


Intention and Motor Representation in Action Explanation


s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk corrado.sinigaglia@unimi.it
































Villiger et al (2010).
























25






Information about outcomes guides planning.

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


Information about outcomes guides planning.



Information about outcomes guides planning.

Move it from there to here




Information about outcomes guides planning.


Move it from there to here get it position it move it hand-1 reach arrive release grasp move release place reach grasp move


Information about outcomes guides planning.

Some motor representations represent outcomes

Move it from there to here








motor representation = intention? No!

< different content >














e.g. rapid identification of key landmarks; slow translation into compass directions




Rapid identification of direction of start from end (projection-dependent)


imagine actually seeing seeing











Any two intentions can be inferentially integrated in practical reasoning.

My intention that I visit Lyon on Friday is a propositional attitude.

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The Interface Problem: How are non-accidental matches possible?

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iii. differ in format from intentions.

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
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
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



Follow that route












(Zhang and Rosenbaum 2007)



x start here