Intention and Motor Representation in Joint Action

The motor system is at interested in large units of action but only in passing objects & relatively short-lived things. Status of large units as j.a. can't be secured in this way

Event w. multiple agents.

But this looks too permissive.

Think about the single agent case.
What gives unity is common intention.

Well, not just: also common motor plan (reaching for a biscuit)

Is it only intention that binds actions of an individual? No: Vetterman's cake reaching: multiple movements are bound together, but not by an intention. Must be motor intention that binds them together (There is a desire, but this isn't coordinating + doesn't bind actions together).

reach, grasp, to mouth...

m.c. represents distributive goal & ensures coordination in a way that normally facilitates collective success.

cf.

individual case

What's important is that there's rep^{n} of outcome & plan of activities;

Diff is just that in joint case the planning includes others' activities.

It really might have been like felicic action to restrict attn to the individual case.

But if now we have something much too narrow.

- fine for passing, lifting
- no good for larger structures, eg pushing handles in sequence to make a dog puppet sing since presumably motor cog doesn't care about this outcome. Interestingly there is something that binds the activities together. Maybe the intention is to do a joint action + goal as separate components.

Many characterise j.a. as nec involving shared intention.

1. This is surprising because few think that actions nec involve intention (Bratman's creature construction illustrates this — unless by 'intention' we mean merely 'strongest desire', of course) & even intentional actions might not involve intention.

(Actually Vellemans Grab a-cookie discussion & Mele & Moser analysis do assume intentional action involves intention.)

2. This is awkward because the notion of shared intention is hard to get to grips with

3. It means that the intentions can't have joint actions as their objects (grounding)

Can we characterise j.a. without shared intention.

Ludwig thinks we can

But: Davidsonian obj.

2nd obj ---

Objection:

j.a. as social motor cognition

(a) doesn't distinguish walking contrast case (both j.a., but not as walking together)

(b) doesn't distinguish dance / shelter example (neither j.a., or example could be set up in that way)

But actually it's not plausible to think these ppl do nec. have shared / we-intention — spose some are merely doing what they're told?

Do we need to think of j.a. in terms of motor representation?

* Searle's dance case shows sometimes objects of shared intention involve no social motor cognition.
* So it isn't that existence of j.a. depends on social motor cognition
* claim is rather this: there are j.a. whose jointness is impossible to characterise w/o social motor rep^n to characterise
* Parallel roles for m.r + intention just different scales; (and intention ultimately depends on m.r. in many ordinary cases.)

[NEED TO PRESENT IT AS: THIS IS HOW FAR I'VE GOT. HELP!]



Is it that I want to compare shared intention + social motor cognition?

- yes; the parallels justify recognizing that each can underwrite an intuitively recognizable sense in which an event can (a) be an action & (b) ~~be~~ involve 2+ agents.

binding

Binding events into actions without intentions.

Shake the tree three times to get fruit. Each time is unpleasant. <3 times = no reward.

3 Shakes could comprise a single action

Intention is not needed

What binds these events together?

Desire + coordination (sequencing) of the shakes.

What ensures coordination? Dynamic rel^n to body/tree?