

Overview

Globalization and Immigration

Global Immigration Patterns

During the belle époque, labor migration was dominated by unskilled and low-skilled workers who moved from “north to south” and from “east to west.” In other words, low-skilled labor moved from the more developed European nations to less developed areas such as the United States and South America. The flow of capital paralleled labor migration, moving north to south and east to west (see Ghose 2003).

- Undocumented migrants now comprise one-third to one-half of new entrants to most developed countries, including the United States—up from about one-fifth a decade ago.
- In 2000, women and girls accounted for almost 49 percent of all international emigrants.
- Today, more than 140 million people—nearly 1 in 40 of the world’s population—live outside their countries of birth, and immigrants comprise more than 15 percent of the population in over 50 countries.

These data from the National Intelligence Council (2001) and Hania Zlotnik (2003) underscore the magnitude of human mobility throughout the world. In the United States, “the nation of immigrants,” virtually everyone is connected to the immigration process. Your parents, grandparents, great-grandparents—someone in your family—made the decision to move to the United States. You may have even recently moved to the United States or to the present city or town you call home. People have always moved—some more often than others—but the magnitude and dispersion of people on the move particularly since the mid-1980s has led Castles and Miller (1998) to observe that the closing years of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first may well be understood as the “age of migration.”

Skeptics of globalization dispute Castles and Miller’s assertion, arguing

that the era of the greatest openness and movement of people was the 1870–

1913 belle époque (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Although data suggest that recent relocation trends do not compare in magnitude to those of the turn of the twentieth century, globalization has altered the nature of the flow of humanity among countries and has ushered in what we can justifiably term a new era in the history of migration. In this chapter, we consider how globalization and global processes have encouraged and sustained migration flows to the United States and the role of immigrants in the United States and the challenges they face.

Beyond these general trends, patterns vary. Taking into account high-skilled migration, or what some call “elite” migration, globalization has created a bidirectional movement. Many of the estimated 25 million high-skilled workers (Munck 2005, 108) who emigrate are white males born in the United States (or Europe); they work as managers, consultants, information specialists, and high-tech specialists for U.S. (or European) transnational firms abroad (see McKendrick 2004). The movement of high-skilled workers also includes female nurses (from the Philippines) as well as male and female engineers, medical doctors, and scientists migrating to the United States and Europe from places such as India and China.¹ Later in this chapter we return to this

issue of “brain drain,” or the migration of educated and high-skilled workers to the United States and Europe, which augments the human capital stock of countries receiving immigrants (the United States) and depletes the human capital stock of countries sending immigrants (India and China).

U.S. Immigration Patterns

Focusing on the United States, the data show that the United States receives a significant percentage of total global migration flows (Ghose 2003, 83–90). Although significant numbers of people migrated to the United States throughout the twentieth century, it was not until after the 1990s that migration flows spiked (Table 7.1). During the 1990s, one out of every two new workers was an immigrant (Sum, Fog, and Harrington 2002) and nearly 40 percent of new U.S. jobs, including those for software engineers, were filled by immigrants (National Intelligence Council 2001).

Throughout the 1990s, the United States experienced record-high immigration, with more than 13 million people entering the country (Center for Immigration Studies 2002). By 2005, the foreign-born population reached 35.2 million, or 12.1 percent of the total U.S. population. This compares to a historic low of 4.7 percent in 1970 and 6.2 percent in 1980. Today, almost one in eight U.S. residents is foreign-born, the highest percentage in over 80 years. If this trend continues, within 10 years the foreign-born share of the population will match the all-time high of 14.8 percent reached in 1890 (Center for Immigration Studies 2002).

Who are these migrants? Consistent with the new trends, contemporary migration to the United States combines both high-skilled and low-skilled

labor that is overwhelmingly *non*-European in origin. Two-thirds of post-1960 immigration to the United States originated in the highly globalized Pacific Rim region: 52 percent from Latin America and the Caribbean (28 percent from Mexico alone) and another 15 percent from South and East Asia (Indochina, the Philippines, and China). Contrary to the stereotype that immigrants are primarily men, women alone or in families represent an increasingly significant factor, constituting half or more of some immigrant groups (Houstoun, Kramer, and Barrett 1984; also see Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold 2000).

What Motivates Migration to the United States?

