment. According to Isaha'a Boh's Cameroon bulletin,⁴¹ the detainees reported that they were forced to rape women in front of the Gendarmes and equally carry out homosexuality—a thing, which as they lamented they "have never known or thought of doing." Amnesty International, USA, has contacted officials of the Cameroun Embassy in Washington D.C. to get their response to these stories but the officials declined to comment, but demanded instead whether Amnesty International believed them, Isaha'a Boh reported. If this picture of Cameroun today is alarming, then one should wonder what would be said of human rights abuses in Nigeria, where both land mass and population are more than that of Cameroun.

The main trouble with Nigeria has been that of continuous and overbearing military dictatorships. More than any other country on earth, Nigeria seems to have recorded more military coups and counter coup attempts in which thousands died. The effect on the national polity has been recourse to other domains for a search for a cure to the power crises, which is poisonously punctuated by religious differences and a dangerous North-South dichotomy. For example, Christians see the Military Coups as dictated by religious inclinations and dominance from Muslims, and yet, another *Grande Nord* strategy. Thus, religious riots—even in University campuses across the nation continue to plague the national consciousness, resulting to thousands of deaths also. To the best of my recollection, only the Shehu Shagari regime was the only civilian President that lasted for a while, with the exception of the regime that lead Nigeria to independence up till 1966, though he too was a Muslim, not to talk of the fact that he was from the North.

Also, all the Military leaders, perhaps with the exception of Johnson Ayuiyi-Ironsi, have been Muslims—Murtala Mohamed, Yakubu Gowon, Olusengun Obasanjo, Mohammed Buhari, Ibrahim B. Babangida, and Sani Abacha. With the exception of the Shehu Shagari regime, all the military regimes recorded gross human rights abuses.

It is easy to recall also the death of Dele Giwa, a newspaper editor who wrote elaborately on peace between Nigeria and Cameroun. Dele was killed by a letter bomb on 21 October 1986, and his death was seen and reported as a political killing. We would recall also the persecution of former Governor of Kaduna State, Balarabe Musa and his aid, Professor Balla Usman of the Department History of Ahmadou Bello University (ABU), Zaria, in the early eighties, and of recent, the death of Mushood Abiola in detention for their struggles to democratize Nigeria. It would equally not be of service to the cause of the people who struggle that Nigeria should be law-abiding, if one should forget the torturous years that the Lagos-based Lawyer Gani Fawehinmi went through, especially those many months he spent in the Maiduguri jail, Bornu State, for threatening to put President Babangida and his wife, Mariam Babangida on the stand for corruption, drug trafficking and human rights abuses.

So too would it equally be a disservice to all Africans if one were to forget the expulsion of Sociology Professor, Patrick Wilmot, of ABU, Zaria, in 1988, and the charges trumped-up on him for being a US-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy. Wilmot was deeply concerned about the political future of Nigeria and predicted too often, many things about Nigeria that came true. For instance, Wilmot was critical of the Babangida regime and the promises he made for returning Nigeria to civil rule. Wilmot had dismissed these promises as quibbles, stating that Babangida had no real intention of returning Nigeria to Civil Rule. He stated that his bet was that Babangida was making plans for another military leader to take over power from him.

For his political maneuvers and deceitfulness, Babangida was known all over Nigeria and beyond by the phrase: “*I.B.B. na (is) Maradonna!*” He, like Biya in Cameroun never kept to a single promise, and dribbled the masses just as Maradona does when he goes through the soccer field, meandering with no real challenger to stop him, or as if there are no players on it.

Even though the long run has proven Babangida wrong, in his times, Patrick Wilmot earned a 48-hour marching order (to leave Nigeria) for, as Americans would say, "running his mouth." Today we know that Wilmot's prediction all came to pass, and that the ex-president owes him an apology, as he does to all Nigerians.⁴² Perhaps the most stinking record of human rights abuses was the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, in November 1995, for protesting the misuse of the revenues and natural resources from the Delta region of Nigeria—their area of origin, and the resultant degradation caused to the environment of that area. Amnesty International Annual Report on Nigeria for 1998, indicated that at least 20 other Ogoni people are still in detention, and without trial on identical murder charges. These human rights abuses do not ignore the many thousands who have been detained for participating in pro-democracy demonstrations, or those who lost their lives in the process. The brutal killing of the wife of Abiola with machine gun fire, in broad day light on the streets of Lagos a year ago is a case in point.

