

(P.1)

What's the Q?

Standard view

① Joint action involves a distinctive ingredient.

-vs-

Mc: there is a kind of joint action that involves no distinctive ingredient; it is merely action.

② Individual action is goal related by intentions only

-vs-

Mc: there are two kinds of state which ground the directedness of actions to outcomes: $mr + intentions$.

③ This generates an interface problem
Might be solved by experience of action + demonstrative reference

④ What goes for the individual case goes for the joint case as well

But how is the interface problem solved here?

9.2

Is there a role for motor cognition in explaining what joint action is?

Distinctive philosophical puzzle about joint action?

Contrast cases

coordinated but
merely parallel (can be cooperative,
more or less helpful)
WALKING - STRANGER

ANTS &
BEES

coordinated,
collective but
not driven by
reasons ???

Coordinated, 'together'
~~reasons for my doing~~
~~it include your doing~~

They intentionally ϕ

What are the phenomena to be contrasted?

Research project: no distinctive ingredients.

~~Pulling~~

Can an action have two or more agents?

~~Action~~

Spse we take social motor cognition seriously.

This might tell us a lot about how j.a. is pble.

Does it also tell us something about what ja. is?

I want to suggest that it does....

(P.3) If I was going to take joint action as a philosopher,
I wouldn't start from here J.4. is regarded as exotic,
~~It is a very intuitive idea~~ JA involves shared intention.

In ordinary thinking about action

~~many people are~~ there is no obvious

distinction between actions w. one agent &

actions with many agents.... But this is not how phil of action proceeds....

(TAKE 2) Philosophy of ~~collective~~ action — no such thing

↑
working hypothesis

How can we cash it out?

Action with multiple agents?

Objection based on bodily movement

Revision:

0. Motor cognition: is it pre-reflective?

1. How to distinguish motor from non-motor?
motor imagination vs. ^{cognitive} action imagination.

multiple agents.

Single agent cases, we end up with adding
exotic ingredients in order to explain
the idea that actions can have

what action is that is based on ~~multiple~~

If we start with a theory of
or more agents.
Then attempts to explain cases involving two

action starts with the individual case and
One way of thinking about cognition and

Exoticism about joint action: (see p.3).

~~I want to argue that~~ we should avoid
exoticism as far as pble ~~because it~~
~~distorts in favour of~~ because non-exotic
themes are more general & simpler overall

I want to argue that we can avoid exoticism,
but that doing so requires us to recognize a
~~that joint action cannot be char~~
distinctive role for motor cognition in saying what j.a.
is. It's a familiar idea that social motor
~~rep~~ is an enabling condition for j.a.;
my suggestion is ~~that we also have to~~ ~~that we~~
~~treat it as~~ constitutive role for it in an act. of
what j.a. is. (And the same goes for
action generally, of course.)

If you characterise j.a. as ~~entirely~~
neutral wrt agency, it's not
surprising that you get on the
cases of all the complexity that
entails for saying what shared
intentions is.

But if you build the agency joint into
the thing wrt ~~one~~ which one has an
intention, shared intention has much less
work to do.

(5)

Our work

We want an acct. of joint action
w/ distinctive ingredients.

First try: an action w. multiple agents

Obj: — too narrow

Reply: event w. multiple agents

Obj: — too broad

Just here must note
that issue also
arises for actions of
an individual agent

Reply: need goal directed joint action

Problem: just here it looks like we
must appeal to shared intention

Reply: social motor cognition will do —
represents your task and mine in
functionally equivalent way

~~Obj: This doesn't enable us to
distinguish walking in parallel from
walking together (or responding
in parallel from responding together)
(If you, we are each doing the task
vs
We are doing the task together)
ie: we have coordination but not jointness~~

eg the two professors' letters of reference
(Need better eg.)

Natural to assume that unity of action
derives from a single rep: of the outcome
driving all of the component actions.
But this need not be the case.

Eg: forgetful person who knows multiple
attempts are needed (break
down a wall). So what if this involves
several intentions?

eg passing an object from
one hand to another

hands of 2 agents vs hands of 1 agent:
same motor planning.

motor rep: of the
outcome (transfer of obj: from
x to y) and of each
agent's part st. parts are
executed in coordinated way

Obj: This doesn't enable us to understand
 how, eg, painting a house could
 be a joint action } or going to N.Y.
 or dancing

Reph Maybe: That really does require shared intention

Obj:

Event is a joint action ←

— it comprises two or more agents' actions

& each agent has a motor repⁿ of
 the outcome & this repⁿ ensures
 that the agents' actions are
 coordinated with each other.

See p. 5 — 'forgetful person' eg.

I worry that this could be fatal,
 that the only thing uniting actions
 into larger action in individual case is
 the fact that they're the consequence of
 a single intention (and where there is
 no intention there's no unity)

— But there is unity at a smaller

scale.