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ROPP54
"Joint Attentional Declarative Pointing: Shared Intentionality A (Action) and Shared Intentionality R (Representation)"
Original Submission

Ulf Liszkowski (Reviewer 1)

Edit Reviewer Comments

Reviewer Recommendation Term:	Major revisions
Rate Review:	Please enter a number from 1-100
Comments to Editor:	Review Sheet: General Judgement ========== 1. It is not "unacceptable" - but as you see I think it would neither convince empirically working researchers in the field, nor philosophers of language and mind. 2. The paper should be stronger on the theoretical possibilities and conceptual analysis. I think it's better to discuss the empirical findings thereafter, in light of clear theoretical positions, rather than deriving and backing up these positions by selected empirical findings and their somewhat unclear re-interpretations.
Comments to Author:	Review: Joint Attentional Declarative Pointing: Shared Intentionality A (Action) and Shared Intentionality R (Representation) The paper addresses the evolutionary emergence of so-called declarative pointing. The idea, as far as I can see is that the driving forces for the emergence are uniquely human mind-reading skills that are absent in non-human primates, despite non-human primates' general ability to engage in shared activities (e.g., hunting). This is an explanation of the 'representational' variant, called the "Shared Intentionality (R) or SI(R) hypothesis". The paper challenges the empirically supported alternative hypothesis by Tomasello and colleagues, which holds that chimpanzees do not point because they lack the skills and motivation for shared intentionality generally (presumably entailing both "shared intentionality (A)" and "shared intentionality (R)"), while they do have general mind-reading skills for understanding others' individual intentionality (to some extent). The author's general argument is formed around two propositions: (i) Declarative pointing DOES NOT depend on 'joint attentional frames' ('common ground'), i.e. it needs not be embedded into previous ongoing activity; (ii) declarative pointing DOES depend on an understanding of mental representations, i.e. intentional relations between mind and world, or intentionality proper. In interpreting selected empirical findings, the author arrives at the conclusion that (i) non-human primates do have skills for shared activities - but these are "not required for declarative pointing" (p. 11 bottom) - and that (ii) their 'mentalistic' performance in recent social-cognitive experiments can be re-interpreted as simple action-perception matching based on mirror neuron systems - they thus lack a sufficient mentalistic understanding for declarative pointing. As a whole the paper proposes an interesting possible view, and it may have its merits in advancing the discussion of what makes human cognition unique. There is still room for improvement and clarification. I think the proposal is not well-integrated into the current discussion and empirical findings (see (1) below). It also lacks a thorough or more precise treatment of the current theory of infant pointing (Liszkowski 2005, 2006; see Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski, 2007) (see (2) below).

The reinterpretation of selected empirical findings is not always convincing - especially since it does not seem to generate testable predictions or alternative methods for alternative empirical studies and some other relevant findings are not considered (see (3) below).

1. The author does not consider that Tomasello 1999 started out assuming that the difference between human infants and apes was precisely what the author seems to arrive at, namely a social-cognitive difference in understanding others' intentionality. Tomasello et al 2005 then re-defined this view - forced by large by his own new evidence - narrowing the difference down to shared intentionality, thus now crediting apes with some understanding of others' intentionality, but not with the skills and motivations to share and cooperate (see Tomasello 2008; 2009). I think it would take the author much more convincing and a more detailed discussion of the evidence to back up the opposite claim that (i) chimpanzees do engage in shared activities (explain, e.g. what is shared really in group hunting?) and (ii) chimpanzees do not have a mentalistic understanding despite passing knowledge/ignorance; intention/accident; attention behind barriers; etc., etc. On the latter, the author may also want to consult Call & Tomasello, 2008.

The author might also want to consider Sperber's theory of human communication and its evolution (e.g., 2001) and Csibra's (2010; Csibra & Gergeley, in press).

2. The paper should focus more on the relevant theory papers of pointing than focusing exclusively on the Vygotskian Intelligence paper by Moll & Tomasello (see Liszkowski 2005, 2006 and Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski, 2007 (with comments); the latter one is not considered at all). The VI hypothesis is much broader than pointing alone, and the review parts miss out important aspects of the pointing theory that the author questions:

a) In my understanding the theory papers basically propose that pointing is underlain by a tripartite of intentionality comprised of a social intention (or motive) - why someone communicates; a referential intention - what someone communicates about; and a communicative intention - that someone communicates and that any inferences are triggered b/c of the communicative act. I think the author misconceives Liszkowski (2005) in assuming (p.12 top) that there are functionally different bases for pointing (declarative vs. informative) and the author accepts too easily a 'classic' divide between imperative and declarative pointing. Instead, the theoretical proposal is that pointing is a unified phenomenon that entails a communicative and referential intention and a social motivation (or intention) that may vary and include such things as helping (informative pointing); aligning/ sharing experience (expressive pointing); requesting help (imperative pointing) - and maybe even other motives such as interrogative pointing. Thus, even imperative pointing is 'richly' interpreted; and the so-called, classic declarative pointing is better specified in terms of its usage, i.e. the social intention/motive.