Sassen (1990) argues that migration to the United States often follows previous flows of U.S. investment, military actions, or implementation of foreign policies. Investment affects migration in several ways. On the one hand, when a U.S. firm establishes a foreign subsidiary, skilled workers from the United States emigrate to work in these firms. On the other hand, investment creates conditions for the future migration of local engineers and scientists to the United States. Local professionals may acquire specialized training under the discipline of the U.S. labor system and even learn about better employment opportunities in the parent company through daily contact with U.S. managers and coworkers (Alarcón 2000). Still, professionals and technical workers seldom migrate because of unemployment in their country of origin; nor are they typically motivated by the gap between potential U.S. salaries and those at home. Rather, as Portes and Rumbaut (1996, 18) found, “the gap between available salaries and work conditions *in their own countries* and those regarded there as acceptable for people with their education” motivate migration. Thus, the globalization of cultural standards can figure into these decisions: if professional and technical workers *perceive* that their standard of living is inconsistent with their status and class, they are more likely to migrate.

Low-skilled migration is also encouraged by what is really an incomplete form of Schumpeter’s creative destruction process (see Chapter 5). Recall that Schumpeter argued that investment often destroys some existing occupations, while rearranging the characteristics of others and creating new ones that offset those jobs lost. Today, however, foreign investment into the Third World destroys and rearranges existing occupations *without* a corresponding increase in new jobs to offset those lost. Because foreign investment typically involves the heavy use of technology and automation, production is increased at the expense of employment in countries that have an abundance of low-skilled labor. Finally, military actions and U.S. foreign policy objectives may fuel emigration. One recent example is the U.S.-sponsored wars in Central America during the 1980s that created tremendous social, political, and economic disruptions, which in turn created the conditions for migration to the United States during the 1980s and beyond.

Sources: The 2000, 2003, and 2005 data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census; all other data are from Gibson and Lennon (1999).

Table 7.1 Size of the Foreign-Born Population and Foreign-Borns as a Percentage of the Total Population: United States, 1890–2000

YEAR	NUMBER IN MILLIONS	PERCENT OF TOTAL
2005	35.2	12.1
2003	33.5	11.7
2000	28.4	10.4
1990	19.8	7.9
1980	14.1	6.2
1970	9.6	4.7
1960	10.3	6.9
1950	14.2	11.6
1940	13.5	14.7
1930	9.2	14.8
1920	2.2	9.5

Global Processes and Immigration

How does globalization more specifically affect migration? The conditions for globalization (e.g., advances in the information infrastructure, transportation, and neoliberal political policies) mean that firms can more easily relocate in order to take advantage of differential production costs between countries. These same conditions also mean that workers throughout the world have greater access to information about job opportunities in other countries. As globalization increasingly integrates the world and creates disruptions that manifest as unemployment, poverty, and marginalization, people are often left with few alternatives except to move.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides a good illustration of this process. When implemented in 1994, proponents of NAFTA promised that the liberalization of relations among Mexico, the United States, and Canada would create thousands of new high-wage jobs in the United States and in Mexico and that the standard of living in the United States, Mexico, and Canada would dramatically improve. Some 10 years later, these promises have yet to be fulfilled (see Faux 2006).

In Mexico, government policies that opened the economy to greater foreign investment have led to the loss of over 1.5 million rural jobs since 1994. Declining rural employment and the growing emphasis on agricultural production for export have distorted Mexican society. As thousands of newly unemployed rural workers migrate to Mexico's already overcrowded cities—where job growth is insufficient to absorb these new workers—the surging labor pool puts downward pressure on wages. Since the passage of NAFTA, for instance, the minimum wage has declined 20 percent, from approximately \$5 per day to around \$4 per day (Jordan 2003). Estimates by the Mexican government show that over one-half of the population earns less than what is required to cover the cost of basic necessities: food, clothing, housing, health care, public transportation, and education (Gallagher and Wise 2002). Equally important, rural job loss is heaviest among those producing food-stuffs for domestic consumption, which in turn increases the cost of food that, according to estimates by Public Citizen (2004), has increased 257 percent since 1994.

