



## **OFTExtended Security Review**

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# OFTEExtended Security Review Report

Burra Security

Sept 16, 2024

## Introduction

A time-boxed security review of the **OFTEExtended** protocol was done by **Burra Security** team, focusing on the security aspects of the smart contracts.

## Disclaimer

A smart contract security review can never verify the complete absence of vulnerabilities. This is a time, resource, and expertise-bound effort where we try to find as many vulnerabilities as possible. We can not guarantee 100% security after the review or even if the review will find any vulnerabilities. Subsequent security reviews, bug bounty programs, and on-chain monitoring are recommended.

## About Burra Security

Burra Sec offers security auditing and advisory services with a special focus on cross-chain and interoperability protocols and their integrations.

## About OFTEExtended

OFTEExtended is a contract that extends the functionality of the OFT standard from LayerZero by adding extra features:

- Possibility to pause bridge transactions

- Limit bridging rate
- Hourly limit rate
- Possibility to enable fees

## Severity classification

Severity	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
<b>Likelihood: High</b>	Critical	High	Medium
<b>Likelihood: Medium</b>	High	Medium	Low
<b>Likelihood: Low</b>	Medium	Low	Low

**Impact** - The technical, economic, and reputation damage from a successful attack

**Likelihood** - The chance that a particular vulnerability gets discovered and exploited

**Severity** - The overall criticality of the risk

**Informational** - Findings in this category are recommended changes for improving the structure, usability, and overall effectiveness of the system.

## Security Assessment Summary

**review commit hash** - 2f9fba2cd3602f5880c644770289ca2fda34b3c5

**mitigation review commit hash** - ad6f39c641a2902e4ea2a8a276677b35abd14cde

### Scope

The following smart contracts were in the scope of the audit:

- OFTEExtended

## Findings Summary

ID	Title	Severity	Status
[L-01]	<code>unpauseBridge</code> should have <code>onlyGuardian</code> modifier	Low	Fixed
[L-02]	Replace <code>&lt;</code> with <code>&lt;=</code> in <code>minBalanceLimit</code> and <code>&gt;</code> with <code>&gt;=</code> in <code>hourlyLimit</code> checks according to the whitepaper	Low	Ack
[L-03]	<code>hourlyLimit</code> configuration change leads to incorrect <code>slidingHourlyLimitUtilization</code> calculation	Low	Fixed

## Detailed Findings

### [L-01] `unpauseBridge` should have `onlyGuardian` modifier

#### Context

- OFTEExtended.sol#L147

#### Description

Based on the `comment` above the `unpauseBridge` function it should be restricted to the guardian address only. It's however restricted to the owner address.

#### Recommendation

Adjust the comment to reflect the correct modifier or change the modifier to `onlyGuardian`.

#### Resolution

Fixed by adjusting the comment.

## [L-02] Replace `<` with `<=` in `minBalanceLimit` and `>` with `>=` in `hourlyLimit` checks according to the whitepaper

### Context

- OFTEExtended.sol#L209
- OFTEExtended.sol#L229

### Description

According to the whitepaper the send function should revert if:

- `balanceUpdate` is less or equal to the `minBalanceLimit`
- `slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` is higher or equal to the `hourlyLimit`

In the implementation the checks are done with `<` and `>`, instead of `<=` and `>=`.

### Recommendation

Recommendation: Adjust the checks to `<=` and `>=` respectively.

```
1 - if (balanceUpdate_ < eidToConfigPtr.minBalanceLimit) {  
2 + if (balanceUpdate_ <= eidToConfigPtr.minBalanceLimit) {  
3  
4 - if (BridgeUtilizationPtr.slidingHourlyLimitUtilization >  
   eidToConfigPtr.hourlyLimit) {  
5 + if (BridgeUtilizationPtr.slidingHourlyLimitUtilization >=  
   eidToConfigPtr.hourlyLimit) {
```

### Resolution

Acknowledged.

## [L-03] `hourlyLimit` configuration change leads to incorrect `slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` calculation

### Context

- OFTEExtended.sol#L111

## Description

Changing the value for `hourlyLimit` leads to incorrect `slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` calculation. Consider the following scenario:

- `hourlyLimit` is 20 ether
- Someone debits/sends 10 ether
- Half an hour passes
- The owner changes the `hourlyLimit` to 14 ether
- Now the maximum you can debit is 11 ether, as the `slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` is 10 ether - 7 ether + 11 ether = 14 ether.

`slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` hasn't taken into account the configuration change.

## Recommendation

A potential solution could be to update the `slidingHourlyLimitUtilization` with the previous `hourlyLimit` value before the configuration changes.

## Resolution

Fixed.