

# CSCI 2467, Fall - 24

## The Attack Lab:

Understanding Stack Discipline and Buffer Overflow

Due: Monday, Nov 4, 11:59PM

## 1 Introduction

Now that you've successfully defused Dr. Evil's binary bomb, we're going to apply those skills in another interesting way. This assignment involves generating a total of five attacks on two programs having different security vulnerabilities. Our expected outcomes include:

- You will learn different ways that attackers can exploit security vulnerabilities when programs do not safeguard themselves well enough against buffer overflows.
- Through this, you will get a better understanding of how to write programs that are more secure, as well as some of the features provided by compilers and operating systems to make programs less vulnerable.
- You will gain a deeper understanding of the stack and parameter-passing mechanisms of x86-64 machine code.
- You will gain a deeper understanding of how x86-64 instructions are encoded.
- You will gain more experience with debugging tools such as GDB and OBJDUMP.

You will want to study Sections **3.10.3** and **3.10.4** of the *CS:APP3e* book as reference material for this lab, as well as important background info in Section **3.7**.

**Note:** In this lab, you will gain firsthand experience with methods used to exploit security weaknesses in operating systems and network servers. The purpose is to help you learn about the runtime operation of programs and to understand the nature of these security weaknesses so that you can avoid them when you write system code. We do not condone the use of any form of attack to gain *unauthorized* access to any systems.

### 1.1 Before you start

This lab requires extensive use of **GDB**, building on your experience from *Bomb Lab*. We will focus especially on **return addresses and stack memory**. In order to highlight these things, we will introduce **GEF** (GDB Enhanced Features), an add-on for GDB which should help you visualize what happens to program state while stepping through instructions. We do not require use of GEF, but many students from previous classes have said they find it helpful.

To use GEF, start GDB as you have before and then issue this command:

```
(gdb) source /opt/gef/gef.py
```

If your prompt now looks like *gef>* then you have successfully loaded GEF.

## 2 Lab details

As usual, this is an individual project. You will generate attacks for target programs that are custom generated for each student. Your solution will be for your targets only.

## 2.1 Getting Files

To obtain your target, go to <https://attacklab.cs.uno.edu/> and follow the prompt.

**Note:** This will only work from on-campus at UNO. It is best to do this on one of the lab machines in Math 209/212, so that you can save it directly to your home directory.

The server will build your files and return them to your browser in a tar file called `targetk.tar`, where *k* is the unique number of your target programs.

**Note:** It takes a few seconds to build and download your target, so please be patient.

Save the `targetk.tar` file to the directory on `systems-lab` in which you plan to do your work. Then give the command: `tar -xvf targetk.tar`. This will extract a directory `targetk` containing the files described below.

You should only download one set of files. If for some reason you download multiple targets, choose one target to work on and delete the rest.

**Warning:** If you expand your `targetk.tar` on a Windows system by using a utility such as Winzip, or by letting your browser do the extraction, you may reset permission bits on the executable files. If so, you'll need to fix this with the Linux `chmod` command, or better yet just do the tar file extraction on `systems-lab`.

The files in `targetk` include:

`README.txt`: A file describing the contents of the directory

`ctarget`: An executable program vulnerable to *code-injection* attacks

`rtarget`: An executable program vulnerable to *return-oriented-programming* attacks

`cookie.txt`: An 8-digit hex code that you will use as a unique identifier in your attacks.

`farm.c`: The source code of your target's "gadget farm," which you will use in generating return-oriented programming attacks.

`hex2raw`: A utility to generate attack strings.

In the following instructions, we will assume that you have copied the files to a protected local directory, and that you are executing the programs in that local directory.

## 2.2 Some rules for attack lab solutions

Here is a summary of some important rules regarding valid solutions for this lab. Some of these points may not make much sense when you read this document for the first time. They are presented here as a central reference of rules once you get started.

- You must do the assignment via ssh on `systems-lab.cs.uno.edu` or on one of the lab terminals in Math 209/212. It will not work on any other systems.
- Your solutions may not use attacks to circumvent the validation code in the programs. Specifically, any address you incorporate into an attack string for use by a `ret` instruction should be to one of the following destinations:
  - The addresses for functions `touch1`, `touch2`, or `touch3`.
  - The address of your injected code
  - The address of one of your gadgets from the gadget farm.
- You may only construct gadgets from file `rtarget` with addresses ranging between those for functions `start_farm` and `end_farm`.