Caught between declining incomes and rising food costs, many decide to make the perilous journey to the United States in search of work. Data indicate that migration from Mexico to the United States has more than doubled since the introduction of NAFTA (U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). Increasingly, migrants are coming from the southern part of Mexico—the region most affected by NAFTA—rather than the traditional sending areas farther north. It is thus not surprising that the hotbed of resistance is in the most affected area: south Mexico, where the Zapatista rebellion emerged in 1994 and where other rural social movements have surfaced, such as *El campo no aguanta más* ("The Countryside Can't Take Any More"), which brought 100,000 protesters to Mexico City in 2003.²

Destination and Social Capital Networks

If someone makes the decision to migrate to the United States, does she or he choose a random destination, or is there a more structured process at work? Historically, people migrating to the United States have headed for the major metropolitan areas. If we focus on current immigration, we find a similar pattern whereby migration has flowed into the urban areas of six gateway states. In 2000, according to Meyers and Yau (2004), over two-thirds of the nation's total foreign-born population lived in six states: California (28 percent), New York (12 percent), Texas (9 percent), Florida (9 percent), New Jersey (5 percent), and Illinois (5 percent). This pattern may be changing, however, as increasing numbers of immigrants from Mexico and Central America—one of the most important sending regions—are settling in nontraditional destination states in the Midwest and deep South, such as Nebraska, Alabama, and Georgia (Mohl and Knudsen 2000; Duran, Massey, and Charvet 2000; Hernández-Léon and Zúñiga 2000; Gouveia 2000; Saenz 2004; also Hytrel and Wheat, unpublished data).

Current research shows that Latinos from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador have become ubiquitous in both isolated rural localities (e.g., O'Neill and Lexington, Nebraska, or Dalton and Vidalia, Georgia) and metropolitan areas (e.g., Omaha, Atlanta, Memphis, and Birmingham) of these new destination states (see Gouveia and Stull 1997; Mohl and Knudsen 2000; Hernández-Léon and Zúñiga 2000; Sassen and Smith 1992; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995). During the 1990s, for instance, the Latino population increased 155 percent in Nebraska (Saenz 2004), 278 percent in Tennessee (Schenk 2003: 7, table 1), and over 300 percent in Georgia and Alabama (Georgia State University 2000). Yet, as recently as the early 1990s, it would have been highly unusual to encounter Latinos in places like the southeast or small midwestern towns. Today, it is not surprising to see immigrants in the Atlanta airport having just arrived in the United States on their first trip away from their family and village. While these immigrants arrive in Georgia speaking little or no English, they are embedded in transnational friendship or kinship social capital networks. It is a system that connects immigrants with labor contractors or employers looking for workers to fill jobs in factories, poultry plants, and the fields harvesting crops. Thus, migration is not a random process; it is structured by emerging and existing social networks.

Latino migration to the new destination states in the Midwest and Southeast reflects the creation of the above-mentioned ethnic communities and social capital networks beyond the gateway states. These social capital networks (see Chapter 9) refer to trust and norms of reciprocity, as well as other features of social organization, such as friendship and kinship networks and mutual assistance. As is the case with communities and networks in traditional receiving areas, immigrants rely on social capital networks to provide monetary and emotional assistance as well as information about jobs and

Table 7.2 Immigrant Shares and Earnings in Selected Occupations: 2002

OCCUPATION GROUP	PERCENT ALL WORKERS (%)	FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (%)	MEAN EARNINGS OF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (\$)
All occupations	14	20	33,700
Private household	42	44	13,000
Farming, fishing, and forestry	37	44	15,500
Machine operators and assemblers	22	34	21,500
Administrative support, incl. clerical	9	10	27,400
Service, except protective	23	24	17,800
Precision production, craft, and repair	17	30	29,400

Source: Capps et al. (2003: table 3).

daily life (housing, schools, legal issues, and so on) in their new country—i.e., the receiving country (see Massey et al. 1987, Massey and Espinoza 1997). We should note that immigrant communities and social networks have always been an essential feature of the migration process. Turn-of-the-century European immigrants, for example, sent letters home telling of their experiences and opportunities in the United States, thus motivating further migration. Yet, difficulties of communication and territorial distances separated these immigrants from their homeland. As a result, their bonds with “home” existed mainly in the imagination rather than in actual regular interaction (Scholte 2000b, 171).