These glimpses are intended to show that the leaders of both Cameroun and Nigeria were, prior to the deposition of the case over the Bakassi peninsular with the ICJ, facing serious internal frictions and thus a dispute with a neighboring state that could likely result to war, served them well in diverting the attention of their masses to this external crisis. As *Africa Confidential* noted:

The trial of strength is dangerous, not just because Biya and Abacha believe Bakassi worth fighting for but because both see the dispute as a way to shore up falling domestic support. Their grip on power is threatened by a rise in ethnic nationalism, economic collapse and restive soldiers; while a full-fledged border war would be damaging, even catastrophic, because of the instability it could spark, this prospect may not prevent them from blundering into battle. Given the diplomatic failures that have marked the dispute, the most probable brake on further escalation appears to be the sense of failure of the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments to convince the majority of their people that the peninsula is worth fighting for.⁴³

Africa Confidential went further to indicate that almost as important as the Bakassi dispute, are the disputes within the two countries in that both nations face serious challenges to their integrity as nation states. Specifically, the paper notes:

Several Nigerian ethnic groups are demanding a break-up of the Federation while Cameroon's substantially Anglophone minority in the south argues as part of its agenda for self-determination that Bakassi's future has to be negotiated from Bamenda (*Buea, it meant*) (the capital of Ambazonia) and not from Yaounde (the capital of Cameroun).⁴⁴

The article then elaborated on the role being played by the French, accusing them for wrong footing, by its policy of backing Biya, Cameroun's president.

The most recent case of ethnic showdown in Nigeria was reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) at 6.00 a.m. Monday July 19, 1999. The news reported a clash between the Yoruba and the Haussa in the town of Shigamo, about 50km from Lagos in which ten people were killed. The fighting, BBC reported occurred because during a Yoruba festival that requires people to stay off the streets, a Haussa woman did not respect the order and was killed. This then sparked a fight between the Yoruba and the Haussa. On November 18 1999, at precisely 6:20 am ET (USA), BBC reported yet another ethnic clash--this time in the Esuku ethnic group. The tribes were fighting over pipelines leftover by petroleum industries. These pipelines are useful to the natives for the channeling of water. According to the BBC report, 40 civilians and 4 police officers were killed in the clashes. The report was suggestive of the fact that the Esuku ethnic group is one of the poorest in Nigeria in terms of development, but is in the richest region, with oil. The clashes, BBC noted has once again put government policy on the line. Thus clash of traditions is not restricted to the Yoruba and Hausas of Nigeria; it threatens every region of both Nigeria and the Cameroons. Worst still is the feud between the Anglophone and the Francophone, which is at the nerve center of Cameroun government malpractice of human rights abuses predominantly aimed at the Anglophones (Ambazonians), election rigging and her contradictory, if not hypocritical posturing claim of sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.

Another alternative explanation of the Bakassi peninsula dispute comes from N. N. Susungi in his article titled "*Cameroon-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict*," (most notably part II of it titled "*Foncha, Muna and the Foumban Conference of 1961 about Southern Cameroons--Foncha and Muna did not betray Southern Cameroons*,"). Susungi laments about the fan fare that surrounded the handing over of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997. In comparing the situation to the hand over of Southern Cameroons to Cameroun, he charge that Southern Cameroons leaders then did not have the constitutional mandate to negotiate. He notes, "even though Hong Kong is full of some of the brightest Chinese...Britain could not have allowed Hong Kong itself to conduct such negotiations on its own behalf with the Beijing authorities. But that is exactly what Britain did in the Southern Cameroons in July 1961."⁴⁵

Quite to the contrary, the declassified file of London show that London had negotiated secret deals with Yaounde, such that Commissioner J. O. Field stayed in Buea on July 1961 instead of being in Foumban where the so-called negotiations were supposed to be taking place. On this count it is clear that Britain betrayed Southern Cameroons, by secretly agreeing with Ahidjo that the British would create a vacuum of the territory, which President Ahidjo would then fill with his own troops. This explains why to many people who grew up in Southern Cameroons; life has always been as if they live in a perpetual state of emergency—one that continues to push them into seeking political asylum in foreign countries. The soldiers ever since Ahidjo illegally acquired sovereignty over Southern Cameroons had never ceased to be on a state of alert. Britain did not only betray Southern Cameroons but by its actions also abused the mandate entrusted on her by the international community.

Perhaps the most pressing evidence from the Cameroun side for the argument that the government would prefer an external conflict to the internal one (so as to divert the attention of the masses from its ills) comes from the Beti and Bulu tribes that were seen as benefiting most from Biya being in office. The Biya regime seems to have suffered some opposition from his own tribesmen, notable from former Governor and Minister Ayissi Mvodo and the former Secretary General at the Presidency Titus Edzoa. Mvodo had switched camp from the Government ruling Cameroun Peoples Democratic

Movement and was being rumored to join hands with the Anglophone-led Social Democratic Front of John Fru Ndi, to be the National Opposition candidate. Besides Mvodo, Titus Edzoa, the Secretary General at the presidency, was about to announce to the public some of Mr. Biya's terrible deeds so as to oust him from power. Biya countered with a few surprising and dazzling moves and like most other political opponents, Mvodo died in mysterious circumstances just a few days after his announcement that he was going to join the Cameroun opposition.