3) In that sense, the author's "Challenge 1", p.11, seems fairly unproblematic. In the single study referred to by Liebal et al., infants comprehend pointing differently depending on the pointers social intention (play puzzle vs. clean up). The social intention is recovered from the previous JA project. In the control condition, a new person points - here infants fail to recover the social intention, precisely because there was NO previous JA project. Thus, the author's conclusion that declarative pointing does not require common ground seems flawed - without recovering the social intention infants might simply understand the referential intention, but maybe not even that - they simply look in the direction of the point (attending to whatever aspect(s) of object(s) in that direction). [Note: consequently, on p. 11 end of 1st paragraph should not read "what" but "why".] Also, Liebal et al. 2010 show that infants' production of 'declarative' pointing (or, expressive pointing) is influenced by the previously shared common ground (see also Liszkowski et al., 2007a,b). Thus, these seem to be further examples of pointing being embedded in common ground.

The author's "challenge 2" is that chimps may not be able to infer the referent of pointing. This is an interesting proposal that could be elaborated. But again, I do not think this poses a deep theoretical challenge to the existing theory. In essence, the existing theory states that a referent is identified BECAUSE OF the shared project. Example: A points to bike. Question - how can B know that A refers to the bike as opposed to its color, location, brand, etc, etc. (see H. Clark, 2003)? It's because of the preceding shared interaction.

Consider that another empirical difference between chimp and human pointing regards not only its underlying motivation (i.e. only requestive pointing), but presumably also the referential usage: they do not request absent entities from mutually known locations, unlike human infants (Liszkowski et al., 2009).

Consider that the Tomasello & colleagues view on apes' mental understanding is apparently one of "the third kind" (Call & Tomasello, 2008 TiCs), i.e. apes do not seem to understand false belief (see Kaminski, J., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2008)). In this regard, I did not fully understand what the author meant by an 'objective' referent (p. 12) - certainly, in communication, the referent is intended, and so there is a conceptual difference between the thing looked at and the mental aspect of it that is referred to. I am not sure whether chimps have been credited with the latter understanding (again, see failures in false belief studies).

The author should elaborate on (i) how the mirror system hypothesis accounts for a range of findings with different methodologies; (ii) why this explanation would not hold for the results with infants in seemingly similar paradigms. The latter is especially important since one cannot credit one but not another species with certain skills based on similar experiments.

The author seems to argue that chimps are also not able to infer "unobservable causal forces" in the physical domain (p.23). I am not sure this is correct; see Call's work (e.g. 2003).

Other developmental work seems to suggest an entirely social construction of social understanding, especially in the case of pointing (see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010)

A more general remark: the paper would benefit from stating the hypothesis and theoretical stances/ implications from the beginning. At times the paper read much more like a summary of others' findings, making it sometimes a bit difficult to follow the genuinely new aspects of reinterpretation and possible empirical support for the alternative interpretation.

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Review: Joint Attentional Declarative Pointing: Shared Intentionality A (Action) and Shared Intentionality R (Representation)

The paper addresses the evolutionary emergence of so-called declarative pointing. The idea, as far as I can see is that the driving forces for the emergence are uniquely human mind-reading skills that are absent in non-human primates, despite non-human primates' general ability to engage in shared activities (e.g., hunting). This is an explanation of the 'representational' variant, called the "Shared Intentionality (R) or SI(R) hypothesis".

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ROPP54
"Joint Attentional Declarative Pointing: Shared Intentionality A (Action) and Shared Intentionality R (Representation)"
Original Submission

Fabia Franco (Reviewer 2)

