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Philosophical Psychology: Action, Perception and Metarepresentation (MA)

University of Warwick, Autumn Term 2016–7
<s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk>

Outline

Philosophical investigation is indispensable for fully understanding many discoveries in the cognitive sciences, and for identifying new areas of investigation. Key questions include: Are any cognitive processes modular? Is a distinction such as that between implicit and explicit knowledge needed in explaining cognitive development? Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? How if it all do motor representations shape experiences of actions, one's own or others'? What is categorical perception and how is it related to phenomenology? Are there multiple systems for tracking others' actions, beliefs and other mental states? Can emotions or other mental phenomena be known by means of perceiving them? When two or more agents act together, in virtue of what can their actions have a collective goal? What is it for agents to act together cooperatively, or to be committed to do so?

Reading

1.	<i>Purposive Action: Intention and Motor Representation</i>
	Reading: Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014); Sinigaglia and Butterfill (ming)
2.	<i>Seeing Red: Do Humans Visually Experience Categorical Colour Properties?</i>
	Reading: Witzel and Gegenfurtner (2014); Webster and Kay (2012)
3.	<i>On the Motor Theory of Speech Perception</i>
	Reading: Liberman and Mattingly (1985); Galantucci et al. (2006)
4.	<i>Understanding Action: Motor Representation in Action Observation, and the Teleological Stance</i>
	Reading: Sinigaglia and Butterfill (ming, 2015)
5.	<i>Seeing Causes</i>
	Reading: Butterfill (2009); Rips (2011)
6.	<i>Do Humans Perceive Others' Feelings?</i>
	Reading: Butterfill (2015)
7.	<i>Acting Together: Collective Goals and Motor Representation</i>
	Reading: Vesper et al. (2010); Butterfill (2016) *Minimal chapter
8.	<i>Belief Ascription: Puzzles</i>
9.	<i>Belief Ascription: Solutions?</i>
10.	<i>Social Cognition in Nonhuman Animals</i>
11.	<i>Mindreading vs Mindsharing</i>

Table 1: Provisional schedule of topics