Titus Edzoa got a more humiliating treatment. He was bundled to the deplorable Kondengui prison on charges that he embezzled from roads-work projects. The truth of the matter is that if there were any two people in Cameroun that could bring down Biya with just a few words, it was Mvodo and Edzoa. As The Herald⁴⁶ noted, Beti were mobilizing to fight Biya following discontent over the death of Ayissi Mvodo and the arrests of Edzoa and others such as Remy Ze Meka, the former Secretary General at the Prime Minister's Office.

This clampdown on former Secretary-Generals speaks for itself and in support of the fact that Biya is more concerned with staying in power than caring for Cameroun's national interests. Besides, why would top government officials including the President bring charges of corruption and embezzlement on people only when they threaten to reveal these same practices? What has Mr. Biya done to the former Minister of Finance Etienne Ntsama, who in the late eighties stole sums of money close to half of Cameroun's national budget and stored it in his ceiling? The truth is that as long as one does wrong to the nation and does not threaten to act against the President, such people, like Ntsama, would always remain in high offices and never to be investigated or sacked.

The extension of the Killing arm of Government opponents used to be a typically Anglophone tragedy, but because Francophones were showing signs that the Anglophone led opposition concerning the way government is run in Cameroun was being bought by many a majority of Francophones, bad leadership has become a national emergency and the killing of political opponents, a national tragedy. But the glaring truth is that Cameroun has been a state on emergency ever since that UN-led mistake of fusing a democratic Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) with a Cameroun, which at that time was

at war with itself. Though some critics of such a theory could argue that the filing of the case against Nigeria was done in 1994, we should recall that by 1994 Cameroun had witnessed strong and very organized opposition from the political parties that were born between 1990-1993. A leader caught in such power frenzy, will surely and most likely resort to external war with a neighbor to divert national attention.

The relevance of these findings to the Bakassi border dispute is clear in that not only does Nigeria charge Cameroon soldiers for being the perpetrators of acts of aggression, but also, Ambazonian leaders at home and abroad hold this same belief. Yaounde would definitely go to war with Nigeria not because it cares about the territory and the people (Ambazonians) who truly own the land, but because of resources they would acquire from there. Ever since the faked unification, the concern of the Yaounde governments has been centered only on extracting the riches of Ambazonia, free of charge, and does nothing in return to the citizens of this ill-fated territory. This position can be verified by simply examining the revenue of the Cameroun petroleum industry and the fact that government does not account for it ever since 1977 when production started, because the resources are from a territory that it knows it illegally acquired. The Cameroun government cannot be proud enough to say how much of these petroleum funds have been invested or used to improve living conditions in Ambazonia. To the best of my knowledge, not a dime has been used in the territory of Ambazonia.

Coupled with these gross violations of international law at the time of the plebiscite, is the fact that since then, Ambazonia has been isolated in terms of communication. Besides poor infrastructure the territory is almost impossible to reach by telephone--all other (French-speaking) provinces of Cameroun are accessible since most of them have been equipped with modern digital systems. Thus the Bakassi peninsula dispute in this regard--the alternative explanation, could be seen as a dispute over the wider territory of Ambazonia and not just the islands of the Bakassi peninsula.

CONCLUSION:

These alternative explanations of the claims of disputants over Bakassi are in themselves, evidence that should be used by the Judges of the ICIJ to determine who truly should exercise sovereignty over the peninsula. While the restatement of the problem

shows some aspects of the chronological development of the dispute to its present level, the actual drawing of the border and contemporary claims in historical context all help us to understand the importance of one instrument—the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913. Any suggestion that because Britain and France hatched a plan to take over German Kamerun, which of course, is one of the least, mentioned causes of World War I meant the Treaty ceased to be enforceable is not reasonable.

We have shown that subsequent treatment of the Kamerun territory on the Nigerian side continued to respect that agreement, besides, the bitter truth that the only boundary instrument, such as pillars along that close-to-2000km long border are those planted into the ground by the Germans. The 1913 Treaty is a legally binding document constitutionally and by the weight of its evidence on the ground--the boundary pillars—are a very reliable, and perhaps the only reliable premise from which to make judgment as to who owns Bakassi. A close look at the cases of the disputing parties will give more credence to this Treaty and the role it will play in determining who should have sovereignty of the Bakassi peninsula.

NOTES:

¹See paragraph 1.67 of Cameroun's Memorial of 16th March 1995; see also Preliminary Objections (PON) of the Republic of Nigeria, Dec. 1995, Vol. 1, p.8.

²Ibid, para. 6.21, and PON, p.8.

³See Preliminary Objections of Nigeria (PON) I, p.5 & 8.