### 3 Target Programs

Both **CTARGET** and **RTARGET** read strings from standard input. They do so with the function `getbuf` defined below:

```
1 unsigned getbuf()
2 {
3     char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
4     Gets(buf);
5     return 1;
6 }
```

The function `Gets` is similar to the standard library function `gets`—it reads a string from standard input (terminated by ‘\n’ or end-of-file) and stores it (along with a null terminator) at the specified destination. In this code, you can see that the destination is an array `buf`, declared as having `BUFFER_SIZE` bytes. At the time your targets were generated, `BUFFER_SIZE` was a compile-time constant specific to your version of the programs.

Functions `Gets()` and `gets()` have no way to determine whether their destination buffers are large enough to store the string they read. They simply copy sequences of bytes, possibly overrunning the bounds of the storage allocated at the destinations.

If the string typed by the user and read by `getbuf` is sufficiently short, it is clear that `getbuf` will return 1, as shown by the following execution examples:

```
unix>./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string:Keep it short!
No exploit.  Getbuf returned 0x1
Normal return
```

Typically an error occurs if you type a long string:

```
unix>./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string:This is not a very interesting string, but it has the property ...
Ouch!: You caused a segmentation fault!
Better luck next time
```

(Note that the value of the cookie shown will differ from yours.) Program **RTARGET** will have the same behavior. As the error message indicates, overrunning the buffer typically causes the program state to be corrupted, leading to a memory access error. Your task is to be more clever with the strings you feed **CTARGET** and **RTARGET** so that they do more interesting things. These are called *exploit* strings.

Both **CTARGET** and **RTARGET** take several different command line arguments:

- h: Print list of possible command line arguments
- q: Don't send results to the grading server
- i FILE: Supply input from a file, rather than from standard input

Your exploit strings will typically contain byte values that do not correspond to the ASCII values for printing characters. The program **HEX2RAW** will enable you to generate these *raw* strings. See Appendix A for more information on how to use **HEX2RAW**.

### 3.1 Tips for developing exploits

- Your exploit string must not contain byte value `0x0a` at any intermediate position, since this is the ASCII code for newline (`'\n'`). When `Gets` encounters this byte, it will assume you intended to terminate the string.
- `HEX2RAW` expects two-digit hex values separated by one or more white spaces. So if you want to create a byte with a hex value of 0, you need to write it as `00`. To create the word `0xdeadbeef` you should pass `"ef be ad de"` to `HEX2RAW` (note the reversal required for little-endian byte ordering).
- The little-endian byte ordering mentioned in the previous item applies to multi-byte integer values (2, 4, or 8-bytes) *only*. It does *not* apply to text strings or machine instructions (byte code) which are shown in Figure 3.

When you have correctly solved one of the levels, your target program will automatically send a notification to the grading server. For example:

```
unix>./hex2raw < ctarget.l2.txt | ./ctarget
Cookie: 0x1a7dd803
Type string:Touch2!: You called touch2(0x1a7dd803)
Valid solution for level 2 with target ctarget
PASSED: Sent exploit string to server to be validated.
NICE JOB!
```

The server will test your exploit string to make sure it really works, and it will update the Attacklab scoreboard page indicating that your userid (listed by your target number for anonymity) has completed this phase. The scoreboard is available on Autolab, as with bomblab earlier this semester.

Unlike the Bomb Lab, there is no penalty for making mistakes in this lab (no more explosions). Feel free to fire away at CTARGET and RTARGET with any strings you like.

Note: also unlike bomb lab, in order for your solution to be counted by autolab, you must also submit the plain-text version of your exploit to Autolab using the submit button. This plain text exploit must also be accompanied by comments of the form `/*` (slash-asterisk-space) and closed by `*/` (space-asterisk-slash). These comments must explain the meaning of each part of the exploit submitted in order to receive credit.

Phase	Program	Difficulty	Method	Function	Points
1	CTARGET	1	CI	touch1	5
2	CTARGET	2	CI	touch2	10
3	CTARGET	3	CI	touch3	15
4	RTARGET	2	ROP	touch2	10
5	RTARGET	4	ROP	touch3	10

CI: Code injection  
ROP: Return-oriented programming

Figure 1: Summary of attack lab phases

Figure 1 summarizes the five phases of the lab. As can be seen, the first three involve code-injection (CI) attacks on CTARGET, while the last two involve return-oriented-programming (ROP) attacks on RTARGET.

