

# Parls joint action 2011-11

Some  
Three things to work in:

1. Q&A from the workshop description
2. Pacherie & Doherty - 2006 p. 110 -  
I want something immediate
3. Pacherie 2011 on shared intention  
as team reasoning (not cog demanding -  
but is it intention?)
4. Wernkeken -  
Gräfenhain & Tomasello | p. "mentoring  
individual  
intention is  
in pers. dev sci not suffic..."

they also have to be  
aware that they are  
pursuing a joint goal, which  
is jointly intended to achieve by  
way of "We intend to do x together  
by way of me doing y, and you  
doing z"

(may be sif that this  
is a ballistic action)

(Bratman's example of  
hand reaching up to  
grasp a bell; not merely reflex)

5. Mention pble that shared intentions are  
just intentions after all?

6. Mention that the contrast cases don't  
work (Alonso was impressed by this).

Eg: —

1. Shared intention is demanding  
(even if it is just intention,  
properly understood)  
WORKING HYPOTHESIS: everything is originally social
2. Pacherie & others attempt to say  
why it's less cog demanding
3. But these attempts involve giving up on  
planning-intention link, so what  
anchors our understanding?
4. Radical step back & ask what  
~~we are trying~~ anchors our understanding of  
action:...

5. We may ultimately need intention in some  
cases. But if not all agent action involves  
intention, then it seems not all joint action  
needs to either.

## Paris: Joint Action.

Need to re-insert cases — idea is to  
move on from shared intention & then say  
what anchors our understanding?

- Not the contrast cases  
(this may require goals + intentions).

- We're left w. examples

Use some of the SAM4 ideas — move from  
reject Bratman on S.I to what is JA anyway?

↳ gets us to collective goods

↳ Then use Pacheri + Doherty — we  
don't want to capture just direct +  
linear forms

↳ But now that we have metaph. fixed,

we can add or remove ingredients w/o breaking  
that any of these ingredients are somehow constitutive of j-a.

all of us, psych + phil,

We have made a mistake about  
the metaphysics of action,  
and this mistake has prevented us  
from seeing the possible importance of  
j-a in development.

leads us to a view on which action  
can be joint to varying degrees;  
the paradigm case is perhaps still whole-  
hearted intention, but there's a lot of  
stuff between that + shared

## Shared intention

- Bratman's acct. too complex
- maybe then we should adopt alt. acct. of j.a. ; Tollefson & Paolucci both take this route
- but let's step back first and ask what an acct. of s.i. is an acct. of if we reject B's ideas about functional roles
- ~~from JAM on shared intention: \*\*\*~~
  - (1) Shared intentions aren't shared ...
  - (2) Nor, on most accounts, are they intentions
  - (3) So the term itself is doubly metaphorical
  - (4) And there are many, many accounts of it ... hard to know which we should select.
- so we have to step back and ask what anchors our understanding of j.a. and why s.i. should be needed to characterize it
- contrast cases (goals, ...)
- Paolucci's argument: Davidson's lesson is that action is an event with an intention; so reasoning by analogy we get a need for

(NO)

say a bit more about this:

children's actions are, probably, voluntary w/o jointness but there is no need for planning

So even setting aside the issue of whether children are having shared intentions, we can see that there could be agents who jointly act but don't coord-plan and so have no need for s.i. as characterized by B. (Or is the 'no need' something that comes later.).

## CONCLN (also intro.).

This was the challenge I think that j.a. might be relevant like this. And in lots of other ways too.

I also think that nearly all current thinking about j.a. & s.i. rests on a mistake. The mistake is to think that there is action & then j.a. This is not true. (see Gilbert quote).

shared intention. I think the reasoning is good but I want to apply it backwards. I see no reason to think that all action involves intention. I think intending is a sophisticated achievement

On the challenge

1. sophisticated On cog — I mean representing perceptions, beliefs, knowledge states + intentions as such.

But why think that any of this is actually hard? After all, can't infants, scrubjays

& chimpanzees all track what others know?

Yes, I think they can.

And I think this ~~research is illuminating~~ should probably be explained by supposing that they identify some kind of intervening variable ~~between~~ linking an agent's environment to her actions; in other words, I see no objection to supposing that this involves On in ~~some~~ one sense.

But I don't think this is evidence that they are representing R. as such.

This is for 2 kinds of reason.