Today, in contrast, the conditions of globalization (e.g., the information infrastructure) significantly enhance the capacities of immigrant groups to construct and maintain trans-territorial networks. Relatively inexpensive and immediate supraterritorial communication, such as e-mail, instant messaging, cell phones, and calling cards, allows for frequent and consistent contact. Latinos in Georgia, for instance, talk about how phone cards help sustain social networks by easing the process of sharing information about job opportunities with friends and relatives in other parts of the United States, Mexico, and Central America (Hytrek, unpublished data). In these emergent Latino communities, new immigrants are able to create and maintain a vibrant cultural life based on concrete realities that include food, kinship activities, sport, musical traditions, and Spanish-language newspapers—a cultural life centered in the home, restaurants, grocery stores, music and dance clubs, soccer leagues, and holiday festivals (Mohl and Knudsen 2000, 15).³

Occupational Location of Immigrants in the United States

By accelerating the flow of investment capital and information, globalization has contributed to migration pressures in places like Mexico and Central America, but what of the other side of the equation: the receiving areas?

Immigrant job opportunities and experiences—like those of all workers—are shaped by the conditions of the labor market itself (i.e., economic prospects, stages in the business cycle, demands for specific kinds of labor, and so on). The same global processes restructuring Mexican society are reorganizing and transforming the U.S. economy and its occupational structures. Immigrants to the United States thus enter an economy characterized by polarized wage and skill differentials (see Chapters 5 and 6): the hourglass economy characterized by large numbers of low-wage jobs, moderate numbers of high-wage jobs, and few in the middle. Reflecting these structural characteristics and the human capital attributes of the immigrants, we find that one-quarter of foreign-born workers are employed in managerial and professional specialty jobs, while almost one-half are employed in low-wage service and blue-collar work (see Figure 7.2).




Figure 7.1 Population by educational attainment and nativity: 2003 (as a percentage of each population, 25 years and over). Source: Larsen (2004: 5).

The Brain Drain

Fix and Passel (1994) argue that while immigrants are more likely than natives to have very low educational attainment, a significant percentage have advanced degrees. Data in Figure 7.1 show that 67 percent of immigrants over the age of 25 have graduated from high school, while 21.5 percent have less than a ninth-grade education. This compares to 87.5 percent and 4.1 percent of native-borns, respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of immigrants with a bachelor's degree or more (27.3 percent) was not significantly different from that of the native-born population (27.2 percent).⁴




Figure 7.2

Occupation of employed foreign-born workers in the United States: 2002.

Source: Migration Policy Institute (2004: 3).

labor demands are fulfilled through numerous mechanisms, including social networks, globalized information networks,⁵ and recruitment by employers. While this may change in the near future, employers typically incur few supplemental employment costs or few recruitment costs and, until the 1980s existing law specifically exempted employers from any liability for hiring undocumented workers.⁶ Low-wage jobs also require little investment in worker training. In fact, employers often benefit from the social networks of the workers themselves, who are often willing to recruit, train, and manage other immigrants.

The characteristics of these jobs—low-skill requirements, low pay, and few benefits—keep large numbers of immigrant workers among the working poor. According to a study sponsored by the Urban Institute, one in nine U.S. residents is an immigrant but *one in five* is a low-wage worker. In 2001, for instance, the average low-wage immigrant worker earned \$14,400 and over 48 percent of all immigrant workers earned less than 200 percent of the minimum wage—compared to 32 percent of native workers (Capps et al. 2003). Looking at Table 7.3, a couple of patterns are evident in the poverty data. To begin, poverty rates among immigrant workers are higher than among native-born workers. As with the general population, however, poverty rates for immigrants have declined since the early 1990s. Recall from Chapter 5 that part of the decline is explained by increased working hours and multiple jobs rather than higher wages. Finally, the current poverty rate for immigrants remains considerably higher than that for the native-born group (17.1 and 12.1 percent, respectively).

Table 7.3 People in Poverty by Nativity: 1993–2004 (Percent)

YEAR	ALL PEOPLE	NATIVE	FOREIGN BORN ^a
2004	12.7	12.1	17.1
2003	12.5	11.8	17.1
2002	12.1	11.5	16.6
2001	11.7	11.1	16.1
2000	11.3	10.8	15.4
1999	11.9	11.3	16.8
1998	12.7	12.1	18.0
1997	13.3	12.5	19.9
1996	13.7	12.9	21.0
1995	13.8	12.9	22.2
1994	14.5	13.8	22.6
1993	15.1	14.4	23.0

At the other end of the “hourglass,” over half (56 percent) of all foreign-born workers are employed in blue-collar jobs—operators, fabricators and laborers; production, craft, and repair workers—and in service occupations (Figure 7.2). Table 7.2 disaggregates these categories. Accordingly, we find immigrants dominating the occupations of private household workers (42%); farming, fishing, and forestry (37%); machine operators and assemblers (22%); and service workers (23%).