## 4 Part I: Code Injection Attacks

For the first three phases, your exploit strings will attack CTARGET. This program is set up in a way that the stack positions will be consistent from one run to the next and so that data on the stack can be treated as executable code. These features make the program vulnerable to attacks where the exploit strings contain the byte encodings of executable code.

### 4.1 Phase 1 (5 points)

For Phase 1, you will not inject new code. Instead, your exploit string will redirect the program to execute an existing procedure.

Function `getbuf` is called within CTARGET by a function `test` having the following C code:

```
1 void test()2 {3     int val;4     val = getbuf();5     printf("No exploit. Getbuf returned 0x6 ")
```

When `getbuf` executes its return statement (line 5 of `getbuf`), the program ordinarily resumes execution within function `test` (at line 5 of this function). We want to change this behavior. Within the file `ctarget`, there is code for a function `touch1` having the following C representation:

```
1 void touch1()2 {3     vlevel = 1;          /* Part of validation protocol */4     printf("Touch1!: You called touch1()\n");5     validate(1);6     exit(0);7 }
```

Your task is to get CTARGET to execute the code for `touch1` when `getbuf` executes its return statement, rather than returning to `test`. Note that your exploit string may also corrupt parts of the stack not directly related to this stage, but this will not cause a problem, since `touch1` causes the program to exit directly.

#### Some Advice:

- All the information you need to devise your exploit string for this level can be determined by examining a disassembled version of CTARGET. Use `objdump -M intel -d` to get this disassembled version.
- The idea is to position a byte representation of the starting address for `touch1` so that the `ret` instruction at the end of the code for `getbuf` will transfer control to `touch1`.
- Be careful about byte ordering.
- You might want to use GDB to step the program through the last few instructions of `getbuf` to make sure it is doing the right thing.
- The placement of `buf` within the stack frame for `getbuf` depends on the value of compile-time constant `BUFFER_SIZE`, as well as the allocation strategy used by GCC. You will need to examine the disassembled code to determine its position.

### 4.2 Phase 2 (10 points)

Phase 2 involves injecting a small amount of code as part of your exploit string.

Within the file `ctarget` there is code for a function `touch2` having the following C representation:

```
1 void touch2(unsigned val)2 {3     vlevel = 2;          /* Part of validation protocol */4     if (val == cookie) {5         printf("Touch2!: You called touch2(0x6 ")6         validate(2);7     } else {8         printf("Misfire: You called touch2(0x9 ")9         fail(2);10     }11     exit(0);12 }
```

Your task is to get CTARGET to execute the code for `touch2` rather than returning to `test`. In this case, however, you must make it appear to `touch2` as if you have passed your cookie as its argument.

**Some Advice:**

- You will want to position a byte representation of the address of your injected code in such a way that `ret` instruction at the end of the code for `getbuf` will transfer control to it.
- Recall that the first argument to a function is passed in register `rdi`.
- Your injected code should set the register to your cookie, and then use a `ret` instruction to transfer control to the first instruction in `touch2`.
- Do not attempt to use `jmp` or `call` instructions in your exploit code. The encodings of destination addresses for these instructions are difficult to formulate. Use `ret` instructions for all transfers of control, even when you are not returning from a call.
- See the discussion in Appendix B on how to use tools to generate the byte-level representations of instruction sequences.

## 4.3 Phase 3 (15 points)

Phase 3 also involves a code injection attack, but passing a string as argument.

Within the file `ctarget` there is code for functions `hexmatch` and `touch3` having the following C representations:

```
1 /* Compare string to hex representation of unsigned value */2 int hexmatch(unsigned val,
char *sval)3 {4     char cbuf[110];5     /* Make position of check string unpredictable
*/6     char *s = cbuf + random();7     sprintf(s, "%8x", val);8     return strncmp(sval, s, 9)
== 0;9 }10 11 void touch3(char *sval)12 {13     vlevel = 3;14     /* Part of validation
protocol */15     if (hexmatch(cookie, sval)) {16         printf("Touch3!: You called
touch3(\"%s\", sval);17     } else {18         printf("Misfire: You called
touch3(\"%s\", sval);19     fail(3);20     }21     exit(0);22 }
```

Your task is to get CTARGET to execute the code for `touch3` rather than returning to `test`. You must make it appear to `touch3` as if you have passed a string representation of your cookie as its argument.

