(1) ESPP 2012

Argument 1

1. ∀ Success on FB requires (i) comparing perspectives & (ii) counterfactual reasoning

2. Infants can pass FB tasks from around 7 mnths or earlier

Thf

3. Ifants can (i) compare perspectives & (ii) engage in counterfactual reasoning from around 7 mnths or earlier

But: (a) could apply same argument to evidence of relative clauses; (b) look at infant FB tasks: there seems to be no reason to spse they require these abilities to pass them — or that any subject would require this?

Argument 2

1. The tasks that Infants can pass FB do not involve (i) --- or (ii) ---

2. Reasoning about mental states as such does involve (i) --- , (iii) ---

Thf

3. Infants are not reasoning about mental states as such ~~merely tracking associations~~

Against this argument:—
(a) variety in task infants can do, involving communication; (b) failure of alternative accounts of what else infants might be doing if not reasoning about mental states. PLUS

(c) Maybe we should question premise (2)...

(d) Not obvious why standard FB task should involve reasoning about mental states — why spse that this task can't also be solved in the infant way?

ESPP 2012

Argument 2

2. The FB tasks that infant cannot pass involve <u>extraneous</u> task demands

Tgt

1 Reasoning about mental states does <u>not</u> involve (i).... or (iii).....

3. Infants can reason about mental states.

In favour of (A) : think about a photograph or a map. It's one thing to be able to <u>use</u> it — eg I send you my photo & you met me at the stn ; and another thing to be able to contrast the photo understands that — because of ageing — there may be a contrast between how the photo represent re & how I actually am now.

Argument #1½ (after Arg 1? 1½)

Implicit - explicit

Modelled on flood - where the ball .

pointing studies?

helping studies &

BUT

(Also older children's failure on non-verbal false belief tasks).

Might be right but it's not straightforward

& doesn't fit the model of the cases very simply

Intro.

What's exciting about Eva + Matti's work? Isolate components of On recognition & study them in non-social contexts.

what is my contribution? To suggest that this research raises some theoretical or even philosophical qts.

Argument 2

v.2 : extraneous task demands...

v.1 : implicit / explicit

Argument 1

reject this?

(= Eros mom)

1. Infants can [false beliefs] represent

2. ... belief involves ---

3. Infants cannot ---

On rejecting (2)
= extraneous task demands
v.1 = implicit/explicit
v.2

see Argument 1½

— distinguish imagining a situation from comparing & contrasting that situation w. reality

Can we say that the early tasks involve selecting or adopting a perspective whereas the later tasks involve comparing perspectives? On this view its not about what you represent but what you're able to do with the representation
(process of acquisition).

I think this is a very important distinction (analogous to using maps & understanding projection relations), but it seems that meany FB tasks that require adopting perspective only ... young children fail ie: they don't rep. compare ys helpful... her.

and presumably that are contradicted & accurate? v. perspectives

In what follows I want to explain why disagreement about the nature of belief matters for understanding what understanding is, which cog. processes underpin it & how it develops.

but p.f. it makes predictions that are contradicted by existing evidence,

I don't think we should rule this line of arg out,

Or, we talk readily about represents belief + ... but what whom of belief is reported to ... in ... their debate about what belief is. But

But wait a minute. Doesn't Mattias'
work suggest that comparing perspects <u>is</u>
a component of representing false belief ?

Yes, but then the mystery is why
two things line up :

- infants can't do it
- it requires

- those tasks

Yes, but this doesn't seem to be
linked specifically to processes of
to specific
assuming belief or deriving consequences

The difficulty is to spare that standard FB tasks
require company Y's belief & his belief whereas
early FB tasks do not require this comparison ⟶ Think especially of pointing & helping

I want to sketch &, tentatively, an

alternative way of resolving the antinomy

Debate about nature of belief in philosophy

1. What kind of rep⁼ contexts do
    beliefs have

    — prop⁼   (Russ)

    — prop⁼   (Fregean)

    — map-like

2. What kinds of norms characterize
    beliefs?

3. tacit beliefs

    vs. judgements / opinions
                                ? how to
                                characterize

Measuring beliefs ———

There are more and less sophisticated
measurement schemes.

Using a propositional scheme gives you
power but requires appreciating perspective
differences.

Using a relational scheme gives you
less power but doesn't require confronting
perspective differences.

→ PROBLEM: simple relational counted
of belief is adequate for success on
standard FB tasks

Not sure I want to present 2 sys: maybe
should just argue — reply for failure of
old approaches? But then it a bit the
boring at the end just do quick 2-sys
manifest

But wait a minute. Should we accept
this characterization of belief?   CRIT.

The difficulty of dealing with this approach
contradiction in any straightforward way motivate
what I take to be a last resort...

2 systems.

Briefly, the idea is that :-

• there are fast & efficient syst — inflexible

• there are flexible syst — demanding becauss
req. perspectival difference

NEED: good counter to the claim that
there are extraneous task demands.
(ie reject (1) in the most paradox).

Reply: think about standard characterization
of what belief is ....

Plus: if there were extraneous task
demands then why do so many variations
show pattern — odd that they feature
across, eg: i) prediction + retrodiction
ii) verbal + non-verbal
iii) 1st ↑ 3rd person   (s matter vr. std FB)
iv) interaction + observation
(accept)
..... &c.

Early tasks tap into the former, late
tasks tap into the latter.

(Consider why Fabrant).

do this
2nd →
Leads in
to Q:
"what is belief?"

do
this 1st →

These claims are inconsistent ...

§3. Reasoning about false belief
requires (i) comparing perspectives
& (ii) counterfactual reasoning's eental component
(minimal differences)

1. Infants can pass false belief tasks
from around 7-months or earlier

§3. Infants cannot [(i) compute minimal
Differences and (ii) compare perspectives]

§2. Passing false belief tasks involves
reasoning about false beliefs.

Eva rejects this claim
(Argument 2)

'Argument 1'

Let's start with

What is an action?

I wonder if difficulties understanding
joint action stem from a failure to
think carefully enough about action.

① Difficulties with the standard story

②