These data are suggestive of the U.S. dependence on low-wage labor to produce, harvest, prepare, and serve our food; manufacture our clothing, furniture, and carpets; and landscape and maintain our properties. These

^a Includes naturalized citizens and noncitizens.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2005c).

Work in the Low-Wage Sector

Contributing further to low earnings among immigrant workers is their concentration in jobs where labor law violations are more likely and punishment of employers is more unlikely (especially among the undocumented).⁷ The restaurant industry, a leading occupational niche for migrants, illustrates these problems. A recent study of New York's \$8-billion restaurant industry showed that workers face not only low wages characteristic of many service sector jobs but also high levels of insecurity and vulnerability. Most of the 165,000 workers surveyed earned less than \$20,000 per year, 59 percent reported overtime violations, and 73 percent said that they had no health insurance. At least 36 percent of the city's restaurant workers are undocumented immigrants (see Greenhouse 2005).

A similar pattern is evident in the apparel industry, also a major occupational niche for immigrant workers. Employment in the apparel industry has steadily declined since the mid-1970s, from 2.5 million workers in 1973 to 703,000 workers in 2004 (Rees and Hathcote 2004, 3). Nonetheless, the industry remains an important component of the U.S. manufacturing sector in such urban centers as Los Angeles. In the southern California region, an estimated 119,400 people held textile and fashion-related jobs in the mid-1990s, representing \$15 billion of the regional economy (Torres 1995 also Vazquez 1981). Immigrant labor is the backbone of the industry; in Los Angeles, for instance, immigrants constitute 93 percent of all personnel in the garment-manufacturing sector (Light, Bernard, and Kim 1999). Los Angeles is also home to the nation's single largest garment plant, the American Apparel, Inc., factory that is located in downtown Los Angeles and employs 3,800 workers, of whom 90 percent are Latino (Hiltzik 2006). With the exception of American Apparel, Inc., which pays an average of \$12 an hour (Hiltzik 2006), apparel jobs are typically characterized by labor law violations, high turnover, job insecurity, and low wages—ranging from \$5.00 to \$7.00 per hour. With the phasing out of apparel quotas on January 1, 2005, and the increasing dominance of Chinese producers in the apparel industry, the future of the industry in the United States is uncertain.⁸ One thing is certain, however: given Chinese minimum-wage levels, which are reported to be as low as US\$55 per month (or even lower), there will be tremendous pressure to reduce production costs in the United States, to relocate factories to low-wage areas, or to reintroduce quotas in the United States.⁹

Globalization, Rural Restructuring, and Latino Migration

While expansion of the low-wage sector has spurred the growth of Latino immigration into the United States since 1980, changes in rural America have contributed to the dispersion of Latinos throughout the country. Often, we neglect the rural areas when discussing globalization and restructuring, but

rural America is tightly integrated into the global economy and is being transformed by the same forces responsible for urban changes: increasing global competition and changing consumer tastes and demands. The links among globalization, rural restructuring, and migration are apparent in agriculture, as well as the meatpacking, poultry, and carpet industries.

The Midwest

A phase of tremendous upheaval and restructuring in midwestern agriculture, the 1980s reversed the trend toward increasing specialization in this industry. In Nebraska, a traditional grain- and beef-producing state, new crops, such as potatoes, began to emerge. Today, the state produces over 986 million pounds of potatoes (ranking twelfth in the United States). Much of the labor for this crop—for production, storage, and processing—is provided by Latino immigrants. A similar pattern is evident in meatpacking. Responding to increasing competition and the rural crisis, globalized corporations such as Iowa Beef Packing and ConAgra relocated plants to rural communities. Over time, these plants became heavily dependent on Latino labor—even more so than in general agriculture—and the Latino population has grown rapidly within the context of rural crisis and restructuring (Gouveia 2000).¹⁰ We can see these economic and demographic changes in potato production in small communities, such as O'Neill (population 3,733); in sugar beets in medium-sized communities, such as Scottsbluff (population 14,732); and in meatpacking in medium-sized communities, such as Lexington (population 10,011) and Norfolk (population 23,516).¹¹ While the food processing industry is a major occupational niche for Latinos in Nebraska, the average hourly wage in this sector is one of the lowest in the food-processing industry nationwide (see Nebraska Department of Economic Development 1999).