**Some Advice:**

- You will need to include a string representation of your cookie in your exploit string. The string should consist of the eight hexadecimal digits (ordered from most to least significant) without a leading “0x.”
- Recall that a string is represented in C as a sequence of bytes followed by a byte with value 0. Type “`man ascii`” on any Linux machine to see the byte representations of the characters you need.
- Your injected code should set register `rdi` to the address of this string.
- When functions `hexmatch` and `strncmp` are called, they push data onto the stack, overwriting portions of memory that held the buffer used by `getbuf`. As a result, you will need to be careful where you place the string representation of your cookie.

## 5 Part II: Return-Oriented Programming

Performing code-injection attacks on program RTARGET is much more difficult than it is for CTARGET, because it uses two techniques to thwart such attacks:

- It uses randomization so that the stack positions differ from one run to another. This makes it impossible to determine where your injected code will be located.

- It marks the section of memory holding the stack as nonexecutable, so even if you could set the program counter to the start of your injected code, the program would fail with a segmentation fault.

It turns out that clever people have devised strategies for getting useful things done in a program by executing existing code, rather than injecting new code. The most general form of this is referred to as *return-oriented programming* (ROP) [1, 2]. The strategy with ROP is to identify byte sequences within an existing program that consist of one or more instructions followed by the instruction `ret`. Such a segment is referred to as a *gadget*. The figure illustrates how the stack can be set up to execute a sequence of  $n$  gadgets. In this figure, the stack contains a sequence of gadget addresses. Each gadget consists of a series of instruction bytes, with the final one being `0xc3`, encoding the `ret` instruction. When the program executes a `ret` instruction starting with this configuration, it will initiate a chain of gadget executions, with the `ret` instruction at the end of each gadget causing the program to jump to the beginning of the next.

A gadget can make use of code corresponding to assembly-language statements generated by the compiler, especially ones at the ends of functions. In practice, there may be some useful gadgets of this form, but not enough to implement many important operations. For example, it is highly unlikely that a compiled function would have `pop rdi` as its last instruction before `ret`. Fortunately, with a byte-oriented instruction set, such as x86-64, a gadget can often be found by extracting patterns from other parts of the instruction byte sequence.

For example, one version of `rtarget` contains code generated for the following C function:

```
void setval_210(unsigned *p){    *p = 3347663060U;}
```

The chances of this function being useful for attacking a system seem pretty slim. But, the disassembled machine code for this function shows an interesting byte sequence:

```
000000000400f15 <setval_210>:
400f15:    c7 07 d4 48 89 c7        mov     DWORD PTR [rdi], 0xc78948d4
400f1b:    c3                       ret
```

The byte sequence `48 89 c7` encodes the instruction `mov rdi, rax`. (See Figure 3A for the encodings of useful `mov` instructions.) This sequence is followed by byte value `c3`, which encodes the `ret` instruction. The function starts at address `0x400f15`, and the sequence starts on the fourth byte of the function. Thus, this code contains a gadget, having a starting address of `0x400f18`, that will copy the 64-bit value in register `rax` to register `rdi`.

Your code for `RTARGET` contains a number of functions similar to the `setval_210` function shown above in a region we refer to as the *gadget farm*. Your job will be to identify useful gadgets in the gadget farm and use these to perform attacks similar to those you did in Phases 2 and 3.

**Important:** The gadget farm is demarcated by functions `start_farm` and `end_farm` in your copy of `rtarget`. Do not attempt to construct gadgets from other portions of the program code.

#### A. Encodings of `mov` instructions (64-bit registers)

`mov D, S`

Source <i>S</i>	Destination <i>D</i>							
	<code>rax</code>	<code>rcx</code>	<code>rdx</code>	<code>rbx</code>	<code>rsp</code>	<code>rbp</code>	<code>rsi</code>	<code>rdi</code>
<code>rax</code>	48 89 c0	48 89 c1	48 89 c2	48 89 c3	48 89 c4	48 89 c5	48 89 c6	48 89 c7
<code>rcx</code>	48 89 c8	48 89 c9	48 89 ca	48 89 cb	48 89 cc	48 89 cd	48 89 ce	48 89 cf
<code>rdx</code>	48 89 d0	48 89 d1	48 89 d2	48 89 d3	48 89 d4	48 89 d5	48 89 d6	48 89 d7
<code>rbx</code>	48 89 d8	48 89 d9	48 89 da	48 89 db	48 89 dc	48 89 dd	48 89 de	48 89 df
<code>rsp</code>	48 89 e0	48 89 e1	48 89 e2	48 89 e3	48 89 e4	48 89 e5	48 89 e6	48 89 e7

rbp	48 89 e8	48 89 e9	48 89 ea	48 89 eb	48 89 ec	48 89 ed	48 89 ee	48 89 ef
rsi	48 89 f0	48 89 f1	48 89 f2	48 89 f3	48 89 f4	48 89 f5	48 89 f6	48 89 f7
rdi	48 89 f8	48 89 f9	48 89 fa	48 89 fb	48 89 fc	48 89 fd	48 89 fe	48 89 ff

