

305 Lecture 47 - Truth in Modal Logic

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Plan

- To talk about what a model for a modal logic is.

Associated Reading

- Boxes and Diamonds, section 3.3 and 3.4.

We start with Leibniz's idea that necessity is truth in all possible worlds.

- Leibniz was interested in metaphysical necessity, so we'll have to qualify this a little, but it's a good idea.
- So instead of saying that each proposition simply has a truth value, we'll say that there are many **worlds**, and at each world each proposition has a truth value.
- But don't assume that propositions have the same truth value at each world.
- In one world I might be standing, and in another world I might be sitting.

What Are Worlds

We are well and truly not going to get into the metaphysics of worlds here.

- Indeed, they need not even be anything like possible worlds in the sense that metaphysicians usually care about.
- They might, for instance, be different times.
- All we care about is that they are things at which propositions can be true or false.

A valuation function tells us which worlds atomic sentences are true at.

- These can be completely arbitrary; we don't put any restrictions on them.

We want more generally a function that tells us whether a sentence is true at a particular world.

- For sentences built up using \wedge , \vee , \rightarrow , \neg , this is relatively easy.
- We just keep on using truth tables.
- So if at world w , A is true and B is false, then $A \wedge B$ is false and $A \vee B$ is true.

We also need values for these sentences:

- $\Box A$
- $\Diamond A$

It turns out these are more complicated - but not much more complicated.

The last part of our model is an **accessibility** relation between worlds.

- Again, this can be completely arbitrary.
- We don't yet put any restrictions on it.
- Notably, we don't assume that it is **reflexive**, **symmetric** or **transitive**

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A lot of relations we care about have one or more of these properties, but not all do. Consider, for example, **admires** as an example of a relation with none of them.

A sentence $\Box A$ is true at a world x just in case the following condition is met:

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A sentence $\Diamond A$ is true at a world x just in case the following condition is met:

- For some world y such that xRy , A is true at world y .

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We get back the Leibnizian idea that necessity is truth in all possible worlds if we assume the accessibility relation is the universal relation, i.e., xRy for all x, y .

Metaphysical Necessity

On this model, iterated modalities are rather uninteresting. These three sentences are true in the same worlds/models.

1. $\Box A$
2. $\Box \Box A$
3. $\Diamond \Box A$

That's because if $\Box A$ is true at any world, then it is true at all worlds. In the general case, where we do not assume that R is universal, these are not equivalent.

For Next Time

We'll talk about the relationship between boxes and diamonds.