


Mindreading & Joint Action

2. What are mental states?


A person is walking away from the camera on a beach at sunset. The sun is low on the horizon, casting a bright orange glow across the sky and reflecting on the wet sand. The person's silhouette is visible against the bright background.

butterfillS@ceu.hu


'chimpanzees understand ... intentions ...
perception and knowledge ... Moreover, they
understand how these psychological states
work together to produce intentional action'
(Call & Tomasello 2008:191)



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'our fundamental conception of what it is to know that P is itself an explanatory conception [...] we think of S's knowledge that P as something that can properly be explained by reference to what S has perceived or remembered or proved or ...'
(Cassam 2007:356)



Henry desires that Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill

Henry desires that Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill

Subject

Attitude

Content

{
Ayesha
Steve
Henry
...
}

desires

that

Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill

Subject

Attitude

Content

{ Ayesha
Steve
Henry
... } { believes
desires
intends
... } that

Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill

Subject

Attitude

Content

{ Ayesha
Steve
Henry
... } { believes
desires
intends
... } that { Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill
s/he will cycle up Hármashatár hill
Henry will win the lottery
... }

Subject

Attitude

Content


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Subject

Attitude

Content

'Propositions ...are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity' (McGrath 2012)




Subject

Attitude

Content

???

'Propositions ...are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity' (McGrath 2012)




Subject

Attitude

Content

‘Propositions ...are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity’ (McGrath 2012)




Subject

Attitude

Content

proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds




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Attitude

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


Subject

Attitude

Content

proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds




Subject

Attitude

Content

proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds

proposition-2 : a (nested) sequence of objects and properties



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
Attitude

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proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds

proposition-2 : a (nested) sequence of objects and properties

< < Ayesha , Hármashatár hill >, cycle >



Subject

Attitude


Content

proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds

proposition-2 : a (nested) sequence of objects and properties

< < Ayesha , Hármashatár hill >, cycle >

< < Steve , Hármashatár hill >, cycle >



Subject


Attitude

Content

proposition-1 : a set of possible worlds

proposition-2 : a (nested) sequence of objects and properties

proposition-3 : a (nested) sequence of modes of presentations
of objects and properties




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'from 7 months on ... humans automatically
compute other's beliefs and seem to hold
them in mind as alternative representations of
the environment.'

(Kovács et al 2010: 1834)

{
Ayesha
Steve
Henry
...
}
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believes
desires
intends
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that {
Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill
s/he will cycle up Hármashatár hill
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Content

'(4) For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p.

'the holding of this norm is one of the defining features of the notion of belief [...] That [...] is what makes it the state that it is.'

(Boghossian 2003:37,38-9)

'(4) For any p: One ought to believe that p only if p.

'the holding of this norm is one of the defining features of the notion of belief [...] That [...] is what makes it the state that it is.'

(Boghossian 2003: 37, 38-9)

'Aside from our purposes in forming beliefs or in using beliefs as guides to action, there is nothing they should or shouldn't be. ... The only fault with fallacious reasoning, the only thing wrong or bad about mistaken judgements, is that, generally speaking, we don't like them. We do our best to avoid them. They do not—most of the time at least—serve our purposes'

(Dretske 2000: 247-8)

'Rational intentions should be agglomerative. If at one and the same time I rationally intend to A and rationally intend to B then it should be both possible and rational for me, at the same time, to intend to A and B.'

(Bratman 1999:220)

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