

Mindreading and Joint Action: Philosophical Tools Notes for Lecture 1

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1. Terminology

Mindreading is the process of identifying mental states and actions as the mental states and actions of a particular subject on the basis, ultimately, of bodily movements and their absence, somewhat as reading is the process of identifying propositions on the basis of inscriptions (Apperly 2010, p. 4).

2. Slide

Last week I suggested that we don't adequately understand what mindreading is. Of course we can *define* mindreading. Mindreading is the process of identifying mental states and actions as the mental states and actions of a particular subject on the basis, ultimately, of bodily movements and their absence, somewhat as reading is the process of identifying propositions on the basis of inscriptions (Apperly 2010, p. 4). Not adequately understanding mindreading means that there are questions we can't answer, and puzzles we can't resolve, and that a deeper understanding of what mindreading is might be needed to answer those questions and resolve those puzzles. Anyway, this week I start from the assumption that we agree on wanting a deeper understanding of what mindreading is. As mindreading is defined in terms of mental states, the natural question to ask is, What are mental states?

Need to be careful here. Since our interest is in mindreading, we don't necessarily want the truth about mental states. We merely want a theoretically coherent conception of them.

3. Slide

To illustrate the need for this, consider Call & Tomasello's claim. What are Call & Tomasello saying the chimps understand?

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First note that this is a claim about understanding. They are not saying that chimps discriminate situations in which another knows from situations in which she is ignorant. They are saying that chimps understand something about the knowledge states that constitute the difference between these situations.

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But what are they saying when they say that chimps understand knowledge? What does this amount to?


6. Slide

Take Quassim Cassam ... are they saying that Chimpanzees have this conception of knowledge? Probably not. After all, they may not want to be committed to saying that chimpanzees think of knowledge states as standing in need of explanation; they may not want to claim that chimpanzees sometimes think to themselves, I wonder how she knew about that? But then what conception of knowledge do Call & Tomasello think chimpanzees have?

I think that this quote is fine if it is intended just to give us a very rough idea about what chimpanzees think. But it would be a mistake to think that it gives us deep insight into what chimpanzees represent that enables them to track knowledge states. The problem is that, pre-theoretically, we don't have a clear enough sense of what 'knowledge' is to know what might be involved in understanding knowledge.

My aim in asking what mental states are is this. If we can characterise—or mischaracterise—knowledge, belief and others, then we might be in a position to be more explicit about what chimpanzees and humans and others understand

7. Slide



The content is what distinguishes one belief from all others, or one desire from all others. The content is also what determines whether a belief is true or false, and whether a desire is satisfied or unsatisfied.

There are two main tasks in constructing a theory of mental states. The first task is to characterise the different attitudes. This typically involves specifying their distinctive functional and normative roles. The second task is to find a scheme for specifying the contents of mental states.

Let's start with the second task and come back to the first. [***OR SHOULD I POSTPONE THE SECOND TASK UNTIL THE LECTURE ON MEASUREMENT?]

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The second task is to find a scheme for specifying the contents of mental states. Usually this is done with propositions. But what are propositions? Propositions are abstract objects like numbers. They have more mystique than numbers, but, like numbers, they are abstract objects that can be constructed using sets plus a few other basic ingredients such as objects, properties and possible worlds.

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There are actually quite a few different views about what propositions are. For example, McGrath says that 'Propositions ... are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity' (McGrath 2012).

Others introduce propositions by appeal to sentences, or utterances of sentences. Here the idea is that a proposition is what the utterance of a sentence expresses and that in virtue of which the utterance is true or false (as well as that in virtue of which it is necessary, if it is necessary). (King 2011)

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We can remain agnostic about these ideas and think about propositions simply as abstract objects like numbers.

Just as there are different kinds of number—natural, rational and real, for instance—there are also different kinds of proposition.

