

Review of manuscript number ROPP96: Shared emotions and joint action

The author's main aim is to support and enrich a minimal account of joint action, by pointing out a variety of ways in which shared emotions can facilitate joint action, without requiring that the participants have knowledge of a complex interconnected structure of common intentions, or possess sophisticated concepts (such as 'obligation' and 'entitlement').

The paper is well-written and interesting, and I believe that with a few revisions it would be a valuable addition to the special issue of the *RPP*.

In what follows I specify places in which there seem to me to be room for further clarification and sharpening.

1. As things are presented in the paper, it is unclear whether the aim of the paper is merely the very modest suggestion that shared emotions happen to be one among other factors that can facilitate joint actions, and could have been, in principle, replaced by other factors; the less modest view that at least some of their contribution allows for certain types of (minimal) joint actions (or for certain aspects of them) which other factors, on their own, can't account for; or the more ambitious claim that some contributions of joint emotions are necessary for minimal joint action (and if so, whether this is taken to be merely a contingent fact or whether it has a deeper basis). It would be good to make explicit, at least in the concluding section, what the author's view (or hunch) regarding this issue is.

2. Top of p.3 'Hence, an account that avoids such complexity is desirable.' It would be helpful if the author clarified in the paragraph that ends with this sentence exactly what his/her position with regard to Bratman's account is. That is, whether s/he accepts that some such account is correct for the more sophisticated joint actions, and the minimal account is only required for the less sophisticated cases, or whether s/he takes the failure to account for the unsophisticated cases to have a more serious implication for Bratman's and similar accounts. (The comments made in the concluding section about the relation between the sophisticated account and the minimal one are also not sufficiently clear enough about this.)

3. In the first full paragraph on p. 3 (the closing paragraph of §2) the author mentions briefly that minimalist accounts 'also seek to redress another limitation of classical accounts, namely, that they ignore the problem of accounting for the actual, online performance of joint actions, which demands that individuals predict, monitor and adjust to each others' movements.' Here, again, it would be helpful to hear a bit more about the way the author views this limitation: whether it is merely a detail that needs filling out, or a more serious problem.

As I point out in (7) below there is room for clarifying whether any of the examples used in §5 are meant to demonstrate the contributions of shared emotions to such a project. And in any case, it would be good to mention this point again in the paper's conclusion, and say explicitly how the discussion in the paper bears on it.

4. The paragraph on pp.3-4 is difficult to follow: it is unclear how the sentences are supposed to be related to each other, and there is also room for more clarity about how this paragraph related to what came before and after it. (A general description of the minimal architecture, should help with the latter).

5. I'm not sure how exactly the minimal criteria for shared action, suggested on p. 5, should be construed. First, it is unclear what exactly is meant by 'expression of emotions': does any emotion which can be detected by another person (consciously or non-consciously) qualify (a possibility suggested by parts of the discussion that follows)? If not, what distinguishes expression of emotions? Secondly, in the formulation of condition (ii), is talk about the effects that a the perception of an expression of an emotion has meant to be read as referring to the possible effects perceptions *can* have? Or is it required that the emotion actually have a coordinating effect on the relevant interaction. Thirdly, it would be good to clarify whether the author is merely offering conditions that capture the range of phenomena which seem to him/her to play a role in enabling joint action, and takes it to be reasonable to label them 'shared emotions' (while allowing that there might be reasons to count other phenomena as shared emotions); or whether s/he wishes to commit themselves to something stronger than this.

5. p.5 conditions (iib) and (iic) – what is the reason for talking about an 'isomorphic affective state' (rather than an affective state of the same type, or something similar), and what exactly does isomorphism in this case involve?

6. Labelling the first type (iia) '*expressed* emotions' is somewhat confusing, since according to conditions (i) expression of the emotions is required in all four cases. If I understand correctly, this type is supposed to involve *awareness* of the emotion's expression. If so, a label which makes this clear might be more helpful.

7. The example in the second paragraph on p.7 is somewhat confusing. At first it is suggested that the relevant expression of the emotion and its effect need not involve intention and awareness of the participants. However, at the end of the paragraph it is suggested that there's room for talking here about a justified expectation, and for criticising the participant who expressed their emotion for doing something misleading. This doesn't seem in place when only lower level expressions and effects are involved.

The author returns to this case in the paragraph on pp.7-8, and again it isn't clear what the status of the example is. Some formulations suggest that the author merely wishes to draw the reader's attention to an effect of emotions which we can recognize by reflections on our own case, and suggests that the same pattern can occur in the interaction between unsophisticated creatures (?) and thus are relevant to a minimalist account. Other formulations suggest that the author is also interested in the way these effects of emotion contribute to sophisticated interactions. There's a need to be clearer about what point is made when, and exactly how it is argued for or explained, etc. In fact, the need to be clearer in this respect applies to all the subsections of §5.

Typos

p. 3, 4 lines up from the bottom of the last full paragraph on the page: 'enables interaction partners', should be 'interacting partners', I think.

p. 5, first line of the third paragraph, 'share emotions' should be 'shared'.

p.5 bottom of the page (iib) 'y enter' should be 'y to enter'

p.10, 5 line from bottom 'accepts' is typo. Should be 'aspects'?

p.11, penultimate line of §5. 'Does rapport facilitate or mutual...', delete 'or'. (this last sentence is somewhat confusing. Given the previous question and attempt at predication, it is natural to expect the last question too to be followed by a predication.)