## B. Encodings of pop instructions

Operation	Register <i>R</i>							
	rax	rcx	rdx	rbx	rsp	rbp	rsi	rdi
pop <i>R</i>	58	59	5a	5b	5c	5d	5e	5f

## C. Encodings of mov instructions (32-bit registers)

mov *D, S*

Source <i>S</i>	Destination <i>D</i>							
	eax	ecx	edx	ebx	esp	ebp	esi	edi
eax	89 c0	89 c1	89 c2	89 c3	89 c4	89 c5	89 c6	89 c7
ecx	89 c8	89 c9	89 ca	89 cb	89 cc	89 cd	89 ce	89 cf
edx	89 d0	89 d1	89 d2	89 d3	89 d4	89 d5	89 d6	89 d7
ebx	89 d8	89 d9	89 da	89 db	89 dc	89 dd	89 de	89 df
esp	89 e0	89 e1	89 e2	89 e3	89 e4	89 e5	89 e6	89 e7
ebp	89 e8	89 e9	89 ea	89 eb	89 ec	89 ed	89 ee	89 ef
esi	89 f0	89 f1	89 f2	89 f3	89 f4	89 f5	89 f6	89 f7
edi	89 f8	89 f9	89 fa	89 fb	89 fc	89 fd	89 fe	89 ff

## D. Encodings of 2-byte (16-bit) functional nop instructions

Operation	Register <i>R</i>			
	al	cl	dl	bl
and <i>R, R</i>	20 c0	20 c9	20 d2	20 db
or <i>R, R</i>	08 c0	08 c9	08 d2	08 db
cmp <i>R, R</i>	38 c0	38 c9	38 d2	38 db
test <i>R, R</i>	84 c0	84 c9	84 d2	84 db

Figure 3: Byte encodings of instructions. All values are shown in hexadecimal.

## 5.1 Phase 4 (10 points)

For Phase 4, you will repeat the attack of Phase 2, but do so on program RTARGET using gadgets from your gadget farm. You can construct your solution using gadgets consisting of the following instruction types, and using only the first eight x86-64 registers (*rax*–*rdi*).

mov : The codes for these are shown in Figure 3A.

pop : The codes for these are shown in Figure 3B.

ret : This instruction is encoded by the single byte 0xc3.

nop : This instruction (pronounced “no op,” which is short for “no operation”) is encoded by the single byte 0x90. Its only effect is to cause the program counter to be incremented by 1.

### Some Advice:

- All the gadgets you need can be found in the region of the code for `rtarget` demarcated by the functions `start_farm` and `mid_farm`.



- You can do this attack with just two gadgets.
- When a gadget uses a `pop` instruction, it will pop data from the stack. As a result, your exploit string will contain a combination of gadget addresses and data.

## 5.2 Phase 5 (20 points)

Before you take on the Phase 5, pause to consider what you have accomplished so far. In Phases 2 and 3, you caused a program to execute machine code of your own design. If CTARGET had been a network server, you could have injected your own code into a distant machine. In Phase 4, you circumvented two of the main devices modern systems use to thwart buffer overflow attacks. Although you did not inject your own code, you were able to inject a type of program that operates by stitching together sequences of existing code. This is quite an accomplishment!

You should also have earned 40 points in the lab by this point. If you have other pressing obligations, you could stop now and not worry about this further. If you are enticed by the challenge (or the 10 extra points), proceed!

Phase 5 requires you to do an ROP attack on RTARGET to invoke function `touch3` with a pointer to a string representation of your cookie. That may not seem significantly more difficult than using an ROP attack to invoke `touch2`, except that we have made it so. (Due to this extra challenge, this phase could be considered extra credit.)

