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CEU Lecture:

Goal Ascription: The Teleological Stance + Motor Movements

Topic:

Pure goal ascription: does not req. knowledge of mental states.

Secondary Aim
To fill in background on motor vs. teleological debate

QQ:

- Is pure goal ascription possible (in principle)?
- How could (not does) it work?

BACKGROUND (from last lecture — or continue that lecture here)

Assume: i) distinguished a goal from a goal-state (eg an intention).

- have a notion of action explicating (it)

which does not req. appeal to mental states

(Eg: teleological functions.)

FIRST ISSUE: segmentation (or should goal ascription start w. more movements? I don't think so.)

Mention (i) Limits of pure goal ascription — cannot take into account ~~of~~ interpersonal differences in knowledge or other mental states.

& (ii) Importance of pure goal ascription for mindreading — not everything starts with belief ascription (reduction of holism).
(Tough to explain — might also mention

What are you doing in the next 383 minutes?

② Lecture: Goal description

START: structure of intentional action

from the inside:

change memory



Recover movements

structure

from movements.

Proposal: it's like speech — multi-layered
even lowest level is goal-directed

→ This is going to require
action = motor bit?

NB: Segmentation doesn't have to involve motor system. In classic C&G experiments — and in Haidt + 2000 displays — it's unlikely we can get motor segmentation.

So it may be that m.s. is just one process, not necessary

probably
Key points: (i) segmentation is necessary &

(ii) it could involve motor representation
(as speech does)

→ ie can assign goals to actions not in our own motor repertoire


→ must distinguish: (i) motor processes involved in segmentation for (ii) components are represented motorically

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So far: idea of recovering structure
idea of starting with segmentation
into ~~units~~ of motor acts

PART 1.

Motor goal ascription



PART 2

Can't you just watch the action & observe which outcomes it has?

failed action (actual outcomes \neq goal) — existence
many outcomes (which if any are goals) — selection

Teleological stance

formulating the principle

the need for derivability

"best justified" needs a metric

(perhaps point is that some principle will provide a useful -approx: which principle is used is an implementation detail)

limits of teleological stance

opaque means

multiple equally good goals (Buridan's ass in reverse)

Need more on limits of teleological stance.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Two models of goal ascription with complementary limits.

Surely plausible that both could be used.

2. So far don't know much about capacities for pure goal ascription so don't know how sophisticated it is in practice

3. ~~Probably~~ Outstanding challenge — OPACITY (cf Platonic Pedagogy)

how could store get from

pure goal ascription to

- i) social tool use
- ii) understanding communicative actions.

heads up to interacting
Mindreaders: make sure
the challenge is vivid.

Relation to natural pedagogy (np):

np shows that if you have solved one opacity problem — communication — then you can solve the opacity problems. This is a massive step forwards. But it leaves open the issue of how you solve the first opacity problem.