# The Cognitive Psychology of Joint Action

**Guenther Knoblich** 

**Stephen Butterfill** 


**Elisabeth Pacherie** 

**Natalie Sebanz** 



joint Which events are actions?


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
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
=<sub>df</sub> 'social motor representation'

How could social motor representation facilitate any joint action?


#### Move it from there to here





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



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











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




















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We have a shared intention that we J if

- "1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
- "2.I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] ...
- "3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us"
  (Bratman 1993: View 4)





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question: Which events are joint actions?

challenge:
How could social motor representation and shared intention harmoniously contribute to joint action?

premise:
Some joint actions are facilitated by reciprocal, agent-neutral motor representations of outcomes whose obtaining would normally involve action on the part of each agent

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
Reciprocal agent-neutral motor representation enables some joint actions

"Simulation of another person's action, as reflected in the activation of motor cortices, gets stronger the more the other is perceived as an interaction partner."

--- Kourtis, Sebanz & Knoblich (2010, p. 4)

premise:

Reciprocal agent-neutral motor representation enables some joint actions



Kourtis, Sebanz & Knoblich (2010)

premise: Reciprocal agent-neutral motor representation enables some joint actions EEG partner object loner EEG


self

Kourtis, Sebanz & Knoblich (2010)

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
(a)




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



Kourtis et al., subm.







# Joint Planning Kourtis et al., subm.






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



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
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


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
The idea was to start with the most direct question (instead of events, about the relation of directedness.)


























#### \*\*\*CUT


Following can be used to explain idea about motor representation and ordinary, individual intention (not essential?)



























## joint Which events are Lactions?




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