To solve Phase 5, you can use gadgets in the region of the code in `rtarget` demarcated by functions `start_farm` and `end_farm`. In addition to the gadgets used in Phase 4, this expanded farm includes the encodings of different `mov` instructions, as shown in Figure 3C. The byte sequences in this part of the farm also contain 2-byte instructions that serve as *functional nops*, i.e., they do not change any register or memory values. These include instructions, shown in Figure 3D, such as `and al, al`, that operate on the low-order bytes of some of the registers but do not change their values.

### Some Advice:

- You'll want to review the effect a 32-bit `mov` instruction (denoted as `movl` in the AT&T syntax used in the textbook) has on the upper 4 bytes of a register, as is described on page 183 of CS:APP3e.
- The official solution requires eight gadgets (not all of which are unique).

Good luck and have fun!

## A Using HEX2RAW

HEX2RAW takes as input a *hex-formatted* string. In this format, each byte value is represented by two hex digits. For example, the string "012345" could be entered in hex format as "30 31 32 33 34 35 00." (Recall that the ASCII code for decimal digit  $x$  is  $0 \times 3x$ , and that the end of a string is indicated by a null byte.)

The hex characters you pass to HEX2RAW should be separated by whitespace (blanks or newlines). We recommend separating different parts of your exploit string with newlines while you're working on it. HEX2RAW supports C-style block comments, so you can mark off sections of your exploit string. For example:

```
48 c7 c1 f0 11 40 00 /* mov    rcx, 0x40011f0 */
```

Be sure to leave space around both the starting and ending comment strings ("`/*`", "`*/`"), so that the comments will be properly ignored.

If you generate a hex-formatted exploit string in the file `exploit.txt`, you can apply the raw string to CTARGET or RTARGET in several different ways:

1. You can set up a series of pipes to pass the string through HEX2RAW.

```
unix>cat exploit.txt | ./hex2raw | ./ctarget
```

2. You can store the raw string in a file and use I/O redirection:

```
unix>./hex2raw < exploit.txt > exploit.raw    unix>./ctarget < exploit.raw
```

This approach can also be used when running from within GDB:

```
unix>gdb ctarget (gdb)run < exploit.raw
```

3. You can store the raw string in a file and provide the file name as a command-line argument:

```
unix>./hex2raw < exploit.txt > exploit.raw unix>./ctarget -i exploit.raw
```

This approach also can be used when running from within GDB.

## B Generating Byte Codes

Using GCC as an assembler and OBJDUMP as a disassembler makes it convenient to generate the byte codes for instruction sequences. For example, suppose you write a file `example.s` containing the following assembly code:

```
# Example of hand-generated assembly code
.intel_syntax noprefix # non-instruction, necessary for intel syntax
push 0xabcdef          # Push value onto stack
add rax,17              # Add 17 to rax
mov edx,eax             # Copy lower 32 bits to
```

The code can contain a mixture of instructions and data. Anything to the right of a ‘#’ character is a comment.

You can now assemble and disassemble this file:

```
unix>gcc -c example.s
unix>objdump -M intel -d example.o > example.d
```

The generated file `example.d` contains the following:

```
example.o:
file format elf64-x86-64
Disassembly of section .text:0000000000000000 <.text>:
0: 68 ef cd ab 00      push 0xabcdef
5: 48 83 c0 11         add rax,0x11
9: 89 c2               mov edx,eax
```

The lines at the bottom show the machine code generated from the assembly language instructions. Each line has a hexadecimal number on the left indicating the instruction’s starting address (starting with 0), while the hex digits after the ‘:’ character indicate the byte codes for the instruction. Thus, we can see that the instruction `push 0xABCDEF` has hex-formatted byte code `68 ef cd ab 00`.

From this file, you can get the byte sequence for the code:

```
68 ef cd ab 00 48 83 c0 11 89 c2
```

This string can then be passed through `HEX2RAW` to generate an input string for the target programs. Alternatively, you can edit `example.d` to omit extraneous values and to contain C-style comments for readability, yielding:

```
68 ef cd ab 00 /* push 0xabcdef */
48 83 c0 11    /* add rax,0x11 */
89 c2         /* mov edx,eax */
```

This is also a valid input you can pass through `HEX2RAW` before sending to one of the target programs.

## References

- [1] R. Roemer, E. Buchanan, H. Shacham, and S. Savage. Return-oriented programming: Systems, languages, and applications. *ACM Transactions on Information System Security*, 15(1):2:1–2:34, March 2012.
- [2] E. J. Schwartz, T. Avgerinos, and D. Brumley. Q: Exploit hardening made easy. In *USENIX Security Symposium*, 2011.