The Deep South

Rural crisis, restructuring, and demographic change are not restricted to the Midwest but are found also in the food-processing and carpet/textiles industries in the Southeast.¹² Dalton, Georgia (population 21,761), for instance, produces over one-half of all the carpet in the United States. Faced with a tight labor market, Latino workers have meant the survival of the industry, according to Dalton's carpet executives (Engstrom 1999, 44). With the average wage in Dalton's carpet factories at \$8.20 per hour (in 2000), these are considered the "good jobs" in the region and a sign of upward mobility (Hernández-Léon and Zúñiga 2000, 57–58). As in the Midwest, southern agriculture has also seen Latino labor come to dominate production and processing jobs. In south Georgia, production of the world-famous Vidalia sweet onions relies almost exclusively on Latino immigrant labor, as does production of tobacco, greens, beans, cabbage, and sweet potatoes. Immigrant and migrant labor is also crucial to forestry, peaches, carrots, and other occupations that

are characterized by low wages (essentially minimum wage without benefits) and physical and emotional burnout.

Latinos are particularly important to the southern poultry industry and fill the industry's insatiable demand for labor. These are brutal and physically demanding jobs that "consume workers." With average hourly wages between \$6.00 and \$7.00, it is not surprising that there is an extremely high turnover rate (Guthery 2001, 62; also Hytrek, unpublished data). In Gainesville, Georgia (population 17,885—known as the poultry capital of the world in the 1970s), for instance, exports of broiler meat grew from \$200 million to \$1.9 billion between 1985 and 1997 (Guthery 2001, 62). At the same time, the Latino population increased by 300 percent, and the position of poultry production-line worker was one of the fastest growing jobs in the United States in the 1990s. Is this a coincidence? Unlikely. As one plant manager remarked, "At the beginning, we had only white folks. Then blacks. Then Vietnamese people. They are [mostly] gone now." A supervisor concluded that "if there weren't Hispanic workers, nobody in America would be eating chicken" (Guthery 2001, 61).

These changes reflect the same global processes that have led to outsourcing in other industries; one of the principal differences between the food-processing and other industries, say automobile manufacturing (or many service sector jobs), is that labor moves to jobs rather than jobs to labor. This may change, however, as immigrant labor increases the possibility of certain industries, such as automobile manufacturing, to relocate factories in the United States. Is it an accident, we might wonder, that Hyundai's recent investment in the United States includes an assembly plant not in a "traditional destination" city like Detroit or Flint, Michigan, but in Birmingham, Alabama? Thus, as global processes restructure the Midwest and South, these same processes are bringing a transnational, low-wage Latino labor force to the heart of Dixie—and the heart of the U.S. "heartland" (Stull, Broadway, and Erickson 1992; Capelouto 2000; Griffith 1995; Gouveia and Stull 1995, 1997; Mohl and Knudsen 2000; Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001; Saenz 2004; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995; also Hytrek as well as Hytrek and Wheat, unpublished data). While these emerging immigrant communities contribute to the survival of these sectors and of these communities, they also bring a cultural hybridization. How these shifting demographics play out in places not accustomed to dramatic change is a story currently being written in places like Vidalia, Georgia, and Norfolk, Nebraska.

Explaining Patterns of Immigrant Integration

Recall that one key difference between migration patterns during the current period and the belle époque is the degree of diversity. Immigrants today bring with them a greater range of material resources and human capital skills (e.g., money, education, training, and language abilities) that in turn condition

how they are integrated into society. Those highly educated and proficient in English (and who migrate legally) often enter into well-paying, high-status jobs that positively affect life chances. Certain skilled workers can also migrate under the skills category (called H1-B visas) of U.S. immigration policy and are advantaged in the labor market relative to other immigrants.¹³ In contrast, immigrants with less human capital are generally "assimilated" into the low-wage sector of the economy.

Human capital, however, is not the sole determinant of how immigrants are integrated into U.S. society. The "context of reception," or the political, social, and economic environments into which they enter, also influences patterns of incorporation (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Political policies in the receiving country (i.e., whether they are welcoming, neutral, or exclusionary) can impact an immigrant's ability to find employment, housing, and other resources needed to survive, regardless of other human capital resources.