1. QC as sources
2. Cog. & conceptually demanding

} [Problem is that (2) concerns f.b. attribution.  
Can solve by saying I think attr. f.b. is  
key to attr. any prop. attitudes at all as such.]

← Restructure LHS body:

1. ICS abilities might seem we're forced to see this as attr. K.
2. But compare electricity  
(A cow knows the difference between a live fence & a dead one; but it doesn't thereby ~~mean~~ understand electricity).
3. Theoretical pbk. of alt. intep: — relational ratio that prop. attitudes
4. Reasons for thinking the relational attitudes acct is better
  - a. — QC — conceptual
  - b. — cog. & cog. demanding

← Might be useful to contrast propositional with relational attitudes at some point.

The first q<sup>s</sup>. about the challenge is:  
Which are arg. proposed?

To answer that q<sup>s</sup> we need to look at what j.a. is.

Most phil. say that a j.a. is one or more actions  
explained by a shared intention. (Example...)  
(excl. Bratman: it's not part of his view.)

So we have to ask what s.i. is.

...

→ see p. ③ above.

...

### The contrast cases

The idea is supposed to be that we need shared  
intention to distinguish these things. But I disagree.

~~To explain why, let me first make a detour.~~

~~This is a simple way of doing it.~~

It is easy to distinguish these cases w/o shared intention.

For in the 'joint' cases, there is a single outcome  
to which each agent's actions are directed. All the  
contrast cases require is that there be some jointness in  
the outcome, not there be jointness of intentions.

### ORDER

First do alternative approach

Then come back to basic shared intention

So: ~~three reasons not to give our acct of  
s.i.:~~  
1) ~~Nothing obviously wrong w/ Bratman's acct~~  
2) ~~Hard to know where to stop~~  
3)

Link: ~~How should we think about~~

~~What is joint action? if it is not~~

If we don't define joint action in terms of  
shared intention, we are forced to go  
right back and ask what j.a. is.

Start w. Ludwig's df

4 Feltri action.

Nice thing about Ludwig's df is that ja is just action.  
But as we shall see, this df is not adequate for our purposes.

Eg. it is enough for each to intend  
that we run to the shelter.

START HERE

# The Challenge

(I mention this not because I want to solve it but because I think it's a way of measuring value. Anything which contributes to this is worthwhile.)

- You might think that ~~everything~~ <sup>the</sup> theory of mind cognition is widespread, but if you distinguish abilities from cognition this is less obvious

# The Conjecture

Joint action plays a role in explaining how I mention this <sup>at</sup> because I'll solve it. But I do think we have made a mistake about metaphysics of j.a. and we can't solve the mistake until this is fixed.

— j.a. anchored in examples (what j.a. is will turn out to be a big issue).

# Challenge

# Conjecture

Risk Obj. to conjecture: there isn't much to explain because one corner early is done, before there is joint action - - - -

main idea is rough:  
relational vs. propositional attitudes

cf. no nesting  
simple, parameter settings, effects on action

nesting  
unconditionally complex effects on action (check Fodor's term).

You might think that there isn't much to explain here

2<sup>nd</sup> Obj. to conjecture: j.a. presupposes sophisticated

On and so can't explain it  
To develop this objection we need to consider what j.a. is - - -

Most accounts of j.a. start with s.i.  
s.i. is a technical term. It's not

"The usual way..." from Thebrigs pp 4 ff. talk

# The arg.

Simply state that I will return to why we shouldn't redefine S.I. (but it's worth noting here that (a) there are no obj. to Bratman's acct; and (b) Bratman himself never says all j.a. involves S.I.).

if j.a. does not involve S.I. what is j.a.?  
Start w. Ludwig. -

If j.a. doesn't involve S.I., we need  
another way of characterizing it.

Natalie + Quenka? No!

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-

Gilbert quote  
Feline action.

∴ Ludwig exemplifies this idea.

∴

Thebinger sequence

∴

collective goal... ~~neutral on coordination...~~  
~~pulleys~~  
~~ants → came up and eat...~~

This makes it seem that we have left something out.

Elisabet: 1) distinguish — what's genuine... contrast cases...  
2) minimal notion  
— pulleys  
— ants

I agree with this, we do need a distinction  
But I ~~don't think~~ we can meet the challenge  
w/o introducing shared intention (anything  
most philosophers would recognize as).

So where are we?