And just as one way to get a handle on what numbers are is to see how they can be constructed from more basic ingredients, like sets, so equally one way to get a handle on propositions is to see how they can be constructed from ingredients we are already familiar with.

Propositions are abstract objects like numbers. They have more mystique than numbers, but, like numbers, they are abstract objects that can be constructed using sets plus a few other basic ingredients such as objects, properties and possible worlds.

11. Slide

I'm about to explain how to construct propositions. But you might ask why we are bothering. We already have abstract objects, namely sentences. Why not just use sentences to specify the contents of mental states? That's only because sentences are not suitable for this purpose. We want a collection of abstract objects that we can use to specify the contents of mental states; so, ideally, we would set things up so that there is only one belief corresponding to each abstract object. And sentences don't have this property. Take the sentence, "s/he will cycle up Hármashatár hill" This sentence refers to different desires depending on who the subject is. (What I desire when I cycle up the hill is different from what you desire when you desire that you cycle up the hill; after all, one of these desires might be satisfied while the other is not.) So we can't use sentences to specify the contents of mental states because some sentences are associated with indefinitely many different beliefs. Instead we need a collection of abstract object such that we can associate at most one belief associated with each object.

You might think we could get around this by avoiding using sentences that contain 'she' and other indexicals. But John Perry has shown that this is impossible. The problem in a nutshell is that Ayesha's desire that she cycle up the hill is different from her desire that Ayesha cycle up the hill because even though she is Ayesha, she might not know that.

You might think something must have gone wrong here. We use utterances of sentences to identify what someone believes or desires all the time. After all, I can tell you what someone desires like this: "Mo desires that s/he will cycle up Hármashatár hill". So how can I be saying that we can't use sentences to distinguish the contents of mental states? The answer is simple. When we utter a sentence we express a proposition. And it is the proposition, not the sentence, that we use to specify the content of a belief or desire or other mental state.

So there is no getting away from propositions. But they're also not par-

ticularly mysterious either.

12. Slide

But there is a second problem [with Singular Propositions]. Suppose Steve = Ayesha. Then these are the same propositions. But someone might have different beliefs. ... This is Oedipus and Jocasta ... which became the story of Heinz and his rubber in the work of Liz Robinson and Ian Apperly ... It's impossible for these propositions to cut more finely than there are individuals in the world. But it seems that mental states can cut more finely. So perhaps we need a third kind of proposition.

13. Slide

Third type of proposition gets around all these problems. So with the third type of proposition we have found a scheme for specifying the contents of mental states that seems to allow us to make as many distinctions as human adults intuitively make.

What can we conclude so far about representing mental states? Someone who represents mental states needs some system of abstract objects, such as some kind of proposition, in order to have a way of distinguishing among their contents. This doesn't mean that they have to represent Fregean propositions: after all, they might represent mental states without being able to specify every possible difference in content. So I'm not suggesting that anyone who represents mental states must be able to represent Fregean propositions. The point is rather just that we understand what sort of thing is required ... and how different abstract objects that could be used to distinguish among the contents of mental states impose different limits.

[***Next issue: relation between beliefs and propositions – are propositions *objects* of belief or are they simply measuring devices? I will come back to this issue in Lecture 3 (on measuring, tracking and representing beliefs).]

14. Slide

So let's return to Call & Tomasello. Our first question in being more precise about their proposal is: What sort of abstract object do chimpanzees use to specify the contents of mental states (for example, to distinguish one intention from another)? In the next lecture I'm going to compare attributing mental states to measuring temperature. If you think chimpanzees can measure temperature, it makes sense to ask what sort of units they use to measure

temperature. E.g. do they use numbers or some other kind of scale? Similarly, if we think chimpanzees can measure mental states, we can ask what sort of abstract objects they use to do this. And, as we saw, different answers have different consequences for the limits of their abilities to represent mental states. So there is even some hope that different hypotheses about which abstract objects chimpanzees use might generate testable predictions.

