Ludwigs

based on Nijmegen 'JA & Knowing Others' Min's

[Insert after on p3 of Nijmegen witer, right after say that will df ja who shared intrution:]

Earlier I said that a joint action is an event with two or more agents. (This of is from Kirkludwig) And I gave an example where Nova and Olive each fire a shot, and each of their shots this fred Neither is individually fatal but they are deadly together.

Fred's killing counts ar a joint action by Ang Ludwig's definition just because it is an event with two agents.

H doosn't matter that

Now you might object that var definition is much too broad. That's because, on my Definition it doesn't matter what Nova and Otive were intending. It doesn't matter Perhaps neith of them intended to kill Fred. Their event of their killing fred would still count ar a joint action on my Definition.

Or suppose that Ohive and Nova did rukend to kill fred each individually. But also that their actions were entirely uncoordinated and that neither even know of the Stur. Still, there freds killing would count as

a joint action in Ludwige sense.

This seems wrong. After all, you wouldn't normally think of Resorm Dogs as the bestanill ushation of joint action.

New Outhine:

1) McM talk

2) but how do yought from mcm to fall Om?

3) It proposed by Tu-ull++Nla

4) but this makes no serve on standard news of J.o.

5) Alt view of jea.

6) Knowing other Minds

Now this reems to show that the Ludwig's definition is much too broad. For it eaf nother of the cases of ja that are important in development or in philosophy involve a goal-directed point actions.

That is, they are cases where the event taken as a whole is directed to some goal, and this or not push, a matter of each agent's actions being individually directed to that goal.

So, minimally, what we need for to capture the sort of

Ja that we find in development, is to introduce

goal-directedness. And you might reasonably

suppose This is exactly why it is temphing to
appeal to shared intention.

One of the functions of shared nuturn is $\rightarrow p3$

(an Mink of mindreading:

intentional relations (what some is interested in)

props attitudes (see behive)

FOR INTRO (state or)

Juan-labs Gomez rargued that interactions are essential for the emergence, in development or evolution; if understanding intentional relations, between agents and objects—in their view, to be able to think about which objects a third person is interested in .— that ability has it roots in cases where you and another person jointy engage with an object, where , in a sense, you share interest in the object.

We might summarise this view by saying that insights into intentional relations has its rosts in social interactions.

I don't know wheter that is true and, for present purposes I'm not planning to counters or defend their view.

I mention it because it provides a model for what I want to 20, Thosis. which concerns more sophisticallal cases of numbreading — is the emergence of there also fostered by social interaction? NAS/MITIMA suggest to taken as indicating that it might be.

precisely to link two or more agents' actions, considered as a whole, to some a goal

[Insert stide from Leipzis? with the arrow connecting action to ontrone via shared intention.]

This, then, is the challenge.

I want to characterize ja who presupposing more than minimal mindreading cognition.

This means, I think, that I cannot appeal to thared intention.

I have to find a way of explaining how an event involving two or more agents could be related to a goal without appealing to anything like shared intention.

To meet the challenge I first want to step back and consider ordinary, individual activity or a moment. - [continue as NIMELEN.]