

What happens when there is shared intention?

There is an event which is intentional under some description....

Joint action widely assumed to involve shared intention.

Yet it seems plausible, at least to scientists, that there are cases of

j.a. w/o shared intention.

[Initially put by Rachier...]

Now those who argue that there

can be joint actions w/o shared

intention have so far focused on

primitive cases only, those involving each agent having potentially different goals.

There is also an apparently compelling argument to show that j.a. w/o shared intention can't be goal directed....

Petterson
Lindwig
& Chant

Joint action is standardly introduced with examples....

The usual way of thinking about joint action involves shared intention. Little

agreement about what shared intention is, but ~~which makes it hard to characterise~~ but the main features of this family of views are awareness of jointness and awareness of others' states.

This general approach has virtues & deficiencies...

New approach suggested by Loewy:

Which events have more than one agent?

- Few if any actions have more than one agent
- There is an attenuated sense in which non-actions can have multiple agents.

- This gives us a very broad notion of joint action.

Can we narrow it to cover of goal-directed j-a.?

- It seems that just here we will have to introduce shared intention. But actually there is a way....

virtues

What

Deficiencies

- Failure to agree on what constitutes shared intention; fragmentation.
- Generally presuppose rich understanding abilities; even Tolstoy
- Doesn't scale to ~~many~~ three or more agents. - agent

The usual way of thinking about these examples is to focus on shared intention....

Leading account ---

Bratman explicitly makes room for non-shared intentional Ja .

Alternative approach suggested by Ludwig.

~~I want to pursue this approach~~

This approach faces several problems but offers the prospect of providing an account of joint action which is both true to the heterogeneity of the phenomena while diagnosing of the special features of shared intentional action.

~~Standard~~ account

non-standard account

puzzle 1 ~~problem~~ non-existence
solution: broaden

puzzle 2 ~~problem~~ 2: does not allow us to
single out goal-directed joint actions

Paradigm cases of joint action.....

Challenge ~~is~~ these cases pose is not unitary.

I want to explore an approach to thinking about these cases which does not hinge on shared intention.

Ingredients of Joint Action.

Two conceptions of joint action:—

- a) shared intention defines it
- b) more than one agent.

I want to explore the prospects for the second account; it raises some puzzle, some of which can be resolved.

puzzle 1: non-existence

solⁿ: broaden to events

puzzle 2: much too broad
esp. can't isolate goal-directed causal f.c.

solⁿ: introduce collective goals

Conclⁿ... The approach of Ludwig provides to provide rigorous, ~~the~~ ^{the} foundation for ^{for} which allows us to see connections and avoid heterog.