

Joint action and knowing others' minds

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or even constituted by, social co-operation”

(Moll and Tomasello 2006: 2–3).


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(ibid.)

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“2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; you intend [likewise] ...

“3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us”

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(a) our individual goals all require for their fulfilment a single outcome

(c) we each expect the others individually to perform a goal-directed activity whose success obviously requires the outcome

(d) each of us expects this outcome to occur as a common effect of all of our goal-directed actions

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A man and a woman are seated at a restaurant table, facing each other. The woman is on the left, with long dark hair, wearing a dark top. The man is on the right, wearing a dark suit and tie, with his hands clasped. They are both looking at each other. The table is covered with a patterned cloth, and there are glasses and plates visible. The background is dimly lit, suggesting an evening setting.

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The problem of opaque means

your-goal-is-my-goal

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1. We are about to engage in some joint action or other
2. The other agent or agents are disposed to help me with what I am currently attempting to achieve.
3. What I am attempting to achieve obviously requires a certain outcome.

Therefore:

4. The others will each have goals whose fulfilment requires that this outcome occur.

first illustration

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ostensive cues

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ostensive cues



shared goals



goal ascription

second illustration

“bed”—bed

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“bed”—bed



“On the top shelf”

(Carston 2002: 130)

“it’s breakfast time and, coming into the kitchen, I see my companion searching around in the lower reaches of a cupboard; knowing his breakfast habits, I guess that he’s looking for a jar of marmalade and I utter:

“On the top shelf”

(Carston 2002: 130)