15. Slide

.... and of course we have to ask the same question about infants and adults. And we should maybe not take for granted that chimpanzees, infants and adults all use the same system of abstract objects to distinguish the contents of mental states.

16. Slide

Now to the other task ... how to characterise the attitudes?

17. Slide

Now we can go back and ask whether these norms are part of different subjects' understandings of the attitudes ... But this hardly seems like a good question to ask. What evidence might persuade us either way?

So I think there are two problems. One is that there is no obvious basis for accepting or rejecting these claims about the attitudes. The other is that this way of distinguishing the attitudes doesn't seem to generate useful questions about mindreaders.

Fortunately there is a different approach, one that relies less on common-sense. We want to get a sense of the space of possibilities ... of the different understandings one might have of intention, say.

Proposal: we should take a constructive approach—creature construction. And we should have a model of the attitudes, one that is clearly enough explained that we can tell whether it is capable of explaining a given individual's behaviour in a particular case.

18. Slide

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explained that we can tell whether it is capable of explaining a given individual's behaviour in a particular case.

The point of creature construction is to ensure coherence. We want to have a functioning, viable creature at each stage. You can't just take a fish and throw in feet. Having feet goes with certain kinds of limb structure and capacities for movement.

Where Call and Tomasello says chimps understand intentions but not beliefs, a reasonable question to ask is, what sort of creature has intentions but not beliefs. By attempting to construct the creature we would get a clearer idea of how, on their view, the chimpanzee understands minds. I'm not going to try that here, although I will offer a suggestion along these lines. Instead today I want to start in the middle, with the most sophisticated creature that we can construct using a well-understood model.

***Davidson quote is relevant here (about nothing in between)

***(not here) Another way to think of this is as constructing an imaginary world. We can maybe imagine a world, one much simpler than ours, where Newtonian physics holds. Maybe it is even in some sense possible for such a world to exist. There is also a world where

***use Dretske naturalism quote? ***start with mere goals and add in states that modulate, or go straight to decision theory?

19. Old Approach

The attitude is normally specified by its functional and normative roles, and these are usually explained in contrast with those of other attitudes. E.g. What distinguishes believing from supposing? These have related roles in guiding action. Velleman (*ref) suggests that believing differs from supposing in aiming at truth. We'll return to this idea later.

To specify the content we first need to identify something about its structure. Mental states are usually thought of as having propositional contents. But there is a variety of types of content that a mental state can have. For instance, you can have an attitude towards a map-like structure, an image, an event-type, an object or a relation.

***examples (e.g. use navigation for attitudes towards maps?)

*Explain what propositions are (like numbers).

*Also explain different types of propositions (Russellian, Fregean &c)

*illustrate limits of different kinds of content (compare with different kinds of number)

20. The origin of the attitudes

Take an attitude like belief or desire. Suppose someone offers a partial characterisation of the attitude. For instance, suppose they say that belief aims at truth whereas desire aims at satisfaction. What is this partial characterisation answerable to? On what grounds should we accept or reject it?

We might treat claims about the attitudes as merely terminological stipulations, so that the only requirement is coherence. This serves only to push back the question further. What are we attempting to capture in characterising an attitude?

Another possibility is to think of claims about the attitudes as answerable to ordinary thinking about mental states. While I doubt we can escape ordinary thinking entirely, I think we should be cautious in appealing to it for two reasons. One is that we don't actually know very much about how people ordinarily think about mental states. The other is that ordinary thinking about mental states may not be right, or even consistent.

The approach to the attitudes I prefer is modelling. This is going to take a while to explain but the idea is simple. Decision theory provides us with a model capable of explaining, within limits, the preferences that agents manifest. The model involves subjective probabilities and desirabilities, which roughly resemble belief and desire in some ways (Jeffrey 1983, p. 59, Davidson 1985). So the model potentially provides two things. One is a fairly precise characterisation of belief-like and desire-like attitudes. The other is an explanation of when postulating them is justified. Justification for postulating these states in a particular case depends on how well the model explains the agents' preferences.

