Embark on a Journey: Threat Modeling with MITRE ATT&CK Framework

By: Brad Voris



"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the **result** of a hundred battles." – Sun Tzu



Brad Voris, (a whole bunch of acronyms)

- Lead InfoSec Architect @ Walmart Global Tech
- 25 years of experience IT/IS/CS
- Undergrad in Cybersecurity @ Wilmington University
- Certifications: CISSP, CISM, CCSP, CCSK, Network+, MTA, MCP, etc.
- Co-Author 2 books: Intrusion Detection Guide and Essentials of Cybersecurity for Peerlyst
- Cloud Security Alliance Zero Trust Training Contributor
- NOT AN EXPERT





MITRE ATT&CK: Lets make it simple

- Understand Threat Modeling
- Understand the Components of ATT&CK
- Select a Campaign, Industry, Threat Actor, etc.
- Create Your Model
- ROCK IT!





Threat modeling with ATT&CK

 A process for improving security by identifying vulnerabilities and threats based on known attack vectors of threat actors


Links you will need

- https://attack.mitre.org/
- https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/
- https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/
- https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/

Additional Training

https://attack.mitre.org/resources/learn-more-about-attack/training/


Could This Be Anymore Overwhelming?



Framework Components




New Tab For uh new tabs...




Matrix Control Plane Makes it "PRETTY"

TTPs: Threats, Tactics, Procedures

well maybe not pretty...




Attack
Tactics
The "WHY"




Attack
Techniques
The
"HOWS"


Select Your Model Context

 We will select a couple campaigns that focus on petroleum industry because this is HOUSTON. Here's how:





Quick Search (Yes I know I can use "Search") Ctrl-f is so much better...



Campaigns/Threat Actors Selected

Home > Campaigns > Night Dragon

Night Dragon

Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China [1]

Home > Campaigns > C0021

C0021

ID: CC institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Versi Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity. [1][2]

ID: C0021

First Seen: November 2018 [2][1] Last Seen: November 2018 [2][1]

Version: 1.0

Created: 15 March 2023 Last Modified: 05 April 2023

tors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications. [2]

Version Permalink

ATT&CK® Navigator Layers ▼

Techniques Used

Domain	ID		Name
Enterprise	T1583	.004	Acquire Infrastructure: Se
Enterprise	T1071	.001	Application Layer Protocol Protocols

Operation Dust Storm

Home > Campaigns > Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.^[1]

Last

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.^[1]

ID: C0016

First Seen: January 2010 [1]

Last Seen: February 2016 [1]

Version: 1.1

Created: 29 September 2022 Last Modified: 11 April 2024

s registered domains for use in C2.[2]

Version Permalink


ATT&CK® Navigator Layers

Techniques Used

Domain	ID		Name	Use
Enterprise	T1583	.001	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure. ^[1]



Download the Campaign Data for Each











Version Permalink






Import the Campaign Data for Each









Uploaded layer version (4.4) is out of date. Please update to v4.5 for optimal compatibility.

Hey MITRE: CHANGELOG Error with no context...

Once Campaign Data is Imported











Create a New Layer From Other Layers








Select Enterprise ATT&CK MITRE ATT&CK v15






A+B+C no this isn't Pythagorean or ABC conjecture... I promise....








Comprehensive threat model of scenarios based on known campaigns of threat actors targeting the Petroleum Industries... VERY EASY...to see, not to say.



But Brad You *Charismatic Gentleman*, Do I Have to Do This *Every Time*? **No**...







This Can Be Exported to the Following Formats:

- JSON
- Excel
- SVG



Ok I Have The Data Now What?

- This is how you Embark on a Journey....
- Build scenarios to test and validate for your assets security posture
- Determine gaps in security controls
- Integrate this function into design of security controls
- Train your team
- Impress your friends!





Questions? Come up front and see me!



Thanks for connecting with me!

- https://linktr.ee/bradvoris
- https://www.linkedin.com/in/brad-voris/
- https://github.com/bvoris
- https://x.com/HMInfoSecViking

