

# Philosophical Psychology: Action, Perception and Metarepresentation (MA)

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## Outline

Philosophical investigation is indispensable for fully understanding many discoveries in the cognitive sciences, and for identifying new areas of investigation. Key questions include: Are any cognitive processes modular? Is a distinction such as that between implicit and explicit knowledge needed in explaining cognitive development? Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? How if it all do motor representations shape experiences of actions, one's own or others'? What is categorical perception and how is it related to phenomenology? Are there multiple systems for tracking others' actions, beliefs and other mental states? Can emotions or other mental phenomena be known by means of perceiving them? When two or more agents act together, in virtue of what can their actions have a collective goal? What is it for agents to act together cooperatively, or to be committed to do so?

## Reading

Adolphs, R. (2001). The neurobiology of social cognition. *Current Opinion in Neurobiology*, 11(2):231–239

Apperly, I. A. (2010). *Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind"*. Psychology Press, Hove

Apperly, I. A. and Butterfill, S. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? *Psychological Review*, 2009(116):4

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1.	<i>Purposive Action: Intention and Motor Representation</i> Reading: Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014)
2.	<i>Seeing Red: Do Humans Visually Experience Categorical Colour Properties?</i> Reading: Witzel and Gegenfurtner (2014); Webster and Kay (2012)
3.	<i>On the Motor Theory of Speech Perception</i> Reading: Liberman and Mattingly (1985); Galantucci et al. (2006)
4.	<i>Understanding Action: Motor Representation in Action Observation, and the Teleological Stance</i> Reading: Sinigaglia and Butterfill (2016, 2015)
5.	<i>Seeing Causal Interactions</i> Reading: Butterfill (2009); Rips (2011)
6.	<i>Do Humans Perceive Others' Feelings?</i> Reading: Butterfill (2015)
7.	<i>Acting Together: Collective Goals and Motor Representation</i> Reading: Vesper et al. (2010); Butterfill (2016b,a)
8.	<i>Mindreading in Humans: Systems, Models and Signature Limits</i> Reading: Butterfill and Apperly (2013); Apperly and Butterfill (2009); Carruthers (2015a)
9.	<i>Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals</i> Reading: Halina (2015); Heyes (2015); Butterfill (2016c)
10.	<i>Interaction in Radical Interpretation</i> Reading: Butterfill (2012); Davidson (1973); Dennett (1987)

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Table 1: Provisional schedule of topics

- Aviezer, H., Trope, Y., and Todorov, A. (2012). Body Cues, Not Facial Expressions, Discriminate Between Intense Positive and Negative Emotions. *Science*, 338(6111):1225–1229. PMID: 23197536
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- Butterfill, S. A. and Apperly, I. A. (2013). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. *Mind and Language*, 28(5):606–637
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- Davidson, D. ([1984] 1973). Radical interpretation. In *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pages 125–139. Oxford University Press, Oxford
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- Etcoff, N. L. and Magee, J. J. (1992). Categorical perception of facial expressions. *Cognition*, 44(3):227–40
- Heider, F. and Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behaviour. *American Journal of Psychology*, 57(2):243–59
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- Lieberman, A. M. and Mattingly, I. G. (1985). The motor theory of speech perception revised. *Cognition*, 21(1):1–36
- Low, J. and Watts, J. (2013). Attributing false-beliefs about object identity is

a signature blindspot in humans' efficient mindreading system. *Psychological Science*, 24(3):305–311

Rizzolatti, G. and Sinigaglia, C. (2008). *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions*. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., and Andrews, B. (2010). Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, 36(5):1255–1266

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Schneider, D., Slaughter, V. P., and Dux, P. E. (2014). What do we know about implicit false-belief tracking? *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, pages 1–12

Sinigaglia, C. and Butterfill, S. A. (2015). On a puzzle about relations between thought, experience and the motoric. *Synthese*, pages 1–14

Smith, J. (2010). Seeing other people. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81(3):731–748

Smith, J. (2015). The phenomenology of face-to-face mindreading. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 90(2):274–293

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