20.1. Actions, outcomes and conditions

That was a bit abstract. Let's get into details. (What follows is based on Jeffrey 1983; it's not my own work.) I'm going to go very slowly at the start. This will be a bit painful if you're already familiar with decision theory, but it's worth it because we will use the basic ideas more than once. (This will be important again in the context of joint action.)

Imagine we are deciding between two *actions*, cycling to the seminar or catching the bus. Let's also suppose that we are only interested in two types of *outcome* these actions could have, staying dry versus not staying dry and getting exercise versus not getting exercise. Among the various possible outcomes, our preference ranking is:

1. getting exercise and staying dry
2. not getting exercise and staying dry

3. getting exercise and not staying dry

Suppose we know that cycling will result in the third outcome, 3, whereas getting the bus will result in the second outcome, 2. Then we should get the bus. In this situation, actions guarantee outcomes so how we act should depend just on which outcome we prefer.

Very often actions are not so simply linked to outcomes. We often don't know whether we will get wet if we cycle. Whether we get wet depends on further *conditions*, such as whether it rains or whether there is flooding. In general, which outcome occurs depends both on the actions we choose and on the conditions we encounter.

action	condition	
	no flooding	flooding
cycle	get exercise and stay dry	get exercise and get wet
take bus	get no exercise and stay dry	get no exercise and stay dry

Table 1: Outcomes depend on actions and conditions

Usually we are not certain about all the conditions relevant to a decision. Instead we have to form a view about their probability. For example, we might know that there is a fair chance of flooding without knowing outright that there is flooding. This means we don't know for sure which outcome cycling will result in. It might result in our most preferred outcome, getting exercise and staying dry; but it might also result in our least preferred outcome, getting exercise and getting wet.

For this reason, in deciding what to do we should ideally take into account both our preferences concerning the outcomes and the probabilities of the conditions obtaining. This could be done as follows.

We first consider the probabilities (see table 2 on the following page). The top left cell represents the probability of no flooding if we choose to cycle. Of course, the probability of flooding is independent of whether we cycle or take the bus. But the approach is flexible enough to accommodate cases where our actions can influence the probability of the conditions occurring.

We then assign weights to the outcomes that reflect how desirable they are in relation to each other (see table 3 on the next page).

Finally we multiply the probability and desirability matrices (see table 4 on the following page). Adding the rows then gives expected utilities for each action. The idea is that we should perform the act with the greatest expected utility. In this case, cycling gets just 0.2 whereas taking the bus gets 1, so we should take the bus.

I've gone very slowly over some familiar ideas because I want us to attend to the basics. There are three basic elements: actions, conditions and

<i>action</i>	<i>condition</i>	
	no flooding	flooding
cycle	probability of no flooding if we cycle: 0.3	probability of flooding if we cycle: 0.7
take bus	probability of no flooding if we get the bus: 0.3	probability of flooding if we get the bus: 0.7

Table 2: Probabilities of four conditions obtaining

<i>action</i>	<i>condition</i>	
	no flooding	flooding
cycle	[get exercise and stay dry] desirability of outcome: 3	[get exercise and get wet] desirability of outcome: -1
take bus	[get no exercise and stay dry] desirability of outcome: 1	[get no exercise and stay dry] desirability of outcome: 1

Table 3: Desirabilities of four outcomes

<i>action</i>	<i>condition</i>	
	no flooding	flooding
cycle	$0.3 \text{ [probability]} * 3 \text{ [desirability]} = 0.9$	$0.7 * -1 = -0.7$
take bus	$0.3 * 1 = 0.3$	$0.7 * 1 = 0.7$

Table 4: Multiplying probabilities by desirabilities

outcomes. Which outcome occurs depends on two things: the action chosen and the conditions that obtain. Desirabilities attach to outcomes. Probabilities attach to conditions. Expected utilities attach to actions. Expected utilities can be derived from desirabilities and probabilities. One procedure for choosing an action is to compute expected utilities (in the way illustrated) and then perform the action with the highest expected utility.