The social context likewise profoundly shapes the process of integration. Immigrants may enter a social context within which they are often "typified" or stereotyped based on their status as immigrants and/or as members of particular racial/ethnic groups. Patterns of discrimination, for example, may cause a particular group to be confined to low-wage or menial labor (i.e., "Mexican work" or "women's work"). Here, we can see how class and status intersect in what Patricia Hill Collins (1991) calls the "matrix of domination" (discussed in Chapter 5). Nonwhite immigrants and immigrant women, for instance, experience greater discrimination and are often integrated into jobs with little opportunity for upward social mobility (Healey 2001, 233). In urban centers such as Los Angeles, Latina immigrants are concentrated in some of the fastest-growing and lowest-paid sectors of the economy, in particular garments, electronics, and the low-wage service sector (Zentgraf 2001). By being confined to the low-wage labor market sector, these immigrants are vulnerable to job instability and unemployment—characteristics of these sectors.

Finally, social mobility is shaped by the nature of the community into which immigrants settle. Social capital networks provide important survival mechanisms that protect immigrants from the impact of cultural change, outside prejudice, and initial economic challenges. As we noted above, ethnic communities are often characterized by high levels of social capital networks. Immigrants sharing the same ethnicity (or race) who move to these communities can tap into important sources of information about jobs and other opportunities, as well as advice and resources. Cuban immigrants to Miami and Asian immigrants to southern California, for example, enter established ethnic economies whereby newly arrived immigrants find employment with Cuban or Asian business owners and entrepreneurs (Portes and Bach 1985, Light and Bhachu 1993, Light and Gold 2000). In many cases, initial low earnings give way to higher incomes as immigrants learn the tools of the trade and set up businesses of their own. We should note that social capital networks can also work in the reverse manner and reinforce low income and

poverty. If, for instance, a new immigrant enters an ethnic community whose members are concentrated in a low-wage sector of the economy, it is likely that the social networks into which she or he will be incorporated will perpetuate class inequality and limit upward social mobility.

Immigration and Political and Civic Engagement

Arjun Appadurai (1990, 5) argues that globalization has created a complex, overlapping, and disjunctive cultural order. One dimension of burgeoning global cultural flows, he suggests, is what he terms the "ethnoscapes." An *ethnoscape* is "the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups" that constitute an essential feature of the world and "appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree." Appadurai's argument is that immigrants bring their entire culture with them. This culture not only exerts influence on the existing culture but also has economic, social, and political effects. While we may see this quite easily in terms of elite migration, it is characteristic of all socioeconomic strata.

In the United States, immigrants from all socioeconomic strata are actively engaged in their communities and participate in schools, churches, local businesses and organizations, and larger political movements. The most obvious form of civic engagement is citizenship, and according to the 2000 U.S. Census, 40.3 percent of all foreign-born people were U.S. citizens (Grieco 2002). Another form of civic engagement is political participation, including voting, grassroots organizing, volunteering for campaigns, or donating money. Latino immigrants, for instance, are especially politically active. Barreto and Muñoz (2003) found that when considering nonelectoral political participation, foreign-born Latinos are more likely to be active than the native-born; among the foreign-born, noncitizens are just as likely to participate as naturalized citizens.

We can see the effects of political and community participation on two interrelated levels. First, there has been an increase in Latino candidates making serious runs for political positions and winning major offices (e.g., Los Angeles and San Antonio), and 2005 witnessed the appointment of Alberto Gonzalez, the first Latino U.S. attorney general. Second, Latino workers have helped breathe new life into the U.S. labor and civil rights movements. In what Harold Meyerson (1999) calls "liberalism with a new accent," immigrants are working to create a dynamic and globally focused movement. The Justice for Janitors campaign and the 2006 May Day Walkout ("A Day Without Immigrants") are only two examples of how Latino and Latina immigrants and workers are building upon shared work experiences and existing social networks to mobilize for fair wages and working conditions and against racist legislation. Because many migrants from Mexico and Central America

bring with them considerable political organizing skills and expertise, they have become important actors in the labor movement (and community-based organizations) in the United States. The role of Latinas and Latinos in the labor movement is exemplified by the significant role of labor organizers such as María Elena Durazo and the late Miguel Contreras, who took over leadership of the Los Angeles AFL-CIO in 1996 and revived "a moribund union movement at a time of rapid demographic change" (Morin and Hall 2005).