Edit Reviewer Comments

Reviewer Recommendation Term:	Revisions
Rate Review:	Please enter a number from 1-100
Comments to Editor:	Review Sheet: General Judgement ========== Apologies for the delay! I think that the paper is acceptable for publication and does make a useful contribution but remains somewhat limited in scope for a theoretical paper - not particularly exciting or novel arguments, and limited empirical evidence on the developmental side. The Editors will judge on the basis of what they have in mind for this special issue whether my comments would warrant minor or more substantial revision. 1. Is the paper acceptable for publication (a) in its present form? (b) with minor revisions? Should the paper be reconsidered after major revision? Is it unacceptable for publication? 2. Please list any other general comments or specific suggestions in the separate blind comments to author's box.
Comments to Author:	Review Manuscript Number: ROPP54 Title: Joint Attentional Declarative Pointing: Shared Intentionality A (Action) and Shared Intentionality R (Representation) This article sets out to provide a review and critique of the theoretical grounding developed by Tomasello and collaborators about the main joint attentional device in human communication: the pointing gesture. Although the paper successfully analyses both comparative and developmental studies of pointing (mostly, if not exclusively, from Tomasello's lab), the author/s somewhat miss the opportunity to contextualise this work in a broader perspective, also including a comparative context extending beyond the Liepzig lab (e.g., the work of Nicky Clayton and Nathan Emery on 'joint attention' in corvids), atypical populations and some consideration of the link with adult realizations through language. And aside from the unsurprising exception of a paper from Tomasello's group again, it is surprising that that there is no other mention of a whole volume dedicated to joint attention from a jointly philosophical-psychological perspective [Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler, 2005]. Having said that, the paper provides a useful review and analysis of Tomasello's theoretical proposition and attempts to address what are described as 'explanatory shortcomings' of such proposition by separating out two types of shared intentionality: one perception-action based

(simply requiring an understanding of goal-directed behaviour: beahviour-reading) and the other representational (relying on the 'representational nature of mental states', in the author/s' words: mind-reading). This is reminiscent of classical analyses of the development of representation and it is carried out by bringing in some classical theoretical tests based on truth conditions and goodness-of-fit, such as Searle's world-to mind (declarative) vs mind-to-world (directive) direction. Since this is not very innovative, I wonder if some consideration of more recent proposals in philosophy of biology would help exploring different conceptual tools, such as the notion of Pushmi-Pullyu Representations which are both descriptive and directive at once, and would be evolutionary primitive [Millikan, 1984, 2004] as well as compatible with mirror neurons/embodied simulation accounts.

It is indeed in the domain of mirror neurons that the author/s find a solution to the dilemma posed by the puzzling comparative results interpretable in terms of intentionality-R abilities in apes. They propose that such results may be explained, rather than by intentionality-R, by embodied simulation via mirror neurons (anticipation of food-directed intentional actions by a conspecific) and need not to invoke more sophisticated intentionality-R abilities in apes.

Having resolved the representational dilemma, the author/s develop a 'shared intentionality-R hypothesis', speculating a first evolutionary transition in which cooperative individuals would have been selected over competitive ones, linked with modifications in the original primate mirror neuron system (e.g., allowing for mirroring of intransitive responses, non-object directed). This would have been followed by a second transition in which 'proper' intentionality-R would have emerged, in which "joint-attentional actions would have been cognitively dissociated from the actions themselves" [p. 22]. Considering that the author/s at this point fall short of providing an evolutionary hypothesis (or a developmental mechanism in infancy), I would have expected something more than a few lines to speculate what this dissociation would entail. Although the author/s' account appears to move in the direction of embodied cognition approaches, no consideration is given to potentially theoretically useful radical proposals in the embodied cognition/joint action literature [e.g. Di Paolo and colleagues: De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010].

Specifically on pointing, the author/s suggest that informative pointing belongs to the first stage and declarative pointing to the second (intentionality-R) stage. If we look at development in human infants, the evidence is not unanimously in the same direction. Liszowski et al. [2004, 2006] showed that 12-14 month old babies point 'to inform', for example when pointing to the keys that an adult had accidentally dropped and appeared to be looking for - the location of the keys being unknown to the adult, infant pointing was interpreted as being 'informative'. However, one might argue that the keys were still somewhat attached to the adult's actions, or had still some action-value. Differently, Franco and Gagliano [2001] found 18-month-old and older toddlers increasing significantly the frequency of pointing when the adult could not see (due to a visual barrier) a dynamic event that the toddlers could see, with respect to when they were watching together. In this case too infant pointing was interpreted as being 'informative' in the barrier condition (infant passing information about an event that the adult was not aware of). The difference between the two scenarios is that in the second one the infant mean to pass information, while in the first the infant responds to the adult's quest and ends up passing on information about the current location of the keys. If I understand the author/s line correctly, they would interpret the first as 'informative' and the second pointing as 'declarative'. However, some authors have argued for a crucial distinction regarding the type of information passed on; for instance, Halliday [1975] considered as truly informational only exchanges in which a toddler would pass new information, so altering the state of knowledge of the addressee. Consistent with this criterion, the informative pragmatic function appeared last developmentally in Halliday's data, supporting the view that exchanges in which a toddler would say 'ball' or point to a ball behind a screen would be more advanced than exchanges in which both adult and baby were visually sharing a ball and the baby would say 'ball' or point to the ball for the adult. Indeed infants of 12 months would point for an age-mate to share interest in a novel event that they visually share - hence 'declaratively' [Franco et al 2009]. The differentiation between 'informative' and 'declarative' thus needs further clarification - pointing being ubiquitous and semantically under-specified, it may support the singling-out of a referent as much as the predication of qualities, locations and all kinds of subjective meaning relationships between the gesture originator and the referent (and the addressee).