⁴Ibid

⁵Africa Confidential, “Nigeria/Cameroon: Blundering into battle,” Vol. 35, No. 8p.6, April 16, 1994, London.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Jeune Afrique, “Cameroun/ Nigeria...La guerre secrete,” No. 1871, 13-19 Nov. 1996, p.13.

⁸Hotline News, “Another Southern Cameroons Offensive,” No.0064, Dec. 1998, p. 3-4.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Southern Cameroons Information Bulletin, “More Anglophone Soldiers Killed In Bakassi Skirmishes,” No. 96001, Friday, March 8, 1996, p.10.

¹²I. Brownlie, African Boundaries, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985), p.553-555. See also The Geographer, “Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary,” International Boundary Study, Office of Research in Economics and Science, No. 92-Nov. 3, 1969.

¹³Ibid, p.555-557.

¹⁴Ibid, p. 559.

¹⁵J. L. O. Ekpenyong, “Potentials of Nigerian Boundary Corridors as Sources of International Economic Conflict,” in Borderlands in Africa, (Eds.) A. Asiwaju, & P. O. Adeniyi, (Lagos: 1989), p.293-305.

¹⁶Y. Bologunin, “The Process of Cartographic Definition of Nigerian Boundaries,” in Olayinka p. 201.

¹⁷See Weladji, C. (1975) “The Cameroon-Nigeria Border (2) Cross River to the Sea,” in Abbia, 29/30, p.165. Note should be taken of the fact that even though the Germans had signed a treaty with the King of Bimbia on 11th July, 1884, that the British were still able to obtain yet another treaty on the 19th of July 1884 with the same King. Consequently, both the Douala and Bimbia area went to the Germans.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 166.

¹⁹Ibid. Germany Surrenders St. Lucia in South Africa in wexchange for Victoria in the Cameroons, April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885.

²⁰Ibid, p.174-175.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid, p. 177; see also Public Relations Office (PRO) (1893), London, Foreign Office (FO) 403, No.187 (Confidential).

²³Ibid, p.178.

²⁴See Public Records Office, Directorate of Overseas Surveys, Doc. CO 554/2452, (Confidential) Signed, B. J. Greenhill, 9th May, 1961.

²⁵See telegraph No.713 Confidential, addressed to Commonwealth Relations Office, repeated Buea No.14, Enugu No.58 Savings, Lagos, May 2, 1961.

²⁶See Nigerian Proclamation No. 126, of May 1954 for details.

²⁷E. C. Burr, Correspondence No. WAF 441/110/01 of May 5, 1961.

²⁸Ibid, May 8, 1961.

²⁹B. J. Greenhill, Correspondence Ref. No. 503/3/4, of May 9, 1961, confidential.

³⁰D. W. S. Hunt, Correspondence Ref. No. NIG 40/240/1, May 10, 1961.

³¹J. Chadwick, correspondence Ref. No. CO 554/2452, June 6, 1961.

³²Woods

³³R. Akinjide, "Bakassi, Whose Bakassi?", West Africa, April, 1994.

³⁴T. A. Mbah, "Southern Cameroons Autonomy Bid," West Africa, 21-27 August 1995, p.1316-1317.

³⁵N. N. Susungi, "Cameroun-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict, Foncha and Muna did not Betray Southern Cameroons," @ WWW.africaserv.com/HISTORY/conflict.html, 1999, p. 4-8.

³⁶A. Mukong, Prisoner Without a Crime, (London: Calvert's Press, 1990), p.80.

³⁷Mungo Beti, "Hidden Truth About Cameroon," in Gaulist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadou Ahidjo, (Ed) Richard Joseph, (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978), p. 95.

³⁸See letter from Prison signed by five political detainees, addressed to The Honorable Chairman of The National Commission for Human Rights, (The Human Rights Defense Group) P. O. Box 359, Tel. 237-36-20-34, Bamenda, Cameroun, dated 13/10/98, for original copies.

³⁹See letter by 61 Anglophone Political Detainees, addressed to Albert Mukong, Executive Director, Human Rights Defense Group, Bamenda, Cameroun, signed by Tete Philip, Sept. 22, 1998.

⁴⁰West Africa, "Damning Report," 21-27 February 1994.

⁴¹Isaha'a Boh (www.boh.org) Cameroon Bulletin, No. 650, Sunday 24, October 1999.

⁴²This writer was a student in the department of Social Sciences at Ahmadou Bello University (ABU), Zaria, where Wilmot taught Sociology before he was given the 24 hour-marching order to leave Nigeria.

⁴³Africa Confidential, Supra note, 5, p. 5.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵N.N. Susungi (1999), Supra note 35, p.3 & 4.

⁴⁶The Herald, "Betis mobilize to fight Biya following Discontent over the death of Ayissi Mvodo and Arrest of Edzoa, Ze Meka, etc." No. 484, Yaounde, Cameroun, July 14-15, 1997, p. 1.