Remittances: Completing the Global Cycle

In what is a continual cycle of global change, immigrants shape the receiving country and, by remitting million of dollars, shape the sending countries. While the remitting of money—or the sending of money back to the "Home" country by immigrants—is not a new phenomenon, supraterritorial communication greatly accelerates the transmission of funds that are used in a variety of consumptive and productive ways in the countries of origin. For instance, in 2001, an estimated \$111 billion was remitted worldwide and about 65 percent of this went to developing countries (O'Neil 2003).

Almost one-third of the world's total remittances are destined for communities in Latin America and the Caribbean, countries that constitute one-half of the U.S. foreign-born population. Over three-quarters of these remittances originate in the United States. From 2000 to 2002, remittances to Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala grew 39 percent, from \$10.2 to \$14.2 billion (Suro 2003). By 2004, the money transfers reached \$23.8 billion, almost \$68 million per day (*Los Angeles Times* 2005b, 2005d). In 2005, Latin America as a whole received roughly \$55 billion, mainly from the United States (*Los Angeles Times* 2005b, B18; 2005d, B18; Bourdreaux 2006, A1; Williams 2006, A1). Increasingly, money transfers take place through automatic teller machines—and new financial forms are being created to facilitate the movement of money—rather than the more typical wire transfers. Much of the money is used to finance local development, paying for street paving or lighting, as well as productive enterprises that create local jobs (*Los Angeles Times* 2005c, B18; Bourdreaux 2006, A1; Williams 2006, A1; Paddock 2006, A1; Wilkinson 2006, A1).¹⁴ Given these numbers, it is not surprising that remittances in 2000 augmented the gross domestic product of such countries as El Salvador, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Yemen by over 10 percent (cited in O'Neil 2003).

Conclusion

The UNDP (2004, 87) states that "globalization is quantitatively and qualitatively reshaping international movements of people." Immigration to the

United States reflects these changes. By the start of the twenty-first century, unskilled and low-skilled workers from Europe no longer dominated immigration to the United States; rather, immigration has been characterized by non-European, highly educated and skilled workers combined with those having little education and few skills. No longer confined to major urban areas in a few gateway states, immigrants from Mexico and Central America are finding their way to rural areas of the Mid-west and Southeast. By considering the impact of social networks and other noneconomic factors in an analysis of immigration, it becomes easier to understand these kinds of changes and the complex interaction between global political and economic processes and decisions made by individual immigrants. As predicted by the social democrats, globalization appears to create porous borders with respect not only to the movement of goods, services, and ideas but to the movement of people as well.

Examining immigration from the vantage point of globalization, we illustrated how immigration from Latin America is being driven in large part by the global restructuring of the U.S. economy that has created a dependence on low-wage workers as well as economic disruptions in the sending countries. At the same time, competitive pressures mean an increasing demand for highly educated workers, including computer scientists, physical scientists, and engineers from India, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Ease of travel, greater access to information, and existing social networks strongly shape individual decisions about migration, although these factors appear to have a stronger effect on those who are highly educated and have the greatest resources. The brain-drain phenomenon is one of the most problematic issues. In the long run, the brain drain will mean a widening of the already huge gap in the human capital endowment among countries, and this will only increase global inequality (Ghose 2003, 113).

As large-scale migration continues, current immigrants will follow in the path of their historical counterparts: they will have children, buy homes, invest in businesses and communities, and become citizens. In contrast to the last major wave at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the supraterritorial communication and ease of travel that have accompanied globalization allow immigrants to remain in close contact with their home countries and to create (transterritorial) global communities. Thus, while immigrants actively engage in their new society, they often maintain tight transnational links with their countries of origin. These connections may well create significant cultural changes in the host society or greater cultural hybridization, as we mentioned in Chapter 4.

Yet this cultural mixing will not be unproblematic. Cultural uncertainty is one outcome of any society experiencing a transition to a multicultural society. These feelings can fuel anti-immigrant and racist reactions as immigrants are blamed for declining wages, higher unemployment, and depleted social-welfare funds (education, health care, and social insurance programs). In many countries, a combination of trade unions attempting to defend jobs and

conservative political parties promoting xenophobic agendas is pushing for stronger restrictions on immigration (Halliday 2000). All of this raises some interesting and largely unanswered questions about the future of globalization and migration. In a larger global context, how much political will or political power will nation-states have to control migration, either into or out of their countries? Will global economic and political institutions come to play a larger role in regulating international migration? Will national borders and national citizenship become increasingly meaningless? These are only some of the central questions we face in current debates over globalization and migration.