

Origins of Mind: Lecture 08

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1. A Puzzle about Pointing

‘infant pointing is best understood—on many levels and in many ways—as depending on uniquely human skills and motivations for cooperation and shared intentionality, which enable such things as joint intentions and joint attention in truly collaborative interactions with others (Bratman, 1992; Searle, 1995).’ (Tomasello et al. 2007, p. 706)

1.1. Why don’t ape’s point?

‘there is not a single reliable observation, by any scientist anywhere, of one ape pointing for another’. (Tomasello 2006, p. 507)

‘Although some apes, especially those with extensive human contact, sometimes point imperatively for humans [...],

no apes point declaratively ever.’ (Tomasello 2006, p. 510)

‘to understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more than the individual goal-directed behaviour. She needs to understand that by pointing towards a location, the other

attempts to communicate to her where a desired object is located; that the other tries to inform her about something that is relevant for her’ (Moll & Tomasello 2007, p. 6).

‘the specific behavioral form—distinctive hand shape with extended index finger—actually emerges reliably in infants as young as 3 months of age (Hannan & Fogel, 1987). [...] why do infants not learn to use the extended index finger for these social functions at 3 – 6 months of age, but only at 12 months of age?’ (Tomasello et al. 2007, p. 716)

Comprehending pointing is not just a matter of locking onto the thing pointed to; it also involves some sensitivity to context (see Liebal et al. 2009).

1.2. Pointing: referent and context

‘Already by age 14 months, then, infants interpret communication cooperatively, from a shared rather than an egocentric perspective’ (Liebal et al. 2009, p. 269).

‘The fact that infants rely on shared experience even to interpret others’ nonverbal pointing gestures suggests that this ability is not specific to language but rather reflects a more general social-cognitive, pragmatic understanding of human cooperative communication’ (Liebal et al. 2009, p. 270).

1.3. pointing vs linguistic communication

‘the most fundamental aspects of language that make it such a uniquely powerful form of human cognition and communication—joint attention, reference via perspectives, reference to absent entities, cooperative motives to help and to share, and other embodiments of shared intentionality—are already present in the humble act of infant pointing.’ (Tomasello et al. 2007, p. 719)

‘cooperative communication does not depend on language, [...] language depends on it.’ (Tomasello et al. 2007, p. 720)

‘Pointing may [...] represent a key transition, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, from nonlinguistic to linguistic forms of human communication.’ (Tomasello et al. 2007, p. 720)

2. What is a communicative action?

2.1. A Gricean view

First approximation: To communicate is to provide someone with evidence of an intention with the further intention of thereby fulfilling that intention (compare Grice 1989, chapter 14).

The confederate means something in pointing at the left box if she intends:

1. that you open the left box;
2. that you recognize that she intends (1), that you open the left box; and
3. that your recognition that she intends (1) will be among your reasons for opening the left box.

(compare Grice 1969, p. 151; Neale 1992, p. 544)

Theory of communicative action (compare Tomasello et al. 2007):

1. Producing and understanding declarative pointing gestures constitutively involves embodying (?) shared intentionality.
2. Embodying shared intentionality involves having knowledge about knowledge of your intentions about my intentions.

2.2. First alternative view

‘No speaker needs to form any express intention ... in order to mean by a word what it means in the language’ (Dummett 1986, p. 473)

‘Interpreting speech does not require making any inferences or having any beliefs about words, let alone about speaker intentions’ (Millikan 1984, p. 62)

2.3. Davidsonian view

‘meaning of whatever sort ultimately rests on intention’ (Davidson 1992, p. 298)

ulterior intentions: ‘intentions which lie as it were beyond the production of words ... [such as] the intention of being elected mayor, of amusing a child, of warning a pilot of ice on the wings’ (Davidson 1992, p. 298).

semantic intentions: intentions concerning the meaning of one’s utterance.

‘The intention to be taken to mean what one wants to be taken to mean is, it seems to me, so clearly the only aim that is common to all verbal behaviour that it is hard for me to see how anyone can deny it.’ (Davidson 1994, p. 11)

3. Words and Communicative Actions

4. Syntax: Knowledge or Core Knowledge?

‘It is of the essence of a belief [or knowledge] state that it be at the service of many distinct projects, and that its influence on any project be mediated by other beliefs.’ (Evans 1985, p. 337)

‘At the level of output, one who possesses the tacit knowledge that p is disposed to do and think some of the things which one who had

the ordinary belief that p would be inclined to do an think (given the same desires). At the level of input, one who possesses the state of tacit knowledge that p will very probably have acquired that state as the result of exposure to usage which supports or confirms ... the proposition that p, and hence in circumstances which might well induce in a rational person the ordinary belief that p.’ (Evans 1985, p. 336)

‘(It is one of the fundamental differences between human thought and the information-processing that takes place in our brains that the Generality Constraint applies to the former but not to the latter. When we attribute to the brain computations whereby it localizes the sounds we hear, we ipso facto ascribe it to representations of the speed of sound and of the distance between the ears, without any commitment to the idea that it should be able to represent the speed of light or the distance between anything else.)’ (Evans 1982, p. 104, footnote 22)

Modules ‘provide an automatic starting engine for encyclopaedic knowledge’ (Leslie 1988, p. 194)

‘The module ... automatically provides a conceptual identification of its input for central thought ... in exactly the right format for inferential processes’ (Leslie 1988, p. 193–4)

5. Action

‘by the end of the first year infants are indeed capable of taking the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987) in interpreting the goal-directed behavior of rational agents.’ (Gergely et al. 1995, p. 184)

‘12-month-old babies could identify the agent’s goal and analyze its actions causally in relation to it’ (Gergely et al. 1995, p. 190)

‘Six-month-olds and 9-month-olds showed a stronger novelty response (i.e., looked longer) on new-goal trials than on new-path trials (Woodward 1998). That is, like toddlers, young infants selectively attended to and remembered the features of the event that were relevant to the actor’s goal.’ (Woodward et al. 2001, p. 153)

‘just as the visual system works to recover the physical structure of the world by inferring properties such as 3-D shape, so too does it work to recover the causal and social structure of the world by inferring properties such as causality’ (Scholl & Tremoulet 2000, p. 299)

‘in perceiving one object as having the intention of affecting another, the infant attributes to the object [...] intentions’ (Premack 1990, p. 14)

‘by taking the intentional stance the infant can come to represent the agent’s action as intentional without actually attributing a mental representation of the future goal state’ (Gergely et al. 1995, p. 188)

‘to the extent that young infants are limited in this way, their understanding of intentions would be quite different from the mature concept of intentions’ (Woodward et al. 2001, p. 168)

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