The paper as its stands has stirred up and realigned arguments and evidence in a promising direction but would need to clarify some of the issues raised above in order to generate genuine progress in the field. The author/s should also highlight how their theoretical proposal differs with respect to Povinelli's Reinterpretation Hypothesis. In conclusion, the article is suitable for the Review of Philosophy & Psychology and is likely to make a very useful

	contribution to this special issue providing the author/s can meet my comments.

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ROPP54
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Original Submission

Naomi Eilan (Reviewer 3)
Edit Reviewer Comments

Reviewer Recommendation Term:	Reject
Rate Review:	Please enter a number from 1-100
Comments to Editor:	Review Sheet: General Judgement ========== 1. Is the paper acceptable for publication (a) in its present form? (b) with minor revisions? Should the paper be reconsidered after major revision? Is it unacceptable for publication? 2. Please list any other general comments or specific suggestions in the separate blind comments to author's box.
Comments to Author:	There are many interesting ideas here, and potentially an interesting alternative to Tomasello, but at this stage neither seem to be clearly enough formulated for it to be obvious what the alternative is. I hope some of the question below help. P.5, bottom/p.6: Relation between joint attention and declarative pointing: you say JA is necessary for declarative pointing but not for imperative pointing. Do you mean 'understanding of JA' is necessary for using and understanding declarative pointing? (As you yourself note, pointing is often done in order to initiate JA, so the latter can't be necessary for the former). Pp 6/7: it would help immensely if you defined declarative pointing at this stage, independently of appeal to JA, distinguished it clearly from proto-declarative pointing, and from imperative and proto-imperative pointing (see Bates et al for the original attempt). This would also help in explaining the difference between declarative and informative pointing, mentioned later in the paper (p. 11), which was not clear, to me at least. It is true that JA and pointing are very close in Tomasello's case, because he defines JA by appeal to the possession and understanding of communicative intentions. But this is precisely this communication-theoretic ingredient in his account that many have objected to in his account (partly because of the sophistication it requires). Different types of objection to this account can be found in Moore and Dunham, who discuss very lean interpretations of JA, and in Eilan et al. The latter in particular is relevant to your concerns, because though rich in one sense, they discuss options that are less demanding the than communication-theoretic approach adopted by Tomasello.; see papers by Eilan, Franco, Roessler and Hobson. p. 12 ff: I'm not sure I understand the way the issues are set up here, and how exactly the idea of 'referent' is being used. Technically, a referent is that which is referred to in the context of a proposition, either in structured thought or in speech. Depending on your theory,

seeing either does or does not have a referent. If you think that seeing involves representing an entity as having such and such characteristics, then seeing does have a referent, and understanding the concept of seeing requires having an understanding of representation. But on other, more plausible accounts, seeing is a two-term relation between perceiver and object. There is an object of perception, but not a referent.(Correlatively, 'intentionality' is usually reserved for use about states with propositional structure. But there is a kind of directedness in seeing or attending, which is akin to it--it might help to distinguish the two).

So when asking whether apes have the concepts of perception we need to distinguish which notion we are using. Ascribing to them a notion of seeing when what we mean just is the two term relation, is much less demanding and more plausible than ascribing to them grasp of representation--which involves, as you say, grasp of the distinction between truth and falsity and so forth. The same holds for human infants.

In the case of joint attention, surely the concept of attention required by infant or animals is a two-term one? In which case the appeal to grasp of intentional/propositional structure is irrelevant?

P.18 ff. Tomasello himself adopts a simulation account of what is involved in infants first appreciating the concepts of 'attention'--which he links to their grasp of action concepts (he thinks of attention as a kind of activity). I'm not sure why this is relevant to the account one subsequently gives of what it is to engage in joint attention.

P.21: Too little time is spent on explaining your own proposal. There is certainly a tradition in the JA literature that regards JA as the context in which grasp of the very idea of an objective world and truth emerges (Katz et al. see paper by Franco) above. On these accounts, grasp of intentionality, in your sense, begins to get going in this context. But as far as I understand your proposal, grasp of intentionality is required for so much as taking part in it in the first place. So JA can have no explanatory role. Is that the right interpretation?

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