

Joint action without Shared Intention

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
'Ayesha and Beatrice between them lifted the heavy block'

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
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Shared intentions minimally require:



- Awareness of not acting individually
- Awareness of others as intentional agents
- Awareness of others' intentions













Shared Task Representations





Shared Task Representations

(1) If a green ring appears, press the right button

(2) If a red ring appears, press the right button

(Sebanz et al 2003)



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


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


Shared Task Representations

(1) If a green ring appears, press the right button

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role of Agent1

*If a finger
pointing left
appears, press
the left button*

role of Agent2

*If a green ring
appears, press
the right button*

*task
representations*

role of Agent2

*If a green ring
appears, press
the right button*



*action
plan*

role of Agent1

*If a finger
pointing left
appears, press
the left button*



*action
plan*

*task
representations*

*action
initiation*

role of Agent2

*If a green ring
appears, press
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role of Agent1

*If a finger
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*action
plan*



*left
button
press*

*task
representations*

*action
initiation*

action

role of Agent2

*If a green ring
appears, press
the right button*



*action
plan*



*[no
action]*

*my task is to
press the
right button*

role of Agent1

*If a finger
pointing left
appears, press
the left button*



*action
plan*



*left
button
press*

*task
representations*

*action
initiation*

*inhibition by
knowledge*

action

role of Agent2

*If a green ring
appears, press
the right button*



*action
plan*



*[no
action]*

*my task is to
press the
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role of Agent1

*If a finger
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*action
plan*




*left
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*task
representations*

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*inhibition by
knowledge*

action



Shared Task Representations



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-
- (1) the events include purposive actions done by more than one agent; and
 - (2) some observers (or participants) can usefully construe the events as if they constituted a single purposive action performed by only one agent.