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Interacting mindreaders can discover more than  
~~The intentional stance~~ mere observers.

~~I want to focus~~

The intentional stance: theorising aims to explain the grounds on which attitudes and goals are ascribed; the principles and assumptions which are needed to justify patterns of ascription. There is no (direct) commitment on whether anyone knows or believes these principles.

These issues of justification are distinct from questions about how in practice ascriptions are made. Much discussion about whether mechanisms of ascription involve theorising or some kind of simulation has occurred. But none of this is relevant (at least not in any direct way) to our present concerns. This is why the intentional

My aim is to show that ~~the intentional~~ stance is often characterised as about how someone could (not does) find out what another thinks (Davidson, Polish?)

In most discussions, the intentional stance is considered from the point of view of observers. The idea is to understand how an observer ~~can~~ <sup>could</sup> identify the goals of ~~another~~ <sup>another</sup> agent's actions, ~~or~~ by observing them, or to identify ~~the~~ what she believes, desires, knows and intends. Sometimes philosophers have ~~criticised~~ objected to this idea: it is wrong to think that mere observation could, ~~provide~~ even in principle, provide knowledge of this sort (eg. deal on R. I.?).

~~The problem with such an~~ But such critics have rarely offered a competing account with anything approaching the clarity of Davidson's or Dennett's account.

I want to suggest that ~~abilities to engage in joint action~~ interaction enables one to know things which one could not know by observation alone. So I do agree with the critics that it is a mistake for a theorist of the intentional stance to suppose that observation alone provides the evidential basis for interpretation.

Interacting mindreaders can make use of routes to knowledge which are not available to mindreaders who merely observe. But in arguing for this claim I do

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not aim to make a radical departure from earlier theories of what makes mindreading possible.

What I offer is an elaboration of those earlier theories: my criticism is not that they are fundamentally misguided, just that they do not tell the whole story about mindreading. Since what I propose is an elaboration, let us first review the current state of theories of what makes mindreading possible.

### 1. Mindreading : evidence base is purely observation

- Non-linguistic, non-communicative
- rationality
- charity
- efficiency (C+G)
- teleology (function ascription)

NB : Since Davidson focuses on cases involving communication, which is arguably an interaction, there is doubt about whether his theory does neglect interaction. So what I should say is that interaction has been neglected for the kind of mindreading that does not involve communication by language. (And even here Asch + G's Pedagogy might be thought to create issues.) And I should explain why it is worth focussing on this case — infants, chimps & scrub jays appear to have relatively rich non-abilities.

This ~~suggests~~ raises the possibility that much adult human mindreading may depend for its justification on principles and facts which do not involve linguistic facts. In any case, it seems a useful exercise to examine whether any such non-linguistic evidence base can support how much mindreading.

(The challenge is to get as much as possible from a restricted evidence base, ~~showing the possibility~~ in order to show that it is pble. in principle that <sup>much</sup> human mindreading does not depend on linguistic evidence).

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## 2. In principle limits of mindreading

- opaque means  
(comm; tool use)

- false beliefs

2 1/2 Expand evidence base: & j.a. = Bratman sk; Buttfell or the simple acct will do

## 3. Your-goal-is-my-goal

- a route to knowledge

## 4. Applications

- understanding more tools

(get person interested; signal j.a. ....)

- understanding comm

(fruitful misunderstanding)

The claim is not that this is how mindreading works.

What we have shown is just that it is possible in principle to solve these problems of using this evidence.

NB On the kind of non-linguistic mindreading.

Should also justify interest here by saying that it's important to build up gradually.

Eg identifying goals of an action  
provides information about  
intentions of an agent

Not that intentions can be read off goals; rather the assignment of goals constrains the assignment of intentions. Bottom up constraint matter given the constant threat of indeterminacy.

(Indeterminacy: not all bad, but spce ~~there~~ & predicts

~~is~~ more indeterminacy than there is evidence for - spce  
So appear able to determine attitude from finch that  
& predict. They should be able to. But at times  
suggested that the & mis: it shows there is less

determinacy than there appears to be. But it ~~is~~ appears  
that this conclusion depends on Ontosp having (i)  
adequately characterised evidence base and (ii) fully  
exploited it. The <sup>fact that a ci entails</sup> ~~existence of~~ unexpected indeterminacy is

evidence that either (i) or (ii) is false; ~~so need to be wary of~~  
it is not evidence of indeterminacy.)

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## 5. Significance

(sig. of communicative part).

The comm part helps us ~~with~~ to reconcile two apparently conflicting claims

1. understanding comm: acts requires rich mindreading
2. rich mindreading is a consequence of comm abilities

The suggestion is that ygging enables one to <sup>(mis)</sup> understand some relational (non-propositional) types of comm: and so breaks into the circle these claims threaten to make. (Whether this actually happened in evo or in dev is a different issue: point for now is just that we can make the claims logically consistent, so there is an empirical go: worth asking. (Mapping the space of possible theories.)