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Developing Mind: Chapters

Pull out & synthesize the philosophical assumptions in different areas
philosophical content.

Each chapter takes a single domain & illustrates general themes. (Not supposed to occur in order: just thoughts)

1. Number - acquisition of new primitive concepts; Fodor's argument for nativism & how to avoid it by non-representational connection:

2. Colour - development is multi-layered; persistence into adulthood; complex role of language. Relates to issues of how we experience colours. Jackson's Mary has the word 'red' then walks out and - blam! - she understands what it is. Things are not so straightforward for ordinary children...

3. Mindreading - How to understand the discrepancy (eg the diff. bet. dependence on CF reasoning & on EP.) Simple forms of mindreading - emotion.

7. Objects & physical principles - pro notions of modularity or core knowledge; problems with these notions; possibility of an experiential explanation (mid-level object perception)

~~5. Causation - are there core concepts that not linked to any particular domain?~~

~~5. Imitation + learning - social pedagogy - Meltzoff, natural pedagogy - social What to say here? Meltzoff imitation; maybe something on tools? Gaze following? Tool use (what?) Philosophical relevance?~~

6. Agency - motor awareness - teleological stance interpretation of goals.

5. The Social Baby - imitation (Meltzoff, Reekers); gaze following; emotion recognition; learning about speech + words; ~~tool use (?)~~; pointing? What's the msg? What's the philosophical issue?

7. Words - see earlier notes

stand alone

stand alone


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Developing Mind: Chapt. Plan.

What's the question? Why start here?

~~Modularity~~
~~Experience~~
~~Mindreading~~

1. Social Interaction: early forms of coordination — sync; gaze following; pointing; helping. Adult-child much earlier than peer to peer collaboration (Brownell commentary on Tomasello 2005 BB3)



Quine

First words — or behaviours involving words — and then reference to objects, etc. (Ontology comes later).

Phil Issues

Modularity — objects
Nativism (new primitive concepts) — numbers
Mindreading — mindreading
Joint Action — words / shared intentionality
What is experienced? — Mischel etc.
Motor awareness — action, speech

(Perceptual awareness)

First Chapter

1. The Social Baby. Consider the hypothesis that social interaction is an enabler of cognitive development. This hypothesis immediately raises a qst: if we think of social interaction as joint action & joint action as shared intention.... In general, how could social interaction be a driver of dev. rather than a consequence? Have to start simple (as always)... imitation, gaze following, agency and goals, emotion recognition, learning about words (statistics, word-object associations) and speech (cp of speech). A package of social skills.

- But two q^{sts}:
- how could infants have these skills
 - : gaze-following presuppose OBJECT
 - : goals presuppose ACTIONS

- and how could these skills jointly enable development.

- : part of the answer might be that they enable language, comes by (Toomallo). But in itself this is unsatisfying. Can't be that adults simply tell children things — ~~were~~ that would only work if they could already know but were simply missing some of the facts.

Alt: I will suggest that ~~that~~ words can f^{ct} as tools (exploit structural features, or meaning only indirectly)

- ([?] words as number series
- ([?] sentences as used to measure mental states.

first problem: isn't social interaction too demanding to be a driver of development?

mention primary & secondary intersubjectivity

emphasise 'shared intentionality'

Simple forms of social interaction
imitation, gaze following
secondary intersubjectivity

Also social skills: agency & goals
emotion recognition
words — learning associations
segmenting speech

Second problem:
even simple skills presuppose some stuff!

Third problem:
how ~~can~~ could the social skills play a role in enabling development?

words can function as tools.

2. Objects and their physical behaviours

- object permanence discrepancy (from intro)
 - also appears for causal principles (barrier stop balls)
 - resolution attempted w. modularity or core knowledge
 - this is problematic (or not a full solution)
 - will return later after considering number & colour
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3. Number

- infant competences & failures
- signature limits: adults, other species
- object-tracking, accumulators
- not just modularity have ideas of rep: format & mechanisms too
- and this clarifies gaps between early (modular) & late knowledge. But this leaves us w. a problem: how if at all does the early, modular rep: lead to the late, conceptual rep:?