20.2. Reversing direction

For simplicity I have so far been speaking as if we wanted to introduce a procedure for deciding how to act. But of course that isn't our aim at all. Our ultimate aim is to be able to justify claims about attitudes—or at least to understand what sort of considerations might provide justification. We still have a way to go.

So far we have seen how subjective probabilities and desirabilities determine expected utilities for actions. If we knew the expected utilities of the actions available to an agent, we could make a prediction about how she will act—about whether she will cycle or take the bus, say. But to work out an agent's expected utilities we would need to know the probabilities she assigns to relevant conditions and how desirable she finds the various outcomes. How could we know this? **What is the evidential basis for ascribing an agent subjective probabilities and desirabilities and how does the evidence support the ascriptions?**

Suppose we knew these things:

1. The agent will always perform an action with at least as much expected utility as any other actions available to her.
2. The agent has just two actions available to her: she can either cycle or get the bus.
3. The agent is getting the bus.

Then we also know that the agent assigns the same, or higher, expected utility to getting the bus than to cycling. So given some assumptions, an agent's actions reveal her expected utilities.

But this doesn't reveal much about the agent's preferences or probabilities. After all, expected utility is a function of both. The agent might be getting the bus because she does not particularly desire exercise. Or the agent might be getting the bus *despite* particularly desiring exercise because she assigns a high probability to flooding (and a low desirability to staying dry).

On the face of it then, an agent's actions might reveal at most her expected utilities (given assumptions listed above) and leave us blind to her subjective probabilities and desirabilities.

If we knew the agent's subjective probabilities then, given some assumptions, we could work out her desirabilities from her expected utilities. Someone who thinks flooding is likely but nevertheless cycles when she could have taken the bus must desire exercise more than staying dry.

***HERE *** intuitive explanation of Ramsey's criterion.

20.3. Ramsey's insight

Ramsey's criterion:

'Suppose that A and B are consequences [outcomes] between which the agent is not indifferent, and that N is an ethically neutral condition [i.e. the agent is indifferent between N and not N]. Then N has probability 1/2 if and only if the agent is indifferent between the following two gambles.

B if N, A if not

A if N, B if not' (Jeffrey 1983, p. 47)

20.4. What is subjective desirability? What is subjective probability?

So far I have also not said what the desirabilities and probabilities are. You may have some intuitions about what these represent. In particular, you may notice that they are intuitively related to desires and beliefs. But strictly speaking so far we should treat as unresolved the issue of what these desirabilities and probabilities are. Our aim is to use the desirabilities and probabilities to elucidate attitudes like belief and desire. So it would clearly be a mistake to rely on those attitudes in saying what desirabilities and probabilities are.

20.5. Towards a model

We want a model to explain actions.

Here's the idea in outline. We want a method that will enable us to assign subjective desirabilities and subjective probabilities to an agent by observing some of their actions. And we then want to be able to *predict* their actions using the assigned subjective desirabilities and subjective probabilities.

20.6. A gap

***So far we have a theory of how attitudes relate to action but we do not have a theory about how they are acquired (a theory of belief fixation).

‘A theory of mind needs a story about mental processes, not just a story about mental states. ... the logical behaviourism of Wittgenstein and Ryle had, as far as I can tell, no theory of thinking at all (except, maybe, the silly theory that thinking is talking to oneself). I do find that shocking. How could they have expected to get it right about belief and the like without getting it right about belief fixation and the like?’ (Fodor 1998, p. 9–10)

‘modern philosophers ... have no theory of thought to speak of. I do think this is appalling; how can you seriously hope for a good account of belief if you have no account of belief fixation?’ (Fodor 1987, p. 147)

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